

RESTRICTED

**FUNCTIONS  
OF THE  
5<sup>TH</sup> ARMY COMBAT  
PROPAGANDA TEAM**

**P. W. B.**

*HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH*

*APO 464 U.S. ARMY*

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY  
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5 April 1944.

Subject: COMBAT PROPAGANDA


To: ALL CONCERNED

1. Combat Propaganda is a comparatively new weapon of war and, as such, it has had little precedent to follow. Moreover, propaganda is an intangible weapon. It cannot be weighed or measured; nor can its results be evaluated with any considerable degree of precision.

2. But that it can be effective has now been established by actual field experience. The excerpts are taken from field reports in the Italian campaign and are part of that experience. They display nothing spectacular and do not provide a basis for pretentious claims; hence they should create no false illusions.

3. But they do show that properly used, propaganda does weaken the enemy's morale; does make him give up more easily; does cause him to fire fewer bullets at our troops; and on occasions, does persuade him to cross the lines and quit the fight altogether. This report, in brief, seems to indicate that propaganda helps to shorten the war and to save Allied lives.

4. That is why the Fifth Army will continue to use it.



MARK W. CLARK,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. A.*  
*Commanding*



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# CHAPTER I

## Shell Leaflets and the Combat Team

Propaganda leaflets lobbed in shell into the enemy's lines are the most precisely tactical of all kinds of psychological warfare. They can carry a message the way the postman does, to the doorstep. They can be addressed to individual enemy units or other groups. They can deal with special emergencies or conditions in special small sectors of an engagement. And they can be delivered hot.

You can't hit a man with a shell unless he is in range. Shells in war are fired on the battle field. That is why the people producing shell leaflets are part of a psychological warfare combat team. Shell leaflets are a field weapon. You have to be in the field to shoot them. The particular knowledge you need is on the spot. The thing you want to do is at hand. The target is just up the road or over the hill, "in contact."

So it is obvious that the work is very military. It is the Army which shoots the guns. Its psychological warfare branch is one of its tools for defeating enemies.

The PWB 5th Army Combat Team is the official propaganda branch of the 5th Army. It is attached to 5th Army Headquarters and functions under that authority. Its shell leaflets are fired by Headquarters order, passing down through regular artillery channels. Its Commanding Officer is a member of the 5th Army Staff.

The particular grist for 5th Army Combat Team tactical propaganda is naturally found in the combat, that is, through its own operations on the spot with 5th Army resources.

Stemming from Staff level, the Team's contacts with all such resources are official and regular. They are maintained for all PWB purposes with Army, Corps and Divisional G-2s, with PROs, with Army and Divisional P/W interrogators, and Army, Corps, and Divisional Artillery (especially the Artillery 8-2s, in the case of shell leaflet operations.) The Team has access to all appropriate reports, intelligence and others. Its own Intelligence and other information are fed back into the Army hopper.

These contacts are maintained by the Team's liaison officers. At the highest level, the Team's CO is responsible for obtaining and processing data on forthcoming operations and other Staff plans. Thus coordination is complete.

## CHAPTER II

### Purpose of Shell Leaflets

The basic purpose of a shell leaflet is to start an enemy soldier talking to himself.

To worry, disillusion, dishearten enemy troops is to make them worse fighters than they would otherwise be, or to make them captives. Parallel with this is the job of convincing them that they will be better off as prisoners than as they are, and that, in the long run, once the war is over and they are back home again in Germany at peace, they will not have lost face for what happened.

In the PWB 5th Army Combat Team, it has been found that enemy soldiers are influenced by leaflets.

*Giving guidance on how to surrender; "Passes," etc.*

Emphasis is placed on giving the enemy soldier reasons for letting himself be captured. "Willing captures" are more common than flat desertions. To desert outright requires a kind of courage or conviction which does not always exist alongside defeatism. But when a man, consciously or otherwise, wants to quit, there are various ways of justifying it. He gets lost on patrol or in retreat. He can't run fast enough. He walks away in the fog or rain. He goes into a house and finds everybody gone when he comes out. So he gets captured.

Such rationalizations help a man give up. A leaflet which has this effect is a success. So is a leaflet which jostles the die-hard Nazi into fighting with reservations. It is as useful a piece of psychological warfare to shake the confidence of a fanatical, brass-bound, death-enamored SS Korporal as to draw a bomb-happy Uebermensch from Bavaria or Innsbruck cringing across the lines.

In this connection, it is well to bear in mind the obstacles which prevent an enemy soldier from deserting or becoming a "willing captive." The hardest thing to break down is conviction. Even if a zealous Nazi digests and believes hard facts, he is unlikely to have the mental clarity to draw the right conclusions from them. Part of this is a continuing belief in ultimate victory—the "miracle," the "secret weapon," the God-endowed intuition of the Fuehrer—no matter how discouraging things may look at the moment.

Other deterrents to surrender or desertion, roughly in the order of their importance, are: Lack of initiative; fear of getting caught by his



own side: fear of getting home long after the war is over; fear of his own, or our mines; fear of getting shot by us; and, recently, fear of reprisals against families. Prisoner interrogation now shows that German troops on this front are being roundly threatened by their officers in this respect.

*Containing news and facts otherwise unavailable. (\*)*

\* *P/W Interrogation.* A lance corporal, 94 Inf. Div., captured Jan. 19, 1944, stated that the only news his troops were getting from the outside was in shell leaflets. A corporal, 71 Werfer Reg., captured Jan. 22, 1944, stated that the leaflets were picked up and read and left "a very demoralizing atmosphere." 46% of 320 prisoners polled Jan. 13 replied affirmatively to the question, "Do you believe that statements in those leaflets correspond to the facts?" A P/W from the 132 Inf. Reg. said, Jan. 16, that we do not use enough leaflets, that there is a big demand for them.

*Reinforcing ideas and suspicions already existent. (+)*

+ *P/W Interrogation.* A corporal, 71 PGR, captured Dec. 28, 1943, had read a leaflet two weeks previously, said he agreed with its contents but had followed orders to destroy it. A P/W, 132 Inf. Reg.: "Leaflets nourish the idea of desertion." A P/W Interrogation Report on 46 *Volksdeutsche*, Jan. 30, 1944, stated: "In the prisoners' companies, the Nazis reject everything as 'lies and propaganda.' But doubters and defeatists use the material in their arguments: 'You can see for yourself what it is like here.' . . . 'Why do we have to withdraw? Because we have no more air force or artillery' . . . 'America can produce undisturbed. We cannot attack her—the Führer himself has said so.'"

*Reducing esprit de corps. (§)*

§ *P/W Interrogation.* A private, captured Jan. 4, 1944. "Though officers still publicly say Germany will win, the men, especially the Austrians, laugh among themselves at such statements and do not really believe them". . . . From Intelligence Summary, 5th Div., Feb. 19, 1944: Two German soldiers of the 274 Reg. were punished for reading and passing *Frontpost* around. The punishment was 21 days extra duty, fatigues during day, fetching rations during first part of night, followed by patrols to Minturno station. They deserted. . . . The increased fracturing of confidence on group lines is displayed by the statement of a German officer-prisoner interrogated Oct. 21, 1943: "The distribution of your leaflets is good. But it would not be, except for the Poles and Czechs who disseminate them perfectly."

*Changing inertia into action in our favor. (\*\*)*

\*\* A corporal, 361 Reg., depressed by the loss of a brother in Russia, by bomb damage to his home in Germany, and by heavy shelling, found four leaflets in the field. The corporal: "I read your leaflets and they gave me the conviction that there is no point to going on." (He seemed to have had no plan of *action* before reading the leaflets.)

*Stimulating hope of survival. (++)*

++ *P/W Interrogation.* Consensus of 46 P/Ws: They felt better when they read the assurance that the Allies keep strictly to the provisions of the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners. Their hatred of the enemy is decreased by facts pointing to the Allies' humanity. The very possession of a leaflet gives a sense of security, as it can be used as a sign of surrender.

## CHAPTER III

### Raw Material for Shell Leaflets

The days news is just about the most important ingredient out of which combat team propaganda can be made. Enemy front-line troops crave news as eagerly as do other people deprived of it, for instance, the inhabitants of Nazi-occupied Europe. *Frontpost*—which is not produced by the 5th Army Combat Team but is distributed by it by shell—is rated at the top of the list of effective leaflets.

The main source of news for the 5th Army Team is its own mobile radio intercept equipment. This is housed in a 6-ton, 2-wheel, semi-trailer van drawn by a 5-ton tractor. The van's power is derived from a mobile generator. The van's equipment, insofar as its news and propaganda interception is concerned, includes short and long-wave receivers, and recording and transcription apparatus. High-speed Morse operators are responsible for taking United Nations and other Morse newcasts, and monitors for receiving not only enemy propaganda and news but BBC and other friendly voice emissions.

By these means, the news is laid in hot and fresh, and with a continuity which is not broken as it may be by less reliable or regular communications.

Essential raw material is likewise fed to the 5th Army Team in special information from PWB and OWI base organizations. Thence also are received the general directives and over-all propaganda campaign planning to which Combat Team operation is keyed.

In the field, essential sources of tactical leaflet material are the regular output of Army Headquarters operations and intelligence reports. G-2 channels are exploited fully. Responsibility for the flow of this intelligence and information lies with the Combat Team's liaison officers, from corps down through line units. The identity of opposing units, with their records, history, recent experiences and current predicaments—exceptionally useful for shell leaflets—are obtainable through G-2.

Paralleling all these sources, and of the utmost importance, is the material derived by Team officers through interrogation of prisoners.

## CHAPTER IV

### Prisoner Interrogation

The prisoner being questioned was about two weeks behind his comrades in reaching the Prisoner of War Enclosure. He had had an urgent appointment with a medical man on account of a foreign body in his left arm.

In his comparative isolation, he had had time to draw certain conclusions about what had happened to him, and had not been affected by contact with other prisoners.

At the time of his interview, he had had a bath and shave, his clothes were fresh, he had eaten a good lunch and was smoking an American cigaret. He seemed to take a great deal of satisfaction in owning a box of matches and was assiduous in attending to the lighting needs of his interviewer. He was being addressed as "Sie" and was obviously quite willing to talk.

Willi Gunther (wrong name), 37 years old, was a Westphalian skilled worker, married, and the father of two children. Because of his occupation, in a metal works near Halle, he had been exempt from military service when the war broke out. His seems to have been a fairly good life, and he a decent sort. His wife worked in a dairy—hence, plenty of milk for the children. Their home was warm. Clothes were, of course, a problem, but not more so than anybody else's.

