

FM 33-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY • AUGUST 1949

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FM 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

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OFFICIAL : J. LAWTON COLLINS
Chief of Staff,
United States Army

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

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FOREWORD

As a military weapon, psychological warfare is no newer than the rumors whispered about Hannibal, the wave of terror spread in advance of the armies of Genghis Khan, Philip of Macedonia, and Attila the Hun, and the methods used by George Washington to increase desertion among the Hessians. What is new about psychological warfare is the manner in which it recently has been systematically organized and used as an integral part of military operations.

Experience has demonstrated conclusively that psychological warfare is a highly effective weapon which can be used to minimize expenditure of human life and destruction of property. It is not a substitute for battle, but a supplementary means of combat which can facilitate and exploit success on the battlefield.

Psychological warfare has limitations and disadvantages. One American army commander who achieved outstanding success in World War II expressed this idea when he said, "Psychological warfare had an important place in the European Campaign. It can accomplish much good. It can also be extremely harmful." It is the duty of commanders to understand how to secure the beneficial effects and to avoid those which are harmful.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Section I. PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS

1. PURPOSE. This manual is a guide to commanders and their staffs in the conduct of psychological warfare. It covers the nature, capabilities, and limitations of psychological warfare; outlines Department of the Army policies and principles relative to its conduct in the field; and provides a guide to methods and principles of training therein. The technical details of the conduct of operations will be found in manuals covering the employment of the various means (such as artillery, aircraft, and radio) used in psychological warfare activities.

2. DEFINITIONS. a. Political warfare. Political warfare is the employment of political (diplomatic and other nonmilitary) means to defeat an enemy. It makes use of propaganda coordinated with foreign policy, either in the direct political relations with other governments or with groups of people possessing political organization. The conduct of political warfare is not a function of the armed forces. It may be planned in coordination with military operations and its execution may affect a military situation or require auxiliary military action.

b. Information services. Information services as a general term, covers all the means and agencies ordinarily used to disseminate information to the public. They include press, radio, films, books, pamphlets, and posters.

c. Psychological warfare. As used in this manual, psychological warfare consists of activities, other than combat, which communicate ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy, and which are conducted by a military command in conjunction with its combat operations, for the purpose of reducing the enemy morale and will to fight. Such activities are conducted in consonance with policies announced through command channels. The most important weapon in the arsenal of psychological warfare is propaganda.

d. Propaganda. Propaganda is any organized effort or movement to spread a particular doctrine or information. It consists of news, information, special arguments, or appeals designed to influence the thoughts and actions of any given group. The popular conception of the term propaganda as implying falsehood or deception is not valid. Derived from the Latin term "*propago*," propaganda implies literally "that which must be spread." While materials used must be selected with a specific purpose in view, truths and facts which the enemy will accept or easily can verify achieve particularly effective results.

(1) Having reference to its source, propaganda may be classified as overt, covert, or grey.

(a) *Overt ("white") propaganda.* Overt propaganda emanates from a stated and

identified source. Such propaganda capitalizes on the authority of the source and provides a basis for assessing the reliability of the source.

(b) *Covert ("Black") propaganda.* Covert propaganda appears to originate from sources other than the actual one. Normally, it is designed to give the impression that it comes from dissident elements in the enemy country or in territory occupied by the enemy.

(c) *"Grey" propaganda.* Grey propaganda avoids specific identification as being enemy or friendly.

(2) Having reference to content, propaganda may be classified as political or military.

(a) *Political propaganda.* Political propaganda primarily is political in nature and, during wartime, is directed at the enemy population or enemy-occupied territories in their entirety. Political propaganda is further directed at neutrals, and may be addressed to allies.

(b) *Military propaganda.* Military propaganda primarily is military in purpose and is directed most frequently at the enemy armed forces. There can be no sharp line of demarcation between military and political propaganda. Often the same item of propaganda will contain aspects of both. However, it is useful to make the general distinction indicated above for purposes of discussion in this manual.

- (3) Both military and political propaganda find employment in information supplied to the civilian populations in areas occupied by armed forces. Consolidation propaganda is designed to support the commands and policies of the commander of an occupational force by consolidating and exploiting favorable reactions to preoccupational propaganda.

e. Psychological warfare plan. A psychological warfare plan defines the mission to be achieved by propaganda with particular reference to the enemy opinions and attitudes. It establishes the timing and coordination to be observed. It outlines the themes and methods to be employed and assigns tasks and responsibilities.

f. Propaganda guidance. Propaganda guidance is achieved by disseminating authoritative instructions concerning the use of current events and information to implement approved plans. Propaganda guidance makes possible the employment of current happenings within the framework of approved plans as the general situation envisaged in the plan changes and develops.

g. Propaganda media. Propaganda media are the means by which propaganda is disseminated. Those most commonly used for military purposes are leaflets, loudspeakers, news sheets, and radio. Pamphlets, posters, films, material means, and word of mouth are other media. These have more limited application in psychological warfare conducted by a military command.

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

3. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT OPERATIONS. Every capable military leader considers the effect of proposed combat operations on the morale of his enemy. It is well established that sudden and overwhelming fire power, brilliant maneuver, surprise, and ferocity in the attack or a skillful defense all serve to depress the enemy morale and to impair his will to fight. Consequently, psychological warfare is an integral part of effective combat operations. Combat operations work upon both the morale and the body of the enemy. On the other hand, there are actions which a command can undertake which affect only the morale of the enemy. Examples of such actions are the dissemination of leaflets and the use of loudspeakers and radio broadcasts for propaganda purposes. These actions can supplement and exploit combat operations by increasing the pressure on the enemy's mind and his morale. Like combat operations, the psychological warfare activities of the command must be integrated with those of higher, lower, and adjacent commands. Furthermore, a command can facilitate its combat operations if it assists in maintaining the morale of friendly elements or disposes favorably other elements inside enemy and enemy-occupied territory by the employment of psychological warfare means. In time of war, the propaganda activities of a national agency aid psychological warfare efforts because any lowering of morale of the enemy home front which such operation achieve affects the morale of the enemy armed forces. The national agency is dependent upon the armed forces

for much intelligence, guidance, and administrative assistance in its operations, particularly in oversea theaters.

4. OBJECTIVES. From the description of psychological warfare given in paragraph 2c, it follows that the basic aim of psychological warfare conducted by a military command is to assist in expediting the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. It achieves this basic purpose by seeking to—

a. Decrease the combat efficiency of the enemy by lowering the morale of his forces.

b. Induce enemy forces to surrender or desert.

c. Sustain the morale of friendly elements in enemy areas.

5. FACILITIES. a. Many facilities can be made available to the commander for the conduct of psychological warfare. Trained and organized units, including specialists familiar with the customs, traditions, and attitudes of the enemy, can be provided to advise the commander and to put propaganda concepts into the language and form most likely to be accepted by the enemy. Specific physical facilities may include—

(1) Mobile printing equipment to produce leaflets or news sheets for dissemination by shell or aircraft.

(2) Mobile public address systems mounted in vehicles and in aircraft.

(3) Mobile broadcasting stations to disseminate oral information and messages.

b. In addition, procedures are established for transmitting requests for propaganda support to the communications zone or the zone of interior. The

greater facilities outside the combat zone make it possible for propaganda in support of combat operations to be disseminated to the enemy armed forces or population as a whole. Propaganda support may include transmissions by fixed radio broadcasting stations, or air drop of leaflets and other publications by long-range aircraft.

c. Combat units can have psychological warfare means assigned and, in addition, can secure support from higher commands in a manner similar to requests for additional artillery fire support. New developments in the fields of reproduction and transmission unquestionably will expand the capacity for conducting psychological warfare.

6. CAPABILITIES. Experience has demonstrated that psychological warfare activities carefully integrated with combat operations can—

a. Enhance and exploit the psychological effect of political, social, or military events.

b. Lower the morale of the enemy with a consequent loss in combat effectiveness.

c. Produce a cumulative depressing effect on enemy morale over an extended period of time.

d. Encourage malingering, desertion, and surrenders by individuals and groups of enemy armed forces.

e. Sustain the morale of subversive and dissident elements in enemy and enemy-occupied territory.

7. LIMITATIONS. The major limitations of psychological warfare are—

a. Stringent requirements for careful coordination with military and political policy of material to be directed toward the enemy.

b. Difficulties in estimating duration of program necessary to achieve desired effect upon the enemy.

c. Effects already achieved upon the mind of the enemy. These effects must be accepted, thereby limiting and channeling subsequent efforts, despite changing situations.

d. Restriction on channels to the enemy.

e. Lack of knowledge of essential factors in the enemy situation.

f. Difficulty in obtaining qualified personnel.

g. Requirements for necessary materials. These requirements compete with requirements for other military activities.

h. Difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of various types of propaganda and media of promulgation, thereby limiting concentration of effort on the most effective programs.

CHAPTER 2

BASIC PRINCIPLES

8. GENERAL. The following principles are announced for the guidance of commanders in the conduct of psychological warfare operations:

a. All commanders are responsible that appropriate psychological warfare activities are conducted by their units in conformity with the plans and directives of higher headquarters.

b. Psychological warfare operations must be planned in the same manner as other military operations.

c. The content of propaganda must be developed in accordance with recognized precepts.

d. Psychological warfare in combat operations must be related to, and in consonance with, the national propaganda program.

e. Psychological warfare activities must be coordinated with military operations.

f. The effectiveness of psychological warfare operations must be evaluated.

g. Publicity concerning psychological warfare operations must be controlled carefully.

Application of these principles is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

9. RESPONSIBILITY. **a.** It is the responsibility of all commanders to take full advantage of the capabilities

of psychological warfare to the end that all forms of pressure may be exerted upon the enemy with a view to saving lives, resources, and time in accomplishing his defeat.

b. Commanders are responsible for controlling psychological warfare activities of their commands so that these are conducted in conformity with policies announced by higher headquarters and that such activities are coordinated with the military operations.

c. Commanders must exercise economy in the employment of psychological warfare means and agencies.

d. Commanders are responsible for defense against enemy psychological warfare.

10. PLANNING. a. General. The basic principles for the planning of military operations are applicable (FM 100-5 and FM 101-5).

b. Information. The information essential for proper planning covers the same general subjects as for other military planning, namely, the mission, intelligence of the enemy, and the friendly situation.

(1) *Mission.* The usual information of the mission is required; in addition, the planner must know the desired general psychological objectives. These usually include undermining the will to fight, fixing responsibility for the war, and inducing surrender of the forces in the field.

(2) *Enemy situation.* In addition to the usual information, the planners need to know—

(a) Factors determining the general enemy morale and attitude. These include cus-

toms, traditions, religion, education, training, and behavior patterns.

- (b) Factors similar to the ones mentioned in (a) above which apply specifically to the armed forces of the enemy. In addition, information is required on doctrines and methods, training, discipline, leadership, supply and evacuation, welfare and morale service, and military customs and traditions.
- (c) The identification and characteristics of the particular enemy units which confront the command, including the specific application of the items mentioned in (b) above, order-of-battle information, and the dispositions and capabilities of the specific enemy units.
- (3) *Friendly situation.* The information needed here is the same as is required for usual operational planning.

c. Use of information. Psychological warfare operations are planned on analysis of the information described above to determine—

- (1) Psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy, such as lack of confidence in training, leadership, or weapons; friction between his allies, Services, and commands; unfavorable aspects of the military situation; inefficiency in the supporting arms and Services; fallacies in indoctrination; irrational fears and superstitions; apprehension concerning conditions at home; belief that prisoners will be treated in a humane manner; dissident elements and minority groups; lack of

confidence between political and military authority; and disbelief in the war aims.

