

## WAR CABINET MEMORANDA.

### CONTENTS.

W.P. (39) 82,	<a href="#"><u>THE EFFECTS OF DROPPING LEAFLETS</u></a>	October 9, 1938
W.P. (39) 119,	<a href="#"><u>THE EFFECTS OF DROPPING LEAFLETS</u></a>	November 8, 1939
W.P. (39) 97,	<a href="#"><u>PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES</u></a>	October 26, 1939
W.P. (R.) (39) 95,	<a href="#"><u>PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES</u></a>	November 27, 1939
W.P. (R.) (40) 2,	<a href="#"><u>PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES</u></a>	January 1, 1940
W.P. (R.) (40) 20,	<a href="#"><u>PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES</u></a>	January 12, 1940
W.P. (R.) (40) 105,	<a href="#"><u>PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES</u></a>	March 29, 1940
W.P. (R.) (40) 119,	<a href="#"><u>PROPAGANDA BY LEAFLET</u></a>	April 13, 1940
W.P. (40) 444,	<a href="#"><u>PROPAGANDA POLICY</u></a>	November 15, 1940

*Printed for the War Cabinet. October 1939.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (39) 82.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**THE EFFECT OF THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS IN GERMANY.**

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

IN accordance with the conclusions reached by the War Cabinet on the 2nd October (39 (34), Minute 2), I circulate to my colleagues a memorandum summarising the information available as to the effect of the dropping of leaflets in Germany, together with a memorandum by Sir Campbell Stuart summarising the arguments in favour of continuing this practice.

H.

*Foreign Office, October 9, 1939.*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR CABINET SUMMARISING THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS IN GERMANY.**

**OUR information which is necessarily fragmentary, comes from (1) foreign Governments, (2) private sources in neutral countries, and (3) our own secret sources. The greatest weight attaches to the first category of reports.**

**(1) FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.**

**A.—Unfavourable.**

*Denmark.*

On the 11th September the Danish Minister in London said that, as a sincere friend of this country, he much regretted the damage which was being done to our position in neutral countries by the dropping of leaflets since this placed neutral Governments and populations in a difficult and embarrassing position.

*Holland.*

On the 10th September the Dutch General Staff stated that in their opinion more harm than good was being done by leaflet dropping. Our leaflets only gave the impression in Germany that we were not pursuing the war seriously and were afraid to arouse reprisals. The same impression prevailed in friendly and neutral countries (this was confirmed by our own secret reports: see under (3) A below).

*Belgium.*

The British Embassy at Brussels was informed confidentially by the Belgian Foreign Office on the 13th September that the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin had reported that the effect of the leaflets was the opposite to that which the British Government desired. They had only aroused German memories of 1918

when they had been urged to get rid of their Government, but had not benefited by so doing. The Belgian Consul at Cologne and German deserters in Belgium had sent similar reports. The Belgian Ambassador in London and the Belgian Military Attaché in Paris spoke on similar lines on the 23rd September and the 27th September respectively.

The Belgian, Dutch and Danish Governments have all complained about the accidental dropping of leaflets on their territory. As it seems to be impossible to avoid this, the irritation caused to these well-disposed neutrals is an important factor to be taken into consideration.

*France.*

On the 10th September the French General Staff, while admitting that there were two opinions on the subject, said that they thought our leaflets had convinced the German people that we did not mean to fight seriously and that they had also discouraged our Polish allies.

B.—*Favourable.*

*Greece.*

On the 23rd September the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Minister that the dropping of leaflets had had a great effect according to their information from Berlin.

(2) PRIVATE SOURCES IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

A.—*Unfavourable.*

*Denmark.*

His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen reported on the 8th September that reliable neutrals arriving from Berlin all took the view that the British leaflets had an unfortunate effect. Unless bombs were also dropped the Germans would think that Great Britain and France were afraid to fight.

*Yugoslavia.*

On the 10th September His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade said that the German propaganda was making great play with our leaflet dropping, and pointing out in particular its uselessness to our Polish allies. Sir R. Campbell recommended from the point of view of opinion in neutral States that if the leaflets must be dropped, we should not mention the fact in our broadcasts.

*Holland.*

A report of the 12th September from Amsterdam quoted a German who had been in Holland during one of our raids as saying that no one in Germany would dare to look at the leaflets.

According to a further Amsterdam report of the 18th September, an important German business man had said that the pamphlets had no effect and only convinced the German people that Great Britain was not serious. The German propagandists had been delighted that we had provided them with such a useful line of internal propaganda.

A further Amsterdam report of the 25th September confirmed the two previous reports.

*Egypt.*

His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has reported widespread criticism of our pamphlet dropping among the foreign communities in Egypt.

*Belgium.*

A report of the 25th September quoted a Belgian business man with good contacts in Germany as reporting that he had heard no mention of the British leaflets during a visit to Germany.

B.—*Favourable.**Denmark.*

His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen on the 13th September reported that, although the style of the earlier leaflets had been criticised, the German Party authorities seemed to be afraid of their possible effects. According to a German Roman Catholic priest, the leaflets were much sought after.

*Switzerland.*

His Majesty's Consul at Basle forwarded on the 13th September reports that, although the German upper classes were scornful of our pamphlets, the lower classes were impressed by this proof of the potentialities of the R.A.F.

*Holland.*

According to the Amsterdam report of the 25th September already quoted above, the leaflets had at least had the effect of surprising the German people in that the British aircraft had in fact been able to cross the frontier.

## (3) OUR OWN SECRET SOURCES.

A.—*Unfavourable.*

According to a report of the 11th September, the M.I.5 representative in Holland agreed that the Dutch General Staff thought the effect of our pamphlets had been most unfortunate. The German people were contemptuous of them and irritated by them. It was, however, suggested that a more objective type of pamphlet which did not personally attack Herr Hitler might be successful.

B.—*Favourable.*

A report of the 17th September quoted unofficial neutrals of no great standing as having reported that the leaflets had had some effect upon the man in the street in Germany.

According to another secret report of the 17th September, a Dutch resident in Berlin stated that the third pamphlet had been effective as compared with the first two, which had been complete failures.

According to a report of the 24th September from a competent channel in touch with representatives of the German middle class not normally favourable to the Nazis, the effect of the pamphlets might be insidious, although they had not been very successful so far.

A well-placed German source, who has proved very reliable in the past, said at the end of September that the dropping of leaflets instead of bombs had done much to convince the German people that the British were sincere in stating that they were not fighting the German people, but only the Nazi regime. The fact that the Allied aircraft had been able to enter Germany in spite of the so-called invincible German defences had also had a good effect. In the opinion of this source, propaganda and economic warfare were the Allies' most potent weapons. The leaflets would be more useful if they were shorter and in bigger print.

As a doubtful case, it might be mentioned that, according to Sir Campbell Stuart's principal German expert, the first full mention of Mr. Knickerbocker's charges of corruption against German leaders was only given publicity in the German press and wireless immediately after the first dropping of the leaflets containing these charges, although these were dropped three days after the charges had first been made. It is, however, arguable whether this was advantageous or not, since it might have been better not to have provoked a public refutation in Germany, but to have allowed insidious rumours to percolate from neutral countries and to spread secretly without any reply from the German Government.

It can be argued that it is yet too soon to pass judgment on this whole question. It is generally agreed that the first leaflets, which had to be put out at very short notice, were not entirely successful and that the whole position was

[20108]

B 2

prejudiced by the unnecessary dropping of leaflets over neutral countries. The later leaflets have, however, been more vigorous, and seem to have been more effective. With experience the leaflet writers are learning their business in the light of the actual war conditions. At this stage, when the Germans have not yet really felt the effects of war, owing to their easy victories in the East and the comparative calm in the West, the leaflets cannot be expected to have an immediate and devastating effect. For the time being they have concentrated upon the useful task of exposing the Nazi leaders and the S.S., &c. More constructive propaganda will be possible when our own war effort on the Western Front and elsewhere is more apparent.

*Foreign Office, October 9, 1939.*

MEMORANDUM BY SIR CAMPBELL STUART'S DEPARTMENT.

SINCE the outbreak of hostilities five leaflets have been disseminated in Germany. Three of them were general in character; one was the Prime Minister's broadcast; and one contained allegations against Nazi leaders of having placed money abroad. A number of others have been drafted and are ready for issue when required. Sir Campbell Stuart has naturally been most anxious to obtain information of the reception accorded to his Department's efforts in Germany, and has sought evidence of it in the wireless and press of Germany and neutral countries and in the reports he receives from Service and secret sources.

Reference by Göring to British leaflets and the drastic and extensive measures taken to prevent their being read by the German public have clearly indicated that the Nazi Government regard them as an effective weapon. Sir Campbell has, moreover, reason to suspect that an attempt to counteract the propaganda of his Department by German leaflets which purport to emanate from Great Britain has begun. This matter is being investigated at the moment.

The German press and wireless have made few references to British leaflets except as an echo of Göring's speech. The American wireless has contained favourable references; the Italian wireless, on the other hand, has not mentioned leaflets. The French press has also been generally favourable. The Dutch, Danish and Swiss press have published full translations of the texts. On the whole, however, few indications of value have been received from these sources.

According to information from private sources abroad, many of the judgments passed upon the merits of British leaflets have been coloured by the "leaflet *versus* bomb" controversy, and as a result leaflets have in some quarters been regarded with unfair disfavour.

Certain of the secret reports received have indicated that the first distribution of leaflets aroused considerable interest and discussion. They have undoubtedly had a "novelty" value. For instance, news from Berlin given in an M.I. 1 (b) report indicated that recipients had been considerably impressed. Similar intelligence was received from Aachen. Further reports indicate that the later leaflets have made a stronger appeal than the earlier. On the other hand, there have been suggestions that some Germans have regarded leaflet distribution as a sign of weakness. Such conflict, however, as exists in the reports received may well be explained by the fact that, whilst certain types of Germans, to whom the leaflets are particularly addressed, are impressed, others are not. This, however, is only to be expected in view of the conditions which prevail in Germany.

News from France that British leaflets have been found on prisoners has led to enquiries from the French military authorities, inasmuch as a *questionnaire* for prisoners had been furnished to them some time ago, but no reply has yet been received. It is hoped that, as the number of prisoners captured increases, information far more detailed and accurate than any hitherto received will be obtained.

The following reasons support the view that propaganda by leaflets should not be interrupted except for serious cause. It is not to be expected that, until deep divisions appear

in Germany, propaganda can do more than sow doubts and misgivings. The effects at which it aims will, however, only be achieved by steady and persistent effort. It may, at the moment and for some time, be impossible to hope for more than the establishment of a reputation for trustworthiness; but it would be an achievement indeed to realise this aim.

The deliberate policy which has governed the efforts of Sir Campbell Stuart's Department cannot be divulged to the public and at the same time kept from the enemy. Unless, however, it is explained, his leaflets are likely to be judged in this country as independent exercises rather than as steps towards a clear objective. As the war intensifies, both the scale and variety of his activities seem certain to increase and, consequently, the difficulties of explanation will be enhanced. There are, therefore, strong reasons for keeping these activities beyond the range of parliamentary questions and open controversy in the newspapers.

The decision of the Government to make the terms of British leaflets actually distributed in Germany available to members of Parliament and to allow them to be published in the Press may have been inevitable, in view of the apparent reasonableness of the argument that it would be absurd to keep from the British public matter freely given to its enemies. It has, however, had some unfortunate effects. The criterion by which leaflets should be judged is, of course, the German version. The public, which is generally ignorant both of German and the German mentality, naturally judges the leaflets from British standpoints. At any time public controversy in regard to a particular leaflet which offends particular British susceptibilities may arise. Such a controversy would obviously give the German propagandists an excellent opening. The fact that leaflets have now to be considered from the point of view of Parliament and the Press as well as that of the German reader presents, of course, an additional difficulty to those who draft them.