There were many Russian prisoners, skilled workers and others, in Willi's factory. Willi couldn't himself to take the official Nazi view of them. They looked to him like average working people, good people, not barbarians or sub-men. Willi brought them extra food now and then. He liked them. They liked him.

Military exemption ended for Willi, however, in March, 1943. A comb-out at the factory caught him. He said his Russian friends cried when he went away. Last February he found himself opposing the Allies at the Anzio beachhead.

It was bad there. His command had pushed Willi's company up to within 50 meters of the enemy, a place where no heavy machine gun company should be, much too close. He was there a month without relief. It was miserably cold. The fox holes were shallow. Even when it wasn't raining (it rained most of the time) they were like muddy pools. Food came irregularly, and was bad. Willi was thoroughly disgusted. Worried,

too. This wasn't the way soldiers of the Wehrmacht should be treated. Something was wrong.

Willi had begun to think about deserting, under those atrocious conditions, he said. But he had put the thought away because he was expecting home-leave almost immediately.

On March 15 the Allies laid down a barrage behind Willi's post. Then they moved in. By that time Willi had been hit by the shell fragment. He was one of only three living men left out of the 30 originally in his group.

Willi's morale was obviously at zero. He was fed up, full of grievances. His month of wintry, dangerous and semi-starved drenching, climaxed by the blow of the shell, hung over his mind and spirit. He had done his best and his army had not done its best by him. It had not treated him as he had a right to be treated, he, a heavy machine gun man, who could still be fighting — or home on leave — if his unit had been correctly handled. . . .

Could Germany win? *Dass glaub' ich nicht.* Would the National Socialist regime survive the war? Certainly not. What could supplant it? Willi's brown eyes wrinkled at the effort to answer. At this point, for the first time, he looked loutish. . . . Answer: I don't know. Question: Do you foresee a people's government coming out of the war, a government which the people would own and run? Same business as before. Willi didn't know.

Two veins existed in this interrogation, as in others—the immediate, tactical vein and the background or strategic vein. Not much pay-dirt in either, to be sure. But Willis report of conditions in his company was corroborative, of other reports, and had its place when properly sifted and with all allowances and discounts made. The interesting fact about his long-range answers was that this man, a skilled worker of middle years, who had had access to trade union ideas before Hitler's rise, who had even belonged to a workers' sports organization—almost certainly of "Red" origin in those pro-Nazi times—had been so mentally brutalized by Nazism that he seemed incapable of imagining a regime based on democratic principles, or indeed, any regime in Germany other than that which he admitted was doomed.

Prisoner interrogation in general has the two aims suggested above: to learn reactions of specific units and military facts about them; to learn background or "ideological" facts and currents.

The PWB 5th Army Combat Team has interviewed prisoners within minutes of capture and through intermediate periods up to weeks later. The effect of prison camp (the "building up of a new morale") presents no insurmountable obstacle to the experienced interviewer. But "on-the-spot" interrogation is preferable.

Establishing "rapport" with a prisoner on political questions is easier than on military, because there is nothing in the former category which the prisoner is not fairly willing to disclose.

It is important in most cases to put a prisoner at ease. He is asked to sit, and addressed in the "Sie" form. A cigaret offered at the beginning of the talk is too patently like a bribe to help. A good way to get the conversation started is to ask the prisoner how he happened to get caught. It releases a pent-up story which pours forth without effort. Establishing "rapport" should never degenerate into wheedling or coaxing. On the other hand, brow-beating and intimidation defeat all purposes. Bad morale grows worse. So does natural antagonism.

Arguing on political grounds is fruitless. The interrogator wants to know, not to convert, a prisoner. There are better ways of developing his thoughts. Questions should be asked to make him continue talking and not change the normal tone of the answer. In reports of interrogations, on the political side, an honest distinction must be made between spontaneous opinions and propositions conceded. Propositions "accepted without protest" by a P/W are nearly useless.

"Delicate" questions, such as the name of a superior officer, are postponed until the questioner has established good "rapport." If such a fact is needed, the question should wait until the end of the interview. Then the question can get "tough," if necessary.

Asking personal data which can be found in the camp files wastes time and increases the prisoner's suspicion that he is talking "for the record." Never ask personal data at the beginning of an interview.

Taking notes need not interfere with the success of an interview. However, breaking into an easy narrative with copious notes is likely to dry up the flow. Better stop taking notes, develop the point, and then pause to write everything down.

One doesn't learn a prisoner's morale by asking. One learn indirectly, by inquiring about the war, about food, clothing, the Luftwaffen furloughs,

mail, relations with officers, opinion about the particular front or sector, opinions about the enemy, about the "Volksdeutsche," etc.

The word "Nazi" for National Socialist is never used. But note it if a P/W employs it himself. Questioning a man on whether or not he belongs to the Nazi Party is not very useful. Soldiers are more likely to have been in the Hitler Jugend and thus could be in perfect sympathy with the Party, though not members. Other answers, too, may be ambiguous.

Inquiry about post-war plans are likely to bring out opinions about Germany's chances of winning more naturally than the direct question.

In general, efforts to impress a P/W by revealing the questioner's intimate knowledge of the P/W's own unit are not helpful, as a rule, but occasionally confronting a P/W with statements made by others of his unit is a good check or stimulus.

It is important to understand soldier lingo. If the interrogator can speak German soldier language, much strain vanishes.\*

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\* A few developments of post-Hitler German army lingo are listed here, from the 5th Army Combat Team's experience. This glossary is incomplete and must be supplemented in practice.

Im Einsatz—at the front, in the front line.

Kompaniechef—company commander.

Kompaniefuehrer—temporary company commander.

Zugfuehrer—platoon leader; but *Battalionskommandeur*, *Regimentskommandeur*.

Ari or Arie—colloq. for Artillery.

Granatwerfer—mortar.

Nebelwerfer—heavy mortar.

Kompaniegefechtsstand—Company CP.

Z. B. V.—zur besonderen Verwendung, miscellaneous combat units.

G. V. H.—garnisons-verwendungsfachig.

Heimat—limited service.

K. V.—1 A

U. K.—4 F

Krad—motor cycle.

LKW—truck, lorry.

Sani—first aid.

ROB—officer candidate.

VB—advanced artillery observer.

Spiess—top-kick.

Tross—rear echelon.

Oberleutnants are not addressed as we would do, "Lieutenant," full title is given.

Say "die Deutsche Luftwaffe," for "the Luftwaffe."

vom Marschbattalion abgestellt—assigned to unit from casual battalion.

OKW, OKH, LMG, HMG, HKL are always used instead of full words.

In analyzing the morale of an enemy unit through questioning prisoners, the way they were taken will effect conclusions. Deserters are poor informants on unit morale, though they are gold mines in other matters. Interrogators have been led by the first flurry of desertions from enemy divisions newly arrived in front of our troops to believe that those divisions themselves were in a general state of bad morale. Nothing could be more deceptive.

The fact has been discovered that practically every enemy division will contain a certain number of men bent on surrender or desertion. These men grasp the first chance to come over when their unit reaches the line.

Where this expectable flurry of desertions is useful is in providing quick material for "greeting leaflets." The men will be full of information for such treatment.

But in seeking to evaluate the morale of a new division, the sample should include a properly weighted body of evidence taken from men authentically captured, not deserters.

The 5th Army Combat Propaganda Team conducts a monthly P/W poll, this being a series of questions on paper with spaces for prisoners to mark their answers and comments. The poll is anonymous but the prisoner is asked to furnish rank and unit. A sealed ballot box is at hand in which the prisoners deposit their papers. The P/Ws are set to answering the poll in batches of 50 under conditions which assure them of their own security and which also prevent collaboration.

The poll's purpose is three-fold. It enables us to follow trends, such as the month-by-month alteration in belief in the "secret weapon." It provides a check on spot interrogations and, by its size (about 300 prisoners a month), dilutes individual differences of opinion to the point where morale factors common to the enemy on this front in any one period are made fairly obvious. And it brings to light important new fields of inquiry by interrogation. (One such interesting field was the different expectations, in the minds of the enemy, as to treatment of prisoners by British and Americans.)

Note that answers are not taken to mean sincere opinions. What they can show, by the alterations in answers from month to month, is variations in the morale level.

## CHAPTER V

### Leaflet Writing

In the experience of producing tactical leaflets for use in shells, some points have been found to stand out. (These are points beyond such generalities as writing-for-the-customer, avoiding dullness in statistics or layout, use of color, etc., and other matters thoroughly familiar to the experienced newspaper man or copy-writer.)

We have learned, partly from the effect of German leaflets on our own troops, partly from other evidence, that hostile, condescending or sarcastic leaflets—no matter how much fun to write—defeat their own purpose. Where strength of expression, attitude and message breaks over into bragging, swaggering and vituperation is where a leaflet stops delivering.

In a war among soldiers, recognition of the enemy's soldierly qualities, credit for bravery, soldier-to-soldier talk (where these matters are pertinent and justifiable) are like butter on bread—they make it swallow easier.

Half the truth believed is better than the whole truth disbelieved. Certain things we take for granted, the German finds incredible. He is apparently incapable of grasping that U. S. production figures ("five ships a day," etc.) are not pure Yankee bluff. The report that eggs items on the breakfast menu of German prisoners was the joke of the Hermann Goering Division. The Germans could not believe that 3000 vessels were engaged in the Sicily landings. It is not profitable in practice to bring up matters that meet German resistance head-on. Measured, toned-down, understated versions of these facts, versions carved to the mental capacity of the imagination-blunted, conceit-blinded German Landser, have greater effect.

Reiteration of the prisoner-treatment theme has been very successful. Practically every 5th Army shell leaflet carries a passage on it. The repeated assurance that prisoners are sure of a square deal and will see their families again leaves its mark. It may influence some to desert. For others, it induces surrender in combat or lagging in retreat, lessened resistance or no resistance at all. The statements should be sober and conservative. The more modest the claim, the more credible.

A most important lesson learned by the 5th Army Team has been to be very sparing in telling the German soldier to desert. Where he is a



"willing captive," he will have devised ingenious alibis for himself. The leaflet writer helps these alibis along instead of baldly imputing a desire to give up—which implies cowardice and only creates antagonism. Save face for the enemy—"If you are in a hopeless position. . . ." "In the face of heavy odds, you have the following choice. . . ." We describe how German patrols ran into the hands of the enemy, how units were surrounded, how the odds were too great for human beings to face. . . .

Leaflets don't have to be in academic German but it is important that they should not sound foreign. The use of soldier language and conventional German army terms helps create a link. But watch closely for slips. A leaflet which can be ridiculed mercilessly by German officers can undo much good work.

