Frank Prosser & SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)
Civilian Organization Of Propaganda:
On 16 August 1940, Nelson Rockefeller was named Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), with responsibility for disseminating news,
films, and radio to Latin America. CIAA retained its independent
existence throughout World War II, despite the formation of several other
information organizations.
On 11 July 1941, the Coordinator of Information (COI) was
formed, headed by Colonel (later General) William ("Wild Bill")
Donovan. COI's responsibilities included the gathering of intelligence and the
analysis and dissemination of information abroad, outside Latin America. COI
was a predecessor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Foreign
Information Service (FIS), with Robert Sherwood as director, was formed within
COI. It dealt with news and white propaganda outside Latin America, and
quickly behaved almost as an autonomous unit.
On 13 June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWl) was
created with Elmer Davis as director, subsuming several other agencies
including FIS (but not CIAA). FIS, under Sherwood, became the Overseas Branch
of OWl, dealing in white propaganda. In this June 1942 reorganization, COI
became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with Donovan, operating as code
number 109, as director.
Responsibilities between OWl and OSS were but vaguely
defined, and disputes within and among CIAA, OWl, and OSS became disruptive.
At this early stage of the war, few officials knew what their organizations
should be doing, but many knew what other organizations should be prevented
from doing. Donovan's ambitious plans for OSS were fought doggedly by Sherwood
and Davis. The squabbling led to presidential Executive Order 9312 of 9 March
1943, which, in attempting to clarify the responsibilities of OWl and OSS,
gave white propaganda to OWl but left black propaganda's status unclear. As
the war progressed, OSS became the de facto owner of black propaganda and OWl
of white, and this arrangement was formalized by an agreement between Donovan
and Davis in June 1944. Early in the war, the U.S. had little expertise in
subversive warfare. Donovan borrowed heavily from the British for experience
in black propaganda; the British, after going through their own period of
high-level resistance to unconventional methods of warfare, had borrowed from
the Germans.
By mid-1943, OSS command (under the director and assistant
director) consisted of two principal deputy directors: the Deputy Director of
Intelligence, who controlled such branches as Secret Intelligence (SI and
Counter-Espionage (X-2), and the Deputy Director of Psychological Warfare
Operations (later Deputy Director of Operations), controlling branches such as
Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups (OG), Maritime Units (MU), and
Morale Operations (MO). MO was the source of black printed propaganda.
In summer of 1943, OSS theatre officers were appointed for
each of the major military theatres in which OSS was operating: ETO (European
Theatre of Operations), METO (Middle Eastern), NATO (North African), and FETO
(Far Eastern). NATO was later renamed MEDTO (Mediterranean Theatre of
Operations), which through its MO branch was responsible for much of the black
propaganda emitted by the OSS. In addition to serving in the chain of command
to OSS headquarters in Washington, the theatre officers were the liaisons
between OSS and the military theatre commanders, who had approval authority
over all OSS and OWl projects in their theatres. The theatre officers served
through December 1944, when another OSS reorganization eliminated this
structure.
OSS established many missions overseas during the course of
the war. The OSS had an important headquarters in London, with Donovan
arranging its first beginnings in August 1941. OSS London reached its final
form in 1943 and early 1944; the MO unit in London was established in May
1943, where, operating under direct allied military control, it produced
subversive propaganda for the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF).
In neutral Switzerland, OSS maintained a headquarters in
Bern beginning in May 1942, using the diplomatic cover provided by the OWI.
There, the OSS (headed by Allen Dulles, who arrived in November 1942 and
operated as code number 110, with cover name "Mr. Burns") and the
OWl (under Gerald Mayer, whose code number was 678) cooperated extensively on
production of propaganda, and official correspondence on this subject seems to
make little distinction between the offices. The Bern OSS unit operated from
Herrengasse 23. The OSS established five sub-units in Switzerland: in Geneva,
Zurich, Lugano, Ascona, and Basel. OSS operations were conducted with great
caution to avoid exposure and arrest by the rigorously neutral Swiss. The
contributions of OSS Switzerland were deemed highly effective.
In neutral Sweden, the OSS established a small base of
three men in Stockholm in 1942; by late 1944 it had grown to 35 members. A
small two-man MO unit arrived in Stockholm in April 1944.
In the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, OSS-MEDTO was
originally (in 1943) designated the 2677th Headquarters Company (Provisional)
G-3. To increase its autonomy, in May 1944 the unit was designated a regiment,
officially the 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional). The regiment was activated
in July 1944 with headquarters near Caserta, Italy, when North African Theatre
of Operations military headquarters (NATOUSA) moved from Algiers to Caserta.