- (2) Obstacles to psychological attack, such as discipline; good leadership; pride of unit; ignorance of the military situation (general and specific) and, conversely, possession of detailed and accurate knowledge of the military situation; good training; fear of the consequences of capture or surrender of the individual and his dependents; fatalistic attitude toward death; personal loyalty and devotion to leaders; ignorance of war aims and military potential; and faith in and determination to fight for a cause.

d. Form. Psychological warfare planning is an integral part of military planning. The forms employed are those prescribed in FM 101-5. When psychological warfare is the function of a special staff section, the psychological warfare plan is prepared as an annex to the operation plan. When there is no separate staff section, the plan may be prepared either as a separate annex or as a part of the annex prepared by the staff section charged with responsibility for psychological warfare. In commands above the division, it is generally best to have a separate annex. A checklist for a psychological warfare plan and annex appears in appendix I.

11. CONTENT. The content of psychological warfare will be developed under the following general precepts:

a. Ordinarily, only military subjects will be employed. When political matters are used, their military implications and significance must be clear.

Political subject matter must be in accordance with policy of higher headquarters and should be potent.

b. Propaganda is useless unless it has an audience. Consequently, a considerable portion of the content must be selected to gain and hold interest. Factual news and entertainment, such as music, sports reports, and skits, are particularly effective with soldier audiences. They should form a large part of the content of propaganda by a military command, at least initially. Selection of the specific items to be used must consider the mental characteristics of the enemy audience and content of such propaganda must be determined in conjunction with the objectives and timing of planned operations.

c. Confidence must be established. This is best accomplished by employing subject matter which is obviously true or which the enemy readily can verify. The dissemination of false information designed to deceive or mislead the enemy as to friendly intentions, capabilities, morale, or dispositions is not a primary function of overt propaganda operations. Overt propaganda media will not be employed for this purpose except as approved by the Department of the Army. False information discredits confidence in propaganda and must be used only in exceptional cases when important tactical gains are at stake.

d. In its approach, the content of propaganda in the initial stages of operations should be persuasive and suggestive rather than arbitrary and direct. Thus, it usually is best to introduce the idea of surrender indirectly and by inference rather than by direct appeals or threats. As the campaign develops and there are indications of success, the approach becomes more specific and direct. Surrender propaganda is

adjusted to the susceptibilities of the particular group to be addressed. Experience provides the basis for the adjustment.

e. The content of any propaganda by a military command should be applicable specifically to the particular situation and the specific enemy units to which it is delivered.

f. The following general themes have proven effective against various kinds of troops under widely different circumstances:

- (1) Fair treatment of prisoners.
- (2) Surrender is not necessarily dishonorable.
- (3) Hopelessness of the enemy position.
- (4) Wisdom of living to work for family and country.
- (5) Unworthy war aims.
- (6) Material superiority.
- (7) Unfavorable conditions at home.
- (8) Successes of opposing armed forces.
- (9) New weapons and methods of warfare.

In the employment of these general themes, it is essential that they be adapted to specific enemy units and the particular conditions of the situation under which they are used.

12. INTERRELATION TO THE NATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROGRAM.

a. It is anticipated that in any future war there will be a national propaganda agency outside the armed forces. This agency may be in the State Department, in some other executive department or it may be independent. However organized, its program will bear a close relationship to the psychological warfare activities of the armed forces. Experience in World War II shows that

mutual support and coordination helped national propaganda whether conducted by military or civilian organizations. In addition, the armed forces normally are called upon to furnish information and administrative support in some phases of the national propaganda program. Further, the armed forces must anticipate being called upon to assist in initiating the establishment of the post-hostilities relationship between United States information services and those in liberated or occupied territories.

b. Coordination of psychological warfare in combat operations and the national propaganda, tactical and strategic, directed to any segment of the enemy or his coalition, results in mutual support. Enemy home front morale reacts on the morale of his armed forces, and vice versa. Furthermore, both psychological warfare by the armed forces and the national propaganda program are weakened or entirely discredited if serious conflicts and inconsistencies occur. Similarly, untimely release of information by one agency will have an adverse effect on other agencies. There are other reasons for coordination. It is important that military security be observed in the national propaganda campaign and that this campaign imply no administrative tasks for the armed forces which the latter cannot carry out. For example, if the national propaganda campaign promises an enemy people that friendly forces will provide food and supplies for such groups as offer no resistance to the friendly forces, it may impose a commitment which the military forces could not assume. By the same token, unless there is careful coordination, psychological warfare in combat operations may commit the country to an undesirable

policy. For example, it might offer terms of surrender to certain enemy groups which would be at variance with national policy.

c. In reference to the provision of information and intelligence for the national propaganda campaign, it must be recognized that in time of war, all propaganda necessarily makes use of military information since military affairs have the greatest attraction. In view of the assistance which the national propaganda can afford the military effort, commanders should be on the alert for information of propaganda value and provide for its prompt transmission. The kinds of information required are discussed in chapter 6.

d. Administrative support of the national propaganda effort may include the transportation and housing of personnel; the transportation of supplies and equipment, such as posters, presses, moving pictures, and paper; and the construction or maintenance of facilities, such as broadcasting stations and printing plants. Such requirements may arise from the need for the national agency to establish facilities closer to the enemy territory, or they may be necessary to insure early initiation of such relations between United States information services and those in the occupied or conquered area during the post-hostilities period as national policy dictates. The last-named activity is, under present policy, a function of civil affairs-military government (FM 27-5). However, since psychological warfare activities are so closely related to the operations of information services, the psychological warfare agencies will be concerned, at least initially, and must be prepared to assist where practicable.

e. Despite the coordination of psychological warfare activities by the armed forces with the national propaganda program, political propaganda does not encompass psychological warfare. It is essential, however, that the themes employed in psychological warfare activities do not conflict with national policy and that military commanders be alert to the fact that they may be called upon to provide support for the national propaganda program. The necessary coordination for such purposes can be achieved by several means. Basic psychological warfare plans are approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff where not only the interest of all the armed forces but also those of the civilian agencies can be coordinated. Subsequent continuing coordination can be provided through propaganda guidance and propaganda directives. At the higher headquarters, there normally is a political adviser, and in some cases a representative of the national propaganda agency, who can provide spot guidance as needed. For the lower echelons of command, guidance and coordination are effected through normal command channels.

13. COORDINATION. a. General. This paragraph is concerned primarily with principles of coordination within a command.

b. Staff responsibility. Responsibility for general supervision of Army psychological warfare at the Department of the Army level rests with the Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff United States Army. At theater, joint and combined task force, and theater Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters, this responsibility may be charged to a general staff

section other than operations. However, at army group, army, corps, and division levels of command, primary responsibility for general staff coordination and supervision of psychological warfare operations rests with the operations officer. At theater and other high levels, details of planning for and conducting psychological warfare operations are performed by a special staff section headed by an officer designated as the psychological warfare officer. At corps and division, a psychological warfare officer is designated by the G-3 to plan, recommend, and conduct psychological warfare operations in consonance with policies prescribed by higher echelons. Specific matters connected with psychological warfare activities which must be coordinated at any level of command are set forth in chapter 3.

c. Coordination. Psychological warfare activities must be fully coordinated with public information and with troop information and education. It is important that there be complete and careful coordination of coverage so that the enemy will find no basis for discrediting propaganda by pointing out that factual portions of propaganda to him do not agree with information released to the general public. Coordination with troop information and education is essential to insure that friendly troops are aware of the form, nature, and objectives of enemy propaganda and are provided with information which will destroy or at least minimize its effectiveness.

14. EVALUATION OF RESULTS. Commanders constantly must evaluate the effectiveness of the psychological warfare operations conducted by their

commands. This is a difficult task for two main reasons. First, it is impossible to separate the effect produced on the enemy morale by fire, movement, and shock action from that produced by public address appeals, leaflets, and the like. Second, since the effects of psychological warfare are cumulative, results in many cases do not become apparent for a considerable period of time after psychological operations are initiated. Because of these limitations, it is important that all sources of indications of the results of psychological warfare operations be exploited. Several methods have been used for this purpose. Their capabilities and limitations are indicated in the following subparagraphs.

a. Noting coincidence between changes in rate of taking prisoners and psychological warfare operations. This is an inconclusive criterion because of the impossibility of separating the effect of combat from that of psychological attack. Leaflets and broadcasts may acquaint the enemy with the adverse situation in which he finds himself. However, it is the combat operation which placed him in that situation. Leaflets and other media play a powerful and extremely important role when they bring the facts before the enemy and clearly show him how hopeless his situation is, and give or suggest to him an escape from it. The fact that prisoners are taken after such evidence has been given to the enemy does not mean that they surrendered because they were shown the evidence. They surrendered because the facts were what they were. Conversely, a serious reduction of morale may take place and manifest itself in few if any voluntary surrenders.

In such cases, psychological warfare does not get credit for the work accomplished if surrenders alone are taken as the criterion of success.

b. Prisoners with leaflets. The percentage of prisoners who are taken with leaflets or other physical evidence of psychological warfare efforts likewise is inconclusive. Many soldiers, no doubt, carry enemy leaflets as souvenirs or perhaps as a bit of insurance. The presence of such evidence shows that the materials reached enemy personnel. Whether or not they were effective is another matter.

c. Interrogation. The interrogation of prisoners can yield many useful evidences of the effect of friendly activities. All such evidence must be subjected to the usual verification for credibility. Generally, prisoners who talk most freely on this subject are malcontents or members of a political or ethnic minority. Obviously, information obtained from such types must be properly evaluated and interpreted. Determining the prevalence of such types and how they may be influenced is, of itself, an important result but it is not a true measure of effectiveness. Interrogation may lead to important conclusions relative to whether or not leaflets, broadcasts, and other means of psychological attack are reaching the areas and units at which they are aimed. It also may give important conclusions as to the relative effectiveness of different means and media employed. Hence, while interrogation is valuable for many related purposes, it is only a partially conclusive means for determining the effectiveness of propaganda.

d. Observer reports. Reports from neutral observers, line-crossers, and agents are important. But they generally are too late to be of great value. They must, of course, be subjected to the customary tests given any information from such sources.

e. Changes in enemy morale. Estimates of the enemy morale and particularly of changes therein are the continuing concern of all good commanders and intelligence officers. Such estimates must be based on reliable facts, particularly the combat effectiveness and conduct of the enemy, the kinds of prisoners taken, and the circumstances of their capture. As in the case of interrogation, such estimates are helpful but not conclusive in determining the effectiveness of psychological warfare.

f. Enemy countermeasures. Countermeasures by the enemy are the most valuable single gage of the effectiveness of psychological warfare. No good commander wastes time and effort to defend against an operation which he does not fear or which is simply a nuisance. Therefore, when the enemy counters a psychological attack, he does so because it has had an effect. Careful analysis of monitoring and jamming reports yields information on counter-propaganda and discloses the programs or types of programs the enemy obstructs. Evidence of such measures can be secured also from captured documents and by interrogation. The types of countermeasures which an enemy may employ are replies, orders, physical action, and indoctrination.

- (1) Replies are indicative of success except when the enemy finds a weakness or an error in

propaganda directed toward him which he turns to his own advantage.

