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I. SUMMARY.

A total of approximately 5,997,000,000 leaflet units were distributed over the Continent by aircraft based in the U.K. during the leaflet operation in the Western European Theatre, which began when the R.A.F. dropped leaflets over Kiel on 03/04 September 1939, and continued on an increasing scale until the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. During this time, the objectives and methods of this leaflet distribution underwent considerable changes in order to keep pace with the developments of war.

In the pre-D-Day period, 2,750,000,000 leaflets were distributed; 2,151,000,000, by the R.A.F. and 599,000,000 by the 8th Air Force, which started leaflet operations in August 1943. In the early phases, these leaflets were almost entirely of a long-range political nature. After the Germans occupied most of Western Europe and the maintenance of morale and the spirit of resistance in these countries became of paramount importance, a large proportion of the leaflets were aimed at the inhabitants of these occupied countries.

With the Allied landings on D-Day, the leaflet campaign became a closely integrated part of the military operations. From D-Day on, although the Army Groups and Army Psychological Warfare Units in the field produced substantial quantities of leaflets for local distribution by fighter bombers and artillery, the great bulk of the leaflets (approx. 90%) were produced by P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. and distributed by aircraft based in the U.K. For the most part, they fell into two categories: tactical leaflets aimed at reducing the enemy’s combat strength by impairing morale and persuading the individual soldier to stop fighting, and strategic leaflets, designed to make civilians take action favourable to the Allied military operations. During this period, a total of 3,240,000,000 leaflets were distributed; 405,000,000 by the R.A.F., 1,577,000,000, by the Special Leaflet Squadron, 1,176,000,000 by the 8th Air Force on daylight bombing missions and 82,000,000 on special leaflet missions by medium bombers of the A.E.A.F. before they moved to the Continent.
II. ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS.

1. The organisations charged with the responsibility for overt psychological warfare in the Western European Theatre, which included as one of its major operations the distribution of "white" leaflets, were the Office of War Information (representing the U.S. State Department), the Political Intelligence Department (representing the British Foreign Office), and the Psychological Warfare Division of S.H.A.E.F. (representing the Supreme Commander).

2. Subversive or "black" propaganda was a separate operation which was the joint responsibility of P.I.D. and the Office of Strategic Services, (representing the U.S. War Department). This operation is only briefly covered in this report as it was not a P.W.D. responsibility, although the Leaflet Section participated in the distribution of "black" propaganda.

3. The civilian agencies were responsible for the political aspects of propaganda, and P.W.D. for the military, but as there was no clear dividing line between the two, close co-ordination was necessary between the three Tri-Partite Committee (composed of the chiefs of the three organisations), and by direct liaison between the operational sections involved.

4. Before D-Day, all leaflets were produced by the civilian agencies, but after D-Day, P.W.D. produced the great bulk of the leaflets with the civilian agencies acting in an advisory capacity and producing only a few leaflets of a purely political nature. An exception was the newspaper Nachrichten für die Truppe, which was produced for P.W.D. by a special P.I.D./O.S.S. editorial team.

5. To handle the detailed mechanics of production and distribution during the S.H.A.E.F. period, there were in effect four echelons, each with its own special aptitude for performing a particular task:


These were equipped with complete news gathering facilities, trained writing personnel, typographical and printing plants, as well as art and layout personnel. Their writing facilities were available for newsheets and periodicals addressed to civilians of enemy occupied countries and for special strategic leaflets addressed to enemy civilians. Furthermore, the special news gathering facilities available to P.I.D. and O.S.S. made them the logical group to edit Nachrichten, the daily "grey" newspaper in German - originally designed exclusively for dropping on German troops, and later, distributed to German

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1 Direct Allied sponsored propaganda.
2 P.I.D. was actually the cover name for the Political Warfare Executive.
3 Propaganda purporting to originate from enemy source.
4 Propaganda which gives no indication of its origin.
civilians as well. A Joint Production Unit was established by these agencies to handle all leaflets printed in the U.K.


This special section of General Eisenhower’s staff was set up to handle all the psychological warfare activities of S.H.A.E.F. It worked in close co-ordination with the other staff sections, particularly G-2, G-3, and G-5 and thus was able to plan psychological warfare campaigns as an integral part of the military operation.

The Leaflet Section of P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F., which included its own writing team and controlled a special leaflet squadron of heavy bombers, and a packing and trucking unit for servicing British-based aircraft with leaflet bombs, was charged with the following functions:

1. Policy guidance of and co-ordination with the Leaflet Units at the Army Group level.

2. The production of general tactical and strategic leaflets, with the exception of a few special strategic leaflets on political themes produced by the civilian agencies.

3. The distribution of all general tactical leaflets from the U.K., and jointly with P.I.D., the distribution of all strategic leaflets.

4. The production and delivery to the Army Groups of such S.H.A.E.F. leaflets as they required for their own distribution.

5. The preparation and distribution of reaction reports and similar material designed to facilitate and expand the leaflet operation by explaining its nature and emphasising its importance.

6. Liaison with the Air Forces production or procurement of leaflet bombs and other material, pick-ups, packing into bombs, and delivery of all leaflets to the airfields.