Leaflets, moreover, may often have to be prepared in the light of information not generally available to the public and, indeed, unsuitable in the public interest for public disclosure. Their purpose, therefore, may easily be misunderstood. It must also be remembered that there is an inevitable anomaly in giving publicity to the output of a secret Department and thus challenging discussion of its methods.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. November 1939.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (39) 119.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

THE EFFECT OF THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS IN GERMANY.

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

IN continuation of the memorandum W.P. (39) 82 of the 9th October, I circulate to my colleagues a memorandum summarising further information received as to the effect of the dropping of leaflets in Germany.

H.

*Foreign Office, November 8, 1939.*

SINCE the last memorandum W.P. (39) 82 was prepared for the War Cabinet on the 9th October, additional information has been received which is summarised below.

The new information has, as before, been classified, according to source, under three heads: (1) Foreign Governments; (2) Private sources in neutral countries; and (3) Secret sources.

(1) FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

(a) *Unfavourable.*

*Yugoslavia.*

On the 4th October His Majesty's Legation at Belgrade were informed by the Yugoslav Foreign Office that their Consul at Düsseldorf, in whom they had great confidence, had reported that the contents of the British leaflets had had little or no effect on the local population. He had suggested that it would be advisable to concentrate the leaflet propaganda upon the theme that Germany was in for a long war if the Hitler regime were not removed.

(2) PRIVATE SOURCES IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

(a) *Unfavourable.*

*Holland.*

On the 7th October a member of the staff of His Majesty's Legation at The Hague reported a conversation with a German business man opposed to the Nazis, who maintained that the leaflet raids had been a complete failure, and

10684 [20281]

had only cemented German feeling against the Allies. The leaflets regarding the fortunes of Nazi leaders had at first been effective, but they had been exploited so far that the average German had begun to doubt their credibility.

On the 19th October the Dutch Secretary of the Amsterdam branch of the Netherlands-England Society informed His Majesty's Legation that a reliable Dutch resident of Vienna, who travelled a lot in Germany, had reported that the pamphlets made no impression at all, in view of the German victory in Poland and the absence of spectacular Allied successes.

*Switzerland.*

On the 11th October His Majesty's Legation at Berne reported the views of an important German industrialist from the Rhineland opposed to the Nazi regime, obtained through a Swiss banker. According to this informant, the effect of our leaflets had been the reverse of that intended, and they had created anti-British rather than anti-Nazi feeling. This particular weapon was not calculated to impress the German people, who laughed at the idea that German strength could be broken by printed leaflets rather than by armed force. A diplomatic colleague of Sir G. Warner criticised the leaflets on the ground that they gave an inadequate return for the risk involved to our aircraft. Among the Swiss, Sir G. Warner reported some divergence of opinion on the value of the leaflets.

On the 14th October His Majesty's Consul-General at Zurich reported criticism of the leaflets by a well-informed Swiss, who thought they should concentrate upon exposing the Nazi leaders, and particularly Herr Hitler, rather than upon emphasising the hardships which Germany would suffer under the Allied blockade.

*Denmark.*

On the 16th October a friendly Danish journalist, who had just returned from a ten days' journey from the Danish to the Swiss frontiers of Germany to ascertain the feeling of the man-in-the-street in Germany, informed His Majesty's Legation in Copenhagen that the effect of our leaflets had been slight.

*Belgium.*

On the 19th October His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels, in a general report on information reaching Belgium about conditions in Germany, stated that a Dutch tobacco merchant of Antwerp, after a business visit to Hamburg, Aachen, Cologne and Westphalia, had said that nobody in Germany bothered about the British leaflets at present.

On the 9th and 10th October an anti-Nazi German business man from the Rhineland, interviewed in Brussels, maintained that the British propaganda leaflets were quite useless and would remain so. The Germans already distrusted their own propaganda, and would distrust enemy propaganda even more.

(b) *Favourable.*

*Denmark.*

On the 7th October Mr. F. E. Jordan, a former Berlin representative of the Federation of British Industries, who had left Berlin on the 1st September and remained in Copenhagen until the 2nd October, criticised the actual technique of the leaflets, but said that according to his information the German police were very quick to seize upon them, and that the German propaganda services were at great pains to produce as soon as possible indirect replies to the leaflets in the German press.

*Holland.*

On the 11th October the Acting British Vice-Consul at Leeuwarden reported information from Düsseldorf suggesting that the effect of the leaflet raids was considerable, because people objected to constant air-raid warnings and the consequent interruption of their normal life.



*Germany.*

On the 19th October Mr. Baylis of the Hamburg Consulate-General, who had just been released from Germany, said that the leaflets appeared to have had some effect, mainly because they proved that British aircraft had been able to fly over Germany.

## (3) SECRET SOURCES.

(a) *Unfavourable.*

According to a report on the 14th October summarising fragmentary information received from all over Germany, the leaflets have not had much effect, although it has been greater in the Ruhr than elsewhere. The Gestapo are not, however, leaving anything to chance.

On the 25th October a former German diplomat, patriotic but anti-Nazi, condemned what he called the "childish leaflets." His relations and friends in Germany had written to him in Switzerland to say how lamentably this propaganda had failed in its intended effect. The only positive result had been to annoy the anti-Nazis, who resented "enlightenment" from outsiders. German psychology only appreciated force and could only be convinced by military action and not by leaflets.

A report from Sir C. Stuart dated the 29th October suggested that in Westphalia the Nazis were attempting to remove apprehension by saying that our aircraft only dropped leaflets and not bombs.

(b) *Favourable.*

According to a report of the 6th October, a good German source who had travelled recently in different parts of the country said that the leaflets were pretty widely read in spite of the German police measures. They were, however, in his opinion too complicated and had not enough punch.

On the 7th October a British source in Copenhagen reported that leaflets dropped in West Germany had been found in Berlin, which proved that they were circulated. The stringent measures taken by the German police to prevent the circulation of leaflets was also significant. A German informant in Flensburg (Schleswig) thought the effect was far greater than was believed in Denmark. The leaflets were read and discussed on the quiet and everybody seemed to know their contents.

On the 29th October Sir C. Stuart reported that he had heard that the leaflets dropped in the Ruhr were taken into workshops and picked up by children in the streets.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. October 1939.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (39) 97.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.**

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues a report submitted by Sir Campbell Stuart on the work of the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries, covering the period the 8th October to the 22nd October, 1939.

H.

*October 26, 1939.*

**ENEMY PROPAGANDA.**

(Report by Sir Campbell Stuart, G.C.M.G., K.B.E.)

ON the 8th October I had the honour to submit a report which covered the work of my Department to that date. Since then there have been a number of developments which it is now my duty to record. Progress has, moreover, been maintained along all the normal lines of activity.

*Leaflets.*

Distribution by the Royal Air Force has continued to be intermittent, only two propaganda flights having been made. During the week before last two leaflets, the first containing the final passages of the Prime Minister's speech of the 11th October, and the second a summary of the whole pronouncement, were printed. About one and a half million of the former have been disseminated in Germany. In addition to the stock now in the hands of the Royal Air Force, a number of other leaflets have been drafted, and are being held in readiness for printing when required. Meanwhile, work has proceeded in connexion with certain secret channels with which I am concerned. It may be added that recent reports upon the effect of British leaflets, and particularly of those which have dealt with the smuggling by Nazi leaders of funds abroad, have been most encouraging, criticism coming chiefly from those who condemn the leaflet because it is not a bomb.

*Balloons.*

It should be remembered that in addition to aircraft as an agency of distribution, we have in France a large and increasing number of leaflet-carrying balloons. They are the outcome of a decision taken some time before the war.

And in the light of my own experience of the valuable part balloons played in the propaganda of 1918. Our balloons are made of doped cotton fabric, and inflate to a diameter of nine or ten feet. At ten thousand feet their endurance is about twelve hours. Height is maintained by the automatic dropping at intervals of leaflet ballast. The balloons are fitted with devices which ensure that when their work is accomplished, they will explode. Each balloon carries approximately three thousand leaflets, and the existing stock of them and rate of production are now sufficient to enable the Balloon Unit to operate continuously during favourable weather periods at a rate of four hundred balloons a week. There were initial flights by some sixty balloons at the beginning of the month. Hitherto the policy of my Department has been to regard the balloons as only to be used when for tactical or other reasons aircraft may not be available.

#### *Broadcasts.*

Active collaboration with the B.B.C. in the preparations of broadcast talks in German, Czech, and within the last few days Polish, has continued as an addition to the news in those languages. One of these talks, an appeal to the former spirit of the German army, with special reference to the death of General von Fritsch, was prepared and delivered by a member of the Department's staff. It has elicited numerous tributes from this country and abroad, and is reported from France to have made a deep impression in Germany. Other talks of a similar type will follow.

Evidence as to the reactions of these talks in Germany will necessarily be less complete than that from non-enemy countries. It is, nevertheless, enough to show that reasonably satisfactory effect has been produced. Furthermore, a new feature in the form of occasional broadcasts addressed specially to the Austrian people has been introduced.

It may be added that the strengthening of the B.B.C. service referred to in my last report has now been introduced. The result is that listeners on the continent now receive the B.B.C. messages very much more loudly than they did in the first weeks of the war.

#### *Relations with the Press.*

The decision that my Department should be transferred from the Ministry of Information to the Foreign Office took effect from the 17th October. As I now fall under the S.I.S. vote, I have naturally been concerned lest the press might raise objection to the greater secrecy it is now prepared to observe. I therefore felt that I should endeavour to secure understanding and approval of the new policy on the part of the principal newspaper proprietors of this country. Consequently I arranged for a private meeting. As a result of a very satisfactory conversation, it was agreed to establish an informal committee with which I propose to confer at regular intervals.

#### *Prisoners of War.*

During the period now under review, I have been consulted by the War Office in regard to obtaining information from prisoners of war and civil internees in this country. My Department has furnished the information sought, and has made a number of suggestions.

#### *German Refugees in Great Britain.*

In my last report I covered at some length the relations of my Department with German refugee organisations and individuals. It is, therefore, only necessary to add that an organisation is being established with the object of maintaining touch with all political refugees from Germany who are in this country, and of selecting those most likely to be of use in an advisory capacity. Further, I intend that my Department shall keep in close touch with such of the selected refugees as are likely to be helpful.

I have also investigated the possibility of making use of an organisation of Austrian refugees which has succeeded in maintaining touch with political groups of many complexions in Austria, and have satisfied myself that they can be employed for certain propaganda purposes of a secret nature, and for eliciting information.

#### *Activities in Neutral Countries.*

My Department concerned with approaches to Germany through neutral countries and

the collection of information from that country has already secured matter of considerable value, and as a result I am developing my activities in this direction on a wide scale. At a later date I hope to be able to report more fully.

*Co-operation with the Forces in France.*

At the end of last week I returned from a visit to France, which I am happy to report has led to valuable results. After preliminary discussions with the War Office, and later with General Headquarters, I have arranged that my Department will be represented by an officer attached to the British Directorate of Military Intelligence in France. His duties will generally be to act as liaison between the British and French Land Forces in the field. In particular, he is to ensure that the Director of Military Intelligence be provided with all relevant information in regard both to the policy and machinery of enemy propaganda. At the same time, he will co-operate with the French enemy propaganda officer at Grand Quartier Général in order to exchange information on all matters calculated to promote the efficient conduct of operations.