- (2) Orders prohibiting listening to broadcasts or reading leaflets are another illustration of countermeasures. The degree of the effectiveness of operations can be judged by the nature of the punishments prescribed, and by the efforts expended to detect violations and to inflict punishment. Important conclusions also can be drawn from the support which enemy troops and subordinate commanders give to the enforcement of such orders.
- (3) Action such as jamming of radio programs, gunfire, loudspeakers, and collection of leaflets, are illustrations of physical countermeasures.
- (4) Indoctrination against propaganda by enemy orientation and education campaigns indicates effectiveness.

g. Summary. In summary, it may be said that neither a favorable time relationship between the employment of psychological warfare and the taking of prisoners, nor the presence of leaflets in the hands of prisoners is a reliable gage of the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations. Interrogation of prisoners, if properly and carefully done, can yield some reliable information on this point. A good indicator of success is found in a weakening of the enemy morale as determined by normal intelligence procedures. The best indicator, however, is a program of enemy countermeasures. Some of the less reliable methods should be employed to verify or check on the results of the more valuable ones.

15. PUBLICITY. Psychological warfare operations by their very nature are known to the enemy. However, experience indicates that any widespread publicity concerning details or specific techniques of psychological warfare operations, particularly that which gives any indication of boasting of success, is disadvantageous. Such publicity tends to increase the enemy soldier's resistance to psychological warfare measures and gives the enemy propagandist a good counterpropaganda theme. The necessity for appreciation of the capabilities of psychological warfare and for support of such operations by the civilian public and the armed forces must be considered in regard to publicity. The weight of the several factors concerning publicity will provide the basis for release of information concerning psychological warfare operations in any particular case. Emphasis of specific or widespread success in psychological warfare should be avoided.

CHAPTER 3

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OFFICER

16. GENERAL. Whether psychological warfare is made the responsibility of the operations section, or is assigned to a special staff section, an officer is designated as the psychological warfare officer. As such, he is charged with the following broad duties common to all special staff officers: making recommendations; supervision of the technical activities and technical inspections relating to his specialty in the subordinate units; coordination with higher, lower, and adjacent units on the subject; supervising routine reports pertaining to his specialty; and technical supervision of the psychological warfare specialists assigned or attached to the command. Specific duties of the psychological warfare officer are discussed under each of the general functions below.

17. RECOMMENDATIONS. The psychological warfare officer must be alert to discover suitable psychological targets which are developing or likely to develop, and to propose suitable plans to exploit them. He must be prepared to suggest plans to accomplish a psychological warfare aim desired by the commander or by subordinate commands. He must keep himself informed of the anticipated operations

of his command and the psychological warfare plans and policies of higher commands.

18. TECHNICAL SUPERVISION. The psychological warfare officer should see that specialized means and agencies are used with the maximum efficiency and that sound techniques are employed in keeping with approved policy. Technical inspection is concerned primarily with insuring that the technical means and equipment are operated and maintained in accordance with technical instructions.

19. COORDINATION. a. The need for the coordination of psychological warfare activities with national propaganda is described in paragraph 12. Direct coordination with national propaganda campaigns normally is effected only at Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, theater, and joint task force headquarters. In lower commands, this is done through the normal chain of command. The coordination described in paragraph 13 is required at all levels of command. The commander charges his operations officer with general staff coordination and supervision of the planning and conduct of psychological warfare operations in accordance with orders from higher commanders and policies of the command.

b. Illustrations of the matters upon which the psychological warfare officer will be required to effect coordination with various agencies are indicated below.

G-1:

Procurement of psychological warfare specialists.

Information concerning United States and allied prisoners of war.

G-2:

The provision of intelligence material for psychological warfare purposes, including intelligence of the enemy in general and of the forces in contact in particular; and intelligence of enemy propaganda principles, organization, and technique.

Assistance in the planning of psychological warfare operations, including recommendations as to potential targets.

Estimates of the effectiveness of friendly and enemy psychological warfare operations.

Security of psychological warfare operations.

Designation of prisoners of war and others with information of value for psychological warfare purposes, and those suitable for use in broadcasting, writing leaflets, and other activities of psychological warfare interest.

Assistance in the planning and supervision of training and other activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda.

G-3:

Information concerning current and future operations.

General staff coordination and supervision of the planning and conduct of psychological warfare operations.

Surrender technique to be given to the enemy.

Training troops in psychological warfare to include defense against enemy psychological warfare activities.

Allocation of ammunition for propaganda dissemination purposes.

G-4:

Procurement of special supplies.

Transportation.

Storage areas.

Civil affairs—military government officer:

Information concerning displaced persons.

Reestablishing information services.

Proclamations and control of civilians.

Signal officer:

Radio channels.

Communications equipment, maintenance, and repair, including radio and public address systems.

Communications facilities.

Photographs suitable for propaganda purposes.

Signal security.

Artillery officer:

Recommendations concerning allocations of ammunition for propaganda purposes.

Selection of units to fire propaganda missions.

Ordnance officer:

Technical matters relative to ammunition and weapons suitable for dissemination of propaganda.

Engineer officer:

Reproduction of printed materials and photographs for propaganda purposes.

Maintenance of reproduction equipment.

Surgeon:

Wounded prisoners.

Public information officer:

Press and photography releases.

Prevention of conflict and contradiction between information released to the general public and armed forces and propaganda directed toward the enemy.

Troop information and education officer:

Suggestions concerning the indoctrination of troops against enemy propaganda.

Prevention of serious conflict between propaganda directed toward the enemy and information supplied to troops.

Air Force:

Leaflet and airborne loudspeaker missions.

Bombs and aircraft for propaganda missions.

c. One particular aspect of coordination which warrants special mention is promoting, within the command, a general understanding of psychological warfare. It is important that troops know what is being done so that they may cooperate intelligently in the operation. For example, the psychological warfare officer must see that the troops understand what the safe-conduct leaflet promises the enemy troops. If an appeal is to be made to a surrounded garrison, he must make certain that the friendly troops know what is going to be said to the enemy. Friendly forces should be informed as to how they are to react in the operation. It also is important that the psychological warfare officer make special efforts to give full information concerning the efforts of other agencies which participate in the operations, such as artillery and Air Force units which disseminate leaflets. In the case of these units, he should furnish translations of leaflets which they dissemi-

nate. This serves to stimulate their interest, improves cooperation, and often leads to worth-while suggestions from the using agencies. It is effective to furnish disseminating agencies evidence of the results of the operations in which they have participated.

20. ROUTINE REPORTS. Under this function, the psychological warfare officer is charged with insuring that the most effective kinds of reports are prepared and submitted to the agencies which can make best use of them. He must be especially alert to see that psychological warfare specialists secure information of plans, policies, and actions which will enable them to fit their operations most effectively into the general plan of combat. He also must be alert to see that these reports indicate those matters, particularly intelligence, which come to the attention of psychological warfare specialists and have value for other staff sections and elements of the command. He must constantly seek to improve the nature and content of his own reports and those to and from other echelons of command under the control of the headquarters to which he is assigned.

21. STAFF SUPERVISION. The psychological warfare officer is charged with exercising the required technical supervision of psychological warfare activities within the command. In addition, he should be in constant touch with the psychological warfare officers of subordinate commands to assist them in carrying out the orders and policies of his commander and to note the progress and effectiveness in the execution of psychological warfare plans. He also effects the

required liaison with adjacent and higher headquarters to insure complete interchange of information and clarification of details of plans and orders. Within the staff he advises and consults concerning the psychological warfare aspects of the actions of other staff sections. The scope of his supervision is designated by the commander through the chief of staff.

22. OTHER DUTIES. The psychological warfare officer ordinarily will perform only the duties of a staff officer, but such duties from time to time may include operator functions such as the preparation of leaflets and loud speaker activities.

CHAPTER 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THEATER LEVELS

Section I. GENERAL

23. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. a. The General Staff, United States Army, has the following broad responsibilities for psychological warfare functions:

- (1) To provide planning, policy guidance, and operational direction for psychological warfare activities.
- (2) To provide Department of the Army liaison with joint agencies and with nonmilitary agencies of the Government.
- (3) To collect, evaluate, and interpret sociological and psychological information.
- (4) To analyze foreign propaganda affecting the military interests of the United States.
- (5) To provide psychological warfare units and bulk authorizations in the organizations of appropriate echelons of the Army.
- (6) To provide direction of Army training in psychological warfare, including defense against hostile or enemy psychological warfare.
- (7) To include psychological warfare material and supplies in logistical planning.

(8) To develop new or improved psychological warfare means, instruments, and techniques.

b. The Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, United States Army, has responsibility for general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities.

24. THEATER. The psychological warfare responsibilities of a theater commander are determined by the directives under which he operates, the conditions in the theater, and the nature of the military operations he is to conduct. The theater commander normally will establish a special staff division responsible for psychological warfare activities and assign to it the functions and duties pertaining to this field. The duties of this division will vary with every theater headquarters. Consequently, no fixed functions and organization can be prescribed. However, those discussed herein may be used as a basis which can be modified to establish procedures and an organization suitable for any particular situation.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES OF THEATER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

25. RESPONSIBILITIES. In addition to the staff duties common to all staff divisions, the psychological warfare division of a theater staff normally will be charged with the following functions:

a. To advise the theater commander and his staff in matters pertaining to psychological warfare. The subject of staff coordination is discussed in paragraphs 12, 13, and 19.

b. To prepare plans for psychological warfare operations to support theater operational plans and for such psychological warfare operations as may be directed by higher headquarters or requested by other commands.

c. To plan, direct, and, in some cases, execute special operations, as for example, control of fixed radio stations, publication and dissemination of newspapers and periodicals on a theater-wide basis, preparation of standard leaflets and recordings, and preparation and transmission of new files and monitoring reports.

d. To coordinate all armed forces' psychological warfare operations within the theater, with particular reference to such matters as the establishment of procedures for dissemination by aircraft and fixed radio stations, the interchange of intelligence, the allocation of special equipment (recorders and loudspeakers), the use of standard themes and leaflets, and propaganda guidance.

e. To coordinate psychological warfare operations with those of other theaters.

f. To effect coordination with political advisers to the theater commander and with representatives of any national information services which may be operating or planning to operate within the theater. The nature and extent of such coordination is prescribed by the theater commander. It may cover any or all of the following points:

- (1) Coordination of theater psychological warfare activities with the national propaganda policy.

- (2) Coordination with allied or neutral propaganda and psychological warfare agencies.
- (3) The employment of funds, equipment, supplies, and personnel from civilian propaganda agencies in psychological warfare operations conducted by a military command.

g. To prepare requirements in personnel, supplies, and equipment for psychological warfare purposes.

h. To supervise the execution of psychological warfare operations as directed.

i. To evaluate the effectiveness of friendly, allied, and enemy psychological warfare.

j. To propose and plan for the employment of new methods and techniques in psychological warfare.

