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STAFF OFFICERS GUIDE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

*Prepared under the direction of
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

THE WAR OFFICE,
1962.

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PREFACE

The term “Psychological Operations” has replaced “Psychological Warfare”. While there is no implied difference of meaning between these two terms, it is considered that the new expression is more appropriate to current situations or in cases of military action in aid of the civil power, eg, in British Colonial territories.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

SECTION 1—NATURE, ROLE AND AIMS

1. Psychological Operations are defined as “the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions, to support current policy by influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of enemy, neutral and friendly groups in time of war or emergency”—or simply, their aim is to get the enemy, or other target audience, to think and act in a way which will be to our advantage.

Psychological Operations staffs and units have no responsibility for the maintenance of morale of our troops or of civilians on the home front.

2. Psychological Operations propaganda is applied by the following methods:—

- (a) The written word (including pictures)—by means of leaflets, posters, pamphlets, books, special publications, the press and television.
- (b) The spoken word—by means of radio, ground loudspeaker broadcasts, voice aircraft broadcasts, surrendered personnel teams, films, discussion groups, public address systems, rumours and television.

3. The aim of this pamphlet is to acquaint formation and unit commanders, and staff officers with the general principles of psychological operations and to provide them with an understanding of how they can be used effectively in support of military operations.

4. In considering the application of psychological operations to military operations it is important at the outset to place them in their true light in relation to other weapons of war.

5. Psychological Operations are not an independent weapon. They are not something to which to turn when all other military means have failed. They are not themselves a substitute for action, and although at times they may take a principal role when overt armed action may be restricted through political or other reasons, they should always be regarded as an organic support weapon and their use should be planned as such.

6. In wartime psychological operations fall into three categories:—

STRATEGIC TACTICAL AND CONSOLIDATION

SECTION 2—STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

7. Strategic psychological operations are directed at the total population—both military and civilian—in the area of operations under enemy, neutral

or friendly control. They form an integral part of the national overall strategic plan and, as such, their policy is decided at government level. The responsibility for directing this type of operation will invariably lie with national or supra-national authorities.

Aim

8. Strategic operations are designed to achieve the following aims :—
- (a) Support and explain the current national policy.
 - (b) Undermine the morale and efficiency of enemy armed forces and hostile civilian population.
 - (c) Promote and encourage dissension and disaffection amongst the enemy.
 - (d) Sustain the morale of friendly groups within enemy-held territory.
 - (e) Elicit the moral or active support of neutral nations.
 - (f) Increase friendship and co-operation amongst our allies.
 - (g) Give support to tactical psychological operations.

Methods

9. Strategic psychological operations achieve their aims by pursuing a relentless campaign to wear down the enemy and by reinforcing friendly opinion in support of military operations. They seek, for example, to exploit:—

- (a) Military and diplomatic defeats suffered by the enemy.
- (b) Failure of enemy agriculture, industrial and financial plans.
- (c) Shortage of enemy food, fuel, housing, clothing, medical and other domestic needs.
- (d) Enemy racial or religious persecution.
- (e) Dissensions and disagreements between enemy leaders and people, labour and management, enemy and satellites.
- (f) Enemy suppression of human rights.

Effects

10. Because strategic operations usually extend over a considerable period of time, their effects are often difficult to evaluate. The results, though effective, are not always specifically tangible; adequate intelligence concerning results is not always obtainable.

SECTION 3—TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

11. Tactical psychological operations are directed solely at the enemy armed forces or civilians located within the fighting zone, or in the area of projected tactical operations. Their purpose is to act in immediate and direct support of military operations. Their aim is normally the accomplishment of a specific military task. Whilst the aims and the methods used to achieve them will be dictated largely by *local* circumstances, the actual propaganda must always conform to the overall political directives laid down for strategic operations.

Aim

12. Tactical psychological operations are designed to achieve the following aims:—

- (a) Lower the morale of the enemy armed forces and weaken their will to resist.
- (b) Facilitate the occupation of enemy towns or territory by delivering ultimata, giving surrender directives, and issuing occupation orders.
- (c) Inform and direct friendly elements operating within enemy territory.
- (d) Remove any stigma placed upon our forces by the enemy.
- (e) Justify our war aims.
- (f) Give support to strategic psychological operations by providing detailed and timely knowledge of local vulnerabilities.

Methods

13. To achieve their aims tactical psychological operations can be employed to exploit enemy:—

- (a) Defeats and precarious situations.
- (b) Inferiority and inefficiency.
- (c) Physical discomforts and hardships.
- (d) Dissensions and disagreements over government and military policy.