An appointment of this kind was necessary in order to enable propaganda to be directed against the front-line enemy troops. For some time past my Department has carefully considered both the nature of this propaganda, and the machinery to be employed in distributing it. For obvious reasons the former will differ in some respects from that of propaganda addressed to the German people as a whole. Certain facts and arguments, such as the retention of the young men of the S.S. and S.A. to dragoon the civil population of Germany, will no doubt, make a special appeal to enemy troops. In the case, moreover, of front-line propaganda, it will be possible to check results, and to adapt policy with much greater rapidity than is possible in the present circumstances. Moreover, a far wider choice of agencies of distribution will be possible. Trench warfare allows of the use of trench and projectile loud speakers, propaganda rockets and guns. Another means of reaching the enemy troops is by leaflets left by patrols in No Man's Land.

*Co-ordination of British and French Broadcasting.*

Ever since I was asked in September 1938 to interest myself in plans for enemy propaganda, I have been convinced of the necessity for co-ordinating British and French broadcasting, in so far as it is to be directed towards our foes. My later experiences have only served to strengthen this conviction. No other channel of propaganda leads more directly or more swiftly to the enemy, and none is so far-reaching in its range. In my last report I gave some of the reasons which led me to believe that our broadcasts in German were being heard alike by German civilians and by troops in the field. I have since received further evidence. Even when the Gestapo are most active, listening seems to continue. I learn, for instance, that headphones are eagerly sought after in Germany, and the practice of keeping one wireless set blaring for the benefit of the police while a member of the family listens in bed to another set is not infrequent. There is also, I am told, a certain amount of listening to our ordinary broadcasts in English.

*Technical Considerations.*

On investigating, at the request of the Air Ministry and the B.B.C., and with the full approval of the Foreign Office, the possibilities of Anglo-French co-operation, I found that it would, as a preliminary, depend largely on certain technical engineering factors. These require to be stated briefly before the problem as a whole is explained. The British authorities, as the result of prolonged expert discussions between the Air Ministry and the B.B.C., had, before the outbreak of war, decided on a plan by which broadcasting could be conducted with full regard to national security. Broadcasting stations before the war worked as engineering units independently of one another, thus allowing the maximum of variety in programmes. It was agreed that such variety must be sacrificed in time of war, to ensure that no assistance be given to enemy aircraft. A wireless station, when it sends out programmes on its own, acts as a guiding beacon to raiding aircraft. This danger is eliminated by arranging stations in groups all using the same wavelength. The principle thus adopted is technically known as "synchronisation".

*The Position in France.*

The French authorities had not given the same attention to this problem as had the British, and it was learnt in the summer that no plan for arranging the French stations in synchronisation had been evolved. The danger of this lack was that it imperilled French continuity in broadcasting, because in the absence of a plan of synchronisation there is no alternative, when air raids begin, to the abrupt shutting down of all French stations. When a plan of synchronisation is working and an air-raid warning is given, all that is necessary from the point of view of security is to shut down any station within fifty miles of enemy aircraft. This means that, since all the other stations in the group continue working, listeners are still able to hear programmes over almost the whole of the country.

The alternative when there is no plan is either to run the risk of helping enemy aircraft or to cut off immediately and abruptly, in the middle of a programme, all stations throughout the country, however remote they may be from the scene of attack. In present circumstances, not only France, but also large parts of England are open to more easy air attack. For broadcasting, at any rate in Northern France, is as useful to enemy raiders attacking England as is English broadcasting. Even if, in the absence of intensive air-raiding, a temporary relaxation of the severe synchronising plan were permitted in Great Britain, it would still remain essential to have such a plan in France, as in Great Britain, ready and in reserve for immediate execution.

*Broadcasting Progress in France.*

In view of the above, I took the matter up personally with the French authorities, and I am glad to say that considerable progress has now been made. The French have agreed in principle to adopt a plan of synchronisation, and have purchased from the British authorities some of the necessary equipment which can only be supplied speedily from this side of the Channel. The wireless stations in the north of France are already working in a synchronised group.

There has, however, in the last week, been a serious hitch in this programme. It was learnt that an obsolete station at Fécamp, controlled by the International Broadcasting Company (of which Captain L. F. Plugge, M.P., is the chairman), has been modernised, and had started to work with programmes in English, Czech and Austrian. The danger of allowing a station so near the Channel to work on its own without any synchronising precautions was felt by the Air Ministry to be grave. My officers, again at the request of the Air Ministry, have, in the last few days, made representations to the French Service authorities, who are in complete agreement with the British point of view, and have confessed that the private interests concerned in France have got the ear of the civil powers without reference to factors of national security. It is hoped that the French Service view will shortly prevail. There remains much technical work to be done before the French system can be regarded as satisfactory, but the necessary machinery has now been established, and is working smoothly.

*Printing in France.*

At an early stage it became clear that considerable advantages were to be gained by arranging with the French authorities for supplementary printing facilities on their side of the Channel. The advantages to be looked for were threefold. First, when the necessary R.A.F. units are in France it may from time to time become more practical for them to be able to collect their bulk loads on the spot. Secondly, the desirability of having printing works scattered so as to avoid the danger of confusion following air attack is obvious. Thirdly, printing works in France might provide a more convenient base for the distribution of leaflets intended for German troops on the Western front. The French authorities have been most helpful in this matter. Following my last visit arrangements have been made by which orders may be placed for the immediate printing at any time in France of a million leaflets, and, if at a later date requirements on a much larger scale are necessary, the French are able and willing to undertake the work.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. November 1939.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (R.) (39) 95.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.**

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues a report submitted by Sir Campbell Stuart on the work of the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries for the period the 22nd October to the 20th November.

H.

*November 27, 1939.*

**ENEMY PROPAGANDA.**

**REPORT BY SIR CAMPBELL STUART, G.C.M.G., K.B.E.**

ON the 22nd October I had the honour to submit a report on my activities. I now present another which covers the ensuing period to the 20th November.

*Leaflets.*

Since the 22nd October, some four million leaflets have been disseminated by aircraft over Germany. One of the three flights made reached Berlin and another Munich. The leaflets carried were versions of the Prime Minister's speech on the 12th October and one which contrasted statements made by the German Chancellor. In addition, since early November, there have been almost regular balloon flights, and more than a million leaflets have been distributed in this way. There is not, of course, the same control of direction; but even though numbers of the leaflets may be scattered over country areas, there is satisfaction in knowing that, in this event, they present a particularly embarrassing problem to the Gestapo. Moreover, there may be strokes of luck. On the 8th November, for instance, a number of balloon-borne leaflets fell over the towns of Chemnitz and Freiberg at a time when the inhabitants were on their way to work.

Reports in regard to the effect produced by leaflets are conflicting. It is, however, noteworthy that the Nazi Leaders seem almost invariably to refer to them in their speeches and that, according to reports received, they are passed from hand to hand over considerable distances and have even reached Vienna. The French, indeed, have no doubt of the value of our leaflet campaign, and are proposing largely to increase their own output. Most significant of all, our enemies are paying us the compliment of imitation.

10725 [20382]

B

In regard to the interest aroused by our leaflets, the following intelligence which has come from a known source in Belgrade will, perhaps, be regarded as of interest:—

“British leaflets are sometimes collected in the following way: the time chosen is at night because, owing to the black-out restrictions, the streets are unusually dark. The searchers, as a rule young girls, go out in pairs with a tiny electric torch. Whenever they see a likely piece of paper they mark it down mentally, but do not stop to pick it up because of the number of possible watchers, police agents and the like. Only after having walked another hundred yards or so does one of the girls slip back in the darkness and collect her prize.”

The reports, on the other hand, which indicate that the British leaflets are either discredited or of little effect in Germany may, it is submitted, be taken as a reflection of the insensibility of the great numbers of Germans to external influence of any kind. Until either military defeat or a general sense of frustration has shaken confidence in the Nazi regime, little or no progress can be expected among its existing supporters. To hold, however, that the news and views imparted by our leaflets do not tend to strengthen such forces of discontent and potential resistance as exist in Germany would, I believe, be a great mistake. The brutal censorship, on which the Nazis depend, ensures that a premium is placed upon news from without. Propaganda in a hostile country cannot, moreover, be expected immediately to gain acceptance. It must create its own authority and forge its way by insistence and reiteration. To abandon it would be to proclaim our failure in an effort which has demonstrably perturbed the German Government

For these reasons I submit that we should proceed with the dissemination, by all means open to us, of printed propaganda, which increasing information will enable us to aim with ever greater accuracy. The undoubted success of our German broadcasts justifies the belief that in print the same type of propaganda cannot be without considerable effect.

#### *Der Wolkiger Beobachter.*

During the period under review, my Department has produced a new form of propaganda for distribution by aircraft, in the shape of a small four-page newspaper illustrated by cartoons. Its title (*The Cloud Observer*) plays upon the well-known *Volkischer Beobachter*. One edition of 750,000 copies is already in process of dissemination, and another is being prepared. It is intended that this new production shall be issued weekly and shall contain items of news which have not reached the German people, brightened with light paragraphs, cartoons and verses. The French have adopted our idea and have also printed the first issue of a newspaper on similar lines.

#### *Broadcasting.*

Reports from within Germany continue to show that tuning-in to the British broadcasts in German continues. The French Secret Service have, I am informed, concrete evidence that listening to foreign broadcasts is increasing in that country, and it has been officially learned from French officials and other sources that the British broadcasts are more popular than any other. A letter from South Germany which has reached the B.B.C. states that “everybody in Germany listens to foreign broadcasts. As a result there is a great feeling of insecurity.” The Belgrade authority, already quoted, adds to his message: “it was perfectly evident from the news discussed among the younger people that the British broadcasts in German were listened to regularly and attentively.” The individual whose experiences it relates had been invited to listen and stated that “there existed a whole series of places, cellars and other buildings, difficult for the authorities to trace, where set-owners listened regularly and invited their friends.” Another secret report states: “listening to foreign wireless is, of course, forbidden, but nearly everyone who has a set listens. They put heavy blankets over the wireless and over their heads to listen in.” Yet another from Düsseldorf declares that “listening-in to the English station is carried out universally.” Many reports of a similar character have been received.

The evidence is, indeed, more than sufficient to justify an important extension of B.B.C. broadcasts which is to begin on Sunday, the 26th November. After this date an extra half-hour will be devoted early each morning to broadcasts in German, Czech and Polish. The object is to reach working-class listeners before they leave their homes.

Interesting evidence as to the range of broadcasts has been provided by the B.B.C. Polish Service. Letters have recently been received from listeners to it in Hungary, Roumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, Holland and even Palestine.

*Co-ordination with the Fighting Services.*

From long before the outbreak of war I have maintained close contact with the Fighting Services and have received much assistance from them. As the war progressed, however, I felt that there was an increasing necessity for co-ordination of my propaganda plans with naval, military and air strategy. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air, I arranged for a meeting of members of my Department (including a representative of the Foreign Office) with representatives of the Services. A number of satisfactory conclusions were reached which will ensure a speedier and more direct supply of information to my Department. It was also agreed to take common action in the preparation of propaganda plans of a secret nature, such as the initiation of whispering campaigns. So hopeful and important were the possibilities our discussion revealed, that it has been decided to hold, at least, fortnightly meetings. In this way, I believe that I shall be able to ensure the closest relationship of my efforts to the military developments of the war.

*Relations with the Press.*

In my last report I mentioned that, in view of the greater secrecy which had attached to my Department since the 17th October, I had thought it wise to confer with the leading newspaper proprietors of London and the Provinces. One result of my first discussion with them was an agreement to form a small private committee. This met on the 2nd November and was attended by Major the Hon. J. J. Astor, M.P., the Hon. Rupert Beckett, the Hon. Esmond Harmsworth, Sir Roderick Jones, Sir Walter Layton, Mr. J. R. Scott and Lord Southwood. The discussion was of the most friendly kind, and the general lines of my Department's policy were approved. It was agreed that future meetings should be held at my discretion, and that Sir Charles Hyde, Mr. Allan Jeans and Mr. W. Harold Thomson, Chairman of the Scottish Daily Newspapers Society, should be added to the Committee. One of the subjects discussed was publication of criticisms of our leaflets in the Press, and it was generally agreed in principle that such criticisms were calculated to help the German propaganda department. All present, therefore, undertook to ensure that their respective journals avoided them.