German troops believe that families of prisoners whose names are announced in anti-Axis propaganda have been made to suffer. This is a deterrent to their giving up. Even the use of initials in quoting P/W statements, diaries and similar documents, causes uneasiness. You lose little or nothing by omission of such attributions. You may, indeed, gain when blank lines and blank spaces instead of names make it obvious to the German that you are deliberately pursuing a policy of omission in order to protect him and his folks. He can expect similar protection if he should find himself a prisoner—and one fewer obstacles remain to his deliberately becoming one.

*The Safe Conduct.* With "willing capture" rather than desertion being generally emphasized, the *Passierschein*, device is for special occasions only. Where there is nothing but a pious wish that he should fold up, he will sneer at it and much good will be nullified.

Where enemy units are trapped or have their backs to the wall, or where a heavy offensive is in progress, Safe Conducts can be highly efficacious. They should be ready for such occasions at advance ammunition dumps. If the passes look official, they are the more effective.

*Special Appeals.* Special messages to Poles, Czechs, Alsations, even Austrians, are open to question except where unit targets consist predominantly of such elements. In many cases, potential desertion of such "Volksdeutsche" troops is actually hampered, not helped, by them. This is because they alienate German elements to the point of rousing special suspicions and therefore increased vigilance.

The 5th Army Team has found it advisable to discount deserters stories. ("The regiment is full of Poles. They are just waiting to come over, but they are afraid they'll be sent to Russia . . .") Deserters exaggerate unconsciously to justify their own desertions.

*The Special Situation Leaflet.* Mention of German units in line, with authentic details about officers, losses, regimental history and gossip can be effective. Such leaflets, written for special occasions, must, however, be absolutely accurate.

*Factual News.* A general conclusion which seems justified is that the anticipation of events is not profitable. News items such as, "The Russians are approaching the Polish border," cut ground from under a future leaflet announcing the arrival itself.

## CHAPTER VI

### A Shell Leaflet Operation

A large scale attack of the 10th Corps of the 5th Army in mid-January, 1944, took it well across the Garigliano. Early that month a PWB 5th Army Combat Team liaison officer was sent for by the Corps Commander who revealed the plan of the operation and requested a series of shell leaflets to accompany it. Since the attack was to be made with very heavy artillery concentrations, the leaflet project was worked out by the Team's planners in conjunction with the I.O.R.A.

Four leaflets were prepared and a fifth was projected. This last one was to be derived from interrogation of prisoners at Corps P/W cages during the attack and from the most up-to-the-minute intelligence. Actually, the attack went so well and so quickly that there was no need for the fifth pamphlet and it was never written.

The leaflets used were entitled (1) Serious Business, (2) Artillery Warning, (3) Where Is the Luftwaffe? and Safe-Conduct Pass. 1 and 2 were planned for firing at the earliest on D plus 1 and were distributed to two Divisions. No. 3 was to be fired during or immediately after air bombardments. The same two Divisions and a third were ordered to fire these shells. The Safe Conduct passes were to be fired on D plus 1 and D plus 2, depending on conditions, and this was done.

It was ordered that the leaflet shells should be concentrated on enemy forward troops and not fired into rear areas.

Detailed preparations were made to prevent confusion in the actual shelling. To ensure that the right shells would be fired at the right time, pamphlets were not mixed, and one regiment in each Division concerned was made responsible solely for one leaflet. The day and hour when shells would be available for collection at a specified artillery dump were set forth in orders. Special label tags were printed, giving the name of the leaflet, and attached to each box of shells inside and out.

Results of this leaflet operation were notably good. The dissemination by the artillery was wide. Nearly all prisoners taken were found to be carrying leaflets, and they included men from all enemy divisions and regiments engaged. Our Divisional Intelligence reported that more P/Ws had been taken than in any previous similar operation, that they came in more easily, and possibly in greater numbers.

The leaflet that brought in most P/Ws was the Safe Conduct. At least 40 per cent of the prisoners had one. In one platoon, they all had it. It was found that most P/Ws kept Safe Conduct passes whereas the other leaflets had been read and discarded by many.

The effectiveness of the leaflets was greatly enhanced because their texts were tied in with the operation. This was found to be particularly true of the leaflet Urgent Warning, because the weight of our artillery barrage proved its urgency correctness.

A further note on this operation: «The effect of the leaflets was particularly noticeable on the non-Germans. A useful target for this type of leaflet is the non-German whose value is not mainly in reducing the strength of a company by desertion, but in furnishing us with vital, immediate, tactical information. During this operation, many Polish, and a few Alsatian deserters were directly responsible for the loss of German lives and for German P/Ws. These deserters may well be influenced by leaflets which strengthen their already formed resolve to come over to us and betray their units. As an instance, on one occasion, 50 men were captured after a Pole had come across and given away gun positions to a forward American interrogator.»

## CHAPTER VII

### Shell Leaflet Printing

Proximity to Naples has made it possible at various times in the Italian campaign to print some tactical shell leaflets there, under normal print-shop conditions making possible the use of colors and, when desirable, half-tones. The Safe Conduct Passes, for instance, have been printed there, since they are more or less a standing order and large quantities are wanted.

But the PWB 5th Army Combat Team is planned as a self-contained mobile unit capable of quick operation on the heels of the battle. That is how it has operated in Italy since December and it has kept up with the forces.

In doing so, it has carried its own printing press with it.

#### The Printing

A. The printing of shell leaflets by the 5th Army Team is done partly by the Crowell mobile printing press and partly by the large base printing plant in Naples. Nearness of Naples to the front has made the latter possible. The advantages in color reproduction, variety in type faces (though this need not be a permanent advantage), and the large demand for the same leaflet to be distributed by air make the use of the base frequently desirable. Where the distance to a first class printing plant is great, where the number of leaflets does not run into the millions, and where speed is essential in getting over a news beat or exploiting a temporary situation, the Crowell press is a wholly satisfactory substitute. Whenever possible, the printing of leaflets on rotary presses which are not of the first order is avoided; the balance of the text on the sheet is distorted and the imprint frequently bad.

B. The Crowell Mobile Printing Unit works with the following material, personnel and procedures:

(1) *Truck and trailer:*

- (a) Bernard diesel engined truck. (Captured German tank carrier)
  - Length 33 ft.
  - Width 10 ft.

Height 12½ ft.

Weight of truck only, 12 tons

Inside measurement of body:

Length 22 ft.

Width 9½ ft.

Height 7 ft.

Weight of equipment 9 tons

Gross weight of truck loaded 21 tons

(b) 1-ton trailer (Standard U. S. Army)

Carrying: (1) 15 Kw. 4-wire, 3 phase 220 volt generator driven by 4 cylinder Waukesha diesel engine.

(2) *Printing equipment* consists of:

(1) Mergenthaler Linotype, Model 8. 17 extra magazines. 20 in all and 2 display matrice fonts 24 and 30 pt. for hand set.

(1) V-36 Miehle vertical. Maximum sheet size 20 x 13½. Minimum sheet size 3¼ x 5½. Maximum speed 3,600 sheets per hour. Maximum printing surface 19 x 12½ ins. Feeds any kind of Paper.

(1) Johnes 30½ in. powered paper cutter.

24 fonts of hand type. Miscellaneous printing material; leads, slugs, wood and metal furniture, twine, gummed tape, dispenser, wrapping paper, cut tympan and hangers, inks in primary colors and white and black, quoin keys, mallet, planer, tweezers, type gauges (pica and cicero) miterer, lead cutter, reglets, virgin metal, brass rule, composing sticks, etc.

Paper carried in 18 x 12½ inch size sufficient for 1,000,000 leaflets.

(3) *Personnel*: Capable of 12 hour daily operation.

(1) Master printer

(1) Driver and generator tender

(1) Linotype operator

(1) Linotype machinist and handyman

(3) Pressmen-binders

(4) *Working procedure*:

The leaflet is composed on Linotype and re-cast four times. Format consists of four fronts and four backs. English translation

is composed once and imposed in forme at the start. When required number of translations are printed, English composition is taken from forme and fourth working leaflet inserted. Sheets are worked and turned until required amount is completed. Cutting is done simultaneously. One hour after last sheet is printed, work is complete.

Press sheet size 18x12½ in. 2,000 sheets per hour is easily averaged, giving a production of 8,000 leaflets printed two sides per hour. Standard backs such as "Treatment of Prisoners of War" can be printed in advance, thus doubling production on any leaflet needed in quantity.

## CHAPTER VIII

### The Army Order

The script of a leaflet passes to the Team's CO and from him to the Chief of Staff, 5th Army. G-2 reads it for security.

Agreement on the leaflet having been reached on the Staff level, the CO, Combat Team addresses an Operations Memorandum to the Artillery Officer, 5th Army for approval and the attachment of the Order required for firing it in shells.

In general, Corps Headquarters is responsible for carrying out the Order. It would pass down through normal channels in any case but it has been the practice of the Combat Team's liaison officers, as a time-saver, to transmit it to the appropriate divisions and lower echelons. The Order includes times for picking up leaflet-loaded shells from the ammunitions dumps.

Herewith is a typical Operations Memorandum, with attached Order.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY  
PSYHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH  
APO 464, U.S ARMY

22 FEBRUARY 1944

#### Operations Memorandum No. 15

To: Artillery Officer  
Headquarters Fifth Army

1. INFORMATION—Fifth Army offensive on southern Italian front.
2. INTENTION—To lower enemy morale.
3. METHOD—Leaflet filled shells will be fired on all enemy concentrations along the 5th Army front. Shells will be allotted to divisions as follows:

#### X CORPS

5 Division . . . . .	150 shells
46 Division . . . . .	150 shells

#### N.Z. CORPS

N.Z. Division . . . . .	150 shells
4 Indian Division . . . . .	150 shells



II CORPS

36 Division . . . . . 150 shells

F. E. C.

2 D. I. M. . . . . 150 shells

3 D. I. A. . . . . 150 shells

4. TIMING—Filled shells will be available at 32 FAS and ASP C-4-14 after 1200 hours, Wednesday—February.

B. Shells will be labelled "5 Fingers" and should be asked for by name. The shell allocation to the French will contain 50% "5 Fingers" leaflets and 50% French special leaflets.

C. Shells should be fired as the tactical situation permits so that total quotas are expended by 0600 hours, Saturday, 26 February.

5. TARGETS—Targets are all enemy concentrations within range. Specific targets will be selected by corps and/or division.

As from today, all 150 mm. leaflet shells used on the 5th Army front are fitted with TM 67 Fuzes which will permit their use up to 12,000 yards; thus, more enemy concentrations are brought within range of the 105 mm. leaflet shell and targets should be selected accordingly.

