

AUGUST 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PART I

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS





JAPANESE INTERNEES AT SAIPAN

"Another factor to be considered is the large number of non military people who have been part of the Japanese garrisons."

Psychological Warfare PART I – August 1944

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COMBAT PROPAGANDA

Introduction:

1. Propaganda may be defined as an organized influencing of the actions and thoughts of others by the medium of words and ideas. Applied to assault and combat operations, it is a systematized effort to influence the actions of enemy personnel in such a way as to render more successful our present and future military operations. Its purpose is to shorten the war and to save lives. Its immediate result should be the decreased resistance of enemy forces and the ultimate surrender of individuals or groups within the enemy ranks.

2. Apart from the humanitarian aspects, the taking of prisoners can prove to be a very profitable military venture. The Japanese prisoner has proved to be a unique person. Although he is difficult to secure because of a very deeply rooted aversion to being captured that has been instilled in him by his military superiors, after capture he is in a situation wherein no instructions have been made concerning the manner in which he should act. As a result, valuable information that has aided greatly the prosecution of the war and saved American lives has been elicited from Japanese prisoners of war. For example, a prisoner captured in XYZ, upon interrogation, provided information concerning the strength and composition of the enemy garrison at ABC that considerably facilitated the subsequent capture of that place by American forces.

3. Inasmuch as the natural inner emotions of Japanese are the same as those of any other race, their fanatical attitude can undoubtedly be influenced, because they are now being captured at an increased rate. This was particularly observed after recent operations, and a possible explanation of it lies in a dawning doubt in the minds of the Japanese that is supplanting their hitherto unshakeable conviction of ultimate victory. If this

is an accurate explanation we can expect this trend to continue with future operations and as the war comes closer to the Japanese homeland. The Japanese military man has always been aware that court-martial awaited him if he were captured, under any circumstances whatever, and then returned home to a victorious Japan. It is now hoped that a dim realization is coming over him that perhaps there will be no victorious Japan, but rather one wherein the whole country and its rulers will be in the same status as he, if he surrenders. This will tend to undermine the dogged resistance to be taken prisoner that has characterized him to date. Perhaps if it can be suggested to him that an honorable future exists for him in Japan, he can be persuaded to give up his hitherto inflexible attitude. If propagan-da can help him save face, it will be effective.

4. Another factor to be considered is the large number of non-military people who have been part of the Japanese garrisons. These include native populations, conscripted Japanese and Korean workers, and resident civilians. Prior to assault all of these forces are united in aiding the Japanese war effort. Past experience has proven that at least some of these elements can be enlisted by our forces either to take a neutral position with respect to operations or even to assist us. Japanese oppression of natives and Koreans and the traditional overbearing Samurai attitude toward non-military Japanese are facts that can be capitalized upon to create disunity and even dissension behind the enemy lines. Accordingly, an organized effort has been made by CINCPAC-CINCPOA to propagandize the Japanese military forces, and this booklet is written both to explain the function of the propaganda section of CINCPAC-CINCPOA and to elaborate on appended propaganda.

5. It is to be pointed out that this activity deals only with assault and military propaganda and must be distinguished from the activity of the Office of War Information, a civilian organization under the executive branch of the government whose responsibility and jurisdiction embrace long-term and political propaganda as well as propaganda directed to the Japanese homeland.

6 For the benefit of those officers who may not have time to read the following, a brief summary is included at the end.

ASSAULT PROPAGANDA:

1. The purpose of assault propaganda is to weaken the resistance of the defending troops, to create disunity and dissension among the composite elements of the garrisons, and to enlist the support of potential sources of assistance. It should vary in intensity and in quality with the tides of battle and with the chronological progress of the operation. One type of propaganda should be propagated prior to the invasion, another issued at the climax of the battle, and still another reserved for that period when enemy resistance is crumbling or when it is completely dissolved and nothing but disconnected units remain.

2. It also should be pointed out that certain propaganda is to be addressed to the officers and military caste themselves, another to conscripted Japanese workers and civilians, and a third type to laborers and native populations. Finally, a special type will be addressed to American and Allied Nationals who may be in the area.

3. In all of this, discretion should be employed since only commanders in the field can arrive at a military conclusion that sets the stage for the issuance of a particular leaflet. For example, some leaflets will be designated, generally, for issue during the second stage (D-2, D-1, etc.). Such a leaflet would be designed to instruct the native population or American Nationals to move to an area clear of bombardment, and to order Koreans and conscripts to take no part in the approaching encounter. If, however, its issue were to deprive the commander of the weapon of surprise, it would obviously do more harm than good.