26. PROCEDURES. The psychological warfare division normally functions like any other special staff division. It is concerned primarily with planning, coordinating, and supervising. However, in many cases it also must operate, as do some other special staff divisions. Examples of the kinds of matters in which it may be required to operate are radio, standard leaflets, air-drop and other newspapers, black propaganda operations, intelligence, and special administrative matters. These are discussed briefly below.

a. Operation in the radio field ordinarily will be necessary when theater-wide coverage can be provided from fixed radio stations which are taken over or set up in the theater. Policy coordination and assignment of missions for such operations are of immediate theater concern. They can be more effectively accomplished by direct theater operation

than in any other way. Extensive monitoring also can be provided more effectively by theater headquarters than elsewhere.

b. The quantity of production and the uniformity essential for standard leaflets can be achieved more efficiently at theater headquarters than by decentralization. Accordingly, leaflets proclaiming fair treatment of prisoners and safe-conduct passes, which are used by all elements operating under the jurisdiction of the theater, ordinarily are produced at that headquarters.

c. News leaflets, and air-drop and other newspapers for dissemination to enemy troops or civilians require a large editorial and publication staff, particularly when the papers are large and widely distributed. Their dissemination generally is effected by strategic Air Force units. All these requirements can be met more efficiently as a theater project than when they are decentralized to lower units. This does not preclude the publication of small single- or double-sheet news leaflets by army group, army, or similar headquarters in special cases.

d. Black propaganda operations ordinarily must be carefully coordinated with secret intelligence and must be closely controlled to prevent adverse or even dangerous results. Accordingly, these are best conducted from theater headquarters.

e. The intelligence requirements for psychological warfare operations go beyond the scope of routine military intelligence. When military agencies are required to support national propaganda agencies by providing information and intelligence, the volume of materials required is so great that it may place an unusual load on normal intelligence agencies. Or-

dinarily, it will be best to have all intelligence secured by the intelligence division and every effort must be made to accomplish this. When that is impossible, the psychological warfare division may be required to perform certain intelligence functions.


f. When civilian propaganda agencies are operating extensively in a theater and when the use of personnel, supplies, and finances from these sources for psychological warfare in combat operations is authorized, the administrative problems introduced ordinarily can not be handled readily by the regular administrative agencies. In such cases, administration for these purposes should be centralized and conducted by the theater psychological warfare division.

Section III. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THEATER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

27. GENERAL. a. The organization of a theater psychological warfare division should be based on its duties and should be functional in nature; that is, groups and sections thereof should be established to perform duties incident to the functions indicated in paragraph 26. One such organization which can be modified to adapt it to the particular circumstances in any theater headquarters is shown in figure 1.

b. When the theater headquarters is joint or combined, the section will contain personnel from each of the Services or allies represented in accordance with the type of staff which is established (FM 101-5).

c. Functions of the various groups of the psychological warfare division are discussed in the following paragraphs.



Note:

— : Indicates organization likely to be required in all cases.

- - - : Indicates organization possibly required in special cases.

FIGURE 1.—Psychological warfare division—theater headquarters.

28. PLANS AND POLICY GROUP. As the name implies, this group is charged with the staff work involved in functions given in paragraph **25b, d, e, f,** and **j.** These include—

a. Development of theater psychological warfare plans in support of theater operation plans, in furtherance of national (allied) propaganda policy and in support of the plans of other theaters.

b. Formulating directives and furnishing guidance to insure continuous coordination in psychological warfare throughout the theater.

c. Formulating requests for psychological warfare support from the zone of interior and other theaters.

d. Preparation of plans and instructions for those operations which will be conducted by the psychological warfare division. (See par. 26.)

e. Establishing requirements for routine and special reports from subordinate commands and preparation of reports rendered by the psychological warfare division.

f. Studying the organization and procedures for psychological warfare within the theater with a view toward increased efficiency and effectiveness in light of any new devices, means, and techniques which may be developed.

29. OPERATIONS GROUP. This group is concerned with the conduct of approved operations and with training. It performs the duties indicated in paragraph **25c, g,** and **h.** The group comprises functional sections each of which is concerned with one or more of the media employed in the theater. The heads of the functional sections and the chief of the operations group form the over-all coordinating element. The

operations group formulates appropriate phases of plans, policies, and orders for inclusion in over-all plans prepared by the plans and policies group. Specific duties are indicated for the functional sections into which the operations group may be divided.

a. Radio section.

- (1) To provide information, advice, and staff supervision for radio operations.
- (2) To prepare the radio phases of psychological warfare plans, policies, and orders.
- (3) To recommend allocations of frequencies, equipment, and personnel for radio operations.
- (4) To conduct radio operations when these cannot be decentralized to lower commands.
- (5) To make recommendations for radio support of theater operations from fixed stations in the zone of interior or other theaters.
- (6) To keep enemy radio operations and the application of new developments in electronics under continuing study.
- (7) To formulate requirements in radio personnel, equipment, and supplies.
- (8) To perform similar functions relative to loudspeaker operations.

b. Leaflet section.

- (1) To provide information, advice, and supervision concerning leaflet operations.
- (2) To prepare the leaflet phases of plans, policies, and orders.
- (3) To prepare leaflets of theater-wide application and to arrange for their dissemination by strategic aircraft.

- (4) To prepare and arrange for the distribution of standard leaflets.
- (5) To arrange for leaflet drops by strategic aircraft requested by subordinate commanders.
- (6) To formulate requirements in personnel, supplies, and equipment for the preparation and dissemination of leaflets.
- (7) To keep under continuous study enemy leaflet operations and new developments in matters of reproduction and dissemination.

c. Other media section. Depending upon the situation, operations in other media, such as newspapers, periodicals, and material objects in black and grey psychological warfare, or operations in conjunction with secret intelligence, sabotage, and subversion, may assume such importance and scope as to require the establishment of one or more functional branches to operate similarly to those described under **a** and **b** above. It may be possible to combine one or more of these activities together with the groups mentioned above.

d. Training section.

- (1) To prepare and supervise training programs required to supplement the general training of psychological warfare agencies and personnel provided to the theater.
- (2) To prepare and supervise orientation in psychological warfare to be given to military units coming to the theater.
- (3) To arrange for the military orientation of any civilian personnel who may be employed for psychological warfare in combat operations.

- (4) To make recommendations concerning the basic training in psychological warfare to be provided in the zone of interior, to include training required for defense against enemy psychological warfare.

30. ADMINISTRATION GROUP. This group performs the normal administrative functions of the executive element in any staff division. It may have many other tasks depending upon the nature of the situation, for example, whether the headquarters is combined or purely United States forces; whether civilian agencies are operating in the theater; whether civilian personnel and supplies are employed in psychological warfare; whether the theater is located in enemy, liberated-friendly, or allied territory; and whether the various elements of the theater headquarters are close together or are widely separated. Under the most complicated circumstances it will be required to perform clerical, communication, supply, personnel, transportation, and fiscal functions. Under the most favorable circumstances, the duties will be limited to matters of office administration, the remainder of the tasks being performed by other agencies of the headquarters. The latter situation should be sought. The organization and functions listed below are those which may be required in the more unfavorable situations.

a. Executive section.

- (1) To plan the physical arrangement of the division.
- (2) To establish office routines and procedures.
- (3) To maintain the records of the division.

- (4) To reproduce reports, communications, and staff studies.
- (5) To provide for the security of the division.
- (6) To receive and route visitors.
- (7) To supervise the message center.
- (8) To supervise the movement of the division.

b. Communication section.

- (1) To operate the division message center.
- (2) To procure and allocate communications facilities for psychological warfare purposes, such as transmission of propaganda guidance; information and intelligence between the division and those of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

c. Personnel section.

- (1) To maintain information and records on personnel not maintained by other agencies of the headquarters, particularly those concerning civilian and allied personnel.
- (2) To prepare personnel requirements.
- (3) To arrange for the acquisition, transfer, promotion, reclassification, and separation of personnel.

d. Supply and transport section.

- (1) To procure, store, and distribute special supplies and equipment not available from the usual military sources.
- (2) To arrange for the movement of the division as a whole, or for individual members.
- (3) To procure and arrange for the allocation and maintenance of transportation not provided by the usual military sources.

e. Fiscal section.

- (1) To arrange for the payment of civilian personnel when not provided for by the usual military agencies.
- (2) To have custody of and disburse any special funds made available to the division.
- (3) To supervise and audit the above functions in subordinate commands.

31. INTELLIGENCE GROUP. When the theater intelligence division cannot supply the necessary intelligence for psychological warfare, an intelligence group may be established in the psychological warfare division. This group is responsible for arranging for the production of intelligence required for psychological warfare purposes, and for processing and arranging for the dissemination to psychological warfare agencies and personnel of such intelligence. It collects information and intelligence when necessary. Specific tasks under these functions may be assigned to sections as shown below.

a. Collection section.

- (1) To formulate the intelligence needs for psychological warfare, including specific directives and requests for information.
- (2) To the extent that the intelligence cannot be provided from the usual sources, to conduct interrogations, interviews, and document research, and to procure the required information.
- (3) To locate enemy personnel and materials useful in psychological warfare operations.

- (4) To arrange for surveys and opinion polls to determine the effectiveness of friendly, allied, and enemy psychological warfare.
- (5) To collect information concerning enemy propaganda and psychological warfare activities.

b. Analysis section.

- (1) To evaluate and interpret information secured from interrogations, interviews, document research, opinion polls, and other sources secured by or for the collection section, and to prepare the resulting intelligence in a form suitable for use in psychological warfare.
- (2) To select and prepare for use in psychological warfare the intelligence furnished to the division from other agencies.
- (3) To indicate the status of enemy morale and the psychological strength and weakness revealed by (1) and (2) above.
- (4) To prepare estimates of the probable effectiveness of proposed psychological warfare plans.
- (5) To prepare estimates of the effectiveness of friendly, allied, and enemy psychological warfare.
- (6) To analyze enemy propaganda and psychological warfare for indications concerning materials and methods useful for counter-propaganda.

c. Report section.

- (1) To maintain such data and records as are required for the intelligence group.

- (2) To formulate and reproduce reports prepared by other sections of the group.

d. Where there is no intelligence group, the analysis and dissemination functions described above are performed by the operations group.

32. LIAISON GROUP. The normal coordination between the psychological warfare division and other staff divisions of the theater staff is conducted in the routine manner, that is, by members of the plans group with G-3, and by members of the intelligence group with G-2. In addition, it is essential that there be close liaison between the psychological warfare division and corresponding elements of the senior Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters in the theater. If task forces are organized in the theater, if the theater forces come from several nations, or if civilian propaganda agencies are established in the theater, constant coordination with each of the elements represented is necessary. Furthermore, it normally is desirable for the psychological warfare division to have representatives make regular visits to subordinate commands to effect the necessary coordination and conduct such supervision as may be authorized. The extent of the liaison tasks may require the establishment of a group, separately or within the plans and policy group. Either system is satisfactory, and the decision as to which to employ is based on the amount and the importance of the liaison required in the particular theater situation. The functions of the liaison group are to insure interchange of information, interpretation of plans and directives, and transmission of requests, instructions,

and suggestions. Supervision and inspection are performed by this group only when prescribed by the theater psychological warfare officer, in accordance with theater headquarters policy.

Section IV. OTHER HEADQUARTERS

33. THEATER ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE COMMANDERS. a. Responsibilities of senior Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders within the theater are similar to those of the theater commander but with emphasis on items of special concern to the particular service. Thus, Air Force units have practically no need for loudspeaker operations but do conduct leaflet operations both for their own purposes and in support of the operations of Army and Navy forces. They are more concerned with fixed station radio broadcasts because these can be used against enemy air forces and, when desired, to present a threat to areas about to be attacked. Extensive intelligence for psychological warfare purposes is available from Air Force sources. Similar considerations apply to the responsibilities of the senior Navy commander.

b. The organization and functioning of the psychological warfare staff divisions at such headquarters will be similar to those at theater headquarters. Depending upon the physical nature of the theater, the proximity of the various headquarters, and the policies of the theater commander, the scope of responsibility and the extent of operations will vary between such wide limits that no general rules can be prescribed. Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of centralizing operational activities in theater headquarters, and in favor of keeping the psychologi-

cal warfare division small and confining its activities to normal staff duties.