John O. Weaver  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.  
Commanding

1st Ind.

Headquarters Fifth Army, Office of the Artillery Officer, APO 464,  
22 February 1944.

To: Artillery Officer, Second Corps.  
Commander, Corps Royal Artillery, 10 Corps.  
Commander, Royal Artillery, N. Z. Corps.  
Artillery Officer, French Expeditionary Corps.  
Fire plan as outlined above is approved and ordered.

T. E. Lewis  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.  
Artillery Officer

## CHAPTER IX

### Rolling and Conversion of Shells

Herewith is a report of the technique of rolling and stuffing leaflets in shells as developed by the PWB 5th Army Combat Team.

105 mm. leaflet shells. Method of rolling leaflets and loading shells.

#### 1. *Details of shells and leaflets.*

a. *Shells.* The shell is the standard American 105 mm. base ejection smoke shell.

b. *Leaflets.* Leaflets are of two sizes:

Normal size: Width—4½ ins. Length—6¼ ins.

Double size: Width—9 ins. Length—10½ ins.

These dimensions have been carefully worked out so that, by rolling the leaflets in different ways, both the American 105 mm. shell and the British 25 pdr. shell can be filled economically with the same size leaflets.

#### c. *Number of leaflets per shell.*

This depends to a large extent on the type of paper used. With ordinary newsprint (which has produced satisfactory results), 750 normal size leaflets, in two rolls, can be loaded into one 105 mm. shell.

With double size leaflets on ordinary newsprint paper, the shell will hold one roll of 350 leaflets.

#### d. *Notes on leaflet rolling and shell preparation.*

It has been found from experience with the 5th Army that it is most practicable to prepare the shells, and the leaflet rolls, independently.

The shells should be taken out of their cases, and emptied of their smoke canisters, before they are actually required for loading.

The leaflets can be rolled by personnel of the Combat Team.

#### 2. *Leaflet rolling.*

a. *Normal size leaflets.* The dimensions of the normal size leaflets are such that two rolls of leaflets, one rolled lengthways, the other sideways, will fit snugly into the 105 mm. shells.

For the first roll, one sheet of thin, strong wrapping paper,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  ins. wide, and about 24 ins. long, is required. A pile of approximately 350 normal size leaflets is placed on the wrapping paper, (with the width of the leaflets parallel to the width of the wrapping paper), and about 4 or 5 inches from the end to allow a piece of the wrapping paper to be turned over. The spare end of the wrapping paper is folded tightly over the end of the pile of leaflets; the end of the pile of leaflets is turned over as short and as compact as possible to start the roll; then the leaflets are rolled over as tightly as possible and the end of the wrapping paper should be held with a short piece of gummed paper to hold the roll of leaflets tightly rolled. (Note: the gummed paper should be slit when the leaflet roll is finally inserted in the shell). The finished roll should thus be  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in. long, and of a circumference to fit snugly in the shell.

For the second roll, one sheet of wrapping paper of the same length as before, but six and one-quarter inches wide is required. A pile of approximately 400 normal size leaflets is then placed on the wrapping paper about 4 or 5 inches from the end as before, but with the *length* of the leaflets parallel to the width of the wrapping paper. The leaflets are then rolled as before, the roll fitted to the shell for size, and then sealed up with gummed paper. The finished roll, this time, should be  $6\frac{1}{4}$  ins. long.

The two finished rolls should adequately fill the vacant space in the shell.

Emptied, de-fused 105 mm. shells should be made available to personnel rolling the leaflets in order that the rolls may be tried for fitting before the gummed paper is stuck on. Finished rolls can be stored until required for loading.

To avoid counting out the number of leaflets requisite for each roll, some simple measure can be contrived whereby the height of each pile of leaflets can be measured before rolling.

b. *Double size leaflets.* The procedure with double size leaflets to fill the 105 mm. shell is the same as outlined above, with the following differences:

- (i) The width of the wrapping paper required is 11 inches.
- (ii) The number of double size leaflets in one roll will be found to be approximately 350.

(iii) The leaflets are placed on the wrapping paper with the length of the leaflets parallel to the width of the wrapping paper.

(iv) The finished roll will be 10½ ins. long, and, like all other rolls, should fit snugly into the shell.

### 3. Preparation of shells.

In order to have a supply of shells ready for loading with leaflets, the smoke canisters are removed in the following manner:

a. Unscrew base-plate (Left-hand thread). This can be done with a punch and hammer. If large quantities of shells are to be prepared regularly, a useful tool can be made from a large wrench or spanner. Two small prongs are welded into the jaws of the wrench or spanner, at right-angles to the jaws, to fit into the two recesses in the base-plate of the shell. The base-plate can then be easily turned by the wrench.

b. Remove copper sealing disc and mill-board washers.

c. Remove smoke canisters.

d. The metal baffle-plate and the bag of powder must be re-inserted, should they fall out.

e. Re-insert mill-board washers and copper sealing disc.

f. Screw in base-plate lightly, to facilitate removal on loading.

### 4. Loading.

a. Empty shell as in preparation of shells.

b. Insert bag of powder (ejection charge). This should lie flat in recessed chamber in nose of shell.

c. Replace baffle-plate to seat squarely on shoulders of recessed chamber.

d. Place one un-holed mill-board washer next to baffle-plate to mask the small hole in that plate.

e. Insert one roll of double-size leaflets, or one short roll and one long roll of normal-size leaflets, separated by mill-board disc.

f. Fill the remaining space in the shell with mill-board washers until the sealing disc just fails to seat against the rear face of its recess.

g. Screw home base-plate until flush with the end of the shell.

## 5. *Labelling.*

To avoid confusion with normal smoke shells, it is essential that all leaflet shell cases and, if possible, all leaflet shells, be clearly marked.

a. *Shell-cases.* A large 'P', (for propaganda) or, preferably, the title of the leaflet loaded in the shells, stencilled on the shell-case, clearly distinguishes them from ordinary smoke shells.

b. *Shells.* If possible, a large 'P' should also be lightly stencilled on the shell itself to avoid confusion.

25 PDR. LEAFLET SHELLS. Method of rolling leaflets and loading shells.

### 1. *Details of shells and leaflets.*

a. *Shell.* The shell is the standard British 25 pdr. Base Ejection smoke shell.

b. *Leaflets.* Leaflets are of two sizes:  
Normal size: Width—4½ ins. Length—6¼ ins.  
Double size: Width—9 ins. Length—11 ins.

c. *Number of leaflets per shell.*

This depends to a large extent on the type of paper used. With ordinary newsprint paper (which has produced the most satisfactory results), 225 normal size leaflets can be rolled into one roll to fit the 25 pdr., thus giving a total of 450 normal size leaflets per shell (two rolls).

With double size leaflets on ordinary newsprint paper, the shell will hold one roll of 250 leaflets.

### 2. *Leaflet rolling.*

a. *Normal size leaflets.* One sheet of thin, strong, wrapping paper, 4 1/2 ins. wide, and about 24 ins. long is required for each roll of leaflets. A pile of approximately 225 normal size leaflets is placed on the wrapping paper, (with the width of the leaflets parallel to the width of the wrapping paper), and about 4 or 5 inches from the end to allow a piece of the wrapping paper to be turned over. The spare end of the wrapping paper is folded tightly over the end of the pile of leaflets; the end of the pile of leaflets is turned over as short and as compact as possible to start the roll; then the leaflets are rolled over as tightly as possible, and the end of the wrapping paper should

be held with a short piece of gummed paper to hold the roll of leaflets tightly rolled. (Note: The gummed paper should be slit when the leaflet roll is finally inserted in the shell). The roll should thus be 4 1/2 ins. long, and of such a circumference to fit snugly in the shell.

b. *Double size leaflets.* One sheet of thin, strong, wrapping paper, 9 ins. wide, and about 24 ins. long, is required for each roll of leaflets. A pile of approximately 250 double size leaflets is placed on the wrapping paper, (with the width of the leaflets parallel to the width of the wrapping paper) about 4 or 5 inches from the end to allow a piece of the wrapping paper to be turned over. From then on, the procedure is the same as for the normal size leaflet, except that the finished roll is 9 ins. long instead of 4 1/2 ins.

3. *Preparation of shells.* Same as for 105 mm.

4. *Loading.*

- a. Empty shell as in preparation of shells.
- b. Insert bag of powder (ejection charge). This should lie flat in recessed chamber in nose of shell.
- c. Replace baffle-plate, with rounded facing on the edges towards the nose of the shell when the plate is dropped in.
- d. Place one un-holed, mill-board next to baffle-plate to mask the small hole in that plate.
- e. Insert one roll of double size leaflets, or two rolls of normal size leaflets, separated by mill-board disc.
- f. Wad remaining space with mill-board washers until the sealing disc just fails to seat against the rear face of its recess.
- g. Screw home base-plate, and tighten set-screw.

5. *Labelling.* Same as for 105 mm.

The system of distributing the leaflet shells to the firing units used by the 5th Army is the one used for other ammunition. The division, when notified of the time that the shells will be ready at the dump, sends through its ammunition officer the required transport to pick up the shells. On special rush leaflets, the Team may find it more practical to transport the finished shells to the firing battery itself, after arrangements have been made with the appropriate S-2 who is selecting the targets. A jeep will carry ten shells easily, a trailer and jeep thirty shells.

## CHAPTER X

### Firing and Observation of Fire

When the order is transmitted, either by direct line or short wave radio, to the divisional Command at the Command post, the important task of assigning the proper targets to all the appropriate batteries is given to the Artillery intelligence officer S-2 of the division. He prepares a complete fire plan on the basis of all the knowledge he possess of the enemy concentrations working from operational maps, and intelligence reports — including the dispositions of friendly artillery. He designates the time for commencing and ceasing fire.

At the allotted gun which is to do the firing of the leaflet shell, the charge is fitted to the projectile and the time fuze in the cap is set to the exact number of seconds according to the range. Full preparation is carried out for firing the gun, including range estimation, etc., and orders are given as the Commander times the operation. After firing and upon reaching the determined range, the fuze ignites the ejection charge and the force of the explosion exerted along the axis of the shell forces out the base plate, which is held only by three or four small screw threads. The leaflets are then forced out and the forward explosion causes the paper packing holding the leaflets in position to break and the leaflets are scattered in every direction.

Firing tables and methods of use.

1. 105 mm. howitzer

a. Table.

Herewith are firing tables and instruction for firing leaflets in 105 mm. and 25 pdr. shells.