The regimental commander was Colonel Edward Glavin, a Strategic Services
Officer of MEDTO. Most of the black propaganda produced by the OSS originated
with MO Rome, which was organized in mid-1944.
The OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945.
OSS Morale Operations (MO):
The Morale Operations Branch of the OSS was created in
early January 1943, and by March was ready for action. Its primary function
was to attack "the morale and the political unity of the enemy through...
psychological means operating or purporting to operate within the enemy or
occupied territories." Chiefs of MO include Frederick Oechsner (began in
early 1943), Col. Kenneth D. Mann (replaced Oechsner in May 1944), Charles
Healy, Patrick Dolan, Morton Bodfish, Howard Baldwin (active in late 1944),
Ltc. J. Roller (chief in February 1945), and Ltc. Herbert S. Little (chief on
30 November 1945, after the dissolution of OSS). (The names are not
necessarily all in order of service).
Through most of the period of our main interest - 1944 and
1945 - MO and other branches of the OSS reported through their OSS theatre
officers. The various field MO units did not work together on a regular basis,
nor did they have close tactical connections with higher authority in
Washington or London. This reinforced the natural secrecy and turf protection
always present in intelligence and psywar work, and led to considerable local
independence of action of the field units, despite continual interference from
OWl and the military. MO-ETO maintained missions in Paris, Stockholm, Bern,
and London. MO-Bern and MO-Stockholm produced black postal stationery. MO-Bern
forged German postage stamps. The London MO unit (cover name MOTTA) was under
direct military control, producing subversive propaganda for PWD/SHAEF and
assisting the British in the production of the highly successful mostly-white Nachrichten
für Die Truppe newspaper.
Other MO units, under OSS leadership, had more autonomy.
MO-MEDTO began with a 3-man mission to Algiers in March 1943. By 1945, MO-MEDTO
maintained bases in Cairo, Algiers, and in the Italian towns of Rome, Bari,
Caserta, Siena, Naples, and Brindisi. MO-Rome produced significant philatelic
black propaganda, including postal stationery and forged German stamps.
MO-Rome maintained contact with MO-Bern in the European Theatre of Operations,
and on occasion shared ideas and materials.
Allied military propaganda in the European theatre:
Beginning in October 1942, as the joint North African
Operation Torch was about to begin, General Dwight Eisenhower, at the time one
of the few military leaders sympathetic to psychological warfare, became
concerned with the problems of coordinating the activities of the U.S. OWI and
OSS, the British Political Warfare Executive and Ministry of Information, and
the British and American Army and Navy intelligence services. Eisenhower
established the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of the Allied Forces
Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ) as a joint U.S. and British operation in the North
African theatre. This set a precedent for other Allied joint ventures. Colonel
Charles B. Hazeltine organized PWB in three sections: combat propaganda units
attached to front-line forces, occupation units that worked in newly captured
territory, and base units that coordinated propaganda efforts of the Allied
Forces Headquarters with those of London and Washington. Following the North
African operation, PWB coordination of propaganda was extended to the
invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy and other actions in the Mediterranean
theatre.
PWB was a model for the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD
or PWD/SHAEF), established in 1943 by Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in London during the preparations for the
cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe in June 1944. PWD had an important
role in the production and dissemination of white propaganda in the
northwestern European theatre until the end of the war. In northwestern
Europe, PWD incorporated the activities of PWB (with PWB units attached to
each of the armies). Elsewhere, PWB continued its operations under a less
complex structure. Both PWB and PWD reported to American generals.
(Note on U.S. Army unit structure: The hierarchy is Army,
Corps, Division, Regiment/Brigade, Battalion, Company, Platoon, Squad. The
"rule of threes" expresses a tendency to have three units within its
parent unit. For instance, typically there are three Corps in an Army, three
Divisions in a Corps, etc. This allows two units to be on the line, with one
unit in reserve.)