34. JOINT TASK FORCES. In joint task forces operating under theater headquarters, responsibilities are as prescribed by the theater commander. These, together with information covered in paragraphs 24 and 25, determine the organization and the extent of operations which the psychological warfare division will conduct, and the organization of the division.

CHAPTER 5

PLANNING PROCEDURES AND MEANS WITHIN ARMY GROUP

35. GENERAL. This chapter outlines the process by which the commander of a combat unit decides whether or not to use psychological warfare, how he determines the most effective method, and how the selected method may be implemented. The discussion is based on units within the army group.

36. ESTIMATE. a. General. When the commander is considering the enemy during his estimate of the situation, he analyzes, among many other factors, the enemy morale and determines features of strength and vulnerability therein. When he is analyzing the courses of action open to him, he considers their effect upon the enemy morale as well as the physical effects. Therefore, in the estimate, he often will find that one or more of the courses open to him is, by its very nature, more likely to exploit a vulnerability in the enemy morale than are the others. Frequently, he will find that he can enhance or produce a psychological effect by employing propaganda means, such as loudspeakers and leaflets, in conjunction with the proposed operation. He may find that the selection of a course of action, which inherently can produce a great psychological effect, also may favor the

complementary employment of auxiliary means to enhance such an effect. However, for the purposes of this manual, only the specific special activities taken to depress enemy morale are considered.

b. Use of auxiliary means. The decision to employ auxiliary means, specifically psychological warfare, is determined in a manner similar to the decision to employ any other support measures. Broadly stated, the decision to use auxiliary means is based upon consideration of advantages accruing in terms of the mission. Knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of such means, as applied to the particular situation, facilitate the commander's decision. The decision to utilize auxiliary means makes essential careful and detailed planning coordination. In point of timing, plans must provide for accomplishing the desired effect without detriment to the operation itself. For example, if a commander foresees the prospect of surrounding the enemy force, he can use psychological warfare means to inform the enemy of the situation and to indicate that he is about to attack in great strength. He can inform the enemy how to avoid destruction. Similarly, if the commander is preparing to attack a given locality, not necessarily surrounded, he can inform the enemy of the imminence of the attack and describe the means, white flags, for example, which the enemy is to employ to indicate that he is prepared to surrender or to offer no resistance to an advance. In such cases, the psychological warfare measures form a part of the specific operation and are closely integrated into it with planning conceived and executed to provide effective timing. Results to be

achieved from the threatened operations are balanced carefully against the effect of enemy foreknowledge and possible action to prevent accomplishment of the mission.

c. Cumulative effects. The estimate may lead the commander to the conclusion that it will be advantageous to use psychological warfare means to exert continuous pressure on the enemy morale to produce a cumulative effect, in the same way that continuous and skillful propaganda is employed effectively in civil life in times of peace. Thus, he may wish to keep the idea of surrender in the enemy mind by frequent repetition of promises of safe conduct, fair treatment, and by outlining ways in which the enemy soldier may avoid combat and be taken prisoner with comparative safety. Other themes discussed in paragraph 11 may be used for the same purpose.

d. Need for coordination. Consideration of the matters discussed in **a**, **b**, and **c** above indicates that commanders of units within the division (or comparable unit) find greatest use for those psychological warfare activities which relate to the specific operation and area in which their units are involved, while the commanders of larger forces are concerned with such activities and also with those which are designed to procure a long-range effect and are applicable over large areas. These considerations demonstrate the need for coordinating the psychological warfare activities of any single command with those of higher and adjacent commands.

37. PLANNING. a. General. If, as a result of his estimate, the commander concludes that psychological warfare can be employed profitably, he next must

determine the most effective means and methods. He should employ those of the available means which will gain the attention of the enemy; are suited to the state of enemy morale, training, customs, and attitudes; are appropriate to the situation at hand; and will assist the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

b. Selection of media and material. Consideration of the capabilities and limitations of each of the media of psychological warfare will determine which one is most effective in getting the appropriate propaganda to the enemy at the desired time in any given situation. Thorough understanding of the enemy, his morale, customs, tradition, training, and attitudes is required to make the best selection of material which will gain his attention and be likely to affect the enemy morale.

c. Organization.

- (1) *Army.* In general, planning for psychological warfare activities in the commands above the corps is broad in scope, entails the use of many means, covers extended periods of time, and applies to large areas. In the higher echelons, there are more extensive facilities for conducting psychological warfare activities. For example, at army or similar headquarters, there ordinarily is an element* capable of extensive psychological warfare operations. It includes personnel prepared to write and reproduce propa-

*The unit currently authorized for this purpose is the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (T/O & E 30-47). This unit is obsolescent. Studies are now in process with a view to the development of a more appropriate unit, probably one of the cellular type.

ganda materials and arrange for their dissemination by aircraft or artillery fire. It usually has a pool of loudspeaker teams for attachment to subordinate units and may include teams for operating mobile radio broadcasting sets. It maintains an extensive file of intelligence and information of value in psychological warfare. It can provide advisers to be attached to, or to maintain liaison with, subordinate elements to expedite the implementation of psychological warfare measures. In special cases, small detachments similar to the army element may be assigned to corps.

- (2) *Army group.* An army group headquarters normally has an element similar to that described for an army except that the mobile radio equipment usually will be pooled at that headquarters instead of at army. Procedures are similar to those at army but more complete service can be given. If the army group is the senior headquarters of the United States forces in a combined theater, the psychological warfare element is quite extensive since it must assume some of the operating functions of a theater headquarters. Staff responsibility is assigned to a special staff section for psychological warfare. The responsibilities, procedures, and organization appropriate for a theater headquarters and commands above the army group are discussed in chapter 4.

d. Corps and division. The corps and division will, in most cases, have only limited facilities for the actual conduct of psychological warfare activities. When the facility for a desired operation is present, the operations officer (or his psychological warfare specialist) arranges for the implementation of the plan. If the plan calls for the use of a medium not available in the command, the request for implementation is transmitted to the higher command having the means to conduct the desired activity. The operations officer makes the necessary arrangements for this purpose. Loudspeaker teams ordinarily are the only means attached to divisions or similar units. Corps and similar units may have such teams and also agencies for preparing leaflets and arranging for their dissemination by artillery and aircraft. Appropriate cellular units for such purposes may be attached for specific operations or for an extended period of time.

38. IMPLEMENTATION. The implementation of psychological warfare measures is reflected by considering the various media which find important application in the military field. They are discussed below under the following categories: loudspeakers, leaflets, radio, and material objects.

39. LOUDSPEAKERS. a. General uses. Public address systems of sufficient power to be heard in combat situations and capable of being mounted in small trucks, tanks, or aircraft have proven extremely effective with small units. Among the general uses for which they are particularly effective are the following:

- (1) To direct surrender proposals to isolated pockets of resistance, such as pillboxes, houses, cellars, or woods where enemy troops are hiding.
- (2) To deliver ultimatums to both civilian and military groups in cities and towns.
- (3) In static situations where intelligence indicates poor enemy morale, to lower morale further and encourage desertions by supplying simple instructions on how to surrender, and controlling friendly fire so that surrenders can be made safely.
- (4) In unusually favorable situations, to obtain prisoners for interrogation without the employment of patrols.
- (5) To control civilians, displaced persons, and prisoners of war in the wake of battle.

b. Employment.

- (1) *Airborne loudspeakers.* Equipment mounted in aircraft can be used to deliver surrender appeals or other propaganda messages to enemy troops in combat areas when antiaircraft fire is not a factor. To minimize the hazard of small arms fire, such messages should be delivered at altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 feet.
- (2) *Loudspeakers in tanks.* Loudspeakers mounted on tanks can accompany armored spearheads on the break-through and exploit situations as rapidly as they develop.
- (3) *Offshore loudspeakers.* Loudspeakers mounted on ships or landing craft may be employed against an enemy on the shore. Such use has proven effective in lessening

resistance and obtaining surrenders in special situations.

c. Plan. As already stated, the general plan for the employment of the loudspeaker is worked out with the aid of specialists and the team then reports to the unit commander concerned for final instructions. The messages usually are prepared with the assistance of specialists. The loudspeaker ordinarily draws enemy fire, hence troop dispositions must be made with this in mind and cables of sufficient length should be provided to enable the announcer to remain at some distance from the loudspeaker. The messages ordinarily should not be more than 90 seconds in length. The characteristics of the public address systems available are found in appropriate technical manuals.

40. LEAFLETS. a. Purpose. Leaflets are the medium which provide the widest variety of employment. Like loudspeakers, they may be used to exploit particular tactical situations. They can be used with complete uniformity over a much greater area and hence are well suited for use in large-scale operations. They also are suited admirably for use in steady campaigns of attrition against the enemy morale. Even those leaflets which are employed to exploit a particular battle situation should be coordinated with any over-all program that is in effect. For convenience in discussion, leaflets are classed as general tactical, local tactical, news, air-drop newspapers, and surrender.

b. General tactical leaflets. This is the attrition type of leaflet. It contains appeals to the enemy troops dealing with the war in the broad sense, using

such subjects as fair treatment of prisoners, the prospects of the individual enemy soldier in the battle yet to come, safe conduct, and the military situation as the principal themes.

c. Local tactical leaflets. This type includes leaflets written for a specific situation arising in the course of battle. Such situations are exploited by a short-lived, rapidly produced and disseminated leaflet. The tactical commander may request leaflets addressed to an individual enemy unit, such as "Soldiers of the XX Division—You are Surrounded!!" Against units known to be low in morale, this type is particularly effective, especially when mention is made of matters of detail such as specific losses incurred. Since the time element is of the greatest importance, planning and production must be accomplished with a minimum of delay. Prior planning makes this possible.

d. News leaflets. News leaflets have been found to be one of the most effective means of undermining enemy morale and of securing the necessary attention favorable to reception of other appeals. This type of leaflets combines accurate, up-to-the-minute, military news gained from all available sources, international news, and news of the enemy home front gathered from enemy or neutral news media or from secret intelligence sources. The appeal of this type of leaflet is based upon providing news coverage otherwise unavailable to enemy troops. It relies for its effectiveness on indirect propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's faith in his unit and his leaders, and to convince him of inevitable defeat.

e. Air-drop newspapers. These generally are larger than the news leaflets and permit a more de-

tailed presentation of the news. They may consist of one sheet folded in half to provide four pages, or may be made up with several such sheets, depending on the material and facilities available. Content is similar to that of the news leaflet, but is wider in scope. The world situation and the enemy's place in it should be presented to show that it is unfavorable to the enemy. They may be used to cause enemy troops to look back over their shoulders at the home front, by stressing the inequality of sacrifice imposed upon troops as contrasted to favored civilian groups. When the military situation permits, newspapers should stir up anxieties over the situation on other battle fronts or with other arms, such as air or naval. Reader interest may be insured by the use of sport news, feature articles, cartoons, "pin-up girls," and the like. Jokes or anecdotes may be extremely effective and may include subtle propaganda content.

f. Surrender leaflets. The demonstrated value of surrender leaflets warrants their special consideration. They may be used even in situations where the enemy's position is favorable, because experience has shown that enemy troops frequently will pick up and hide the leaflets as insurance against the future. Possession of the leaflet serves to keep the surrender idea constantly in the soldier's mind. All troops must be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the text, make-up, and appearance of the surrender leaflets; and appropriate instructions should be issued regarding the taking of prisoners bearing safe-conduct or surrender leaflets. Two examples of these general classes of leaflets are the "safe-conduct" and the "I-surrender" types.