Effects

14. In contrast with strategic operations, the results of tactical psychological operations are often more readily apparent; the flight, defection or surrender of enemy troops, the capitulation of strong-points, the unopposed entry into a town, or the expansion of a local success into a substantial gain, are all likely to be indicative of success. Interrogation of prisoners will also frequently provide indications as to the effects of a tactical operation.

SECTION 4—CONSOLIDATION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

15. Consolidation psychological operations are directed entirely at the civil population in both forward and rear areas with the aim of supporting military operations by influencing and gaining the co-operation of civilians in the rear of, or adjacent to, the fighting zones.

Methods

16. Consolidation operations achieve this aim by:—

- (a) Countering enemy propaganda designed to cause and aggravate unrest and discontent.
- (b) Dividing the population from and discrediting guerillas and saboteurs.
- (c) Disseminating government directives and in every way attempting to gain the co-operation and goodwill of the people, especially when irksome restrictions have to be imposed.

Effects

17. The effectiveness, or otherwise, of consolidation operations can, of course, be measured in the audience response. However, it should be borne in mind that frequently an apparent lack of co-operation on the part of the population will spring not so much from hostility as from fear of reprisals by the enemy.

SECTION 5—PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORTING INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES

18. Psychological operations have an essential contribution to make in support of IS Operations. The scale of disturbances may vary from local outbreaks against authority to revolution inspired by Communism or nationalism or a combination of both. In simple cases of aid to the civil power in the event of unrest, brought about by agitation and propaganda, a counter balance may be provided by an information service pursuing a sound constructive and positive programme supporting the governments actions.

19. If however the situation deteriorates because of terrorist activities and a state of emergency has to be declared, there is a need for a much more offensive type of programme, which whilst supporting the governments aims, will act as a destructive force against the terrorists.

Aim

20. The aims and methods of psychological operations in the IS role are similar to those given in Sections 2, 3 and 4.

Psychological operations in support of the IS role are designed to achieve the following aims:—

- (a) Support and explain current local Government policy.
- (b) Promote and encourage dissension and disaffection amongst dissident groups.
- (c) Sustain the morale of friendly groups in the area of operations.
- (d) Increase friendship and co-operation between the government and the people.
- (e) Justify the presence of and possible intervention by troops.
- (f) Lower the morale of any terrorists or dissident factors and weaken their will to resist.

Methods

21. Psychological Operations achieve these aims by measures which include:—

- (a) Countering propaganda designed to cause or aggravate unrest and discontent among the people.
- (b) Explaining to the people by means of leaflets, posters and radio, the reasons for the imposition of certain restrictions.
- (c) Publicising the advantages and methods of surrender.
- (d) Offering rewards for information.

22. It must be borne in mind that psychological operations carried out in these circumstances are particularly liable to touch upon political questions, and it is essential therefore that all operations are in complete conformity with Government policy; no promises, threats or statements made will diverge in the smallest degree from the laid down political directives.

SECTION 6—PROPAGANDA

23. Inherent in the employment of psychological operations devices is the use of propaganda—“any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated with the intention of influencing the minds of others directly or indirectly”.

24. When considering his line of attack the propagandist must bear in mind the capabilities and limitations of propaganda which are:—

(a) Capabilities

- (i) Propaganda is capable of acting as the official voice of the nation, which, through it, presents its aims and objectives.
- (ii) Since it carries the full weight and authority of the nation it can make use of the nation's prestige and position in the world.
- (iii) It can create issues in the enemy camp by openly bringing up and playing upon questions which the enemy wishes to ignore.
- (iv) It can counter false claims and allegations made in enemy propaganda.
- (v) It must be quick to seize every opening either by exploitation or rebuttal.

(b) Limitations

- (i) Being the "voice of the enemy" it must face natural resentment if the audience is hostile. In countering false claims it must be careful not to increase the enemy audience's belief in them.
- (ii) As it presents the official view of the nation, it is limited in the subject matter it may employ. It must remain dignified and truthful and therefore avoid the use of sensational themes which might adversely affect the national standing.
- (iii) Without full access to the target audience, e.g. through jamming, censorship, restrictions and penalties imposed by the enemy for listening and reading, its effects can be reduced and sometimes nullified by the enemy.
- (iv) The distance between the originator and the target audience may restrict the effective range of its activities.
- (v) It is always open to enemy propaganda.