Allied military propaganda in the Mediterranean -
North Africa and Italy:
Military units in North Africa. With the outbreak of
war, a small force of the British 8th Army found itself opposed in Cyrenaica
by the Italian 10th Army, which the British quickly routed. This
British success led Hitler in early 1941 to send to North Africa an
expeditionary force under General (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel. Rommel
reported to the senior German commander in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal
Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief, South, and Luftwaffe commander in the
Mediterranean, who would serve with distinction in Italy. The dramatic
successes of Rommel's Afrika Korps in 1941 and early 1942 led to the
controversial Allied Operation Torch - the invasion of North Africa - in
November 1942. Until that time, there had been no significant U.S. forces in
the North African theatre. The British military had undergone several changes
in command: In 1941 General Sir Archibald Wavell was replaced as
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, by General Sir Claude Auchinleck, who in turn
was replaced in August 1942 by General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander. To command
the British 8th Army in North Africa, Churchill appointed General Bernard
Montgomery, who quickly resurrected British fortunes by routing Rommel's
Panzerarmee Afrika (which included the Afrika Corps) first at Alam Halfa in
August and then at El Alamein in October.
Operation Torch, which began 8 November 1942, was the first
combined Allied military operation of the war. In addition to the British 8th
Army under Montgomery, which was already on the scene, the forces were
comprised of a Western Task Force (U.S.) under Lt. General George S. Patton,
Jr.; a Center Task Force (U.S.) that included the U.S. II Corps, under the
command of Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall (and later under Patton); an
Eastern Task Force (U.S. and British) led by Major General Charles Ryder; and
the British 1st Army, commanded by Lt. General Kenneth N. Anderson. In
reaction to this assault, that same month Hitler created the 5th Panzerarmee
in Tunisia under General Jürgen von Arnim to augment Rommel's Panzerarmee
Afrika. In February 1943, Alexander was placed in charge of the newly created
18th Army Group, which incorporated the British 1st and 8th Armies and the
U.S. II Corps in Tunisia. The German forces, together with remains of the
Italian 1st Army, were forced to surrender North Africa in mid-May 1943.
Military units in Italy. For Operation Husky - the
invasion of Sicily in June 1943 - overall ground command went to General
Alexander, who commanded the 15th Army Group. This group consisted of the
British 8th Army under General Montgomery and the U.S. 7th Army under General
Patton. The occupation of Sicily was completed in September 1943.
The invasion of mainland Italy commenced beginning 3
September 1943, with the British 8th Army under Montgomery attacking at the
toe of Italy and on the Adriatic (eastern) shore; beginning 9 September, the
U.S. 5th Army under Lt. General Mark W. Clark attacked the western
shore at Salerno (Operation Avalanche). German defenses were under the command
of Field Marshal Kesselring. The Allies occupied southern Italy during late
1943, but, thwarted by Kesselring's skillful defense, the Allied advance
bogged down in the winter of 1943-1944 at Cassino on the Gustav Line in
south-central Italy.
In an attempt to break the stalemate and outflank
Kesselring's troops, on 22 January 1944 the Allies launched Operation Shingle,
the invasion of Anzio. The result was deadlock on two fronts, at
Cassino and Anzio. The stalemate dragged on with heavy losses on both sides
into the spring of 1944, until in May the Allies broke through the Gustav Line
and, following a breakout from Anzio, converged on Rome. Rome was captured on
4 June 1944, two days before the invasion of Normandy.
Following the capture of Rome, advances by the Allies
continued at a crawl, with Kesselring fighting an effective delaying action
throughout the remainder of 1944 and into 1945. British and American efforts
were hindered by the withdrawal of substantial portions of the British 8th
Army and the U.S. 5th Army to participate in Operation Anvil (renamed
Dragoon), an attack on southern France in mid-August 1944 to divert German
forces from the Normandy front. In Italy, the Allies stalled at the Gothic
Line in late August and the Winter line for the long winter of 1944-1945.
Fighting continued until the end of the war on 2 May 1945.
Allied military psywar activities in North Africa.
Prior to the joint Allied Operation Torch in November 1942, British units
produced a small amount of white printed propaganda aimed at Italian and
German troops and indigenous Arab civilians in North Africa. These activities
were based in Cairo, Egypt. Some 30 leaflets in Italian are known to have been
directed to Italian troops in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (both now in Libya).
Leaflets in German and in both German and Italian are known. A few leaflets in
Arabic are known from this period.
In October 1942, with the approach of Operation Torch,
control of propaganda was assigned to the newly created Psychological Warfare
Branch of Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), operating out of Algiers. For
some of its work, the Allies used the SIPA press in Algiers. Although the
meaning of SIPA is not known, it appears to have been a local printing job
shop that published newspapers. The Free French in North Africa also made use
of SIPA's press. The propaganda output was almost exclusively white. Allied
leaflets in Italian were airdropped on Italian troops in Tripolitania and
Tunisia. German-language leaflets and bilingual German/Italian leaflets were
airdropped on Axis troops. Leaflets in Arabic and leaflets in French were
airdropped for civilians in North Africa. Some leaflets produced in Algiers
were dropped in southern France and Northern Italy.