- (1) *Safe-conduct type*. Designed as a formal document, such a leaflet may bear the great seal of the United States, and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention with instructions to friendly troops to give the bearer humane treatment. It is presented as an elaborate, authoritative document, and includes procedures for surrender, such as "Lay down arms, take off helmet and belt, raise your hands, and wave a handkerchief or this leaflet."
- (2) *"I-surrender" type*. In situations where visibility factors are important, such as jungle and island warfare, the surrender leaflet must be clearly distinguishable at a distance. For example, it may carry broad red, white, and blue stripes. The size of the leaflet may vary according to the local situation, since commanders will be reluctant to provide the enemy with a leaflet large enough to conceal a weapon or a hand grenade for use in surrender ruses. Experience has shown the value of giving enemy troops specific instructions on how to surrender—what to do with arms and equipment, what to wave, how to approach friendly lines, and number of persons in a group. The chief differences between this leaflet and the safe-conduct leaflet are that it is not as official in appearance as the safe-conduct leaflet and is *from* the enemy rather than *to* him. The important consideration in the employment of this type of leaflet is

its easy identification by friendly forces under existent field conditions.

g. Employment. The situations in which leaflets are best employed can be deduced from the characteristics of the various types which are described above. For tactical purposes, where it is desired to reach enemy troop concentrations or civil populations in the rear of the front line, leaflets may be disseminated by tactical aircraft of the Air Force unit operating with the field force. They may be disseminated on a smaller scale by liaison-type aircraft flying over the lines. Enemy troop concentrations and field positions may be reached more accurately with leaflets packed in specially adapted artillery shells and fired with considerable precision on pinpointed areas. Appropriate technical and field manuals should be consulted for information regarding technical details of distributing leaflets by aircraft and artillery. On occasion it may become necessary to use aircraft of the Strategic Air Force to distribute leaflets. The use of these aircraft is arranged in consultation with higher headquarters. Technical details concerning dissemination from aircraft are given in appendix 2, and those relating to dissemination by artillery in appendix 3.

- (1) *Standard leaflets.* In his analysis of the situation with the psychological warfare officer, the commander will consider the use of available standard leaflets which are prepared and stocked in advance. If these are appropriate, the time, place, and method of dissemination will be agreed upon. The psychological warfare officer then will see

to the implementation of the plan while the commander sees that any required instructions are issued to the troops in whose area the leaflets are to be employed. The psychological warfare officer arranges for getting the proper leaflets to the disseminating agency, Air Force or artillery, and for briefing them concerning the mission. Experience has indicated that the best cooperation is achieved when the disseminating units know what the campaign is attempting to accomplish; therefore, translations of the leaflets which they disseminate should be provided.

- (2) *Special leaflets.* If the situation is such that a special leaflet is indicated, the psychological warfare officer is in a position to suggest an appropriate theme. When a theme is approved, the psychological warfare unit prepares the leaflet, ordinarily submitting a draft for final approval by the commander concerned. From then on the process is the same as that which applies in the case of a standard leaflet. It is essential that both the commander and the psychological warfare officer keep the situation under continuous review in order that the prior planning required for the production of special leaflets may be accomplished.
- (3) *General campaign leaflets.* When leaflets of a general nature, such as newspapers and safe-conduct passes, are disseminated as a part of a campaign of a higher headquarters, such as theater or army, the commanders of

the areas concerned are informed of the time and place of dissemination and of any cooperating action their commands are to take. Leaflets ordinarily are given identifying numbers to facilitate calls for their employment.

41. RADIO. **a.** Radio is best suited for getting news to the enemy troops over a wide area and to civilians behind the enemy front line. It has only limited direct use for psychological warfare in the combat area because the number of receivers in the hands of enemy troops is limited and because it is difficult to establish an audience on a particular schedule and frequency. These difficulties may be overcome in part by utilizing the frequencies of established stations and by informing the prospective audience about the station and its programs through leaflets, public address systems, and air-drop newspapers. Broadcasts are made from fixed stations or from mobile broadcasting stations. In some cases, the latter can be established on the site of fixed stations that have been destroyed and employ the frequency of the station they replace. Considerable time is required to prepare an appropriate program in the proper language and dialect, rehearse (or record) it, and arrange for its transmission at the most effective time. This time is increased when the station is at a considerable distance from the command desiring the broadcast.

b. Radio finds greatest application in those campaigns which are long-range or sustaining in character and when it is desired to cover a wide area.

Such psychological warfare operations usually are conducted by commands above the corps.

c. A smaller unit may desire to use radio in psychological warfare when it is on an independent mission, particularly when the mission includes the investment of an isolated enemy force. A small unit, even though it is part of a larger force, may find radio useful when it wants to broadcast a message addressed to a particular unit but wants that fact to be widely known. For example, it may wish to broadcast a welcome to an enemy unit which has just appeared or is about to appear on its front, and may want not only that unit but others to know that its movements are known.

d. Plans for the employment of radio are worked out in the same manner as indicated for loudspeakers and leaflets. Requests for the broadcasts to be made are transmitted to the next higher command which has radio facilities at its disposal. In special cases, such as when the unit is on an independent mission or is in an area that cannot be reached from an available fixed station, a mobile station is attached to the command for a particular mission or for a given phase of military operations.

42. MATERIAL OBJECTS. Soap, seeds, needles and thread, candy, cigarettes, matches, and similar small, essential items which are known to be scarce or unobtainable in the area concerned, may be disseminated by aircraft for psychological warfare purposes. The package must be so designed that it is sufficiently attractive to catch the eye of the potential users and be picked up. It must be labeled with the source and

carry a propaganda message applicable to the area where dropped. Employment of this medium has proven most effective in areas inhabited by primitive peoples, when the object is to induce them to cooperate with friendly forces operating in the areas. Such articles can be used with some effect in enemy-occupied areas, especially when the enemy has prevented the local people from securing the commodity which is being dropped. The use of this form of medium is subject to the danger that the enemy may copy it but insert poisons or incendiaries into the commodity. Planning and conduct of operations are similar to those for other media.

43. NEW DEVELOPMENTS. New developments, such as facsimile transmission, guided missiles, and parafrag bombs, and improvements in such equipment as aircraft and public address systems, are certain to affect the conduct of psychological warfare. Commanders and psychological warfare officers must be alert to the opportunities such developments may offer to enhance the capabilities of psychological warfare in combat operation.

CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE

44. GENERAL. The success of psychological warfare operations is dependent upon a voluminous flow of accurate intelligence dealing primarily with the military situation and enemy morale. Intelligence material must be obtained to estimate the enemy's capabilities and the state of his morale, and for use in propaganda. Timeliness is an important element in providing intelligence for psychological warfare in combat operations. Favorable conditions for the use of psychological warfare may exist for only a short period of time, and if prompt recognition and exploitation of the favorable situation is not effected, then the psychological warfare campaign will lose all or a portion of its effectiveness. The task of intelligence is to discover promptly the major sources of weakness in the enemy's morale, to anticipate situations in which psychological warfare may be employed, to furnish the psychological warfare operative agencies with the facts with which to exploit the situation, and finally, to gather information from which to gage the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

45. RELATIONSHIP TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. a. Psychological warfare agencies de-

pend upon the military intelligence agencies to furnish the necessary intelligence in the same manner as the combat arms and the Services do. Intelligence activities among psychological warfare elements should be limited to selecting appropriate material from normal intelligence, informing G-2 of the intelligence requirements for psychological warfare, and disseminating selected intelligence among psychological warfare agencies within the command. Close coordination between psychological warfare activities and intelligence agencies, and a sensitiveness on the part of intelligence officers to the requirements of psychological warfare, are prerequisites for the efficient production of intelligence for psychological warfare purposes.

b. The following steps are necessary if the intelligence agencies are to obtain efficiently the required information and intelligence for psychological warfare activities:

- (1) The psychological warfare officer must transmit to the intelligence officer a list of his intelligence needs. These may be expressed in general terms, in the same manner that the commander expresses his essential elements of information, or they may be expressed in a number of detailed questions. Since the field is vast, it generally is desirable for psychological warfare personnel to indicate priorities for the information most needed.
- (2) Upon receipt of the intelligence requirements from the psychological warfare agencies, the G-2 incorporates these requirements into his collection plan, the instru-

ment by which he plans the search for *all* items of required information. The G-2 then formulates directives and instructions to the collecting agencies directing their search for information required for psychological warfare activities.

- (3) When the collecting agencies furnish G-2 with the requested information, he places that information and intelligence produced therefrom into the hands of psychological warfare personnel. The intelligence officer transmits to the psychological warfare personnel not only information and intelligence which they have requested but also all intelligence which the G-2 believes will affect their operations. Many times an intelligence officer not only may furnish the requested information to psychological warfare agencies, but also will provide additional valuable information and make the source of the information (such as prisoners of war or documents) available to psychological warfare personnel for further study.

46. INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED. The type of intelligence which is especially useful for psychological warfare exploitation comprises evaluated and interpreted information on all factors likely to affect enemy morale. These factors may be military or psychological, and while many of them are general and constant, others may reflect purely local or temporary circumstances. The following are some typi-

cal subjects about which intelligence, in addition to the usual order-of-battle information, is required :

a. Regarding enemy troops.

- (1) Strength of enemy units, casualties caused by battle or sickness, availability of replacements, and length of time in combat.
- (2) Activities and operations of small enemy units.
- (3) Frictions between soldiers and civilians, injustices to soldiers, and inequality of sacrifice.
- (4) Frictions among Services, among arms, and among units. Regional frictions projected into the armed forces. Frictions between rear echelon and combat troops.
- (5) Frictions between officers and enlisted men. Position of noncommissioned officers in such divisions.
- (6) Inefficiency and corruption in command.
- (7) Service age-groups, particularly under 18 and over 45.
- (8) Discipline; injustices in army legal system.
- (9) Absence without leave and desertion, insubordination, strikes, and riots.
- (10) Immorality, drunkenness, and debauchery.
- (11) Worrisome conditions on the home front.
- (12) Dubious war aims of leaders of political groups.
- (13) Inadequacy or inequality in living conditions, food, pay, recreation, promotions, mail, health, sanitary conditions and medical care, individual equipment, uniform, and leaves and passes.

- (14) Indications of the effectiveness of psychological warfare campaign as evidenced by changes in enemy morale, when considered in relation to the psychological warfare campaign; enemy countermeasures; interrogations and the study of documents.

b. Regarding enemy civilians.

- (1) War aims of government, of political leaders, and of business or industry.
- (2) Disaffected elements, underground organization, and terrorist groups.
- (3) Postwar problems within the enemy country.
- (4) Nature of propaganda being directed to enemy civilians by their government. Degree of success of such propaganda.
- (5) Frictions and divisions within the country, including racial and religious frictions, and division between employers and employees or other economic groups, government and industry, government and church, and leaders and special civilian groups.
- (6) Police organizations, including secret or political police. Effect on civilian populace of harsh or unjust police methods, and degree of resentment to political police.
- (7) Factors tending to affect civilian morale, including cost of living; food shortages and inequalities in distribution; black markets and profiteering; commodity and consumer-goods shortages; excessive taxation; inadequate housing; public health and incidence of disease; currency problems and debased values; labor problems; bombing, guided missile, or similar offensives.