CHAPTER 2—INTELLIGENCE**SECTION 7—SOURCES AND AGENCIES**

25. Like any other operation of war, psychological operations must be based upon sound, reliable intelligence if they are to be successful. The vital importance of this factor in psychological operations cannot be emphasised too strongly. Once propaganda has been disseminated it cannot be recalled, and should it have been founded on inaccurate intelligence nothing can be done to avert harmful consequences. It cannot be retracted without doing further harm, and the damage which ensues is not confined to the failure of that specific operation alone, but can be so spread as to bring the whole psychological operations structure into discredit and disrepute.

26. Psychological Operations intelligence needs to be based on as full a selection of sources as it is possible so that an overall picture of the situation can be obtained. Speed of communication is also essential in this respect in order to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Normal intake of secret and open information will be supplemented by field interrogation, censorship, general intelligence on the enemy country and monitoring resources.

SECTION 8—INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PECULIAR TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

27. Whereas conventional military intelligence is concerned only with the material aspect of the military characteristics and conditions of the enemy, psychological operations planners need to know the enemy's mental attitudes and reactions to a great diversity of conditions in order to assess his psychological vulnerabilities.

28. Psychological Operations intelligence, therefore, must comprise detailed and up-to-date information on the political, religious, social, economic and psychological as well as the military characteristics and conditions of whatever individuals, groups, races or nationalities form the potential target. In order to achieve such a comprehensive picture of the situation there will be a requirement for special collection of intelligence

SECTION 9—ASSESSMENT OF PROPAGANDA EFFECTS

29. In addition to the usual classes of information referred to above there are two others of the highest importance in assessing the effects of psychological operations. Firstly, there is that obtained by an intelligence watch kept to observe the degree of target audience reaction to our propaganda. The information from this may be conveniently classified under three headings:—

- (a) *Responsive action.* This direct evidence of effects is more usually apparent in tactical and consolidation operations than in strategic. It includes the immediate surrender of enemy soldiers in battle after a direct leaflet or loudspeaker appeal; a definite act of sabotage or other action by a friendly civilian population following a broadcast or leaflet appeal, or other equally clear-cut response to a psychological operation. It may, on the other hand, show itself in the hardening of the enemy's attitude if the operation has been ill-timed or based on inaccurate premises.

- (b) *Participant reports.* This type of evidence, which is obtained from interrogation of PW, refugees and escapers, and the examination of captured documents, whilst potentially of the utmost value, nevertheless needs very careful sifting and study to reach the truth concerning the effects of a psychological operation. Stories may be coloured by political or national bias or self-interest; letters and diaries may contain wishful thinking, imaginary details and other false information. At the same time, documents intended for political or educational training will frequently reveal the impact of our propaganda efforts.
- (c) *Observer commentaries.* Official observers in neutral countries and friendly agents in enemy territory and friendly agents in enemy territory are some of the sources of this type of evidence. In the tactical sphere, report by OPs and our forward troops on immediate enemy response to leaflets and loudspeaker operations are also useful.

Indirect indicators

30. The second additional type of information lies in those indirect indications supplied by the enemy in the form of sanctions imposed on those caught reading or listening to our propaganda; radio jamming; tightening or relaxing of military discipline, and his own propaganda designed to counter our efforts. A study of the intensity of these measures before and after an operation can result in a clear indication being obtained of the efficiency—or otherwise— of our efforts.

CHAPTER 3

LEAFLET OPERATIONS

SECTION 10—CHARACTERISTICS

31. One of the principal methods of transmitting propaganda, particularly in tactical operations, is in the use of leaflets.

32. In psychological operations the term “leaflets” is applied to actual leaflets, airdrop newspapers, news-sheets, posters, safe-conduct passes or any attractive item containing a message.

33. In deciding whether to use leaflets, the propagandist has to consider chiefly the standard of literacy of his target audience, weather conditions, production facilities and means of delivery available.

34. The following are some of the unvarying capabilities and limitations attendant on leaflet operations:—

(a) Capabilities

- (i) The text or illustration can be chosen to suit the characteristics and literacy of the audience and the purpose of the leaflet.
- (ii) A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. It may be passed on to others without alteration or distortion.
- (iii) The written word has a higher credibility rating than the spoken word.
- (iv) Leaflets are capable of reaching a wide range of individuals, including those who are out of loudspeaker range and those who are unable to receive radio messages.
- (v) Leaflets can be directed to a specific, selected target.
- (vi) They can be produced in a variety of styles, shapes and sizes to meet varying situations.
- (vii) By the use of colour and typography, a leaflet can be made to convey meanings beyond its textual or pictorial content.