*Censorship of the Texts of Leaflets.*

During the past few weeks I have had some discussions with the Censorship in regard to prohibition of the publication of the texts of my Department's leaflets. The reception accorded to a "Stop" notice which deprecated it has shown that the great majority of British newspapers are prepared to accept a restriction of this kind. The reasons which I adduced to support the case for secrecy were, briefly, as follows :—

1. Publication in Great Britain of the texts of leaflets would be likely to be followed by publication in the Neutral Press, and consequently by neutral comment. If this were favourable the German authorities would be stimulated to increased precautions; if unfavourable, it would be used against us.

2. It would be difficult to permit the publication of some leaflets and to forbid that of others, inasmuch as our enemies would be swift to deduce our reasons for discrimination.

3. My Department is closely associated with the Fighting Services, and it is probable that its activities will be increasingly co-ordinated with strategy. Propaganda may, indeed, become a part of military operations. It is therefore

[20382]

B 2



a matter for serious consideration whether the publication of leaflets addressed to German troops in the line and disseminated in connection with military movements should not be forbidden.

4. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which it might be undesirable that neutrals (say Russia and Italy) should be publicly informed by us of the purport of certain regional distributions it may be desirable to undertake within enemy territory.

#### *Refugees.*

I am able to report continued good progress in the organisation of the various Refugee Groups in London. Our contacts with Germans, Austrians and Czechs are now so firmly established that we are receiving considerable assistance from them in preparing and collecting information about conditions in their respective countries as background for our work.

#### *Liaison with France.*

During the past week I learned that the Grand Quartier General has decided to intensify French propaganda activities by leaflet distribution on a large scale. The decision was based on reports received by them indicating that opinion in Germany was gravely disturbed at the prospect of prolonged hostilities. In reporting this fact to me my liaison in Paris pressed me personally to attend a meeting there of the Anglo-French Enemy Propaganda Liaison Committee, which operates under the authority of the Anglo-French Propaganda Council, in order to discuss the preparations for the French leaflet campaign. As I was unable to leave London, my Deputy-Director went in my stead. The meeting was held on the 17th November, and he has since reported to me that it was entirely satisfactory. He was able to compare both the experiences and the products of my Department with those of its French counterpart, and to discuss plans of future co-operation. His readiness to be of every possible assistance to the French was, I understand, warmly appreciated. Moreover, a suggestion put forward by him that, in order to counter the German propaganda effort to divide the Allies, a joint Anglo-French leaflet should be issued by both countries, was welcomed eagerly, and a draft which he had taken with him was immediately approved. In the course of the discussion the French expressed the view that the publication of the texts of leaflets in the Press was undesirable, and stated that they intended to approach their Censorship authorities with a view to forbidding it.

As a result of the increased interest of the Grand Quartier General in leaflet propaganda, and the probable enlargement of output on the part of the French propaganda department, the necessity for the co-ordination of the propaganda policies of the two countries becomes even greater than before. In view, however, of the recent meeting in Paris, I am inclined to believe that, thanks to the goodwill of the French authorities, and their appreciation of British efforts, it will be possible for me to achieve the co-ordination desired.

#### *Fécamp.*

An unexpected obstacle to the full and orderly working of Anglo-French radio propaganda into Germany has arisen. The British wireless stations under the B.B.C. have, since the outbreak of war, been working on a system which all the experts of the Air Ministry and of the B.B.C. are in complete agreement to be essential to prevent enemy aircraft using broadcast programmes as a means of finding their way to their chosen targets in this country. This re-arrangement of peacetime procedure has imposed limitations on the programmes, but is accepted as essential by the B.B.C. engineers no less than by the Air Ministry if national security is not to be jeopardised. The French experts had not made the same preparations in advance as had the English, but they began shortly before the war to put their house in order. Close and fruitful liaison was established between the French experts and those of the Air Ministry and the B.B.C. The first necessary steps—and those particularly important to this country as involving stations in the north of France—had been taken shortly after the outbreak of war. It was believed by those concerned in this country that British national security, so far as it was affected by French broadcasting, had been safeguarded. An unexpected set-back then had to be faced. A station at Fécamp in Normandy, in which

Captain Plugge, M.P., is interested, and which had been closed down some considerable time before the outbreak of war, was, under pressure from interests in this country and in France, allowed to reopen. This station at Fécamp is broadcasting every day in English for the benefit of the B.E.F., and in Austrian and other foreign languages. It is a menace to national security in Northern France and Southern England. Representations have been made at the instigation of the Air Ministry, through the British Ambassador in Paris, to the French Authorities. Until this station is closed down it will be difficult to pursue the discussions so fruitfully begun on Anglo-French co-operation in propaganda broadcasts to Germany. It is impossible to discuss broadcast programmes so long as uncertainty remains as to which stations will be available for broadcasting. It will further be impossible to discuss broadcast propaganda in a spirit of full mutual confidence with the French so long as doubt remains in the minds of our Allies as to our national policy over the conduct of broadcasting as a whole.

*Meeting with the Dominions Ministers.*

In view of interest shown in the work of my Department by the Dominions, I thought it right, after consultation with the Secretary of State for the Dominions, to take advantage of the presence of the Dominion Ministers in London to explain the scope of my activities and to ask for any suggestions or criticisms they might have to offer.

A meeting took place at my London headquarters on the 17th November, and was attended by the following:—

The Hon. R. G. Casey (Australia).  
 The Hon. Peter Fraser (New Zealand).  
 Colonel Denys Reitz (South Africa).  
 Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (India).  
 The High Commissioner for Australia.  
 The High Commissioner for New Zealand.  
 The High Commissioner for South Africa.  
 The Duke of Devonshire was also present.

The Hon. T. A. Crerar was unavoidably absent, but I have arranged to explain the whole matter to him in a private interview.

The discussion was in every way satisfactory. As one result of the meeting, arrangements have been made for all the visiting Ministers to broadcast to Germany in the immediate future, expressing the attitude of their respective countries towards the War.

*Conclusion.*

After some twelve weeks' experience of its working I have found that my Department has become much more than a transmitter of print and words to Germany. Copious and sound information is essential to propaganda, and my intelligence section has had perforce to attain a high degree of efficiency. It is now, for instance, supplying, in addition to its ordinary duties, a regular review of German Propaganda to the War Cabinet, and a daily summary of information to the Services and some other Departments. The fact, moreover, that my Department requires the swiftest and most exact information of the effects produced by its activities has necessitated the creation of what, although small in number, is virtually a secret service of its own. Again its effort to influence opinion in Germany has demanded that it should pursue every channel which leads there. As already indicated, one of them is German residents in neutral countries, another neutral newspapers likely to percolate into enemy territory. Thus the range of its activities tends to increase.

During my earlier connection with the Ministry of Information I stipulated for way-leaves to Germany through neutral countries. Thanks to the close liaison maintained from the first between us, and to the fact that my object of reaching the enemy differs essentially from that of the Ministry, no conflict between our respective efforts has arisen or should ever arise. I am, indeed, inclined to believe that, in the near future, it may be possible for my Department, in view of the experience it has gained of German propaganda methods, to render effective aid in countering German propaganda, not only in Germany, but wherever its evil influence is effectively employed.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1940.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (R.) (40) 2.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.**

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues, for their information, a further report, for the period the 20th November – the 21st December, by Sir Campbell Stuart on the work of the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries.

H.

*Foreign Office, January 1, 1940.*

**REPORT BY SIR CAMPBELL STUART.**

*Bad Weather.*

My last report was dated the 20th November. Since then the weather has been exceptionally bad, even for late autumn, and consequently the Royal Air Force have informed me that it has only been possible for them to distribute one million leaflets by aircraft, and another million by balloon. This total comprised *seven* separate leaflets. The delays and uncertainty entailed by unfavourable conditions have been even more disappointing than the shrinkage of output, since they have made it almost impossible to count on the leaflet as a means of swift rejoinder to the enemy's propaganda. We had, however, foreseen the difficulties of the season, and had adjusted our plans to them. For some time past our leaflets have been so drafted that they do not rapidly become out of date. My printing orders have, moreover, been reduced to accord with the smaller load which winter temperatures enforce, and I have relied increasingly upon our little four-page paper, *Wolkiger Beobachter*, since it combines propaganda points with facts withheld by the German censorship, and thus effects an economy in the volume of our production.

*Supplement to the Wolkiger Beobachter.*

In regard to this useful broadsheet I may add that we now intend to enclose with it a supplement which will permit us to treat serious propaganda themes more comprehensively and argumentatively than has hitherto been possible. I hope that this new production will obtain a considerable circulation from hand to hand. At the same time I am, of course, continuing to produce the one-page large-print leaflet, since, owing to Gestapo measures against picking up our literature, it conveys its message to the maximum of potential readers.

10794 [20558]

B

For the time being, however, I am, in view of restriction upon distribution, using it only for such important propaganda points as the Prime Minister's broadcast on the 26 November, the invasion of Finland and the pooling of Anglo-French resources.

#### *Special Raids.*

I am also beginning to develop regional propaganda from the air. By arrangement with the Royal Air Force I have supplied them with leaflets for dissemination by special raids on Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hamburg. Climactic conditions, however, have not yet permitted these flights. The delay is unfortunate, since, in addition to their propaganda value, they would have demonstrated to the German authorities our capacity directly to foster local dissensions.

#### *Joint Anglo-French Leaflet.*

In my last report I mentioned that my French colleagues had readily accepted my suggestion of a joint Anglo-French leaflet intended to counter the effort of German propaganda to divide the Allies. This is in the hands of the Royal Air Force, and a second has since been prepared. So warmly, indeed, have they taken to the idea that recently they have themselves suggested a co-operative effort to produce a six-page leaflet of a more ambitious type than either country has yet attempted. This, it has been agreed, will contain a joint statement signed by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France. The other contents have, at the suggestion of the French propaganda department, been, for the most part, drafted by us, and the whole is now being printed in Paris.

#### *Londoner Brief.*

Under leaflet production I may also record a new venture in the shape of a fortnightly news-letter in German, which, with the ultimate aim of reaching Germany, we are now posting to German firms in neutral countries, and to neutral firms which are known to trade with the enemy. The distribution is about five thousand, but, if our reports indicate that our efforts are successful, it will probably be increased. I need scarcely add that in regard to this publication I am acting with the full knowledge and approval of the Ministry of Information. Neutral countries fall, naturally, within its sphere of activity; but I have from the first agreed with it that my Department is entitled to all necessary way-leaves through neutral countries to its own objective, the German people. A rough and ready definition of my claim is the right to conduct propaganda either by direct or indirect means among Germans in Germany itself or outside it. My liaison with the Ministry of Information is very close, and arrangements exist in virtue of which each of us will know all activities of the other which concern neutral countries. Consequently, there is no fear of overlapping or waste of effort.