In other words a discreet use should be made of the designations of the leaflets. Again, some leaflets are made up for issue at the very moment when the battle clearly turns in our favor and creates an important psychological crisis. This crisis should be capitalized upon at once with the designated leaflets. In short, the designations of the leaflets should be adhered to, but their application is to be governed by higher authority. Emphasis should be placed on the timing of the distribution, however, since this is as important a factor as the contents of the leaflets themselves.

PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO BY-PASSED AND ISOLATED GARRISONS:

1. Propaganda directed to by-passed garrisons differs from that directed to Japanese resisting the assault forces. Generally the by-passed garrisons may be propagandized in a more leisurely fashion, and in preparing the material attention has been given to encouraging prolonged reflection. Many of the garrisons are fever and malaria-ridden and without supplies. Most of the troops have been isolated for a considerable period and have been away from home and families as well as from the influence of their importunate militarists. Thrown together under often harrowing circumstances, disaffection is more likely to occur here than in the heat of battle. The lack of food and medical equipment, and the severity of their condition make the appeal to their appetite and physical relief easier. However, despite conditions that are to us perfectly horrible and apparently beyond human endurance, these garrisons hold out in defiant but hopeless resistance, clearly proclaiming the enormity of the problem. As a result, forces that could be employed elsewhere and munitions that could accelerate the prosecution of the war must be expended on opposition that is not prompted by military strength but rather by deep-rooted beliefs, superstitions, loyalties and fanaticism. The spirit of resistance is always present, and anything that propaganda can do to destroy this spirit is a definite and tangible operational gain.

2. Here again great discretion must be resorted to in the propagation of the attached leaflets. Some of the garrisons have been only recently isolated, whereas some have been isolated for a long period. Some are completely without supplies; others have occasional supplies filtering through. Some have been subjected to intensive or regular bombing and strafing, whereas others have been left comparatively quiet. Again, there are large numbers of Koreans and elements that are potentially dissident in contrast to almost solidly homogeneous units. It is therefore imperative that care be taken in following the suggestions accompanying the attached leaflets.

THEMES:

1. The themes chosen for the propaganda are multiple. Basically they are themes that would be addressed to soldiers and civilians of all nations. The underlying appeal is to those human qualities that the Japanese BUSHIDO or military tradition has caused to be suppressed for generations but which can never be hammered from the human spirit. The Japanese is a sensitive person, invested with all the emotions and affections that we associate with our own homes and families. He suffers the pangs of homesickness; he has almost a passionate desire to return to his homeland, and he certainly longs for his hot baths, his good food, and his good wine.

2. His entire training and tradition have made him particularly sensitive to suggestive modes of speech and writing. The indirect and the inferential has been instilled in him. He dislikes syllogistic reasoning, and his mental reactions are intuitive and sharp. He is, even in lower intellectual groups, responsive to the artistic. He is readily impressed with calligraphy or fine handwriting. Poetry is read by the most churlish Japanese and is attempted by many. The disposition of the Japanese is highly impressionistic. All Japanese aspire for aesthetic effect in everything - in floral arrangements, in pictorial representations of nature, and in ceremonies.



ME-ZOO-YA TAH-BAY-MO-NO OH AH-GAY-MAH-SHOW
(WE WILL GIVE YOU WATER AND FOOD)

JAPANESE COMBAT PHRASES

REPRODUCED BY D-2 SECTION
2nd MARINE DIVISION FMF

3. But all this emotion and this love of the aesthetic is completely hidden behind an inscrutable mask that occidentals can only with difficulty penetrate. From the day he is born the Japanese is trained to conceal his emotions and to wear his mask. In preparing these attached leaflets, therefore, all of these qualities have been noted. Pictorial and floral designs are used, and appeals are made to emotions, to homesickness, and to the frailty of body and spirit, although the Japanese will pretend to respond to none of these.

4. Some of these themes are:

(a) Appeal to physical needs:

Weary, hungry, and wounded men desire rest, food and treatment no matter what their training and tradition. This is something to which a strong appeal can readily be made. This appeal has already been responsible for the taking of prisoners in past campaigns. Thus, if propaganda can reach Japanese soldiers, conscripted workers, and civilians, and appears to them credible, a tug of war will be set in motion within each one, and each victory of the physical needs over the traditional warrior code (Bushido) will be an operational success.