(b) Limitations

- (i) Effective psychological operations often depend on the rapid exploitation of fleeting situations. The time necessary to prepare, reproduce and distribute leaflets might reduce their effectiveness in such a situation.
- (ii) The distribution of the finished leaflets depends upon other arms, services and agencies.
- (iii) The enemy may impose severe punishment on troops picking up and circulating leaflets.
- (iv) The enemy may organize the rapid collection and destruction of leaflets and other counter-measures.
- (v) Complete co-ordination with the forward troops is essential. Failure by our own troops to abide by the provisions made in the leaflets can seriously damage the effectiveness of the operation.

SECTION 11—CREATIVE TECHNIQUES**Preparation**

35. There are four main principles to be observed in the preparation of any leaflet. It must be so designed as to gain the maximum *attention*. The propagandist must be satisfied that the leaflet will be *accepted and understood* by the audience and will convey his exact meaning. It must arouse or play upon an existing *need* in the audience (eg, self preservation), and finally, it must suggest a way of satisfying that need.

Headings

36. The leaflet heading should be brief and eye-catching; no more than one to four words. If possible it should summarise the theme of the entire message in short, forceful words.

Text

37. The first sentence or two of the text should contain the substance of the message followed by facts and details, so that the attention of the audience is captured with the first few words.

Facts

38. Facts of vital importance to the reader, whether favourable or unfavourable to him, will command his attention if expressed briefly and to the point. Simplicity of words, and ideas that are likely to be easily grasped by the reader, must always be used. Involved and obscure arguments are useless.

Themes

39. Normally only one theme should be used. A leaflet which presents two or more unrelated subjects tends to confuse the audience and detracts from the persuasive strength of each subject. If more than one theme is used, they should be closely related to a single task.

Colour

40. The use of colour can add to the appeal and help to convey the desired mood. Normally colours will be chosen to contrast with the terrain on which the leaflets are to be dropped, but in exceptional circumstances, for example when sanctions are imposed by the enemy against picking up and reading leaflets, or when organised collection and destruction is likely, then it may be desirable to choose a colour which will blend with the ground to delay detection and collection.

Art

41. Photographs, cartoons and drawings can all convey additional meaning. They can, if carefully produced, often be used with the minimum of written comment—a useful device when employed against an audience with a low standard of literacy.

SECTION 12—CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENT

Categories

42. Leaflets broadly fall into the following six categories:—

- (a) Surrender leaflets.
- (b) Safe-Conduct passes.
- (c) Newspapers.
- (d) News-letters.
- (e) Contingency leaflets.
- (f) Special situation leaflets.

TRANSLATION

ONE MINUTE

which may save your life

Read the following six points carefully and thoroughly. They may mean for you the difference between life and death.

1. In a battle of material, valour alone cannot offset the inferiority in tanks, planes and artillery.

2. With the smashing of the West Wall and the collapse in the East, the decision has been reached: Germany has lost the war.

3. You are not facing barbarians who delight in killing, but soldiers who would spare your life if possible.

4. But we can only spare those who do not force us by senseless resistance, to use our weapons against them.

5. It is up to you to show us your intention by raising your arms, waving a handkerchief, etc., in an unmistakable manner.

6. Prisoners-of-war are treated decently, in a fair manner, as becomes soldiers who have fought bravely.

You must decide for yourself. But, in the event that you should find yourself in a desperate situation, remember what you have read.

Translation of British Surrender Leaflet used against WEHRMACHT. A good leaflet with an arresting heading, and a persuasive approach. It also embodies instructions as to how to surrender. For reverse of leaflet see plate 2.

What is to be done?

Individual surrender: Individuals or small groups surrender by putting away weapons, helmet and belt, raising their arms and waving either a handkerchief or a leaflet. If Allied soldiers are in the immediate vicinity they are to be called. Safe Conducts, though helpful, are not absolutely necessary. Collection points for PWs are to be found along the main highways and thoroughfares.

Group surrender: Where larger groups surrender, this has to be carried out while observing military discipline. The ranking non-commissioned officer is responsible for its orderly execution. Officers surrender their units in a body, if possible, to an Allied officer of equal rank. If parleys are required, authorised parlementaires may be sent according to the Hague Convention, to contact the nearest Allied Command Post.