The 105 mm. howitzer:

HOWITZER, 105 mm, M2 and M2A1

FOR PROPAGANDA FIRING

SHELL, B. E., M84; FUZE, T., SQ., M54; 27.4 lbs.

*(Filled with 200 sheets of 9×6¼ Propaganda)*

Use in conjunction with  
 FT 105-H-3 for SHELL, H. E., M1

Propaganda Desired Range (yds.)	He Range Setting (yds.)	Fuze Setting Graze Burst (sec.)
2000	1880	6.4
2500	2375	8.0
3000	2870	9.7
3500	3365	11.5
4000	3865	13.3
4500	4370	15.2
5000	4875	17.1

CHARGE 7

5000	4955	13.1
5500	5465	14.7
6000	5975	16.3
6500	6485	18.1
7000	7000	20.0
7500	7525	21.9
8000	8090	23.8

**IMPORTANT NOTE:** Above figures are for graze burst. Proper angle of site must be added to obtain desired Height of Burst. Recommended height, 100 yds. above ground.

To obtain the desired Propaganda Range the weapon should be given the corresponding H. E. Range setting shown under column 2. The proper Fuze Setting is listed opposite each range in column 3. Proceed in the normal manner; include the computing and setting of all ballistic corrections as if firing HE at this range setting.

With the TM 54 fuze, the maximum fuze time of flight is 25 seconds. TM 67 fuzes increase the maximum range to 12,000 yards with a time of flight of 75 seconds. The TM 67 is to be used without the booster. Generally, ammunition dumps will not be stocked with the TM 67 fuze and a separate arrangement for them will be necessary, the change of fuze being effected by personnel at the dump where the shells are packed with leaflets.



The 25 pdr:

PROVISIONAL RANGE TABLE FOR LEAFLET SHELL (25 (pdr)

Weight 17.8 lbs.

CHARGE II

I. Range	False Range to be set on sight	Fuse lengths for bursts on line of sight
2000	1475	2.7
2500	1975	3.5
3000	2475	4.3
3500	3000	5.1
4000	3575	6.0
4500	4050	6.8
5000	4600	7.6
5500	5200	8.4
6000	5825	9.2

CHARGE III

5000	4350	6.2
5500	4950	6.9
6000	5550	7.6
6500	6150	8.3
7000	6750	9.0
7500	7350	9.8
8000	7950	10.6
8500	8550	11.4
9000	9150	12.3
9500	9750	13.2
10000	10350	14.2

To obtain the required data:

1. Plot map reference of center of area.
2. Measure off correction for wind (30 yds. up wind for each foot-second shown for 5 f. s. time of flight.)
3. Measure line of range and A/S to the point found in 2.
4. Apply correction of the moment for line and range.
5. From data found in 4, and using appropriate table above, find fuze setting and false range.

6. Apply fuze correction of the moment, using chemical shell Range Table for prediction.

Leaflets can be fired with charges, 1, 2 and 3; thus a maximum range of about 12,000 yards can be reached.

Leaflet shell fire may be observed in the same manner as high explosive, especially air-burst, and smoke shells. When the shell is observed to burst, there is a small puff of black smoke, smaller than air-burst HE, and a cloud of leaflets about five times the size of the smoke puff. The leaflets appear as a thin white vapor which sometimes flashes in the sun. They settle slowly to the ground. With a light breeze, if the leaflets leave the shell at a height of 300 to 400 feet, the area covered by the leaflets is approximately 150 yards in diameter, below the point of burst. With a cross-wind from 12-15 miles per hour, the leaflets reach the ground approximately 500 yards from a point below the burst. The area of coverage does not vary appreciably with the velocity of the wind.

The force of the discharge has a concertina effect on the rolls in the shell and imparts to the leaflets a uniform crinkled pattern which hardly impairs legibility. The flash from the explosion which discharges the leaflets and base plate gets past the baffle plate to a small extent, scorching or tearing a small number of the leaflets. The stronger the charge used in the firing, the greater the crinkling of the leaflets. Therefore targets at shorter ranges have a slight advantage over more distant targets.

Once grounded, the leaflet may be read easily. The dangers incurred in moving in the slightest degree on the battlefield make it highly desirable to get the leaflets directly on the enemy position. The ideal case was that of a German soldier from the 44th Infantry Division who had a leaflet delivered into his foxhole announcing the landings near Rome. The best time for the firing is near dusk, so that the enemy can observe where the leaflets fall in order to get them after dark. Rainy weather should not delay the fire. The leaflets lose none of their legibility in the rain and some of the crinkling actually disappears. Leaflets have been found in excellent condition after having been exposed to the Italian winter for over a month.

The most economical terrain for leaflet coverage is flat, wooded country. Targets in mountains are most difficult to reach, and in open, base country, the leaflets blow along the ground from the point of impact.

ENEMY REACTION  
*to*  
SHELL-FIRED LEAFLETS

*COMMENTS GATHERED FROM PSI/W  
DURING THE REGULAR MONTHLY POLLS*



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**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH  
APO 464 U. S. ARMY**

**ENEMY REACTION TO LEAFLETS DISSEMINATED BY  
SHELL FIRE ON THE 5th ARMY FRONT,  
DECEMBER 1943 - MARCH 1944**

The following report is an attempt to gather together comments and reactions of the enemy, both of Ps/W and of the German High Command, to Allied propaganda leaflets, more particularly to those disseminated by shell fire over the enemy on the 5th Army front during the period December, 1943 to the middle of March, 1944. The selection of reports has been as wide as possible.

**G. B. FOSTER**  
Capt., I.C.

20 March 1944

1st Ind.

Combat Propaganda Team, PWB, HQ 5th Army,  
APO 464, U. S. Army, 20 March 1944.

To: All concerned.

1. Approved and forwarded for information.

**JOHN O. WEAVER,**  
Lt. Col. G.S.C.  
*Commanding*



## NOTES on POLLS of Ps/W on LEAFLET REACTIONS

A regular monthly poll has been taken at 5th Army P/W cage to test the reaction of Ps/W to leaflets, and early in February a similar poll was conducted by A.C.M.F.

The results obtained from the 5th Army monthly polls show that at least 50 per cent German Ps/W (in one month 70 per cent) have seen our leaflets here in Italy. It is a significant fact, that an average of 37 per cent have believed them to be true.

The A.C.M.F. poll was conducted by means of a short form which military interrogators were asked to fill in. The Ps/W whose reactions were tested were from twelve different German divisions, taken both at the beachhead and on the main 5th Army front, and were all EM/ORs or NCOs. 58 per cent of the Ps/W had seen our leaflets. As was to be expected, most Ps/W who had not seen leaflets were from units recently arrived in the line. The leaflet which was best known was *Frontpost*.

Reactions to our leaflets were tabulated as favorable, unfavorable, or indifferent. Of 66 Ps/W who had seen our leaflets, 30 were favorably impressed, 18 unfavorably, while the remaining 18 were indifferent.

Comments by Ps/W about our leaflets were perhaps of more value than the statistical results of the poll. Of the Ps/W unfavorably impressed, several stated that our leaflets were *all propaganda*, or *bad propaganda*, or *the same propaganda as Russian leaflets* of which P/W had seen *plenty* on the Eastern front. One P/W said he thought leaflets affected only those who are fed up with the war anyway: another objected to what he called *statements by deserters* quoted in one of our leaflets.

By far the preponderating note in the favorable comments is the emphasis on truth and credibility. *50 per cent true; other 50 per cent could be true; 90 per cent true; true — nobody believes in German victory; believed everything; prisoner treatment statement in leaflet confirmed by former German P/W who escaped in Tunisia; sometimes exaggerated* — such are the comments which stress truth and credibility as the chief criteria for an effective leaflet.

## INTERROGATION REPORTS

**1. IPW Report 449, 15 March. Interrogation of 4 Ps/W from 115 Recce Bn and 129 PGR.**

P/W statement: ". . . on Mt. Camino many soldiers of the 115 Recce Bn had picked up leaflets, and they have been carrying their *Passierschein* in their pockets, eagerly awaiting for the right moment to come. 1st Lt. Asselhofen (killed on Mt. Camino) threatened to shoot any soldier attempting to desert."

**2. IPW report, 11 March 1944, from a VI Corps Interrogator, on 3 Ps/W from the 9 PGR.**

Ps/W stated that the anti-war feeling of older men in their company was very strong. (One P/W said that in their company — 4/9 PGR — 25 to 30 men were over 30 years old.) "Our leaflets", continued the report, "have made a great impression on them and have fortified them in their anti-war attitude. They say they are an object of constant discussion among the men they do not even hide them when a non-com is present."

**3. IPW report. Interrogation of several Ps/W at the beachhead, 4 March 1944.**

P/W statement: "Lt. Richter, O. C., II Company, 146th Infantry Regiment, told his men that our propaganda was designed to hoodwink them, and that our leaflets were a collection of lies. In his opinion the English did not have anything to eat themselves and that Ps/W, instead of living on the fat of the land, would be forced to work in coal mines under negro guards."

**4. An interrogation report dated 4 March 1944, reads:**

"Only three of the ten Ps/W had seen leaflets, and none of these three seems to have been impressed or interested."

**5. A report on the interrogation of six prisoners captured at the ANZIO beachhead between the 25th and 29th February, reads:**

"One P/W saw a leaflet, of which a quantity were lying in a quarry at the beachhead, most of them torn and wet from rain. He picked one up and took it to his dugout to let it dry. Other men said they had seen different ones. Unable to identify the leaflet, he recalls it spoke of honest



captivity', decent food, and treatment in camps, and that in America there are educational courses. 'I meant to keep it. It said one should show it if captured, but of course I didn't want to do that. I didn't exactly believe what was written. One is very sceptical about what is written. It is taken for propaganda.'

**6. A report on 7 Italian civilians who crossed the lines in 10 Corps area 19 February 1944, states:**

"...German leaflets were eagerly picked up by German soldiers, who read them with much interest. It was believed that these leaflets had decided some to desert or to hide out with Italians and surrender when we advanced."

**7. Extract from a Div. Intelligence Summary No. 91 to 1800 hrs. 19 February 1944:**

"On our left this evening there arrived from 274th Regiment, two deserters who, for reading and passing around *Frontpost* had been punished by their company commander. The punishment was 21 days extra duties; fatigues during the day, fetching rations during the first part of the night, followed by patrols as soon as the moon had risen, to Minturno Station (7695). Lack of sleep, combined with the incipient desire to be on the winning side, nurtured by our leaflets, caused the two to break away from 3rd Company, to which, as machine gunners of 4th Company, they had been sent."