(b) Appeal against self-destruction:

The basis of this appeal is recognition of the soldier's devotion to his country and his selfless contribution to his cause. He is asked what he would contribute to his country or his family if he needlessly destroyed himself. There will be another day when a chastened Japan, rid of the military spirit, will welcome him home, because all Japanese - civilians and troops - will have surrendered.

(c) Appeal by face-saving devices:

Through all appeals no mention is made of the word surrender (Kosan or Kofuku) or prisoner (Furyo or Horyo). The Japanese is asked to "lay down his arms" or "cease hostilities" because he has done his duty and further sacrifice would result in no benefit to his country. Here the word honor is used with great care, if at all.

(d) Appeal by citing lies of Japanese leaders:

The Japanese leaders have gone to rather extreme lengths to convince the ordinary soldier of Japan's invincibility, but as our victories become more and more demonstrable, the ordinary Japanese soldier who does not know too much about the course of the war can be shown in a credible manner what the actual war situation is. Thus he will be impressed and begin to disbelieve his leaders. The apparently widespread belief instilled by constant warnings by the military leaders that Americans torture their prisoners is refuted constantly by propaganda. Pictures of Japanese (with their features indistinguishable or turned away) eating well or playing ball are used to dispel these fears. Promises and boasts of their navy can be used with striking effectiveness to show that they have been deceived. What the Japanese navy claims to have done and promised to do has been oftentimes ludicrous and its falsehoods can be demonstrated readily.

(e) Appeals designed to create dissension and friction:

The basis of this appeal is to bring home to the Japanese the wretchedness of the condition into which he has been forced by his superiors and comfortable leaders at home who consider him a mere expendible or "shadow soldier." Invidious comparisons are drawn between his condition and the condition of his comfortable leaders. A corollary of this theme is one that sets men against officers, Army against Navy, Koreans against Japanese, civilians against military. All of this is intended to create friction and dissension and ultimately even insubordination.

(f) The appeal to authority and respect for law:

The essence of this appeal is that the American forces have rightfully captured this particular area and are lawfully exerting their control over it. The Japanese is therefore told that he, a law respecting man, should comply with the orders

of the rightful commander. He recognizes and respects authority. He needs a leader, and inasmuch as his higher ranking officers have deserted him, their authority must be replaced by that of the American commander to fulfill this need. It must be recalled that the Japanese is regimented from birth.

- (g) Appeal by citing the overwhelming might of American troops and industry:

The nature of this theme is obvious and it is used extensively, particularly during the pre-invasion and invasion stages. Daily it is becoming easier to demonstrate.

DISSEMINATION:

1. In connection with the use of propaganda, care should be taken to do nothing that would leave the impression with prospective prisoners that the facts stated are falsely presented. If, for instance, individuals among the enemy's ranks do comply with the instructions, as much care as is possible should be exerted to see that no harm comes to them. Others may be observing the process and their conduct may be irretrievably influenced if those complying fall victim to an unintended barrage. At the same time this should in no way reduce the high degree of caution necessary to detect acts of treachery or entrapment that the enemy has shown himself so highly capable of in the past.

2. It is also recommended that the word surrender (kosan or kofuku) or prisoner of war (horyo or furyo) never be employed in connection with the taking of a Japanese prisoner. This is in conformity with the general conviction that everything must be done to help the captured ones save face. If pictures are taken of surrendering prisoners it is best that their features be obscured, or at least that the impression be given to them

or to others who may be watching that their facial characteristics are obscured. (No reference is made here to pictures taken for identification purposes.) For the Japanese, it must be remembered, would rather die than have it be known that he surrendered. Even the most voluble and informative prisoners thus far captured, although perfectly willing to give intimate details concerning their Army and Navy plaintively request that absolutely no word of their capture be relayed to their family or to their government. Thus only if the Japanese begins to feel that his surrender is inconspicuous and will not be publicized will he give serious attention to laying down his arms.

3. In spite of this deep-rooted and almost universal shame of surrender, however, a few prisoners have been taken who have been willing to go back to urge other Japanese "to lay down their arms" or "to cease struggling" or inform them that they would not be tortured if they did so. This latter fear of torture is quite wide spread, having been systematically implanted in all personnel - military and civilian - by the Japanese leaders. Indeed, one of the first reactions of the prisoners taken has been surprise that they were not tortured. Thus, this unwarranted fear has been treated at length in the themes of surrender. But if a Japanese does volunteer to go back or has been trusted to broadcast to his comrades, care should be exercised that he does not resort to trickery or to an indiscretion. If a broadcast is made the text should be prepared and monitored by an interpreter who could immediately stop any talk taking an unfavorable turn.