Treatment of Prisoners

1. **IMMEDIATE REMOVAL** from the battle-zone. Base camps are ready for you.
 2. **DECENT TREATMENT.** According to the Geneva Convention, you are treated like soldiers.
 3. **GOOD FOOD.** You receive the same nourishment as we, the best-fed army in the world.
 4. **HOSPITAL CARE.** Your wounded and sick are treated just like our own.
 5. **MAIL CONNECTION.** You can write 4 postcards and 4 letters home per man per month.
 6. **RETURN HOME.** After the war you are returned home as soon as possible.
-

Surrender leaflets

43. When the enemy is hard pressed and his morale is shaken, special surrender appeals can be addressed to him by means of leaflets. The content should be based upon accurate and up-to-date intelligence of the situation, possibly illustrated with a simple sketch map showing the enemy's tactical position and containing explicit directions concerning surrender and subsequent treatment.

44. Care should be exercised that the content does not appear to mock or ridicule the enemy or imply that any stigma can be attached to his surrendering. The aim should be to enable the enemy soldier to rationalize his act of surrender by representing it as a logical step, in the circumstances in which he is placed, to preserve himself for some other duty or course which is made to look honourable. (An example of a Surrender Leaflet is shown at Plates 1 and 2).

Safe Conduct passes


45. A Safe-Conduct Pass is often incorporated in the surrender leaflet. It is the most official in appearance of all psychological operations leaflets. It is designed to be carried by the enemy soldier when he surrenders to our forces. (An example of a Safe Conduct Pass is shown at Plate 3).

46. Possession of the safe-conduct pass reassures the enemy soldier during unfavourable circumstances that there is a way out of his present dangers. It discourages him from making a last-ditch stand by telling him he can surrender with the promise of fair treatment.


47. The safe-conduct pass, although aimed primarily at securing surrenders, has important anti-morale effects. Constant possession of the leaflet, even joking about it in favourable times, advertises and keeps alive the knowledge that in it lies a way out to safety should the soldier find himself in a position of utmost extremity. The germ of defection is thus preserved in the soldier's mind.

48. The essential characteristics of a safe-conduct pass are:—

- (a) *Distinctive form.* The typographical arrangements and colour must be unique from all other leaflets used. It must be easily recognized by our own troops.
- (b) *Official appearance.* The pass must convey the impression of being a serious and official document. To this end it should bear the stamp or seal and facsimile signature of the supreme commander in the theatre.



SAFE CONDUCT



The soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

A. R. Alexander
FIELD MARSHAL

Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations

Translations in German, Italian
and Polish on other side.

- (c) *Clear directions.* The pass features the captor's language in large type and subordinates the enemy translation. It should assure the enemy soldier wishing to surrender that it will afford him adequate protection when he gives himself up.
- (d) *Convenient size.* The discovery of a safe-conduct pass in a soldier's possession by his own superiors may render him liable to extreme punishment. The pass must therefore be of a size which will enable it to be conveniently kept on his person without risk of detection.

Newspapers

49. Newspapers can be used with advantage, if facilities exist, in strategic, tactical or consolidation operations. Whilst their effects are likely to be long term, they are often invaluable in building up audience credibility by the factual reporting of news with an apparent absence of propaganda.

50. If it is contemplated to use a newspaper the following conditions should be borne in mind:—

- (a) It must be so produced as to look like a newspaper and, moreover, the type of newspaper to which the target audience is accustomed.
- (b) It should be regularly issued, dated and numbered serially.
- (c) It must avoid appearing an obvious vehicle for propaganda. Its content should be balanced by the inclusion of international, sporting and unimportant but attractive items. Pictures—suitable reproduction facilities exist—will add much to the overall attractiveness.

News leaflets

51. There will be occasions when a piece of news, good or bad, is so important locally that it demands special and immediate treatment. Such news if disseminated rapidly before the enemy has had time to take action, puts him in the unsatisfactory position of substantiating our output or impairing his own credibility.

52. On these occasions a special news leaflet can be issued containing the information. Such leaflets are particularly effective when the enemy has imposed strict censorship or other controls over the dissemination of news. In these leaflets the propagandist is not, of course, bound to follow the layout adopted for newspapers.

Contingency leaflets

53. During the course of operations certain recurring situations may require precisely the same type of psychological operations action, or it may be that a good appreciation may anticipate the development of an exploitable situation or again, that certain themes may be considered worthy of constant repetition. In these cases contingency leaflets are fully or partially prepared in advance thus not only permitting quick and timely action later, but also spreading the load on personnel and presses.

Special situation leaflets

54. These are leaflets produced in response to a particular and, perhaps, fleeting opportunity. The main considerations in their use are purely those of timing, production and dissemination requirements. Against the enemy they are successful because they are exploiting a known vulnerability and convey to him the conviction that we possess accurate and up-to-the-minute knowledge of his situation. They can thus serve to heighten and aggravate his fears and dissensions in moments of crisis or, in other cases, impart information which will pacify a disturbed or apprehensive population.