**8. The comments of two prisoners, taken from a report dated 17 February 1944 on the interrogation of Ps/W captured at the beachhead, were as follows:**

They saw the *Kesselschlacht* leaflet shortly before going into action and many other leaflets "which were read, but little attention paid to them" One didn't discuss them; thought them rather exaggerated.

They had seen many leaflets, all of them speak of quitting, getting home by letting oneself be captured, etc. "We know that from the East." They thought the Red Army leaflet "about right."

**9. Extract from a report on the interrogation of a German officer P/W at 5th Army P/W Cage, 16 February:**

"The P/W had not the impression that the German Command was very worried by our leaflets. The regulation that all leaflets must be handed in

was not strictly enforced by P/W in his own company. He said this was mainly because there were so many leaflets nowadays and German soldiers were so overworked with their ordinary duties that it was considered inexpedient to impose on them the additional burden of repeatedly coming to the company office, handing in leaflets and making reports on them. He said he thought this was the general attitude toward leaflets. Actually, not many leaflets were found in his sector. He recollected only a *Frontpost* two or three weeks before capture. He said, however, that *Frontpost* is of great interest to front-line soldiers. Because they are so cut off from their own news sources."

**10. A 5th Army report on a sergeant from 9 Pz. Gren. Regt., captured 13 February 1944, stated:**

"...most old-timers see the war lost, and the P/W thinks that propaganda leaflets should do a great deal of good, to which he added that, as an example, not 'till recently had they found out from propaganda literature what actually happened to Rudolf Hess, as they were told that he went insane and was committed to an asylum. P/W states that in such circumstances many soldiers begin to lose faith when they have been told lies by their own government."

**11. In a P/W interrogation report dated 11 February 1944, a P/W is quoted as follows:**

"He was 3 days in the line but didn't see any leaflets. But in Florence, on January 24 (i. e. two days after the landing), when visiting comrades in the Lazarett, he was told about leaflets announcing the landing near Rome. His comrades kidded him about going south, as 'The MLR would be thrown back 200 km.' The P/W admitted misgivings but, 'a soldier has to carry on'."

**12. Another P/W interrogation report, dated 1 February 1944, summarizes the reactions of a lieutenant from the 134 PGR, thus:**

(a.) The leaflet announcing the landing near Rome was brought to him at C. P. at about 1400 hours on D-day. He couldn't believe it and called up the Battalion C. O. It was jokingly referred to as the "latest High Command Communique". "South of Rome seemed too close." In the evening, the Battalion C. O. called back, regretted that he had to confirm the news.

(b.) Rome follow-up leaflet: About three days later, "the exact situation was presented to us." It also mentioned Stalingrad. "It is clear they have to

be kicked out of the beachhead if the Southern front is to hold. If the landing progresses and the beachhead expands, then of course we are in a bad situation down here."

(c.) Other leaflets: The P/W was platoon leader in another company when he saw the leaflet *An die Hoch- und Deutschmeister*. It happened that Lt. Kunze, who was referred to in the leaflet was in a neighbouring position. He kidded Kunze: "Where are your trunks, Kunze, old boy? I see they reduced you to Lieutenant". (It appears that the leaflet should have referred to Kunze as Oberleutnant.) Said to himself: "Interesting how they know everything." The footnote about Austria was the first news he had about the Moscow Conference.

(d.) General: "Of course, there is the order that leaflets are to be destroyed, but that cannot be enforced. When men bring in leaflets, they don't hand them in, they just bring them for my information."

**13. The following reaction of five Ps/W are taken from an interrogation report, dated 1 February 1944:**

Number One had seen *The Enemy in Your Rear* and was not impressed.

Number Two remembered *Getting down to serious business* quite well. He said it was "all very good", but it ignored one thing: That Bolshevism means the annihilation of Europe. That, he said, is something we can never forget. If Russia were not in the war, it might be a different story. We would find the arguments in your leaflets more plausible.

Number Three had found some leaflets. Gave them to an officer who wrote "Enemy Propaganda" on them and sent them to the company commander.

Number Four had seen *Getting down to serious business*. He thought it good, but his reaction was: "Wait 'till you are taken prisoner or die." He would not consider desertion. He also remembered the *Artillery Handbook*—was impressed by the diary.

Number Five said about our leaflets: "They have their effect." The German soldiers read them, make as if to throw them away, and say: "That is rubbish." But that, he says, is just the official manner — the correct pose. The ordinary German soldiers, though he may be annoyed by the leaflets, thinks about their contents, would like to discuss them, but is afraid to.

**14. Other comments and reaction to our leaflets, taken from various P/W interrogation reports, are as follows:**

Number One saw a torn leaflet, remembers it talking about *Wozu?* He expected good treatment, but was surprised. "I don't want to say that I didn't believe what the leaflet said, but I didn't think I would be treated as well as I am."

Number Two: Barely a few days after his regiment arrived at the front, there came a leaflet *An die Hoch- und Deutschmeister* (addressed to the German 44th Division). It told the name of an officer who had his things packed when the enemy attacked. The company commander issued an order against picking up leaflets. Most men were scared, and didn't. The reverse side of that leaflet read: *Five Minutes English* — he thought that swell. He thought treatment would be good, but not as good as it was.

Number Three saw one leaflet *Zeit gewinnen — Wozu?* (Saving Time for What?) Points about treatment at first were doubted, but "Now we see it really is so."

Number Four saw leaflets being fired, but couldn't get one. They flew too far back and to the side. "Besides, one couldn't touch them."

Number Five saw a leaflet which spoke of good treatment in captivity. The company commander told his men to treat enemy prisoners well and not to take anything away from them, because the Allies treat German prisoners well, too.

Number Six saw leaflet *Artillery Handbook*, which seemed plausible. That Allied artillery is superior by 20:1. Expected "nothing pleasant" from captivity. Expected to be kept relatively close to the front, to be carrying ammunition or driving mules. It was unanimously believed that prisoners have a tough time. Also, the "propaganda" they heard said that the food is bad.

Number Seven expected good treatment in captivity as he had previously heard from comrades Ps/W to that effect. Leaflets helped to confirm this view. Nevertheless, he was pleasantly surprised.

Number Eight was unnerved by artillery fire and readily accepted statements on treatment in captivity.

Number Nine thought leaflets contained a good deal of propaganda. Nevertheless he believed much of the material in them.

Number Ten saw *Calendar* leaflet and handed it to his Lieutenant who disposed of it after a brief scrutiny.

Number Eleven saw the *An die Hoch- und Deutschmeister* leaflet but had no time to finish reading it as his Lieutenant appeared.

Number Twelve picked up and kept *Five Minutes English*.

Number Thirteen saw leaflet addressed to *Hoch- und Deutschmeister*. He considered it good propaganda and thinks it by no means wrong for us to continue sending over leaflets.

Number Fourteen believed and found leaflets to be true.

Number Fifteen saw one leaflet and believed it.

Number Sixteen saw two leaflets: *Artillery Handbook* and *Where are you bound for?* He did not feel too sure about the truth of leaflets.

**15. The following extract is taken from a PWB, ACMF interrogation report, dated 30 January 1944:**

"... 39 of these 46 Ps/W had seen leaflets. The rest had been only 1 to 3 days in the positions."

The most frequently named leaflets were: *Blitzkurs in Englisch*. (Five Minutes English,) *An die Hoch- und Deutschmeister*. (To the German 44th Division) and *Zeit gewinnen — Wozu?* (Saving Time for What?)

Mention was also made of a number of articles on the military situation, the air war, German retreat in Russia, and so on, apparently in *Frontpost* or similar leaflets. Only one P/W could remember the name *Frontpost*.

From what Ps/W say, the following general statements can be made about leaflets:

The soldiers know of the instructions about turning in leaflets, and that it is forbidden to read them. However often these instructions are repeated by Uffze, Feldwebel and officers, they are not carried out.

Leaflets are objects of general interest and are read by all the soldiers regardless of their political attitude. In three cases, unit leaders (Gruppenfuehrer) read out the leaflets to their men.

*Das bringt immer Amwechslung*, (They make a change), *Es ist immer was Neues* (It's something new) — *Man ist neugierig was die zu haben*

(One is curious to see what they have to say.) — these phrases most closely express the general opinion.

If there is time and opportunity, there are always discussions about the leaflets which often lead to political discussions.

Although in general there is no doubt about good and correct treatment in captivity, statements about white bread and coffee as part of the food are considered as *unmoeglich* (impossible). The assurance that the English and Americans keep strictly to the provisions of the International Red Cross is accepted with satisfaction.

Figures about material, and information on the situation on the Eastern Front, are taken with a certain scepticism, "because it can't be checked" or "one can't believe the German communique either" (*dem OKW-Bericht kann man ja auch nicht glauben.*)

The Nazis reject everything as "lies and propaganda". But those who have doubts, and the defeatists, use the following arguments on the situation: "You can see for yourself what it's like here" (*Ihr seht doch selbst wie es hier ist*). "Why do we have to withdraw — because we have no more Luftwaffe or artillery." "America can produce undisturbed; we can't attack her — the Fuehrer himself said so. Data that can be checked about German Divisions, incidents in the positions, names of units and officers, arouse astonishment: "How they get to know everything!" (*Wie die nur alles wissen koennen.*)

16. **On 27 January 1944, the Corps interrogator, FEC,** stated that he believed that, in general, our leaflets make a real impression, specially on non-Germans, and that it is important to keep on assuring them of good treatment as Ps/W. They believed our leaflets on this point rather than the contrary statements of their officers. He also reported that one Alsatian prisoner informed him that his company commander wished to desert with him, but was prevented from doing so and forced to retire with the rest of the company by a master-sergeant.
17. **Cpl. (Obergefr.) from 94th Inf. Div., captured 26 January 1944,** stated that German soldiers did not believe good treatment in P/W camps as promised in Allied leaflets.
18. **On the day after the landing near Rome, 19 Ps/W taken by an**

**American Division**, knew, or had heard of our "Allied landing near Rome" leaflet and generally believed the landing had been made.

**19. The following extracts are from IPW reports from G-2, 5th Army:**

(I) "Leaflets sent over yesterday were seen mostly to have fallen in the river. However, those received were good, and their contents discussed by the troops." — (*Division Report, 20 January, 2 Ps/W, 104th PGR.*)

(II) "Leaflets thrown over the 276th IR area went over big, although intended for Austrians in the 134th IR. Most of the men kept at least one in their paybooks and were waiting for their chance. Recently, when 5 engineers were killed, leaflets were found in four out of the five men's paybooks.