#### *Broadcasting.*

Fortunately, indeed, the frosts and fogs of winter do not frustrate the B.B.C. Indeed, the limits they have imposed on our printed output have to some extent been compensated by additional time on the air, since the early morning news programme to Germany is in full swing. The B.B.C. now give four German programmes a day, and so satisfied am I of their value that I have asked for three more. If my request is granted our output will stand in a more satisfactory proportion to the immense flood of wireless propaganda which pours from the German stations. Inasmuch as we believe that the German public listen in chiefly for the sake of trustworthy news, the B.B.C. confine special talks in German to the later evening programme, which always includes one, and usually two, of these and only less regularly at other times. In these we seek to provide a wide variety both of topics and of speakers. Matters of entertainment value only is, however, avoided, since we believe that Germans who are risking their personal liberty by tuning in seek information rather than amusement. Instead, we strive to make in attractive form the strongest possible appeal to German reason and sentiment. Every now and then a broadcast specially addressed to Austrians is included, and we have been fortunate in securing (according to experts) excellent broadcasts and broadcasters for this particular feature. Czech, Polish and the recently introduced Slovak broadcasts also continue in these respective languages, and, as I recorded last month, are

heard far over Central Europe. We have recently been challenged in the Press for failing to labour propaganda points which arise in the news. This, however, is a deliberate policy. Germans are satiated with the over emphasis of their own propagandists, and there is every reason to believe that they welcome the more restrained presentations of our own wireless.

*Results Achieved.*

In the period under review further evidence of the effectiveness of British propaganda has been received. One letter from Germany, reported from a refugee source, states that, "in spite of penalties, the leaflets are being passed around, even from one town to another .... the print is so legible that you don't have to pick the leaflet, but can read it lying on the ground." Many sources confirm that the circulation is considerable, and some also state that active measures are still being taken to counter their effect. The Chief Censor has heard from a known Dutch informant who visits Germany that "the German population in any big town in general is anxious for the news by pamphlets to be thrown by British aeroplanes." He often heard such questions as "Did you receive a pamphlet, too?" and "May I read your pamphlet?" Other information which I have received from an American source within Germany emphasised the value of a British leaflet, "Der Führer Spricht." Mr. Villard, the American journalist, has also paid a tribute in the Press to this particular piece of propaganda. It is perhaps worth adding that steps are being taken to provide that, when leaflet raids on certain localities can be timed more accurately, a secret agent will be present on the spot and will report by devious channels on their effect.

*Broadcasting Reports.*

Information received in regard to the effect of our broadcasts in Germany strengthens the belief that listeners to them are increasing, and that they are more highly esteemed in Germany than any other foreign services. The reason usually given is the trust placed in the accuracy of the B.B.C. news. An instance of a regular German listener who papered his windows and listened to a much reduced volume has been conveyed to me. Another message states that, though headphones can only be obtained illicitly, they are often used; yet another, that the style of the German bulletin is made to suit the German mentality. We have, however, been told that families which employ servants and some with young children are chary of listening. As we had hoped, tidings of prisoners are a particular attraction. Furthermore, we were interested to learn through a trust-worthy source in Hungary that, in spite of the fact that the B.B.C. provide a programme in Magyar, Hungarians listen to a great extent to the British news and talks in German.

It would appear that, as the result of years of censorship and distortion, the longing of Germans for accurate news has become so great that numbers of them will risk imprisonment to indulge it. In these circumstances we are conscious of great opportunities; but I submit that the inexorable condition of realising them is that we continue to uphold our standard of strict truthfulness.

*Essential Intelligence.*

It is, of course, obvious that the efficiency of any organisation for propaganda such as mine depends primarily upon its service of Intelligence. For the purposes of broadcasting—and in a lesser, though still important degree, of leaflet production—the information at its disposal must be fresh, accurate and complete. From the first we sought to create a first-class intelligence department, and soon found that we required from it a daily summary of the Press and broadcasting both of Germany and of neutral countries. To this we came later to add intelligence received from sources of our own. This summary is naturally devised to meet what our Intelligence Department knows to be our special needs. It has, however, attracted the attention of the Service and other Government Departments, which, at their own request, have for some time been supplied with copies of it. Recently, moreover, we have been asked to take over the fortnightly review of German propaganda for the War Cabinet, which was formerly furnished by

[20558]

B 2

the Ministry of Information. It will thus be seen that we require an Intelligence staff of some size, stronger indeed than our productive and translating staffs combined. Reading neutral newspapers naturally demands readers versed in a range of languages. I am glad to say, however, that, owing to their quality, I have not had to exceed the number of four senior and two junior experts, some of whom are also available for other work.

#### *Anglo-French Co-operation.*

I have already alluded to joint Anglo-French leaflets. They are, indeed, a promising outcome of the excellent relations which exist between my own department and the French Propaganda authorities. Only last week I visited Paris in connection with the work of the Joint Anglo-French Propaganda Council. On many sides, as well as from the specially informed, I heard of the influence of German propaganda on both the French army and civilian population. British propaganda in France is not within my sphere, but I can think of few better ways of deterring enemy efforts to disintegrate the *Entente* than to show their authors that the direct result of this type of argument is to unite the propaganda forces of France and England. My French colleagues are alive to this fact, and I feel that I can count on their assistance. I feel, also, that my co-operation with the French in propaganda against a common enemy may well tend to assimilate the war policies of the two countries, and to promote both the spirit and fact of compromise.

#### *Co-operation with the Fighting Services.*

Since my last report I have held two meetings of my Services Committee which have been attended by the Directors of the respective Service Intelligence or their nominees. Each of them has led to useful conclusions, and to increased co-ordination of propaganda with strategy.

As a result of arrangements made at them, my service of military news for broadcasting has been valuably increased, and two specially effective broadcasts on the sinking of the *Graf von Spee* have been delivered. In some respects these meetings have provided a common ground for discussion of propaganda aspects of the war, which, I venture to believe, may have been scarcely less valuable to the Services than they have been to my department. In view, moreover, of the interest the Services take in the publicity and propaganda activities of the Ministry of Information in France and Neutral Countries, and of my own relationship with that department, I have invited the heads of its Foreign Publicity and News Departments to become members of the Committee. It may be of interest to add that the whispering campaign, discussed by the Committee and mentioned in my last report, is now in operation.

#### *Secret Activities.*

Secret arrangements made by my Department in Neutral Countries have begun to bear fruit in the form of interesting reports. I have, of course, no intention of developing an extensive and redundant secret service of my own but I have placed, or am arranging to place, a few well-chosen agents at points from which information of the kind my organisation particularly requires is likely to emerge from Germany.

#### *Refugees.*

During the last month I have continued my efforts to co-ordinate the refuge groups in Great Britain so as to be able to take full advantage of such useful information and advice as they have to give. I have also found certain individual refugees of standing, both German and Austrian, who have helped me considerably. My method has been to put to a carefully selected few a questionnaire embodying points of special difficulty, on which I believed that their views might be of value, and I have had useful replies. This, I believe, will probably be found to be the most effective way of employing their knowledge of enemy conditions which tends, in most cases, to rest on past knowledge rather than on recent news. I am, however, obtaining a certain amount of intelligence through émigré channels, which has already proved valuable in providing matter for broadcasting, and will, I am convinced, increase in volume as time goes on. The establishment of the type of relationship I have sought has not been easy, and I have certainly no reason to regret my cautious approaches to this particular

problem.

I ought, perhaps, to add that, in such relations as I have with refugees, I am withholding any encouragement to schemes for the establishment of a German Government in Great Britain or to political intrigues of a sectional character in regard to the future of Germany.

*Relations with the Press.*

I have, since the meeting mentioned in my last report, kept in touch with the leading newspaper proprietors of London and the Provinces, who are members of my informal committee, and have had personal interviews with some of them. A full meeting of the Committee has been arranged for the 3rd January, at which I intend to report upon the outstanding features of my Department's work.

*Conclusion.*

I find that I can look back on nearly four months of propaganda directed towards an enemy whose spirit has frequently been elated by victories claimed, but not yet depressed by any serious defeat. Reviewing our efforts, I can find scarcely a point of potential value which has not been employed. Frequently, as the retorts of the enemy have shown, we have struck shrewdly. Such reports, moreover, as are received from German sources indicate that we have only to persist along our present lines to secure ever-increasing results. This is also the view of our French colleagues. I am satisfied with my machine, which, I believe, is capable of producing the propaganda the circumstances of the war require. I am equally satisfied with a position in which I have the advantages of intimate contact with the Foreign Office and the Service Departments, and I am, indeed, grateful for the assistance they render me so willingly. In one particular only have I reason for regret: It is that circumstances do not permit of a wider and more copious dissemination of British propaganda by our aircraft. I trust, however, that increasing air resources and the coming of better weather will enable this invaluable weapon to be employed on a larger scale.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1940.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (R.) (40) 20.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.**

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues, for their information, a memorandum in which Sir C. Stuart reviews the past activities, surveys the present position and attempts to foresee the future work of the Department for Publicity in Enemy Countries.

H.

*Foreign Office, January 12, 1940.*

**PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.**

*Memorandum by Sir Campbell Stuart.*

The coming of a new year has suggested a review of past efforts, a survey of the present position and an attempt to see as far as may be into the future.

*Propaganda Policies.*

Since the outbreak of war British propaganda in Germany has passed through two stages. In the first, which lasted only a couple of weeks, it followed the lead of the Prime Minister with attacks upon the relations between the German Government and the German people. In the second, its ruling motive has been to lower the resistance of the enemy by undermining their morale. This has implied efforts to destroy confidence both in the Nazi regime and in Germany's capacity to win. During the second stage it became necessary, owing to Nazi internal propaganda based on the Polish victory, further to argue that even this success did not lessen the certainty of an ultimate defeat of Germany.

Each of the two main lines of propaganda pursued since mid-September has been supported by a number of auxiliary arguments. Undermining the Nazi regime has, for example, included efforts to sow mistrust in the Nazi leaders by stressing divergence between party and national interests, dissensions in the party itself, the iniquity in the party "bosses," their responsibility for worsening conditions, and the charge that it is they who stand in the way of peace. Attempts have also been made to shake faith in German propaganda, and to appeal to such moral sense as remains in Germany.

10823 [20630]



The theme of destroying confidence in Germany's capacity to win has, on the other hand, been developed by demonstrating Germany's inadequate military and economic strength, the growing power of the Allies, the hostility of subject peoples within the Reich, the absence of support from Germany's friends (including the Soviets), and the opposition of the civilised world.

*A more complex Situation.*

In the first four months of the war the situation, both military and political, with which we had to contend was comparatively simple. By the New Year it had become more complex. There is now a real, though repressed, crisis in Germany. It is chiefly the result of two factors:

- (a) The Russo-German Pact with its consequences, namely, the Finnish war, the abandonment of German interests in the Baltic, the physical and political approach to Communism, the Nazi movement towards the Left, and the threats to German interests in South-Eastern Europe, and to the supplies looked for from Russia.
- (b) The prolongation of the war beyond the expectation of the mass of Germans.

In regard to (a) the German move towards Russia and its results have widened the breach between the older and conservative German nationalists and the younger revolutionaries of the Nazi party. We, therefore, continue to harp on the injury wrought by the Russian entanglement to German interests. Propaganda along this line harmonizes the immediate aim of overthrowing the present German Government with the established British policy of protecting Europe from Bolshevik penetration. The Nazi trend towards Communism offers, moreover, a powerful lever for detaching Germans from the existing regime. To many of them its anti-Communist crusade had been the great attraction of the Nazi party. Our earlier appeal against Nazism is, therefore, being developed into one against Nazi-Communism. This does not entail the suggestion that there are two kinds of Nazism, a good one which is anti-Bolshevik, and a bad one which looks to Moscow, nor indeed that Stalin's dictatorship is essentially different from that of Hitler. We propose rather to exploit the *volte-face* towards Communism to illustrate the meaninglessness of Nazism, arguing that the Stalin-Hitler pact is the natural result of the assimilation of two systems of oppression. Our appeal is, therefore, to human antipathy to a regime under which the loyal supporter suffers as well as the opponents. In making it, however, we must safeguard ourselves against the retort that the British are socially reactionary. This, in view of both our national record and Labour support of the war, should not prove difficult.