SECTION 13—METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

55. There are three principal methods of delivering leaflets to the enemy; by conventional artillery, by air drop bombs and packages, and by means of infantry patrols.

Artillery

56. The gun at present used as a means of delivery is the 25 pr Close Support field gun. Its successor will also have the same capability and it should shortly be possible to use the medium gun in this role. The shell is a modified base ejection smoke shell which ejects leaflets over the target. Maximum shell capacity is 200 leaflets measuring approximately nine inches by seven inches for the field gun and 500 leaflets for the medium gun. The pattern of distribution is dependent on wind speed, height of burst, and configuration of the ground. As a rough guide, the average spread from one shell set to burst 100 feet above the ground would be 300 feet by 300 feet.

57. In considering the use of artillery as the means of delivery, the following capability and limitation factors should be weighed:—

(a) Capabilities

- (i) The smoke shell is easily and quickly modified at the gun position to take leaflets; no special equipment is required.

- (ii) Use of artillery enables pin-point or small area targets to be engaged.
- (iii) Both field and medium guns are normally part of any field force and should, therefore, be readily available.

(b) *Limitations*

- (i) The shell capacity is limited and a small percentage of failures cannot be avoided.
- (ii) Operations may be restricted by the range of the gun.
- (iii) There is a tendency for leaflets to be damaged on ejection.

Aerial delivery

58. The main method of aerial delivery is the air-drop package. At present no BRITISH leaflet bomb is available which can be dropped from aircraft. The US Air Force is equipped, however, with the M129 leaflet bomb with a capacity of 45,000 leaflets which can be delivered by an aircraft of suitable size.

Air-drop package

59. This consists of a package of paper, or other material, containing the leaflets and held together by a length of safety fuze. A simple pyrotechnic device attached to a static line from the aircraft triggers the fuze which burns through releasing the contents of the package at the required height above the ground. These packages may be demanded through usual Ordnance channels. Each package has a capacity of approximately 12,000 leaflets.

60. By using aircraft for delivery purposes greater distribution can be achieved in one sortie than by the use of artillery and the operational range is considerably increased. However, the use of aircraft is more likely to be hampered and perhaps prevented by weather conditions and enemy action.

CHAPTER 4

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

SECTION 14—OPERATIONS GROUND AND VOICE AIRCRAFT

61. The second principal method of delivering tactical propaganda is by loudspeaker. It can be used either in the ground role or from voice aircraft.

Ground operations

62. The equipment currently in use in the British Army is illustrated below. Designated the ALS 10 it is a normal issue to all major units employed on IS operations for crowd and curfew control, and is well suited to psychological operations. (See Plate 4).




PLATE 4

63. It consists of loudspeakers, amplifier and batteries. A small modification enables the ALS 10 to operate in conjunction with a tape recorder. By means of endless loop cassettes a taped message can be broadcast repeatedly. This will allow a single message to be repeated as often as desired without further adjustment of the apparatus. The loudspeakers can be sited to operate by remote control up to a maximum distance of approximately 400 yards from the rest of the equipment.

As will be seen from the photograph the whole equipment, plus that of the two members of the loudspeaker team, can be transported in a $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck drawing a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trailer. It is not a difficult task to mount it in any suitable GS vehicle under local REME arrangements.

64. The effective range of the equipment in the ground role depends upon weather conditions (particularly wind) and the type of terrain over which it is used. Generally, satisfactory results can be obtained in average conditions in open country at a maximum of 800 yards range. At this range the entire message should be heard by the target audience. At longer ranges up to 1,000 yards the gist of the message should be discernable under most conditions.

65. A list of the major items which comprise one complete ALS 10 equipment when used in the psychological support role is shown in Appendix A.

66. In addition to the ALS 10 a small, powered hand-loudspeaker known as the Transhailer has been issued to principal overseas commands and is effective over a range of about 400 yards.

Voice aircraft operations

67. When used from aircraft, loudspeakers are mounted externally under the aircraft wing or fuselage, or are sited to broadcast from an opening in the fuselage. For maximum length of audible message the aircraft orbits the target with speakers directed towards the centre of orbit. The shape or location of the target and the nature of surrounding terrain may be such that the orbit method is not possible or desirable; straight and level flight or a figure-of-eight manoeuvre may be used with speakers suitably adjusted for vertical or sideways transmissions.