". . . Strict orders were given to have leaflets collected and burned. Counterpropaganda was also used telling the men that our leaflets were all lies and we did not have enough food here to feed our own men. This made the German soldiers believe our leaflets just that much more." (*IPW rep. 193, 24 January 3 Ps/W — 276th IR.*)

(III) "Ps/W stated that the only news they were getting from the outside was from leaflets that were being shot over them." — (*IPW Report 182, 23 January 3 Ps/W — 276th IR.*)

(IV) "Leaflets are said to be picked up and read; they leave a very demoralizing atmosphere." — (*Division Report, 22 January 1944, P/W from 71st Werfer Regiment.*)

(V) "Ps/W state that leaflets are very good . . . they thought we do not employ enough of them. They suggested the following: (1) Print only true facts, preferably with true figures, locations, units, happenings. (2) Omit anything that sounds like propaganda and is not likely to be true. (3) Counteract German propaganda such as: Savage negroes and Indians in our troops, bad treatment in P/W camps, Americans being uncivilized, etc. (4) For Austrian troops: (a) Why do Austrians have to share their homes with the bombed refugees from Germany, who do not appreciate and consider themselves the masters, especially in Vienna? Why did Goering take the valuable Gobelins from Schoenbrunn to Karin hall? Why the Austrian crown to Nuernberg? (b) Austria will not be bombed except the war factories, which the Germans have set up. (c) The United Nations guarantee the independence of Austria." — (*IPW report 166, 21 January. 8 Ps/W, 95 th Recce. Bn., 5th Division.*)

(VI) "This organization has in the past weeks received many of our leaflets. P/W considers they are very good and mentioned that they are having tremendous effect on Austrians, as well as Germans in the division (44th). Special reference is made to the leaflet entitled: 1944 — *Wirst Du den Frieden noch erleben?* (Will you live to see the peace?) This P/W, and he speaks for many others, considers this the best ever put out." — (IPW report 168, 19 January, P/W 96th Arie Regiment, 44th ID.)

(VII) "No leaflets have been received in this sector lately. In others, 4 Ps/W stated, they had no demoralizing effect." — (Div. Report, January 18. P/W from 129th PGR.)

(VIII) "This P/W, who is very intelligent, thinks we do not use enough leaflets. These is a big demand for them, but only a few have been seen." — (IPW Report 157, 16 January, P/W from 132nd IR.)

**20. The following extracts from a report on desertion in 44th Gren. Div. and 5th Mtn. Div. during the period 30 November 1943 - 6 January 1944, dated 13 January 1944, are noteworthy:**

**44th Grenadier Division**

". . . Allied treatment of Ps/W was constantly pictured by officers as harsh and even savage but, as the figures show, without convincing many. This largely to be ascribed to our leaflets which were in the main believed.

"112 of those interrogated had seen Allied leaflets at the front, representing 40 per cent of the total.

"It would appear that Austrians look for leaflets more diligently than Germans. They certainly impress Austrians more, although even Nazis admit that we tell the truth. No desertion could be directly credited to leaflets but they had obviously influenced potential and actual deserters considerably."

**5th Mountain Division**

"Only approximately 25 per cent of the Ps/W from this division had seen Allied leaflets. All were impressed by them and they no doubt had a considerable influence on potential and actual deserters." (This division did not come into the line until 21 December, 1943).

**21. On 4 January 1944, a Div. G-2 reported three Germans surrendered carrying leaflets.**



**22. Extract from an RA Div. Intelligence Summary, 10 December, 1943:**

"The three Ps/W who were taken carrying our leaflets were questioned on the reaction of the enemy on reading these pamphlets. The reply was as follows:

"The leaflet is only taken seriously by those who have already made up their minds to desert, such as I, on principle. When I approached my comrades with the leaflet they stated: "We do exactly the same thing and ours are exaggerated and so are the English ones. They are only put over to bluff us. "They did have to withdraw some of their words for we soon found that the Arty warning\* (see footnote) was not bluff. However, it did not have any effect on them, for the Arty fire is so bad all the time, so what the hell!"

The above prisoner was a Slav, and carried an *Artillery Warning* leaflet; the other two were carrying the normal propaganda leaflet which indicates the way a German should give himself up.

Some papers sent back from the Ps/W have included a copy of the *Frontpost*."

**23. G-2 and the Artillery S-2 of an American division** reported that early in December, 42 Austrians surrendered at Lagone from the 44th Division. When our troops came along, they had stopped fighting. They had all read our leaflets and had consequently decided to give up. Many of them had leaflets on them.

**24. The Adjutant of a Fd. Regt., of a British Div.** reported that from an O. P. on Monte Camino on 12 November, during the first Camino battle, 5 Germans had been seen to approach from out of a wood to behind a wall which was 150 yds. from the O. P. They raised their arms above the top of the wall waving what looked like leaflets. 4 Bren guns, which were trained on the Germans, were told to hold their fire in order that it might be seen what the enemy intended to do. Then a German Spandau opened up and laid a curtain of fire between the O. P. and the wall, and the Germans were forced to withdraw to the wood.

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\* The Arty Warning leaflet was especially written and produced for the Artillery; the translation reads as follows:

**URGENT! WARNING FROM THE ENEMY ARTILLERY!**

Our artillery has just stopped firing. You have experienced another example of the hitting power of our artillery. What you have lived through is nothing. One blow follows another. German soldiers: We warn you! Our batteries are silent only in order to give you a last chance. The Allied Artillery is not asleep. Up 'till now you just had a sample. Soon our guns will show you what we call a real barrage. This leaflet is your Passierschein (safe-conduct). Our next message: **SHELLS!**

**25. The following note from G-2 « Intelligence Notes No. 46 », 15 February 1944, on « Counter Desertion » is significant:**

” According to a recent P/W, any German soldier who, as a straggler, is away from his unit for more than 3 hours, must produce a written certificate signed by the commander of the unit he joins up with. In default of such a certificate, the man will be court-martialled. This is the first report of such counter-desertion measures, and as the information was imparted by only one P/W, it is not yet known whether this is purely a local practice, or whether it is of a more general nature within the army.”

**26. The following note is reproduced from G-2 « intelligence Notes No. 47 », 22 February 1944:**

” From the diary of an NCO of 276th Infantry Regiment:

22 January: ” I am done. The arty fire is driving me crazy. I am frightened as never before . . . cold . . . During the day one cannot leave one's hole. These last days have finished me off altogether. I am in need of someone to hold on to.

25 January: ” I start becoming a pessimist. The Tommies write in their leaflets that the choice is ours, Tunis or Stalingrad . . . we are on half rations. No mail. Teddy is a prisoner. I see myself one very soon.’ ”

# **SPECIAL REPORT on LEAFLET SHELLS FIRED DURING OPERATION "X"**

## **1. Preliminary arrangements**

Early in January, 10th Corps planned the large-scale operation, which was to carry them well across the Garigliano. In preparation for this operation, Psychological Warfare Branch, 5th Army, was asked to produce a series of four leaflets, which were to be geared to the consecutive stages of the operation, and which were to be fired by the artillery on a carefully planned timetable during the first two days of the attack. A fifth leaflet was to have been written for the third day of the attack to suit the tactical situation. The operation went through so successfully during the first two days, however, that it was deemed unnecessary to produce any further leaflet.

## **2. Results**

(I) Owing to the speed with which the advance went forward, and also to the great number of prisoner that came in, no detailed study of the results of the leaflets, nor an evaluation of their effect, was possible.

(II) It was, however, established at the time: that the leaflets were given wide dissemination by the artillery, and that prisoners, bearing leaflets, had come in in very considerable numbers.

(a.) At the end of January, the chief interrogator at 10th Corps P/W Cage reported that during the previous ten days (i. e. since the beginning of the crossing of the Garigliano), more than 800 Ps/W had been taken, including men from all divisions and regiments, and that they nearly all had leaflets.

(b.) At the same time, a Divisionnal Intelligence Officer stated that during the operation, they had taken more Ps/W than in any previous similar operation, that the prisoners had come in more easily, and possibly in greater numbers.

(III) Later reports indicate that the effect of the leaflets was considerably greater than was apparent at the time. Following are a few notes on the results of the leaflets:

(a.) Most prisoners had a leaflet or had read one. In certain cases, many leaflets were dropped in inaccessible places, but the coverage of the front was so generally good, however, that this did not detract from the effectiveness of the operation.

(b.) The leaflet which brought in most Ps/W was the Safe Conduct leaflet. At least 40 per cent of the prisoners had one. In one platoon they all had it. Most Ps/W kept their Safe Conduct leaflets, whereas the other leaflets had been seen and read but not kept. Many were picked up and passed around. There were many cases where the P/W said he had got the leaflet from a friend.

(c.) Attempts to counter the effect of the leaflets were made by the enemy:

It was a routine order that all leaflets had to be handed in to an officer, but there were very few cases where this had been done.

Many of the leaflets in the possession of Ps/W had been marked across with a red line or a red cross, and had the words *Feindpropaganda* (Enemy propaganda) written on them.

(d.) Of the four leaflets produced for the operation, the Safe Conduct leaflet had the most tangible effect. On several occasions, when platoons or half-platoons were isolated or in tough spot, they disobeyed Hitler's command to hold the ground at any cost, and readily produced their Safe Conduct in the hope of fair treatment.

(e.) The effectiveness of the leaflets was greatly increased by the fact that the German text had been so worded to tie in with the operation. This was particularly true of the *Urgent Warning* leaflet. Prisoners reported that the artillery barrage had been so heavy that everybody was convinced that the leaflet was no understatement.

(f.) The effect of the leaflets was particularly noticeable on the non-Germans. A useful target for this type of leaflets is the non-German whose value is not mainly in reducing the strength of a company by desertion, but in furnishing us with vital, immediate, tactical information. During this operation, many Polish, and a few Alsatian deserters were directly responsible for the loss of German lives and for German Ps/W. These deserters may well be influenced by leaflets which strengthen their already

formed resolve to come over to us and betray their units. As an instance, on one occasion, 50 men were captured after a Pole had come across and given away company gun positions to a forward American interrogator.

### **3. Conclusion**

From the reports which have been received, it is evident that the effects of the leaflets in this operation were perceptible, and that the tangible results which were obtained were closely knit with the operation, particularly with the artillery barrage.

## GERMAN PROPAGANDA to ALLIED TROOPS

German propaganda to Allied troops on the 5th Army front has been limited during the last six months, but shows a marked increase in the last few weeks.

1. During the first fortnight of December, leaflets in English were left by patrols in one locality on our 'front. This was an illustrated brochure entitled *We Protest* which was picked up by patrols of a British division on the banks of the Garigliano.