White leaflet code designations for this theatre are, as is
not surprising in wartime, largely inconsistent, missing, repetitive, and
confusing. The best compilation of these leaflets is R.G. Auckland, Catalogue
of Allied Leaflets Dropped in North Africa to German and Italian Troops and
Civilians, 1940-1943, Psywar Society Blatter Catalogue No. 17, 1990.
Allied military psywar activities in Italy. From
1943 to 1945, the U.S. 5thArmy in Italy produced numerous white propaganda
newspapers and leaflets. The 5th Army also assisted the British 8th
Army in leaflet production. Klaus Mann, with the U.S. 5th Army, probably
designed leaflets for both Armies. The numbering and labeling systems used in
this theatre are confusing, and it is often difficult or impossible to
determine the origin of the leaflets. However, there is little doubt that the
bulk of Allied military printed propaganda for Italy originated with the
Americans.
In Italy, the U.S. 5th Army produced the
"G-" and "GL-" series of leaflets. The 5th Army
probably also produced the "AU/" (for Austria), "C/GN/", "G/"
(for the Balkans), "G.A." through "G.Z.", "G.B.",
"GC/", "G.G.", "GN", "Gn/",
"GS", "GT/", "GIG/", "GTC/", "LN"
("Letzte Nachrichten"), and "NN" ("Neueste
Nachrichten") series of leaflets, and numerous other one-shot leaflets
either uncoded or with codes not belonging to a series. From late 1943 until
the German surrender, the 5th Army produced several long-running series
of leaflet newspapers, including Frontpost/ Wochenblatt für deutsche
Soldaten; Frontpost Ausgabe Süd /Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Soldaten;
Frontpost Ausgabe Süd / Wochenausgabe; Frontpost / Ausgabe der Adriafront;
Adriafront / Wochenblatt für deutsche Truppen; Nachrichten aus der Heimat /
Frontpost Beilage; Luftpost/Ausgabe Süd; and Luftpost und Soldaten-Nachrichten
/Ausgabe Süd. Fifth Army's main Frontpost series began 4 November
1943 with Issue No. 1 and ran through No. 126 (20 April 1945).
Compilations of Allied leaflets for Italy are found in Hans
Düsel, Catalogue of Allied Aerial Leaflets for German and Austrian Troops
in Mediterranean Countries and Islands, 1943-1945, PsyWar Society Blatter
Catalogue No. 21, 1994; and Hans Düsel, Catalogue Listings of U.S. "Luftpost"
and "Frontpost" Newspapers Disseminated by Air to German Troops and
Civilians in Europe and to German Troops in Italy, 1944-1945, Psy War
Society Blatter Catalogue No. 19, 1991.
Allied military propaganda on the European Western
Front:
Northwestern European theatre: military organization of
SHAEF. Under Eisenhower, SHAEF was organized in three Army Groups (AG's):
the 6th AG, commanded by U.S. General Jacob L. Devers; the 12th AG, commanded
by U.S. General Omar Bradley; and the 21st AG, commanded British Field Marshal
Bernard F. Montgomery. The 6th AG comprised the French 1st Army, commanded by
General Lasse de Tassigny; and the U.S. 7th Army, commanded by General
Alexander Patch. The 12th AG comprised the U.S. 1st Army, commanded by General
Courtney Hodges; the U.S. 3rd Army, commanded by General George Patton; and
the U.S. 9th Army, commanded by General William H. Simpson. The 21st AG
comprised the Canadian 1st Army, commanded by General D. G. Crerar; and the
British 2nd Army, commanded by General Miles Dempsey.
Military psywar structure under PWD/SHAEF. The Chief
of PWD/SHAEF was General Robert A. McClure. At the Army Group level, PWD was
combined with Public Relations to form a special Publicity and Psychological
Warfare (P & PW) section. Nominally, an AG's PWD officer reported through
the AG's P & PW officer. At the Army level, Psychological Warfare Branches
(PWB's) were formed within the General Staff section G2 of each Army.
Officers in charge of PWD activities in the Army Groups and
the Armies were:
6th AG: James Clark; 12th AG: Colonel Clifford R. Powell;
21st AG: Brigadier Neville.