68. The most effective height above target for speech broadcasting has been found to be 1000—2500 feet. The maximum horizontal distance from target for reasonable reception with current equipments is in the order of 1000 yards. The choice of manoeuvre and operating height will depend on the nature of



Plate 5

Interior of Twin Pioneer CC Mk. 1 showing speech broadcasting equipment. In the foreground are the four amplifier packs (two for each speaker) and in the background is the operators position showing controls, tape desk and seating for operator and linguist.



Plate 6
Twin Pioneer CC Mk. 1 showing speakers mounted under the stub wings.

the target and the surrounding terrain, and on the performance of the aircraft used. Engine noise naturally affects reception and a compromise must normally be drawn between the slow speed requirement for maximum reception time at any given point and the need to fly at "quiet" engine settings.

69. The following are the main characteristics, favourable and unfavourable, inherent in the use of loudspeakers in both the ground or voice aircraft role.

(a) *Capabilities*

- (i) Unaided reception. Provided that the situation will permit of the equipment being brought up within effective range, there is little the enemy can do to prevent the broadcast being heard by his troops. Literacy is clearly not a factor.
- (ii) Shock value. The shock effect of a loudspeaker broadcast can be very valuable in assisting the psychological impact of the message. This is particularly so in the case of surrender appeals.
- (iii) Mobility. The mobility of the equipment enables it to be brought to bear swiftly upon a selected target.
- (iv) "Face-to-Face" effect. The message can be made to appear personal to the target audience. Additional meaning can be conveyed through vocal inflection and tone of voice.
- (v) Immediate evaluation. It is often possible quickly to assess the effects of the propaganda used by observing the immediate reaction of the audience.

(b) *Limitations*

- (i) Sensitivity of equipment. The loudspeaker equipment is sensitive and prone to failure unless handled with considerable care.
- (ii) Protection and concealment. Whilst the enemy can do little to prevent reception of the message once the equipment is within range, he may adopt violent counter-measures as soon as he has located it. For this reason concealment, though often difficult, is vital. Siting must conform to the plan of the local commander and adequate protection must be afforded by the forward troops when loudspeaker equipment is used in the ground role. When employed from voice aircraft an escort may have to be provided.

Linguists

70. The best effects from loudspeaker broadcast are usually obtained by live broadcast using the idiom of the enemy language. Taped loudspeaker appeals can be used to overcome the shortage of linguists but they may lack the topicality and sympathy which direct speech can give. On the other hand, tapes prepared unhurriedly in a safe area may well give a more effective performance than a live broadcaster operating under fire and other difficulties. The use of tapes can also avoid the risk of unreliable linguists nullifying a broadcast by wrong inflexion of voice or deliberate alteration of text.

71. The loudspeaker message should not exceed 40 seconds in broadcast time when using the endless loop cassette method, and not more than 90 seconds when using direct unrecorded speech. This will forestall enemy attempts at counter-measures and also ensure that the appeal is kept simple and comprehensible. Whenever possible, repetition should be used in the content of the message to ensure that the salient points of the appeal are not missed by the target audience.

CHAPTER 5

RADIO OPERATIONS

SECTION 15—CHARACTERISTICS

72. The use of radio in psychological operations is normally confined to strategic and consolidation operations and will almost invariably be operated by Government sponsored civilian agencies. There may be occasions when Service participation in running a radio station or programme may be required and the radio may be used in Service consolidation and tactical psychological operations.

73. Radio can be an ideal medium for psychological operations. Its value chiefly lies in its quality of mass communication. In areas where radio receivers are widespread, radio can reach more people more quickly at one time and from one source than any other medium. The “black” operation of radio stations claiming to be in enemy territory is being increasingly used by many countries as a means of psychological operations, and if cleverly done and put out on the right wavelengths can be most effective.

74. The following are the main characteristics of radio as applied to psychological operations :—

(a) *Capabilities*

- (i) By its speed in reaching the target audience it allows propaganda to be prepared and disseminated to take advantage of fleeting opportunities in fast-moving situations.

- (ii) Exploitation of its flexibility in time and wavelength enables it to be brought to bear against the right target at the right time.
- (iii) Through the use of its highly specialised organisation it can produce programmes of high quality and attractiveness.

(b) *Limitations*

- (i) Dependence upon skilled technical personnel, producers, announcers and other specialists can result in breakdown of operations if their services are discontinued.
- (ii) The enemy can introduce effective counter-measures such as jamming and the use of wired radio.
- (iii) When used to support tactical operations, fighting troops may have no time to listen to radio.
- (iv) Receivers may be inadequate for appreciable effects to be obtained.