47. SOURCES. All sources available to the G-2 are utilized to produce the intelligence required to conduct psychological warfare operations. The more fruitful sources of intelligence for psychological warfare are prisoners of war; enemy civilians and refugees; captured documents; enemy broadcasts and press reports; special studies of enemy areas, populations, and economics; and agents.

48. SECURITY. Complete intelligence must be made available to psychological warfare agencies if they are to achieve maximum efficiency. While much of this intelligence can be used as background without jeopardizing security, intelligence and psychological warfare officers must be on the alert constantly to insure that security is not violated in the material that is disseminated to the enemy. Occasions will arise in which the commander must make a decision as to the use of specific material after balancing potential gains against potential losses by disclosures to the enemy. Much of the material used in psychological warfare may be obtained from public information releases.

CHAPTER 7

DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Section I. GENERAL

49. NECESSITY FOR DEFENSE. **a.** Commanders are responsible for defense against enemy psychological warfare. Because of its nature, the matter is not a specific function of psychological warfare officers. They can, however, be of material assistance to commanders and others concerned with this function because they should have a thorough understanding of the psychology of the enemy and of his psychological warfare themes, methods, and operations.

b. Psychological warfare activities can be complemented by large-scale efforts at subversion. Black propaganda, in certain cases, can be effective to a considerable degree before it is known that such propaganda is being directed at elements of a command. Intelligence personnel, therefore, are concerned with aspects of a defense against psychological attack. (See FM 30-5.)

50. ORIENTATION AND TRAINING. **a.** Consideration of the problems of defense against psychological warfare leads to the conclusion that, although its effect is upon group morale, the individual soldier is the target. It is essential, therefore, that adequate and

continuing training, both individual and unit, and accurate, timely, and comprehensive orientation be arranged to provide instruction for, and understanding by, all military personnel of the elementary history, technique, and objectives of psychological warfare, as background for defense against psychological attack.

b. The matter of training is discussed in chapter 8. Certain aspects of training, as a general background for defense against psychological warfare, are considered therein. Paragraphs 51-56 consider methods of defense against more specific enemy psychological warfare activities. The methods of defense against enemy psychological warfare may be classified under the general headings of motivation, training, information, prohibitions, replies, and physical action.

Section II. METHODS

51. MOTIVATION. A soldier who is properly motivated, patriotic, and proud of being a soldier has a strong basic defense against enemy psychological warfare. The proper motivation of the citizen, that is, instilling pride in country and a willingness to serve it even under adversity, cannot be wholly accomplished after he is brought into the armed forces in a national emergency. It is a project that must be initiated in his basic education and training in normal life. The armed forces can help. They can expand on the foundation developed in the citizen's prior training and strengthen, to a degree, the motivation established by the time the individual joins the armed forces. The methods for accomplishing proper motivation are considerable and embrace

many factors. Certain factors are reflected in the discussion of obstacles to psychological attack. (See par. 10c (2).) Appropriate motivation as a means of defense against enemy efforts to destroy morale is of great importance. Motivation stems from good leadership, sound training, and adequate and continuing orientation.

52. TRAINING. A well-trained soldier, confident in his own ability and that of his unit, is a highly resistant target for enemy propaganda. Like motivation, sound training assists in the development of unit *esprit*. Reference herein is intended to note its importance and to indicate the need to consider the subject in the formulation of training programs.

53. INFORMATION AND EDUCATION. Timely and comprehensive information is a strong defense against propaganda. Consequently, the conduct of an effective troop information and education program within a unit provides a powerful antidote for enemy psychological warfare measures. The psychological warfare officer can provide information regarding the characteristics of the enemy, and the nature of the propaganda and psychological warfare programs and methods which the enemy uses. In many cases, he can give valuable suggestions for countering them. Because of the obviously adverse effect on troops of having propaganda personnel take an active part in troop information and education programs, their participation should be limited normally to the provision of information and advice to the agencies which plan and carry out the programs.

54. PROHIBITIONS. Under this heading are included such measures as restrictions against listening to or reading enemy propaganda, and prohibiting the discussion of enemy claims and reports. Such prohibitions are definitely against United States tradition and practice. To adopt them would do far more harm than good. Accordingly, they should not be used. It is likely that such measures would be initiated only upon specific authority of theater or higher headquarters.

55. REPLIES. **a.** Open replies to enemy propaganda ordinarily are inadvisable. A reply to an enemy operation tends to give it an air of validity since it is assumed that a reply is made only when the enemy is effective. Only when it is possible to demonstrate that enemy claims are false in terms of matters which the hearer or reader personally can verify, is a reply likely to prove effective.

b. Indirect reply often is practicable. This can be accomplished by disseminating, through the normal channels, information which refutes the enemy claim but makes no reference to the particular enemy statement to which it replies. In less frequent cases, it is possible to anticipate enemy propaganda and to disseminate countering information before the enemy theme actually appears. Troops should be informed that the enemy does conduct psychological warfare operations. The weaknesses of enemy psychological warfare, specifically errors in fact, should be indicated. Such instruction is as valuable as is the description of enemy weapons, tactics, and organization, and the ways to neutralize them. This instruction, however, should be integrated into normal

training and information programs, and should be aggressive in establishing the soundness of United States aims, methods, training, and morale bases rather than defensive vis-a-vis enemy propaganda.

56. PHYSICAL ACTION. This method includes a wide variety of actions ranging from the firing on enemy loudspeakers, through the staging of attacks to seize or destroy radio transmitters, to the jamming of enemy broadcasts. Provided the employment of channels and equipment is compensated for properly in the disruption of the hostile program, jamming is a sound method to employ. Attacks on enemy psychological warfare agencies by surface or air forces normally are conducted incidental to other operations. The advisability of conducting specific attacks is decided by the same principles that determine the selection of any other objectives. Local attacks, such as firing on enemy loudspeakers, are at the discretion of local commanders. Combat units usually derive a certain amount of satisfaction from such attacks and should be encouraged to make them. These provide one more way of destroying enemy personnel and facilities and they reveal to the enemy that it is preferred to attack him rather than to listen to his propaganda.

CHAPTER 8

TRAINING

57. GENERAL. Psychological warfare training has the dual purpose of giving the field forces a general knowledge of psychological warfare and of making specialists in psychological warfare of some personnel. These objectives are attained by providing adequate coverage of the subject in training literature and by furnishing instruction in appropriate schools.

58. FIELD FORCES. a. Training for the field forces will include the following subjects:

- (1) The nature and mission of psychological warfare, stressing the close coordination required by military and psychological operations, and the fact that psychological warfare provides additional means whereby pressure can be applied upon the enemy.
- (2) The capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare in combat operations, bringing out its cumulative effect and stressing the circumstances under which psychological warfare can and cannot be employed profitably.
- (3) The procedure by which the arms secure psychological warfare support for combat operations, stressing the necessity for prior

planning on the lower levels by considering factors such as the time necessary to prepare loudspeaker appeals, leaflets, and broadcasts.

- (4) The role of Air Force, armored, and artillery units in the dissemination of propaganda.
- (5) The necessity for all arms to carry out any threats made by psychological warfare. For example, if a loudspeaker message notifies the enemy that all the artillery pieces in a division will fire in the event of a failure by the enemy to take given action, then this threat must be executed.
- (6) The use of surrender or safe-conduct leaflets, stressing the methods of taking prisoners bearing such leaflets.
- (7) Defense against psychological attack, to include—
 - (a) Importance of the individual soldier's contribution to unit morale, as part of the armament against psychological attack.
 - (b) Coordination with individual and unit training, and with troop unit and service school instruction in allied intelligence subjects, for example, proper behavior in interrogation to frustrate enemy use of psychological intelligence; handling of rumors; prompt reporting of information concerning enemy propaganda; and the problem of subversion.
 - (c) Value of information and education programs.

b. The above subjects should be presented to junior officers and enlisted personnel by specially prepared or briefed officer-instructors. This training should include practical exercises in which they are required to make a decision as to whether psychological warfare should be employed in a given hypothetical situation, and, if so, what kind of propaganda techniques and themes should be used. Practical training in these matters will be afforded in field training and will be related to the maneuver enemy. (See FM 30-101, FM 30-102, and FM 30-103.) In maneuvers, stress will be placed on the procedures of arranging for psychological warfare support by loudspeaker and leaflet operations. The training with respect to loudspeakers will include planning the mission, selection and occupation of position by the loudspeaker team, conduct of the voice cast, and the briefing of the supported troops. Training in leaflet operations will include the technique of requesting and planning the mission, loading leaflets in shells or bombs, distribution of the shells or bombs to the disseminating artillery or Air Force units, briefing the unit on the mission, and the process of firing or dropping the leaflets. Such training provides instruction both for the field forces and for the psychological warfare specialists.

c. Training for the field forces in psychological warfare should be continuous and progressive.

d. In all field training in psychological warfare, care must be exercised to insure that the activities do not serve to confuse the public. Where there is danger that the material may be heard by, or fall into the hands of, large groups of individuals not concerned with the training, such propaganda will be

plainly marked or announced as "Propaganda Training." Political themes will be avoided.

59. QUALIFICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SPECIALISTS. Personnel selected for training as psychological warfare specialists should possess as many of the following qualifications as possible:

a. Thorough knowledge of the technique used in influencing public opinion.

b. Knowledge of the fundamentals of mass psychology and public opinion analysis.

c. Knowledge of what influences soldier morale.

d. Foreign residence and travel, as well as reading and speaking knowledge of appropriate foreign languages.

e. Thorough knowledge of United States and foreign military organization, staff procedure, and tactical doctrine.

f. Military and civilian experience in the preparation of material for press, radio, publications, stage, or motion pictures.

g. Extensive educational background with major studies in one of the following: advertising, applied psychology, history, political science, journalism, or the equivalent in practical experience.

h. Unquestioned loyalty.

60. SPECIALIST TRAINING. a. The qualifications of specialists indicate the scope of the training which they will require. The training should aim to correct deficiencies and to develop the specialist's ability to apply his special qualifications to military situations. In addition to the usual training in military organization and staff procedure, the program for

training specialists in psychological warfare must include the following subjects:

- (1) The factors which influence soldier morale.
- (2) Enemy morale, attitudes, and opinions.
- (3) Analysis of reports on enemy countries in order to determine psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- (4) Coordination with various agencies to obtain psychological warfare information, and the recording and evaluation and interpretation of that information.
- (5) Estimation of tactical situations to determine the kind of psychological warfare, if any, to be employed.
- (6) Preparation of written material, including leaflets, news copy, radio scripts, and loud-speaker messages.
- (7) Psychological warfare organization.
- (8) Public address system techniques.
- (9) Radio broadcast techniques.
- (10) Leaflet reproduction, including principles of lay-out.
- (11) Evaluating the effect of psychological warfare.
- (12) Enemy psychological warfare methods.
- (13) Practical exercises on the procedure for integrating psychological warfare with the current operations.
- (14) Practical exercises in preparation of propaganda material under simulated combat and battle conditions, including—
 - (a) Preparation of tactical leaflets to meet specific situations.

- (b) Analysis of intelligence for psychological warfare purposes.
- (c) Preparation and dissemination of public address system material under simulated battle conditions.
- (d) Loading and firing leaflet ammunition.
- (e) Packing and disseminating airborne leaflets.

b. The specialized training and instruction of psychological warfare specialists should be followed by a period of field training with combat units prior to their employment in combat.