U.S. 1st Army: Lt. Colonel Sheperd Stone, then Captain
Albert H. Salvatori, then Captain Jacob Tenenbaum.
U.S. 3rd Army: Lt. Colonel Louis Huot.
U.S. 7th Army: Captain Roos, then Hans Wallenberg.
U.S. 9th Army: Major Edward Caskey, then Captain Peter
Hart.
The PWD in Britain produced the "T",
"V", "W", "Y", and "Z" series of white
leaflets.
Working under PWD, the OWl produced the several
"US" series of white leaflets destined for various countries: "USB"
leaflets were for Belgium, "USC" leaflets were for Czechoslovakia,
etc. Other "US" leaflet codes are: "USD," Denmark; "USF,"
France; "USG," Germany; "USH," Holland; "USI,"
Italy; "USJ," Channel Islands; "USL," Luxembourg; "USN,"
Norway; "USP," Poland. OWl and the British PWE (Political Warfare
Executive), apparently outside the PWD umbrella, produced the "X"
series of white leaflets, which employed a country code similar to the
"US" series.
Military propaganda on the Western Front: Twelfth Army
Group. In the northwestern European theatre following D-Day, the 12th Army
Group's Psychological Warfare Detachment (PWD 12th AG) was particularly
industrious in producing (mostly) white propaganda. Within the 12th Army
Group, PWD's tactical PWB attached to the U.S. 9th Army in the field produced
the "CPH" series of leaflets. Another PWD tactical unit, the PWB
attached to the U.S. 3rd Army, produced the "PWB" series of
leaflets.
We will examine 12th AG's progress through France and
Germany by following the production and distribution of Frontpost, their
successful newspaper for German troops in the Western Front (France, the Low
Countries, and Germany). The production of Frontpost and its offspring
is a useful illustration of the frenzied pace of activities during the
campaign in Western Europe.
While not forsaking its propaganda goals, Frontpost contained
mostly straight news, and is therefore "white". The first issue,
dated 14 August 1944, was prepared in the operations tent in a field near St.
Sauveur in Normandy. The printing of the first issues (Nos. 1 through 5) was
done at Rennes, in Brittany. Single-sheet (two-page) issues were produced
thrice weekly.
With the advance through France, the publication site for Frontpost
and tactical leaflets was moved to Paris soon after the fall of the city.
The first Paris-printed issue was dated 31 August 1944. Nine issues (Nos.
6-14) were printed in Paris.
Beginning with issue No. 15 (dated 22 September 1944),
printing was moved to the plant of the Luxemburger Wort in the city of
Luxembourg. Beginning with No. 33, dated 13 November 1944, the newspaper
became a four-page weekly. Since Frontpost was being airdropped inside
Germany, its content began to include news of interest to German civilians in
addition to soldiers. Frontpost continued publication through issue No.
48, dated 20 April 1945.
In order to reach areas close to the battle lines not being
serviced by Allied airdrops, in early November 1944 PWD 12th AG began an
abridged version of Frontpost, called Feldpost, in single-sheet
leaflet size, to be released from artillery shells fired by front-line
artillery units. The first issue appeared 5 November 1944. Feldpost was
initially issued once a week; later twice weekly. From the first, an exact
English-language version of Feldpost, of course named Field Post, was
produced and circulated among the gunners and Army personnel involved in
distributing Feldpost.
As increasing territory in Western Europe fell to the
Allies, PWD 12th AG began the production of a newspaper aimed at civilians in
areas controlled by the Allies. The first issue was dated 27 November 1944 and
was called Die Neue Zeitung ("The New News"); all subsequent
issues were entitled Die Mitteilungen, loosely "Information."
This civilian newspaper was distributed by land, not airdropped.
With the deeper advance of Allied forces into Germany
following the crossing of the Rhine, even Die Mitteilungen could not
serve the entire Allied-occupied area, and beginning 2 April 1944, 12th AG
began production of its first local newspaper, Kölnischer Kurier The
Cologne Courier was highly successful, and led to a chain of local newspapers
as the 12th AG advanced.
References for 12th AG activities: "News sheets as
weapons of war," in William Daugherty, Psychological Warfare Casebook,
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, pages 556-562; this article
was taken from History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare, 12th Army
Group, January 1943-August 1945, pages 116-126. Additional information is
in Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors—America's Crusade Against
Nazi Germany, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1996.
This article Copyright Frank Prosser
& Herb Friedman, 1998 and may not be reproduced without permission.