SECTION 16—PROGRAMME PLANNING

75. The likelihood of Service Officers being in the position of taking over and running a radio station is remote but, should the occasion arise, the following principles should be observed:—

- (a) *Wavelength.* If not already allotted, this must be decided upon and made known both to the radio authorities and the audience.
- (b) *Station Identification Signal.* This is necessary as an introduction and postscript to the day's programme. It also builds a feeling of familiarity in the target audience.
- (c) *Interval Signal.* Coupled with (b) above, this identifies the station and can be used to fill gaps in the programme by assuring the listener that the station is still on the air.
- (d) *Timing.* Correct timing and punctuality of transmissions are of cardinal importance. Special programmes designed for particular 'red letter' days observed by the target audience help to create an atmosphere of familiarity.
- (e) *Daily habits.* The listening habits of the audience must be studied to discover peak listening hours and the types of programme likely to prove most attractive at any given time of the day.

- (f) *Rehearsals.* Despite the urgency with which programmes may sometimes have to be put on the air, it is of the greatest importance that they should be rehearsed beforehand. The smooth and punctual presentation of material all conveys an impression of control and efficiency indispensable from any psychological operation.
- (g) *Printed matter.* Leaflets may be useful in gaining attention for important broadcasts, in following up and supporting broadcast themes and for notifying wavelengths, transmission times, popular programmes, etc.

CHAPTER 6

COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

SECTION 17—RESPONSIBILITY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

76. In war or any emergency the overseas department of H.M. Government and the Services will assume the responsibility for conducting psychological operations in its own sphere of responsibility. The overseas department will direct the psychological operations effort in the strategic field whilst the services, will carry out tactical operations. There will be close co-ordination between these departments in the planning and carrying out of operations.

Consolidation operations will often be planned and executed jointly in the early stages of military occupation or liberation, but will become the sole responsibility of the local Government directing civil administration after active military operations have ceased or moved on from the area.

In the case of IS operations in aid of the civil power in a British dependant territory, psychological operations will rest with the overseas Government.

SECTION 18—PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STAFFS

77. Psychological Operations are a General Staff (Operations) responsibility. Staff Officers trained in psychological operations will be provided at Force Headquarters on a scale commensurate with the size of the force. Their task will be to advise their Commander and lower formation Commanders and to control the tactical operations in support of the force. All projected operations will be within the framework of political guidance given by the Political Adviser to the Force Commander when one is appointed. In the absence of a Political Adviser the Psychological Operations Staff Officer must ensure that the operations conform with the overall political directive. It is also his responsibility, through liaison with Intelligence Staffs to ensure that psychological operations units receive relevant and timely intelligence upon which to base their operations.

SECTION 19—PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS

78. Tactical psychological operations units will be placed in support of the force whenever the necessity arises. These units will consist of Service personnel with the addition of civilian specialists as required.

The units will be self-contained for transport and specialized equipment, but will generally be attached to a formation HQ for administration. Their size and equipment will vary according to operational needs, but will be based upon the following:—

- (a) *Headquarters.* Consisting of OC and small staff. Their function will be the preparation of propaganda based on the political directions and intelligence received from the psychological operations staff at force or formation headquarters. The OC will be responsible for ensuring liaison is established with forward troops in the area of a projected psychological operation and also with leaflet printing and dissemination agencies. Facilities exist for producing simple leaflets in an emergency, but normally they will be printed by RAOC printing units or local presses.
- (b) *Field sections.* These may be composed of one or more sections. Each section will be capable of operating independently for the dissemination of propaganda through the media of loudspeakers and leaflets.

SECTION 20.—PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CENTRE

79. The study of psychological operations in support of military operations is the responsibility of the Psychological Operations Centre, located at Maresfield Camp, UCKFIELD, Sussex.

The Centre is a War Office sponsored establishment under the control of DGMT, run on behalf of the three services. It is responsible for conducting courses for officers of the three services and representatives from other Government Ministries to teach them the principles of psychological support for military operations. In addition, the Centre will provide assistance to Home and Overseas Commands for local psychological operations courses and exercises involving the employment of psychological support.

ALS 10 Equipment Table

Amplifier	1	
Loudspeakers re-entrant	2	
Recorder magnetic tape (REH 1)	1	
Microphone	1	
Transformer rotary	1	
Batteries secondary portable 6 Volt 170 AH	12	
Charging sets BSA 300 watt 15 volt	1	
Endless loop cassettes	12	} For use with the recorder magnetic tape
3½ metal spools	12	
Spare spools of tape	12	