4. No reference should be made to the Emperor. Any unfavorable reference to the Emperor will only antagonize the prisoner or prospective prisoner and consequently detract from the military success of the entire operation. Although there does exist in the minds of some Japanese a doubt to the contrary, to the average Japanese the Emperor is a "living God."


FROM TIME TO TIME OFFICERS IN THE FIELD
HAVING DAY TO DAY CONTACT WITH THE JAPANESE
MAY PERCEIVE NEW TRENDS AND NEW FACTS RELA-
TIVE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROPAGANDA.
ALL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS SHOULD BE FOR-
WARDED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SECTION
CINCPAC-CINCPOA.



Left hand corner : -
The moon's so beautiful, so romantic,
and we're together Promise you'll let
nothing spoil our love.



Right hand corner : -
Dearie you'll take me with you, won't you?
It's so lonesome all alone, Besides, I have
a hunch Buddy is never coming back...and I do
want to have loads of fun while I'm still
so young.



Middle section : -
You have been fooled into believing yourself
a hero. Pause and think about the men at
home--these big sissies who are running around
with your womenfolks--while you, not knowing
what you're fighting for, face ugly death to
become another unknown soldier.

Left hand lower corner : -
You needn't worry, dearie, I'm assigned
on home duty. we can always be like
this. Just imagine what the poor suckers
overseas have to suffer.

Right hand lower corner : -
Ooh* la la, that was a thrilling
experience! I feel so fresh
again, so alive, so happy in
your arms.



We were the happiest of couples



Until our tearful parting, Oh how she wept!



But, no sooner had I left, my wife was told
that I'd never come back.



REPRODUCTION
OF
PROPAGANDA
LEAFLETS USED
BY
THE JAPANESE.

THIS BOOKLET IS PREPARED FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE
OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND SHOULD BE HANDLED CON-
SISTENT WITH MILITARY SECURITY.

PLAN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION:

1. The material appearing under this chapter head is the actual plan for the distribution of the leaflets, and it is suggested that continual reference be made to it.

2. The accompanying leaflets are merely a selected group, and additional ones, as well as other propaganda material, will be made available to the addressees of the booklet. These leaflets should become a part of the booklet in order that every addressee may have on hand one copy of all material. This will enable him to request the quantity and variety he wishes for any particular operation or at any particular time. If any type of propaganda proves to be ineffective or becomes obsolete, addressees will be informed and may eliminate the type from their active list.

3. When bundles of leaflets are received they will have attached to them a card containing a translation and explanatory notes. These explanatory notes are supplements to the following suggestions and should not be substituted for them.

4. For the purposes of Psychological Warfare, an assault operation is divided into the five following phases:
 - (a) The softening-up period.
 - (b) The period of intensive bombardment immediately preliminary to the invasion (D-3, D-2, D-1, etc.).
 - (c) The invasion itself and the establishment of a beach-head (D, D+1, D+2, etc.).
 - (d) That period when it becomes obvious to the enemy that our forces will be successful.
 - (e) The mopping-up period.

5. Thus, the following division is made in the numbering:

(a) 100-399 inclusive. Leaflets bearing these numbers have been prepared for the period of aerial bombardment of an entire tactical area, preliminary to any further action to be taken in that area. Within any given area no single location should be made an exclusive target of propaganda material. Even if a particular area showered with leaflets is not to be invaded, the leaflets will not be wasted since the area is then a future by-passed garrison. This softening-up period commences with the commencement of the aerial bombardment of the entire area and ends with the opening of the second stage.

(b) 400-499. Leaflets bearing these numbers are designed for that period of intensive bombardment, usually by surface ships, just prior to invasion. Here again the propaganda should not necessarily be limited to the area actually to be invaded. These leaflets will differ in intensity of appeal from those issued during the first stage. Here, because of the desirability of surprise, it may be inadvisable to use propaganda.

(c) 500-699. Leaflets bearing these numbers are designed for that phase when the actual landings are made and the main engagement begins.

(d) 700-799. Leaflets bearing these numbers should be used when the enemy realizes that our forces will be successful in their attacks. As has been indicated, this is an important psychological stage and propaganda may be very effective at this point.