2. Two leaflets, written in Urdu was fired on 6 March 1944 over the Indian troops in the N. Z. sector. A translation of the leaflet into English is given. (No. 3.)

4. A leaflet written in English, addressed to the soldiers of the United Nations, was fired over the Ornito/Cerasola sector at about 1000 hours, 18 March 1944. 10 shells were reported to have been fired, bursting at a height of 100 feet above the ground.

5. A series of 8 different leaflets were sent in from the Nettuno beachhead area. These were reported to have been picked up in one area only, during the first three weeks of March, in very small quantities. It is not possible to state whether they were sent over by shell fire, or dropped by plane. Included in the series were several pictorial leaflets, all addressed to American troops, and another advertising the times of the *Jerry's Front* broadcasts.

## TEXTS of ENEMY LEAFLETS

No. 1:

### BRITISH SOLDIERS

You are fighting against an opponent whom you know very well. You are not facing Italians, but Germans.

As gallant soldiers you have had occasion to become acquainted with the courage and the grit of your German opponent. You know well the Germans stood up in battle, although they were always inferior to you in number. But you know well enough what it means when the Germans are numerically equal to your own forces or even superior.

In the face of insurmountable odds a thousand men of crack British Guards surrendered.

If they were forced to do so, then it is not dishonorable for you to lay down arms in case you are facing nothing but certain death.

General Clark certainly played you a dirty Yankee trick. And who has got to bear the consequences?

*No. 1, reverse side:*

#### BRITISH SOLDIERS

What it means to be put under American command, your forces are finding out at Nettuno.

The "accomplishments" of this American leadership are indeed typically American: operations were insufficiently prepared and led to the most dreadful reverses for your troops. Your picked units were carelessly thrown into the battle.

Certainly, the Yanks played you a nasty turn.

They not only committed tactical mistakes, but their actions bordered on criminal folly.

In their arrogance they have underestimated the German strength.

They have staked all on one card.

We shall see who has got the better trumps.

AI-029-2-44

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No. 2:

#### BRITISH SOLDIERS

The Allied Headquarters have surely not informed you of the heavy losses inflicted on your forces at the beachhead of Nettuno.

What about getting the real facts?

A few days ago over 1,000 American soldiers were made prisoner at one blow near Cisterna. On February 4, at Aprilia strong units of the 1st English Infantry Division were encircled and partly annihilated or captured.

Apart from these exceptionally heavy casualties, 994 prisoners, among them 19 officers, were taken. These famous British crack troops fought bravely and therefore suffered heavy losses.

Realizing the hopelessness of this battle, they surrendered.

What these British Guards did was not dishonorable but reasonable.  
They surrendered because they were facing certain destruction.

No. 2, reverse side:

#### BRITISH SOLDIERS

What happened on February 4th to the 1st English Infantry Division was only a prelude. The same fate may be in store for you.

You are facing German soldiers with the most up-to-date and heaviest arms.

Behind you lies the sea.

Led by the amateurish American command, you unsuspectingly walked into a trap.

Lay down your arms if you want to see your country and your families again.

THE NEAR FUTURE WILL CONVINCING YOU THAT  
THE ODDS ARE AGAINST YOU

AI-028-2-44

No. 3:

*Translation of German propaganda leaflet written in Urdu.*

The leaflet is headed: "REUNION".

On one side is a sketch of an Indian family group, (United or Madras Province), its members apparently waving goodbye to someone. Beside it are the following lines:

"Having bid you farewell, our eyes followed you until you were of sight."

No. 3, reverse side:

#### INDIAN BRETHREN

If you considered your lot carefully it would be quite clear to you that not only is any hope of reunion with your near relations and beloved ones difficult, but to a certain extent impossible. Thousands of troops die daily in the battle field — is it necessary that your corpse should be among them?

No — CERTAINLY NOT!

Why not then, on getting a chance, desert to the GERMANS. Thousands of your Indian Brethren are passing their life comfortably in camps and



for them the war is over. At the end of the war they will certainly be happy to be able to go and see their relatives.

**JUST THINK! DON'T WASTE YOUR LIVES FOR NOTHING.**

*Note:* You can desert to the Germans safely by showing this paper.

*Additional Note in German:* Indian soldiers approaching the German lines with this leaflet are to be treated decently as deserters, should be fed, and evacuated to the rear under escort.

Initials bottom right-hand corner of leaflet "Lw.P. PVO-100 F-3-4".

(*Source: Indian Division. IS No. 43.*)

## GERMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

The German command thought it necessary to counter our leaflet "*Allied Landing Near Rome*", disseminated by us on the afternoon of the landing. The following is a translation of the German leaflet which, presumably, was distributed to German front line troops:

### HOW ABOUT THE LANDING?

1. After the enemy, due to your courage, was unable to break through our land front anywhere, he now tries his hand at a landing operation.

Besides, he thinks he can undermine your morale by a leaflet entitled:

#### *Allied Landing Near Rome.*

With customary distortion and falsification of the true situation, the attempt is made to impress the German soldier and to shake his much-feared power of resistance.

The military situation is pictured as if "every resistance on the part of the Germans means senseless shedding of blood" and is therefore in vain. An "inexorable ring" is said to close around the German army and a battle of encirclement is said to be in preparation, "similar to that of Stalingrad". Since there can be "neither advancing nor retreating", the only way out is said to be an "ordered surrender as at Tunis."

The map illustrates in rough lines how the Southern Front runs and shows the beachhead created by the Allied landing on 23 January in the Anzio-Nettuno area. From this simple schematic drawing anyone can see without difficulty the absurd exaggeration of British agitation which would trick the German soldier into believing that his army is engaged in a "hopeless battle of encirclement."

THE ARMY REMAINS UNSHAKEN AND THE FRONT IN THE SOUTH CONTINUES TO STAND. NOWHERE THE ALLIES GAIN A SIGNIFICANT OR DECISIVE SUCCESS. THE LANDING NEAR ROME, TOO, GIVES NO OCCASION TO SERIOUS FEARS, AND ANYONE CAN AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WITH CERTAIN CONFIDENCE AND CONTINUE TO DO HIS DUTY.

*Reverse side* shows a map of Italy in outline with the German occupied part of the country shaded in. A thick line runs across the peninsula to

indicate the main southern front. A black blob with an arrow pointing to it indicates "Beachhead". A caption in large letters reads:

### THAT IS THEIR BATTLE OF ENCIRCLEMENT.

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2. The following is a translation of a German leaflet received by PWB through G-2, 5th Army, and which represents efforts on the part of the German command to counter the effect which our front-line propaganda is having on German troops: (13 February 1944).

#### A FRONT LINE SOLDIER SPEAKS HIS MIND

The truth about the treatment of prisoners-of-war!

"Whoever keeps this leaflet, shows his *honest* intention of becoming a prisoner-of-war."

Thus reads the beginning of one of the many Allied leaflets which try to induce us Germans to an act which they themselves don't believe in. For what does the Tommy know of honesty, anyhow, or of "honest surrender"?

What would he do if, in a football game, one side "surrendered honorably"? He would whistle and jeer, that's what he would do.

Whistling and jeering is what he will be doing to the "soldiers" who surrender "honorably" in battle. As deserters and cowards he will treat them.

With enticements and travel-folder advertisements, the enemy tries to hold out captivity as the ideal of the war. In his delusion of heaping us soldiers with high-sounding sales talk, he forgets that we German soldiers are men of character who follow the Fuehrer's orders, true to oath.

Let the Tommy gorge himself with grabbing eagerness in his silly trench-propaganda of the World War. Let him treble his paper consumption. He'll just reduce his newsprint supply, and we get plenty of

#### TOILET PAPER

*The Reverse side* shows a crude pen drawing of a sneering, pipe-smoking "Tommy" with bayonet-fixed rifle, contemplating a mass of miserable Germans behind a barbed-wire fence. One haggard-looking German stretches a begging hand through the strands of the fence . . .

Text: THAT IS CAPTIVITY.

3. In view of our own extensive front-line propaganda, the following translation of a German document, dated April, 1943, but recently found with material of a much more recent date, is of particular interest. It may, in fact, be a re-issue, to meet the present situation.

Since hardly any German combat propaganda is undertaken at this front, and since the Germans all-too-obviously are at the receiving end of propaganda everywhere this is believed to be counter-propaganda, designed to give German troops the impression that indefatigable German combat propagandists are continually at work, dealing out to the enemy what German troops themselves are receiving.

The impression is created that leaflets dropped by air, leaflets shot by shells and grenade launchers, frontline loudspeakers, etc. are continually exploited to the limit, so that new methods are wanted for even further intensification of the effort. Quite correctly, the German command thus hopes to lessen the impact of our propaganda, making it seem part of a two-way traffic.

Translation

GERMAN HIGH COMMAND  
"COMMUNICATION TO THE TROOPS"

PRIZE COMPETITION

Ist Prize. . . . .RM 2,000 and 1 accordion, etc.

This competition is addressed to all Wehrmacht members, to be sure, but it must be said right away that . . . it presupposes a certain knowledge . . . of the real conditions at the front, which is not theoretical. Therefore only he who has fought at the front . . . will have a chance . . .

With great success our propaganda has in the past already been directed against the enemy, it has spared many of our comrades life and blood and thus fulfilled an important function.

The question now is to find ways and means to make German propaganda to the enemy more intensive, and if possible to divorce it from complicated technical devices so that the comrades in the furthestmost front lines may have an opportunity to disseminate propaganda material of the OKW-Army propaganda, in order to sap the enemy's will to fight, to convince him of the justice of our cause and thus to bring the war to a quicker end.

Therefore, the Army High Command section of Army propaganda calls you to participate in this contest, to think about the following problems and to offer suggestions. So far, we have disseminated propaganda to the enemy as follows:

1. Leaflets and pamphlets dropped from airplanes.
2. Leaflets disseminated by special ammunition, viz by the rifle grenade which it discharged by the launching attachment of rifle No. 98.  
or by propaganda bomb (from a special discharge tube),  
or by propaganda grenade 41 via propaganda mortar and white-red projectile fired from artillery.
4. (sic) Front-line loudspeakers from front to front.  
Moreover, megaphones, shouting in unison (Sprechchoere) and leaflets disseminated by patrols.

It is now the idea to find ways and means to disseminate propaganda to the enemy by other ways, that is, by means other than the above, and which can be contrived by the troops themselves. Material produced at home is being used, and desires for additional shipments used if humanly possible. Of course, it is impossible that an "inventor" uses parts of the precious shipments from home, rather . . . the inventions have to be of the kind which can be produced without resorting to any scarce materials.