*Responsibility for Prolongation of the War.*

The prolongation of hostilities beyond German expectations has had the natural results of disappointment, uncertainty, and the creation of a mood of enquiry. All of these, and particularly the last, yield opportunities for British propaganda. War guilt has, of course, been and remains an important feature of our case. Indeed, such hopes as her enemies possess of revolution in Germany are based on the evils of war being attributed by the German people directly to the German regime. Guilt for the *prolongation* of the war seems, however, to us an even more effective form of indictment, since it associates the Nazis with the abiding evils of privation rather than with the sacrifices linked to triumphs of, for example, the Polish campaign. It will be possible in propaganda on this note to play upon Hitler's implicit refusal to respond to the "deeds, not words" demanded last October by Mr. Chamberlain. It is, in fact, difficult to see a more effective way of outflanking the sustained and successful Nazi effort to persuade the Germans that the blame for all the distress they suffer lies on England.

*Undermining Hitler.*

Another development of propaganda which is now possible is systematically to undermine the position of Hitler himself. We do not at this stage suggest personal attacks on him, but that we should consistently treat him as the pawn of events and personal influences,

rather than the active master of his country's fate. This is a matter to which we are still giving careful thought.

*British and French Policies.*

There is yet another development which we have been considering with no less care. British propaganda has in its earlier stages been based on a distinction between the German people and the Nazi regime. A similar distinction is not recognised by our French allies. When we have spoken of Hitlerism they have continued to speak of Germany. The French attitude, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would render propaganda largely ineffective, since it would hold Germany to be beyond redemption. The British view, on the other hand, has not hitherto embraced the possibility of spurring the Germans to redeem themselves. There has, moreover, been some danger in placing too much emphasis on our good will towards the German people and on our readiness for a peace of reconciliation. It might even have led some of them to feel that their country could wage a brutal war for as long as it was convenient, and then demand that we should make good our words. If we did not, our refusal might be treated as a breach of undertaking, and used in propaganda against us.

The Prime Minister's reminder at the Mansion House that the German people must realise their own responsibility for prolonging the war has come, therefore, as a welcome lead. Not only will it sharpen the instruments of propaganda, but it will enable us to align our policy more closely with that of our French colleagues. Once we have explicitly accepted the fact that the German people are accomplices in Germany's crime, we are in a better position to win the French to the view that Germany should be offered the opportunity of redemption. If agreement on this point were reached, it could be expressed in both British and French propaganda by the extension of our attack upon the war-mongering Nazi into one upon a war-mongering Germany.

*A Common Formula.*

Such an attitude would compensate threats with offers, and fears with hopes. The earlier British formula that we had no quarrel with the German people conveyed to them only an indirect alarm. The French formula of quarrel with both regime and people offered on the other hand no hope to the latter. If the German people were now confronted with a clear alternative between warfare waged against themselves and ceasing to be the accomplices of crime, they might well be stung to greater activity in the cause of peace. A formula which expressed this attitude might well, therefore, become the central theme of the Anglo-French propaganda effort, each Government being free to enlarge upon it in accordance with its own desires.

Events must, before long, prove to what extent the German people are at one with their Government in waging war. If it were found that there is, indeed, a powerful element in Germany prepared, as far as possible, to resist the Nazi war policy, propaganda could be modified accordingly, and a way should be kept open for this purpose. If, on the other hand, no such element appears, the Prime Minister's insistence on the responsibility of the German people is susceptible of progressive development.

*January 11, 1940.*

*Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1940.*

SECRET.  
**W.P. (R.) (40) 105.**

**Copy No. 1**

*March 29, 1940.*

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to  
ensure the secrecy of this document.**

WAR CABINET.

PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues, for their information, a Report by Sir Campbell Stuart on the activities of the Department of Publicity in Enemy Countries for the period from the 7th February to the 22nd March, 1940.

H.

*Foreign Office, March 29, 1940.*

PUBLICITY IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.

*Leaflets.*

IN my last report, dated the 6th February, I deplored the interference of frost and snow with the dissemination of leaflets over Germany. In a period of six weeks only 7,000,000 had been distributed. Since then, however, improvement in the weather and an increase in the number of aircraft employed in our work have combined to secure a much greater output. In the period I now review thirty-five individual leaflets to a total of over 24,000,000 copies have been distributed. Of these 1,234,000 copies have been carried by balloon. A number of the flights have been of exceptional range and daring. Two visits have been paid to Poland, the second reaching Warsaw; three to Prague, two to Vienna, one to Linz, and no less than six to Berlin and its district.

It has now become possible for us to count, subject to military necessities, on both larger and more regular distributions. Consequently, we are enabled, on the one hand, to print fresher news, and, on the other, to prepare regional propaganda aimed at particular districts of Germany, and even at particular cities. This tends to sharpen the point of our productions. Indeed, we can now feel that the cumulative effect at which we have long aimed is in process of achievement. This is especially true of the Hamburg-Bremen area. These cities have been visited frequently, first, because we believe them to be a specially favourable soil, and, secondly, they are the best of all objectives for the training purposes of the R.A.F. I need scarcely explain that the selection of targets is a matter we discuss closely with the R.A.F. Unfortunately, with the approach of shorter nights, the range of aircraft is likely to be progressively restricted and the more distant targets visited of late to be inaccessible.

The leaflets scattered over Germany in the past six weeks were widely varied in form and substance. For example, one, a folder illustrated with photomontage, conveyed a joint message from the Prime Ministers of Great Britain

10956 [21055]

and France; six were consecutive issues of the little paper *Wolkiger Beobachter*; one was based upon quotations from the Prime Minister's Birmingham Speech; another on quotations from Lord Halifax and Mr. Churchill; others again were addressed to German women and to ex-Trade Unionists. Anticipation of increased activity in the air has, moreover, led to the preparation of a long series of leaflets with special applications to the Hamburg area, Kiel, the Upper Rhine and the Ruhr. It includes some single-page news sheets under titles embodying names of places to be visited.

In our newer productions we are making greater use of illustrations, employing our own cartoonists for the purpose. We believe that a good photograph, cartoon or drawing, which conveys its message clearly, is a valuable addition to our short single-sheet leaflets. Even Germans cannot resist a picture.

#### *Broadcasting.*

On the 3rd March the B.B.C. inaugurated the first of the three broadcasts by which it has intended for many weeks to supplement its daily programme in German. The period chosen for it is from 11:15 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. There is reason to believe that, although the hour be late, children and servants will by then be well out of the way, and the risk of listening will be somewhat less than in the case of the earlier broadcasts. It has, indeed, been suggested to us from French sources that audiences could be found even later in the night.

At the end of February Professor Lindley Fraser, to whose selection my last report referred, began his regular tri-weekly talks on the German programme. He is, according to the experts at Portland Place, shaping well for the role of regular commentator in German. Every Saturday he visits my country headquarters in order to discuss his scheme for the following week, and each of his broadcasts is subsequently prepared in consultation with my staff. Personality in a broadcaster is the result of careful training by the experienced rather than of individual inspiration, and there is reason to hope that Professor Fraser's talks will in time become a most valuable feature in our wireless propaganda.

It is also worth mentioning that, at the end of February, the B.B.C. arranged for weekly talks in Czech by Jan Masaryk, in the programme addressed to his fellow-countrymen. These have, we believe, proved an effective addition. Indeed, the large numbers of listeners in the Protectorate have encouraged us to pay the closest attention to the broadcasts addressed to it, and warranted the special message from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs broadcast on the 14th March, the eve of the anniversary of the German entry into Prague.

We have recently been engaged in reviewing with the B.B.C. both the policy and technique of the broadcasts to Germany and the other countries within our sphere of action. As a result we have prepared a series of directives, in which we describe as closely as possible the internal conditions in each of them, and lay down the principles to be observed in wireless propaganda. We have also recommended certain minor changes in the presentation of talks and news, which will, we hope, enhance the effects produced.

#### *Results Achieved.*

There is a volume of reports to the effect that our leaflets have been received, circulated and widely read in Germany. In regard, however, to the general impression created, it is usually impossible to obtain more exact evidence than the opinion of individual recipients in Germany—at the best an uncertain guide. In the case of the recent raids upon Austria the reports have been somewhat more illuminating. One, from a British Vice-Consul in Roumania, stated that the leaflets dropped in Vienna produced considerable effect. People went, despite vigorous precautions, to considerable lengths to read them, and, it added, as an example, that callers in twos and threes visited one greengrocer's shop where a leaflet was known to have been preserved. Other reports have confirmed the view that, in this case certainly, our productions achieved excellent results. Moreover, Herr Bürckel, the Gauleiter of Vienna, made a vicious onslaught upon their texts, a clear indication that they had been widely read and required refutation. This is, indeed, a common sequence to raids by the Royal Air Force since, beginning with Göring on the 9th September last, every speech of a German leader (except that of Hitler at the Berlin War Memorial) has contained an attack either on the leaflets or on the policy of bombless flights over Germany. From Czecho-

Slovakia, too, the reports upon the results of the special flights there have been most encouraging. A great impression was created, and the intelligence which has reached us up to date indicates that the leaflets themselves were well received.

In regard to the reception of our broadcasts, messages received from secret and other sources suggest that the recent increase in the penalties for listening have not succeeded in restricting it. One, from the British Consulate at Liege, states that the German-language population of the German cantons, which otherwise listens only to Cologne, listens also to them, and that they are stated to be highly satisfactory. Clandestine listening is, the report goes on, believed to be on the increase in Germany. One method now employed is to make up a party of four people, of whom two keep watch at the door and window, while the others listen in a darkened room to the receiving set, which has been heavily muffled in rugs and bedclothes. A secret report of early March confirms that, despite the threat and the imposition of heavy penalties, large numbers of the population continue to listen to the "forbidden" foreign broadcasts. German listeners, it says, refer to items of information in a very guarded way. The usual formula is: "I had a very strange dream last night—I dreamt. ..." The friend replies: "That's strange, I had the same dream: what a coincidence." The B.B.C. have also received plentiful evidence which satisfies them that many Germans continue, in spite of the severe restrictions, to hear and to discuss foreign broadcasts.

#### *The Soviet Union.*

I have for some time been making the necessary preparations for the task of introducing propaganda into Russia which the Government has committed to me. I have selected and appointed a small nucleus staff of experts which is already engaged in collecting the information required, and surveying the problems entailed. Progress in this matter must, owing to its peculiar difficulties and the fact that we are not at war with Russia, be slow; but I am satisfied that there will be no unnecessary delay in accomplishment of all that can be done.

#### *Relations with France.*

I have recently been to France. The chief object of my visit was to promote, in order to facilitate my co-operation with them, a closer co-ordination of the various bodies in that country which are concerned with propaganda directed at the enemy. I found that I obtained a ready hearing from those Ministers and officials to whom I spoke, and particularly from M. Reynaud, General Gamelin and M. Mandel. In view, however, of the fact that the appointment of a Minister of Information was generally anticipated, I decided to await that event, and then to raise the matter afresh. The recent change of Government and the appointment of M. Frossard have now created a situation which may perhaps enable me shortly to visit Paris and renew my endeavours.

#### *Neutral Countries.*

We have recently taken steps to improve our arrangements for securing information through neutral countries of internal conditions in Germany. A member of my staff has visited Denmark, Sweden and Norway and inaugurated a more regular service of intelligence, which should be a valuable supplement to the reports we have been receiving from our agents in Switzerland and Belgium. On his return, he reported favourably on the reception of our newsletter, the *Londoner Brief*. The circulation of this publication is now about 8,000, and we are pursuing a policy of concentrating it in States bordering upon the Reich, with the belief that a considerable number of copies infiltrate into enemy territory. We have learned, for instance, that it reaches Vienna in some numbers. We have also heard from Latvia that an issue which treated of Finland made a deep impression in Riga. We have, moreover, made preparations which are now in an advanced stage, to produce another newsletter in German, which will be printed in the neutral countries bordering on Germany, and posted into it.