(e) 800-999. Leaflets bearing these numbers should be used during the phase of operation when resistance has been broken and only mopping-up remains.

6. By-Passed and Isolated Garrisons:

Much attention has been given to propaganda for Japanese who have been by-passed by our troops. Here, however, the time element which is so important in assault operations is not a great factor. More important is the variety of themes to be used. Such themes will be available for selection and may be used at discretion. The pamphlets for by-passed garrisons are numbered serially from 1000-1999.

MEANS FOR DISTRIBUTION:

1. The best method of distribution is probably by airplane, although the ingenuity of the operational forces is sought on this point. Most of the leaflets themselves are small so that they may be inserted by the finder into a pocket or be easily concealed. They make a fairly compact bundle.

2. If the pamphlets are released by plane, care should be taken that the bundles in which they are packed are dropped or hurled through openings in order to keep them clear of propellers, engines, and tail surfaces. Care should be taken too that there are no planes in the rear of the releasing plane. A leaflet of one sheet is calculated to fall one thousand feet in five minutes. A double-sheeted leaflet is said to descend the same distance in three and one-half minutes. The suggested altitude at which leaflets may be dropped is from tree top level to five thousand feet. A bundle will be limited to five hundred leaflets or less and will be held together with a piece of string or elastic band near the end of the bundle. If the bundles are thrown with force into the slip stream they will break up immediately and the individual leaflets will commence their descent.

3. It has been reported that the British have developed a barometric device which delays the diffusion of the leaflets until the bundles have descended to a designated altitude. Although a device such as this could be used, it has not yet been made available in this theatre of war.

4. It is further reported that "leaflet bombs" have been recently perfected by an American army officer. These are made from cylindrical laminated paper containers approximately sixteen inches in diameter and forty-seven inches long. Cords are run length-wise through the outside surface and fastened to a time fuse in the cover of the container. The fuse can be set to explode anywhere from within a few seconds to a minute and one half after release. The explosion causes the cords to rip the container into shreds, releasing the contents. Upon hitting the ground the fuse causes mild damage such as that which would be caused by flak fragments. Such a "bomb" is designed to contain five bundles weighing several hundred pounds. A fin on such a missile would make for greater accuracy.

5. It has been found that mortar shells can be used as a successful medium of dissemination. A 60-mm. mortar shell can contain as many as seventy-five leaflets, and for short range purposes is more precise than "bombing".

6. In reference to the number to be dropped, it has been the experience in the past that many leaflets are carried by the wind beyond the confines of the enemy lines and into the sea. For this reason an ample supply should be on hand. Furthermore, the variety of operational accidents is so great that a great number may be destroyed at any time. Therefore all the leaflets should not be conveyed in one vessel.

7. In order to assure that leaflets will be picked up, various devices will be used to make them attractive. In addition to pictorial designs on the leaflets themselves, such desired tidbits as cigarettes and small pieces of sweets might be attached to approximately every hundredth leaflet. The use of a cigarette for this purpose is particularly suitable and will cause the recipients to pick up the leaflets for the cigarettes. In this way leaflets will come to their attention even if they have no particular interest in them or have been prohibited from gathering them.

8. It has been found that the pilot releasing the leaflets should be made aware of the possible advantages of this propaganda in order that he may not consider the whole process non-combatant and be inclined to complete his assignment with indifference. It is therefore suggested that translations of the leaflets be made available to him and to his crew and the whys and wherefors of the procedure be explained.

9. In the event that the propaganda takes the form of recordings or announcements over a public address system ingenuity should be used in setting up the loud speakers. The particular factors of terrain, din of battle, wind direction, and degree of resistance of the enemy should be considered. Recordings have been made and contain the same themes mentioned above.

JAPANESE REACTION TO PROPAGANDA:

1. Passing reference is made to what would appear to be recent Japanese reactions to propaganda. An intercept of a Japanese boardcast on 27 June 1944 revealed that a committee headed by Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador to Italy, has been set up in Tokyo with a six point program. These points include:

- (1) Propagation of the Imperial way.
- (2) Study of harmful ideas.
- (3) Exposing of tricky, enemy propaganda.

2. Akin to this is a recent report that the Japanese troops in the 33rd Division operating in the Imphal area have been instructed on the "integrity required of each man in the Imperial army" in case of capture -- which, as reported, is the first known official admission that there are circumstances in which Japanese soldiers might become prisoners.