APPENDIX I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLAN AND ANNEX

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. The psychological warfare plan and annex follow the form prescribed for the operation plan. Under each of the numbered paragraphs, only subjects peculiar to psychological warfare agencies and operations are included. Where applicable, references to previous orders and to standing operating procedure are used. Only in cases in which special application or emphasis is desired, are such instructions repeated.

2. FORM.

Headquarters

Place

Date and time

Annex — (Psychological Warfare) to Operation Order —
Map:

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Status of morale and elements of psychological strength and weakness. These items are covered by references to appropriate material previously published, or to appendixes, when appropriate.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Psychological warfare means available within the command or on call from other commands.

(2) Psychological warfare operations in progress and planned by higher and adjacent commands which

may have effects pertinent to the issuing command.

c. Assumptions. The assumptions on which the plan is based. These are used in the plan only.

2. **MISSION.** A statement of the general and specific psychological objectives for the operation or for the period covered by the plan. This includes phasing in reference to time or in accordance with planned stages of the operation, whichever is appropriate.

3. **TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS.** A separate lettered subparagraph for the issuing command and each element of the command, giving the specific task of each command, and attachments of psychological warfare specialists thereto. Instructions applicable to two or more commands are included, such as—

Standard themes to be stressed.

Themes to be avoided.

Standard leaflets and recordings prescribed or available.

Procedures for securing support in the form of leaflet drops from strategic aircraft, and broadcasts from fixed radio stations.

4. **ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS.**

a. Supply.

(1) Allocations and distribution of propaganda leaflet ammunition.

(2) Allocations and distribution of special equipment, such as recorders, printing presses, and loud-speakers.

(3) Allocations and distribution of special supplies, such as paper, art materials, and foreign language type.

b. Service.

(1) Maintenance of special equipment.

(2) Fiscal matters relating to special funds, if any, available in psychological warfare operations.

c. Personnel.

(1) Employment of enemy personnel in psychological warfare operations.

- (2) Personnel matters relating to civilians, if any, employed for psychological warfare purposes only.
- d. *Miscellaneous.*
 - (1) Special reports.
 - (2) Other administrative matters.
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS.
 - a. Allocation of radio frequencies assigned for psychological warfare. •
 - b. Arrangements for the transmission of psychological warfare information and intelligence required for broadcasts by fixed stations and for newspapers prepared in rear areas, and for transmission forward of spot intelligence and news files.
 - c. Arrangement for monitoring enemy psychological warfare.

Appendixes.

Distribution.

Authentication.

(Commander)

APPENDIX II

DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS BY AIRCRAFT

1. GENERAL. Distribution of leaflets by aircraft depends for effect upon mass distribution, or saturation of large target areas. For this reason, heavy, medium, and fighter bombers are more valuable in the dissemination of leaflets than the light observation-type aircraft. Light observation aircraft should be used only under the most favorable circumstances, as they are unarmed, unarmored, and comparatively slow.

2. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS. **a.** As a means of distributing leaflets, aircraft possess the following capabilities:

- (1) Aircraft are able to fly great distances, which allows them to disseminate leaflets to concentrations of enemy troops located beyond the range of friendly artillery, and to civilians located in enemy rear areas.
- (2) Aircraft are capable of transporting large numbers of leaflets.
- (3) Aircraft are capable of saturating large target areas in one leaflet-dropping operation.

b. The limitations of aircraft for delivering leaflets are—

- (1) Bad flying weather causes the cancelation of leaflet missions.
- (2) Aircraft lack the pinpoint accuracy needed for disseminating leaflets to a selected enemy unit.

3. HAND DROPPING. In instances where the situation permits, dropping leaflets from planes may be the best means by which a specific coverage can be made. The leaflets are bundled and packaged in a manner that prevents them from dispersing until after they have cleared the tail assembly. For this purpose, 500 leaflets are tied together by a string one-fourth of the way from the edge of the leaflet. Four of these bundles are wrapped in a package with a loop string attached as a rip cord. When this package is tossed over the side of the plane, the rip cord being held, the wrapping is ripped off and the leaflets begin to disperse as soon as they hit the slipstream. One man can open a hatch and throw out a package of leaflets without assistance, and leaflets so thrown will clear the tail surfaces before beginning to disperse.

4. RATE OF FALL. A free-falling leaflet of the standard size (5 by 8 inches) falls 1,000 feet in 5 minutes. A double sheet, or 4-page leaflet, falls the same distance in $3\frac{1}{2}$ minutes; therefore, distribution by this method should be from low-flying planes, for if leaflets are released at 6,000 feet in a 20-mile wind, they will drift 10 miles. From high altitudes, however, propaganda leaflet bombs are the most effective means of distribution.

5. LEAFLET BOMBS. **a.** When antiaircraft fire is intense, leaflets must be dropped from altitudes which make hand dropping impracticable. It also may be advisable to drop leaflets while dive-bombing in order to gain the advantage of speed while dropping from a low altitude so that a specific area may be covered. Therefore, when local conditions prevent the dropping of leaflets from altitudes below 3,000 feet, or when dive-bombing is employed, leaflet bombs should be used. To secure good distribution over a given area, bombs should be set to burst from 700 to 1,000 feet above the target.

b. While no bomb as yet has been standardized for distributing propaganda leaflets, operational bombs may be modified easily for that purpose. The following are the types which have been found most effective:

- (1) Bomb, leaflet, 100-pound size, T1 (modified M-26 flare case).
- (2) Bomb, leaflet, 100-pound size, T2 (M-15 adapter cluster case).
- (3) Bomb, leaflet, 500-pound size, T3 (M-16 adapter cluster case).

c. Of the types noted above, the first has been the most widely used. This consists of the M-26 flare case, 50 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, with a streamlined nose and tail fin to assist trajectory. Leaflets are prepared in rolls of 1,500 each, not over 7½ inches in diameter, and tied with a string. Using standard-size leaflets, 5 by 8 inches, seven rolls may be placed in the flare case, a total of 10,500 leaflets. The American M111, M111-A1, or M111-A2 fuzes, or the British 860A barometric fuze may be used. The

weight of the bomb, loaded with leaflets, is approximately 65 pounds. A complete description of this bomb will be found in TB 9X-86 (not stocked in adjutant general depots; copies, when required, may be obtained from the office, Chief of Ordnance, Attention, ORD FM-Pub., Washington 25, D. C.).

6. LEAFLET DISPERSION. When leaflet bombs are employed, the fuse usually is set to cause a discharge at approximately 1,000 feet above and upwind of the area desired to be covered. Since the leaflets are carried along by the wind, it is necessary to select the point of burst some distance to the windward, based on wind velocity at the time of mission. The following table, subject to revision due to improvement in aircraft performance factors, serves to indicate approximate drift of leaflets, assuming 1,000 feet to be the height of burst.

<i>Speed of wind</i>	<i>Miles</i>	<i>Yards</i>
5	0.416	720
10	0.834	1,440
15	1.02	1,760
20	1.18	2,020
25	1.32	2,280
30	1.44	2,480
35	1.56	2,700
40	1.67	2,880
45	1.77	3,030
50	1.88	3,200

APPENDIX III

DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS BY ARTILLERY

1. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS. **a.** For the purpose of delivering leaflets, artillery has the following capabilities:

- (1) Artillery is capable of distributing leaflets with pinpoint accuracy.
- (2) Artillery can distribute rapidly leaflets written on the spot from local intelligence to fit the tactical situation.
- (3) Artillery can disseminate leaflets with reasonable accuracy regardless of weather conditions.
- (4) Dissemination of leaflets by artillery fire permits the extremely close coordination between the psychological warfare campaign and the combat operations of a tactical unit.

b. For the purpose of delivering leaflets, artillery has the following limitations:

- (1) Artillery has a limited range and cannot reach troop concentrations deep in the enemy's rear areas.
- (2) One artillery round has only a limited carrying capacity for leaflets. Many rounds are necessary, therefore, to provide adequate coverage for even a small area.

2. TYPE OF WEAPON. The basic weapon used by United States artillery units for firing propaganda shells is the 105-mm howitzer. With the shell and fuze commonly employed to deliver leaflets, this piece has an average maximum range of approximately 8,000 yards, enabling leaflets to reach enemy battalion, regimental, and sometimes division command posts. The shell is the standard 105-mm base ejection smoke shell M84, HC, BE, W/PD, used with the M54 fuze. When the smoke cannister is removed, the projectile will hold approximately 500 artillery-size leaflets (4 by 6¾ inches). The piece, shell, and fuze are standard United States weapons in common use; they are most desirable from a psychological warfare viewpoint because of their availability and range.

3. IMPLEMENTATION. Implementation of artillery leaflet dissemination is coordinated by an artillery liaison officer attached to the army (corps) psychological warfare unit. His responsibility covers the performance of all necessary tasks from the time leaflets come off the press until they are fired by artillery units. This involves four principal duties—

a. Coordination with Army ordnance and ammunition officers to insure a continuous flow of ammunition for propaganda use.

b. Coordination with the artillery officer to arrange leaflet firing missions.

c. Modification and loading of ammunition, and its delivery to ammunition supply points, divisions, or field artillery batteries, as required.

d. Assistance to artillery units in firing of propaganda shells.

4. PLANNING. In planning leaflet missions for artillery, the following facts must be considered:

a. To insure adequate dispersal, a maximum of 25 rounds (105-mm howitzer) must be fired into an area 500 by 500 yards.

b. Early hours of morning or just before dusk are the best hours for firing leaflets. Restricted visibility allows the enemy soldiers to pick them up with the least fear of retaliation from their officers.

c. Leaflets fired into open fields on the front lines are seldom picked up due to the obvious danger of being observed.

d. In dense woods, best distribution is obtained by firing all rounds on impact, thus avoiding high loss of leaflets which would tend to cling to the foliage of trees.

e. The direction and velocity of the wind will have to be considered carefully. Amount of drift may be estimated on the basis of data given in paragraph 6, appendix II.

5. FIRING TABLES (for Howitzer, 105-mm, M2 and M2A1; Shell, 26.4-lb., BE, M84 (leaflet); Fuze, T, SQ, M54).

Table I.—Charge 5

<i>Range (yards)</i>	<i>Elevation (mils)</i>	<i>Fuze setting (sec)</i>
3,000	138.7	8.9
3,200	149.4	9.6
3,400	160.3	10.2
3,600	171.5	10.9
3,800	182.9	11.6
4,000	194.5	12.3
4,200	206.3	13.0
4,400	218.5	13.7
4,600	231.0	14.5

Table I.—Charge 5—Continued

<i>Range (yards)</i>	<i>Elevation (mils)</i>	<i>Fuze setting (sec)</i>
4,800	243.7	15.2
5,000	256.7	16.0
5,200	270.0	16.7
5,400	283.7	17.5
5,600	297.9	18.3
5,800	312.5	19.2
6,000	327.6	20.0

Table II.—Charge 7

<i>Range (yards)</i>	<i>Elevation (mils)</i>	<i>Fuze setting (sec)</i>
5,000	147.3	12.8
5,200	156.2	13.4
5,400	165.3	14.1
5,600	174.6	14.8
5,800	184.2	15.5
6,000	194.1	16.2
6,200	204.2	16.9
6,400	214.6	17.6
6,600	225.2	18.3
6,800	236.1	19.0
7,000	247.2	19.8
7,200	258.4	20.6
7,400	269.8	21.3
7,600	281.5	22.1
7,800	293.5	22.9
8,000	305.9	23.7
8,200	318.7	24.5
8,400	331.9	25.4

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