#### *Co-operation with the Services.*

The Consultative Committee on which the Secretariat of the War Cabinet, the

Intelligence Departments of the Services, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Information are represented, has, in the period under review, met three times. The Head of the Secret Service is also a member. It continues to provide a valuable clearing-house for suggestions in regard to propaganda activities. An important part of its business is discussion of ruses *de guerre*; and a number of "whispers," which have doubtless echoed in Germany, have originated at its meetings. Its chief object is, of course, the correlation of the policy and work of my department with strategy; and in this respect the Committee has proved, in so far as circumstances have allowed, of substantial value.

*Relations with the Opposition, the Liberal Party, and the Press.*

I continue to maintain close personal touch with the Labour and Liberal Parties through Mr. Lees Smith and Lord Samuel, the representatives respectively accredited by them for contact with me. Hitherto I have encountered on their part, and that of other non-Governmental leaders with whom I have discussed the work of my department, only the most helpful spirit, and no differences of opinion have arisen. I also frequently see private Members of Parliament who have exhibited a particular interest in the activities of my department. On the 18th March I held a meeting of my private Committee of Newspaper Proprietors, and found that they also had no criticisms to offer. All who attended it were satisfied with the propaganda now emanating from my office, and even prepared willingly to accept the restrictions upon the publication of the texts of our leaflets which the Censor has imposed. In view of the "news value" of many recent leaflet raids on enemy territory, their attitude in this matter is, I submit, both patriotic and disinterested.

*Relations with the Roman Catholic Church.*

Indirectly we are in contact with his Excellency Cardinal Hinsley, and have been assured of his unqualified desire to help us in every way within his power. Throughout the extensive mission field of the Roman Catholic Church we have indirectly established contact by letters. Such letters, it is clearly understood, will never contain any political propaganda; but they will insist quietly and convincingly on just those ideals for which the Allies are fighting, and which, once accepted, will necessarily lead the leaders to be sternly critical of Nazi tyranny.

*Conclusion.*

Finally, I am happy to report that the progress made by my department in every other branch of its activities has been continuous, and, to me at any rate, satisfactory. I have recently strengthened my staff by the appointment of Mr. F. A. Voigt, the distinguished Foreign Editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, as head of my Intelligence Section, and am finding him most useful in that capacity. As month follows month, my German department has been gaining experience in its work, and I have every reason to believe that the propaganda it prepares serves its purpose as fully as the information at our disposal permits. My relations with the other departments with which I am concerned grow closer. This is particularly true of the Ministry of Information, with which my liaison has been strengthened, and of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, where I have posted a liaison officer.

CAMPBELL STUART.

March 22, 1940.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1940.*

SECRET.  
**W.P. (R.) (40) 119.**  
*April 13, 1940.*

**Copy No. 1**

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

**PROPAGANDA BY LEAFLET.**

*Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues for their information a report by Sir Campbell Stuart on propaganda by leaflet in Germany, Austria and German occupied territory in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Some of the information in this report has already appeared in the paper W.P. (40) 120 circulated by the Secretary of State for Air.

H.

*April 13, 1940.*

**REPORT ON PROPAGANDA BY LEAFLET IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA,  
THE PROTECTORATE AND POLAND BY SIR CAMPBELL STUART,  
G.C.M.G., K.B.E.**

IN all the reviews I have furnished of the work of my Department I have included an estimate of the results achieved by our leaflet propaganda. It has been based on reports from the S.I.S. and on others from my own agents abroad, from the more trustworthy German *émigré* organisations, from travellers returned from Germany, and from incidental sources of various kinds. At first the evidence was scanty; but as time has passed, it has become fuller and more conclusive. I therefore feel that, in the light both of greater knowledge and experience, I should attempt more fully to answer the question whether the efforts of my Department to weaken the resistance of Germany by the dissemination of propaganda from the air are, in fact, proving successful.

*Dissemination of Leaflets.*

The activities of Great Britain in regard to propaganda of this kind have, of course, been on a larger scale than those of either her ally or her enemy. The French have produced leaflets in considerable numbers, but they have not distributed them in equivalent quantities. We, on the other hand, have produced

10982 [21146]

B

and distributed 71 individual leaflets, and the monthly totals of our disseminations over enemy territory by aircraft and balloon have up to date been:—

September .....	20,250,000
October .....	5,360,000
November .....	4,027,000
December .....	2,164,000
January .....	5,623,000
February .....	8,064,000
March .....	20,254,000
April 1—6 .....	736,000
	66,478,000

N.B.—The disparity in these figures is due to operational and weather conditions.

#### *A German "Approach."*

The Germans also have followed our example by adopting leaflet propaganda by air as a weapon of war, though for reasons of their own, which are possibly fear of our defences and petrol shortage, they have directed it against France, and not against Great Britain. They have also in some cases imitated the exact types of our productions. It is one of many indications that they find our propaganda methods far from ineffective. Indeed, an interesting report recently received from the S.I.S. suggests that they feel themselves to be getting the worst of the propaganda warfare in the air. It states that a person who has for years been in touch with the Nazi hierarchy and is known by it to have connexions with Great Britain lately received a courier from one of its leading members, who made the following proposal:—

"It is unworthy of the great traditions of the British and German Air Forces to use them for the rather low business of propaganda. If the R.A.F. will desist from dropping tracts, the German Air Force will also stop dropping leaflets on France. If not, the German leaflet-dropping campaign will be intensified and British airmen flying over Germany will one day have a very unpleasant surprise. This will cost the British a lot of valuable lives and machines. A tacit gentleman's agreement should be reached to stop this propaganda from the air." The recipient of this message felt that the importance attached to our propaganda flights in so high a Nazi quarter was most significant.

#### *Enemy Anxieties.*

The reason for the German Government's disquietude at the recent increase in the propaganda activities of the R.A.F. are set forth in another Secret Report, which has greatly interested me. It points out that the Chiefs of the German Air Force, from Göring downwards, had so strongly assured the German people, and even more significant, their party organisations, of their security from enemy air attack, that they have found themselves in a serious dilemma. Either they must lose face or they must embark on air conflicts over important industrial centres which, in addition to the noise and excitement they would cause, would entail a serious loss of time and interfere with the much-needed rest of workers already overstrained. Reassurances addressed to the Hitler Jugend to the effect that one day the whole British Air Force will be annihilated, are beginning to lose their effect, while the S.A. are criticising the German Air Force freely for their inaction. The Gestapo, moreover, which hitherto have been opposed to counter-activities, are now reconsidering their attitude. The leaflets dropped by the R.A.F. are, the report goes on, a serious problem. "It is against human nature and especially against German nature not to read a printed piece of paper. You can convict a man if he deliberately listens to foreign broadcasts, you cannot send a man to a concentration camp if he tells you with righteous indignation: 'I felt it my duty to remove this rubbish; I do not want my children to be poisoned.' This is the excuse which, with variations, has been given on many occasions when civilians were accused of having picked up these leaflets. After several years' experience of Gestapo rule there is hardly a German stupid enough to take leaflets home and keep them. They are read and promptly destroyed."



Another problem, the report states, is that of collection and swift destruction. Large numbers of people, in addition to the police and S.A. are employed, and by no means all of them hold their tongues. Moreover, the German authorities particularly dislike flights over Berlin, for the Berliner, who has a strong and somewhat sardonic sense of humour, also respects courage, and has been exhibiting an amused admiration of the British Air Force. This is wholly incompatible with the contemptuous hatred German internal propaganda seeks to inculcate. It is significant that there has been of late a concerted effort on the part of the German Press to spread the illusion that all our leaflets are distributed by balloon.

*Moral Effect.*

It is, indeed, in their employment as the visiting cards of the R.A.F. that one of the values of leaflets lies. A Reuter message which appeared in the Press a few days ago contained an account of a distribution of an Austrian edition of our miniature newspaper over a small village near Braunau, Hitler's birthplace. At first the inhabitants hesitated to believe that they could be English; then, despite the ban, everybody picked them up and read them. Some were impressed and believed the contents, others dismissed them as mere propaganda. No measures to collect them were taken for some time, but at last the local schoolchildren were turned out to gather them up. In cases of this kind the moral effect upon the German people cannot fail to be considerable. No other method, except unrestricted bombing, could more directly convey to them the far-reaching strength of the British air-arm, or the peril which hangs over the inhabitants of the greater part of Germany. Even if the message borne were no more than an announcement that British aeroplanes had been overhead the leaflets would achieve valuable results. Incidentally, it is interesting to speculate as to the effect on British opinion if the German Air Force were night after night to penetrate unhindered into our country and leave millions of leaflets behind.

*Further Reports.*

There are many other reports of an encouraging nature. One which comes from a secret source states that a member of the German Air Force had himself seen the leaflets in Lübeck and that, in spite of police instructions, no one gave them up to the authorities.

Again, an apparently well documented memorandum received from one of His Majesty's Vice-Consuls on the reception of leaflets in Vienna tells that their effect was considerable. Vigorous precautions were taken against picking them up, but people went to considerable lengths to read them. It was added, as an example, that callers in twos and threes visited one greengrocer's shop where a leaflet was known to be preserved. Other intelligence from our own sources and from the Austrian organisations in Paris have confirmed the effect of leaflets in Austria.

A report from His Majesty's Consul-General at Antwerp dated the 29th March is as follows:—

“The entire population learns that air raids by British planes have been carried out over practically all parts of Germany, including Austria and Poland. During the various raids by British planes over Western, North-Western and Northern Germany, millions of pamphlets were dropped and were very carefully collected, not only by Hitler Jugend or Party organisations, but also by civilians who, as a matter of fact, have proved to be very eager to spread the contents of such pamphlets amongst their friends. The pamphlets go from hand to hand and, only in very few cases, people, instead of showing them to others, hand them over to the police or Party organisations.”

Other secret reports have also referred incidentally to the effect of leaflets in Germany. Nearly all agree in describing the flights as important.

The well-informed Social Democrat “Green Reports” from Germany have also stated that the effect of the leaflets in one district has been considerable. We know, of course, that earlier in the war leaflets distributed in Western Germany had found their way as far east as Berlin and Vienna.

[21146]

B 2

*Leaflets in the Protectorate.*

All reports (detailed reports of distribution have now been received from Czech sources) agree that the effect of the flights and of the leaflets was powerful. The news of the flights has been passed from mouth to mouth, and nearly the whole population knows about them. People receive great encouragement from this knowledge. One report states that the "effect is almost dangerously exhilarating." When leaflets are picked up their contents are quickly made known by a whispering campaign over the whole country. Two members of the Mafia who have recently escaped from the Protectorate have reported that the text of the leaflets was suitable and that the flights have made a tremendous impression on the population.

*Leaflets in Poland.*

The information we have expected from Poland in regard to results of the two flights to that country has not yet reached us. A letter, however, from a Polish soldier interned at Vaxholm, which was stopped recently by the censorship, contained the following information:—

"The spirits of the people are raised because they saw birds in the air, from which feathers with Polish writing fell, which deeply impressed our Polish population and cheered them up, because they have no other news, since the wireless sets have been confiscated."