JAPANESE COMBAT PHRASES

INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVING ASSAULT PROPAGANDA DUTIES:

1. In order that propaganda addressed to Japanese troops be effective, one of the Intelligence officers already attached to the command or corps which will conduct the assault should have as his main duty the preparation and dissemination of assault propaganda. This officer should have some understanding of Japanese psychology and the aims and objectives of psychological warfare, and an appreciation of the timely use of propaganda material.

2. Since it is the purpose of the Psychological Warfare Section of CINCPAC-CINCPOA to prepare constantly various necessary studies, propaganda material, and information concerning the enemy in any given area, the Intelligence officers concerned should consult the personnel and files of the Psychological Warfare Section before drawing up any plan. Both propaganda material and plans for utilization of this material will be prepared and developed by this office, and, by consulting this office and securing these materials, Intelligence officers will be enabled, in advance of each operation, to expedite their program and execute it with maximum speed and efficiency. Thus, all officers having propaganda duties should be in constant contact with this section at all times during the preparation of plans for an operation.

3. Since particularly effective propaganda must often times be prepared at the scene of action, it is necessary that certain highly fluent language officers and nisei be attached to the unit. These language officers and nisei would be used to interrogate PW concerning the effectiveness of the propaganda used and to gain additional pertinent information concerning the special characteristics of the opposing Japanese forces. This will enable the Intelligence officer to have all available facts at his disposal. It will also be necessary for these language officers and nisei to translate into correct Japanese (this fact is vitally important) the particular message to be conveyed. It is important that these persons be assigned for this definite purpose rather than for interrogation whose primary purpose is to secure combat information.

4. Equipment and material for the preparation of propaganda at the scene of action are included in the equipment of any command or corps, but, as a precautionary measure, Intelligence officers should consult this section prior to an operation.

CONCLUSION:

The foregoing chapters purport to explain the nature of the work that the Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Section of CINCPAC-CINCPOA is now engaged in. The recommendations and suggestions are general. Fundamentally, the section's mission is to engage in special studies in the field of Psychological Warfare, and to draw up propaganda material and recommendations for such material. Leaflets have been stressed in this booklet, but public address systems, posters, handbills, photographs, and all other propaganda media are employed. It is pointed out, however, that propaganda, to be most effective, should be planned carefully. This is true whether the operation involved is an assault campaign or a campaign to liquidate or neutralize a by-passed garrison.

SUMMARY:

1. The purpose of propaganda is to save lives and shorten the war. When a Japanese is induced to surrender, American lives are saved and munitions remain unexpended. Although he is difficult to take, the Japanese, once taken, will talk freely and give information invaluable to future operations. Therefore, every Japanese prisoner taken represents a definite operational success.

2. Efforts to induce Japanese to surrender are not as futile as might appear on the surface. An integral part of his stubbornness has its root in a conviction, instilled in him from birth, that Japan is invincible. This conviction, however, we are rapidly destroying. He must also be convinced that when Japan surrenders (military and civilians alike) it will be possible for him to return home. This is at present difficult, and all Japanese consistently ask that no word of their capture be relayed to their families or to their government.



3. Every garrison besides troops, consists of Koreans, conscript laborers, and natives who do not possess the Japanese stubbornness. Appeals to these can be made on a reasonable basis. Because of Japanese oppressive treatment, these elements often despise their oppressors and are fertile ground for dissension.

4. Propaganda must be versatile. Thus, types of propaganda to be directed to by-passed and isolated garrisons will differ from types used during the assault operations. Again, propaganda for assault operations includes the softening-up and pre-invasion phases, the periods when landings are made and Japanese resistance begins to crumble, and, finally, the mopping-up period.

5. The Japanese, despite his training and his military tradition, is subject to the same weaknesses of emotion and physique as is anyone else. Thus, the themes used in propaganda are those that would be directed to soldiers of all nations. Allowances, however, must be made for his fanaticism for self-destruction and his ingrained aversion to logical thought. Moreover, no reference should be made either to the Emperor or to the terms surrender (kosan or kofuku) or prisoner (horyo or furyo).

6. Propaganda may take the form of leaflets, broadcasts, public address systems, handbills, and posters. The use of any one type should be determined by particular circumstances.

7. The leaflets attached to the booklet are a selected group of propaganda material. Others will be made available in order that a complete set of propaganda themes may be used in conjunction with this booklet.

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11.2