*Devising the Policy of Leaflets.*

It is, of course, difficult to obtain except from reports, of which the above are typical, any precise information of the effect of a particular leaflet upon Germans of different regions, mentalities and classes. There is, too, naturally enough, conflict of evidence since the people of Germany tend, as do those of other countries, to differ in their individual views. Owing, moreover, to the penalties imposed, our products are not freely discussed, and secret agents seem to find great difficulty in obtaining reactions. I have, therefore, in devising the contents of leaflets, to trust chiefly to the local knowledge of my experts, their close study of the German Press and wireless, and their ingenuity in selecting and employing the points most likely to strike home. In view of the fact that they are, probably, the most competent and are certainly the most experienced men to be found for their task, and in addition are advised by the best expert intelligence of the Foreign Office, it is difficult to see how a more effective method of influencing the German people could be found. There is certainly no reason, even after careful investigation, to believe that any of the German refugees in this country would do better. Their knowledge is, of course, available; but propaganda is an art, and requires a special training and skill, together with an understanding of German psychology, rare indeed even among Germans themselves. Moreover, few Germans, if any, could present the British point of view, an essential of my work.

*Forms of Leaflet.*

There has been constant development in the forms of our propaganda.

In our large type one-sheet leaflets we have always aimed at conveying simple messages, but now we are also employing pictures freely, in order to catch the eye of the passer-by. In our miniature newspaper and its supplements, on the other hand, we give the latest possible news, and develop arguments more freely. We believe that, though the smaller print we employ in it would not be easily read even by a stooping person, this production (which the Germans have imitated closely) enjoys a considerable hand-to-hand circulation. We are also conscious of the souvenir value of productions of a more elaborate type, and intend further to develop them. In addition, we are engaged upon the production of an imitation of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the German newspaper of largest circulation, which will be sufficiently close to deceive at first sight. Moreover, with the increased means of distribution the Air Ministry has made available, we have been able largely to develop the production of regional leaflets. For these we can select the points best adapted for particular localities and address ourselves with all the greater force to those who, we know, will read them.

There is another aspect of leaflet propaganda which is worth mentioning. The leaflet conveys not only news and argument, but also something of the spirit or mood of the country from which it comes. Thus, when Germany was elated at the collapse of Finnish resistance,

and her propagandists were loudly boasting of the diplomatic defeat suffered by the Allies, we replied by propaganda leaflets of a specially cheerful and courageous tone.

*Risk of Curtailing Effort.*

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to prove that, despite the immense difficulties with which we have to contend, our leaflet propaganda is steadily exerting an influence, which, if it continues on the present scale, is bound to be cumulative. The facts that early this year heavily increased penalties were imposed on those who read or talked about our products, and that the Nazi leaders continue in almost every speech to denounce them, are we believe incontrovertible evidences of success. So are the swift responses of German Propaganda to statements made in them. Leaflet distribution by air has indeed become, as both Spain and Finland helped to prove, a normal method of modern warfare. In connexion especially with military operations it has a great and valuable part to play, as will, I have no doubt, appear if and when the appropriate circumstances arise. We have now for seven months been committed to a big propaganda campaign in Germany. If we were at this stage for any reason to abandon or curtail it, it would inevitably be attributed to weakness, and we should court discredit. So much so that, even if air warfare intensified, I should plead for the reservation of a sufficient force of bombers to enable our present power of conveying news and of fomenting and fostering discontent in Germany and her subjugated territories to be maintained. If, for example, a heavy engagement of the German forces on the West encouraged restiveness in Czecho-Slovakia, in Austria or in Poland, it might be of high importance to convey messages of good cheer or suggestions to their insubordinate or resistant peoples.

*Restricting the Press.*

In conclusion, I would allude to one of the minor, though somewhat difficult, problems which has confronted me. In the early days of the war the Chief Censor, after careful consideration and discussion with me, issued a notice to the Press asking it to refrain from publication of the texts of leaflets or from comments upon them. There were many reasons. The chief was that publication would have invited discussion and perhaps criticism both in this country and in others which could, and almost certainly would, have been used by German internal propaganda to the disparagement of our efforts and the disadvantage of Great Britain. The Government might, moreover, have had to suffer much of this criticism in silence, since it would have been virtually impossible to state publicly the reasons for the adoption of certain lines of propaganda without betraying secret sources of information, or the deeper aims of national policy or strategy. Indeed, a domestic wrangle over our propaganda to the enemy would have been both humiliating and unseemly, and would have tended to provoke the gleeful ridicule of the German Ministry of Propaganda. Time and experience has affected none of these considerations nor has any wise alternative appeared. There is even objection to the publication of those leaflets which are in themselves quite unexceptionable, since the enemy would only too soon detect the principles upon which we published or withheld our productions.

Furthermore, Front-Line propaganda may, before long, bulk largely in our work, and it is a matter for grave consideration whether an activity so closely allied to military operations should be advertised in the Press. As an instance, it might be desirable to couch leaflets intended solely for the enemy soldiery in terms quite foreign to the minds and experience of the British public as a whole. There would, indeed, if the texts of our leaflets were made public property, be a risk of our subjecting ourselves to limitations and influences from which the propagandists of the enemy are entirely free. It is even possible to imagine that, if Press and public interest in our products continued, the Government might be seriously embarrassed by pressure on the part of newspapers and public men to adopt ill-advised suggestions and even conflicting lines of propaganda.

Fortunately, although there have been some indiscretions, the more responsible journals of Great Britain have, hitherto, accepted the restrictions imposed in good spirit, a fact which is due to two invaluable letters addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to British editors. In this matter I would add that my conversations with my colleagues in France have led me to believe that their views on restriction of the publication of leaflets accord with those of the British Government.

*Printed for the War Cabinet. November 1940.*

SECRET.  
W.P. (40) 444.

Copy No. 1

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.**

**It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.**

**WAR CABINET.**

PROPAGANDA POLICY.

*Joint Memorandum by the Minister of Information and the Minister of Economic Warfare.*

THE accompanying paper has been drawn up in close consultation and complete agreement with the Chiefs of Staff, whose views are given in the note below. We are very glad to record this agreement, and we look forward to regular consultations with the Chiefs of Staff in the future, in order to ensure that political and military warfare are constantly co-ordinated. The paper is submitted to the War Cabinet in order that approval may be obtained for the principles of propaganda laid down.

(Initialed) D. C.  
H. D.

*Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1,  
November 15, 1940.*

NOTE BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF.

WE are in cordial agreement with the principles and aims set out in the attached Memorandum on Propaganda Policy as far as they relate, as they do to a considerable extent, to our military strategy.

2. In addition to long-term propaganda, we think it important that our day-to-day propaganda and publicity machine should be ready to react immediately to events, and, if possible, to exploit them. The kind of events we have in mind are the invasion of Norway, the collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war. Although disadvantageous to us from the military point of view, it might have been possible to make much capital out of the above events in the propaganda field if we had been fully ready to exploit them at once either by careful anticipation or by prompt action when they occurred.

3. Moreover, it should be clear from the start what line our propaganda and publicity is to take—at present there is a liability to hesitancy and uncertainty in the way in which the Press reacts to these events.

4. As a result of our discussion with the Ministers of Information and Economic Warfare, we have already instituted certain measures which should enable our liaison officers with the Press and the B.B.C. to be more fully informed of our views when drastic changes in the strategic situation occur. We are ready, on our part, to co-operate to the fullest extent to achieve accord with the Departments concerned in the development of our Propaganda Policy.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND  
J. G. DILL.  
C. F. A. PORTAL.

## PROPAGANDA POLICY.

THE purpose of this appreciation which we have drawn up in collaboration is to define the lines on which British propaganda should be conducted. As has already been pointed out in the Chiefs of Staff appreciation of future strategy, propaganda must play an important part in our methods of defeating Germany. It is, in fact, an essential element in the strategy of total warfare.

### *Aims of British Propaganda.*

2. Propaganda as an arm in war has two main functions:—

To wage psychological warfare—

(a) with the simultaneous object of destroying the moral force of the enemy's cause and of sustaining and eventually enforcing conviction of the moral force of our own cause;

(b) by co-operating with the other arms to prepare the way for and to exploit the effects of the military and economic offensive.

3. These functions are complementary; and underlying both must be the common aim of weakening the resistance of our enemies and of maintaining the morale of our own people and the confidence of our friends. In both, counter-propaganda must play an important part.

4. In the succeeding paragraph we summarise our main conclusions, for which we ask the approval of the War Cabinet. In doing so, we wish to stress the urgency of tackling this problem of our propaganda policy, and of placing it on an established basis.

### *Conclusions.*

5. We recommend that our propaganda policy should be governed by the following principles:—

(a) Our propaganda should be planned with due regard to the possibilities of the strategical situation. Machinery already exists for coordinating our propaganda and strategy by means of contacts between the Chiefs of Staff or their representatives on the one side and the Minister of Economic Warfare and the Minister of Information or their representatives on the other.

(b) The news published in our open propaganda should be true and accurate. Unpleasant facts should not be hidden merely because they are unwelcome.

(c) Whatever the strategical situation, our propaganda should not become defensive. While we should guard against inspiring over-confidence, we should capitalise to the utmost all the factors in our favour, and should exploit any visible military successes, however small

(d) While it is too early as yet to formulate in any detail a propaganda plan in direct relation to next year's campaigns, the elimination of Italy as a means to the defeat of Germany comes first among our strategic aims, and a propaganda plan to promote it would naturally emerge from the discussions referred to in paragraph 5(a).

(e) The maintenance of public morale in this country, and the undermining of morale among our enemies and their forces in the occupied countries, will be of supreme importance during the coming months of strain. It should be the particular aim of our propaganda during the present winter to preserve the moral force of our own cause and to destroy the false moral foundations of our enemies.

(f) Although essentially we are fighting for our very existence, this factor alone is not fully adequate to the psychological needs of our own people and means nothing to our enemies. A more positive conception is required. From the point of view of our propaganda, there is a real need for a formulation of post-war aims in broad terms which will sustain the spiritual motive force of our own people, appeal to our supporters abroad (especially America) and counter the German conception of a new order.

- (g) To be effective, propaganda should be supported by action. While we fully recognise the practical difficulties, it would be of immense value in our propaganda if—besides being able to proclaim our ideals for the future—we could point to positive evidence of a programme of social and economic reconstruction already in progress in this country.
- (h) At the same time, we should exploit the achievements already made in the past in the field of social reconstruction and Imperial organisation, which should be driven home by comparison between conditions in the democratic countries and the totalitarian States.
- (i) Without committing ourselves in any way to a policy of reprisals, we should stress our growing ability to meet terror with terror and to mete out retribution to our enemies at our own selected time.
- (j) As an essential corollary to “fear” propaganda, we should hold out the hope of a “fair deal” to our enemies in a British peace. In this connection, we should stress the ability and intention of the United States and ourselves to relieve conditions in Europe immediately the war is over. Such propaganda would be reinforced if we could actually purchase and set aside stocks of food in the American continent for future European relief.
- (k) Incitement to revolts in Europe against the Axis Powers is one of the positive objects of our propaganda subject to the proviso that no attempt should be made to incite revolts prematurely.
- (l) We should try to sow mistrust between Germany, Italy and Japan, and should hammer in the theme that the origin of the war lies in German aggression and that the sufferings of all peoples are directly due to this.
- (m) Our counter-propaganda should continually exploit the lies and inconsistencies of German propaganda.
- (n) It is the duty of the Services to ensure the prompt release of “hot” news and to afford all possible facilities for publicity, as well as to suppress information which might compromise security. There must be constant co-operation between the service staffs and the propaganda and press authorities, with the object of conducting a planned propaganda campaign in line with military policy and operations. To this end it will be necessary to perfect our machinery for day-to-day propaganda and publicity to meet current events.
- (o) Finally, the question of the closer co-ordination of broadcasting by the B.B.C. with Government policy during the war should be considered, in order to ensure that no matter is broadcast by the B.B.C. which in any way conflicts with the wishes of the Government Departments concerned.

*Richmond Terrace, S.W.1,  
November 15, 1940.*