7. Co-ordination with the Joint Production Unit.

In actual practice, the Leaflet Section assumed an even larger proportion of the total Allied leafleting effort than had been originally planned. Its Special Leafleting Squadron was the only air force unit under the operational control of P.W.D., and therefore, the only one available at all times for distribution where and when it was most needed. In addition, production and trucking facilities in the U.K. were vastly superior to those on the Continent. As a result, the great bulk (roughly 90%) of all air-dropped leaflets, both tactical and strategic, were produced in the U.K. and distributed by U.K.-based heavy bombers.
c. The Psychological Warfare Units of the Army Groups.

Leaflet functions at Army Groups varied according to the equipment and personnel available to the Army Group and Army teams respectively. Two other factors conditioned Army Group leaflet activities: first, overall propaganda lines were determined at the S.H.A.E.F. level, and second, the Army teams because of their forward locations and better tactical intelligence, were the ideal agencies for the output of purely tactical propaganda. To the Army Group Units remained several vital functions in the overall leaflet effort:

1. Production of semi-tactical newsheets and general tactical leaflets for situations applying uniquely along their own Army Group Fronts.

2. Air liaison, including co-ordination of fighter bomber drops by tactical air commands, passing of target requests for the Special Leaflet Squadron from Army teams to S.H.A.E.F., and, in the case of the Twelfth Army Group, direction of medium bomber drops.

3. Intelligence. The Intelligence Section of the Twelfth Army Group, Psychological Warfare Unit gathered considerable leaflet reaction material and consolidated leaflet intelligence material from the Army teams. Although much of the work of this section was not concerned solely with the leaflets, but with the psychological warfare effort as a whole, it was of value to those concerned with leaflet production and distribution at all echelons.


Staff position. In the Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups psychological warfare was organised as one of the dual functions of the Publicity & Psychological Warfare (P. & P.W.) Section, a separate staff section responsible to the Chiefs of Staff. At Sixth Army Group Headquarters, psychological warfare became a sub-section of G-2, giving it the advantage of access to G-2’s extensive intelligence-gathering facilities.

Difference in function and organisation of various Army Groups. At the Twenty-first Army Group, limited printing facilities at Army level necessitated production of a considerable number of tactical leaflets at group, but limited personnel prevented any extensive psychological warfare intelligence activities. In the Twelfth Army Group, the Army teams usually had adequate printing facilities available and the Army Group produced less than a dozen different leaflets almost entirely of a general tactical nature, in addition to the newsheets Frontpost and Feldpost. At the Sixth Army Group, the dual French-American nature of command, and the smaller psychological warfare section, made liaison the principal function at group level, and the newsheet Frontbrief, as well as all leaflets, were put out by the Army teams.
d. The Army Psychological Warfare Teams,

which were best able, because of their forward location and rapid intelligence to exploit local tactical situations with combat leaflets aimed at specific enemy units and positions. Much of the effectiveness of the Army team derives from its unique ability to produce and distribute these leaflets quickly and, above all, to direct co-ordinated loudspeaker and leaflet missions at the request of local commanders.

These teams, which functioned either under G-2 or as separate units, were considerably hampered by initial shortages of personnel and equipment. Often improvising in the field, printing on mobile equipment and in local plants where these were available, some Army teams were responsible in the closing days of the campaign for the dissemination by artillery shell and fighter bomber of a million or more leaflets daily.

In addition to the output of local tactical combat leaflets, Army Psychological Warfare Units performed several other leaflet functions, roughly paralleling those at Army Group:

(1) Output of a limited number of general tactical leaflets and in the case of the Seventh Army, a weekly newsheet.

(2) Air liaison, involving co-ordination of requests from divisions and corps for leaflet drops by fighter bombers and the S.H.A.E.F. Special Leaflet Squadron.

(3) Artillery liaison, including filling requests by lower echelons for artillery leaflets, procuring S.H.A.E.F. leaflets for artillery use, assuring the supply of propaganda shells and the loading and transport of these shells to firing points.

(4) Intelligence. Army Combat loudspeaker teams in the front lines and interrogators at P.O.W. cages provided vital information for use in propaganda operations at all levels.

e. Co-ordination between echelons.

Between S.H.A.E.F. and the civilian agencies. After D-Day, as the leaflet operation became more tactical, S.H.A.E.F. produced a larger percentage of the leaflets and the civilian agencies limited themselves to a general policy supervision except in cases where political issues were involved when it was necessary for the leaflets and radio to be closely co-ordinated. They continued, however, to edit Nachrichten which became more important, and in the closing months of the campaign accounted for about 60% of the available airlift.

Between S.H.A.E.F. and the Army Groups. (Note: Although the pattern of co-ordination between S.H.A.E.F. and each of the Army Groups was basically the same, the remarks below apply to co-ordination with the Twelfth Army Group to a much larger extent than to the other Army Groups).
(a) Directives were issued at irregular intervals, covering important strategic developments - such as the Rundstedt counter-offensive, the crossing of the Rhine - or important general topics - such as the treatment of Military Government by our propaganda. Such directives were prepared by P.W.D. and issued by S.H.A.E.F. under the authority of the Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Periodic written guidances, daily (by cable) and weekly, which were used to clarify policy points which came up in the preceding period, and which were passed down to armies by the Army Groups. Guidances were usually found to cover topics too limited in time to be of use for tactical leaflet writers, but were useful for policy control of the newsheets.

(c) Periodic meetings, usually on a fortnightly basis, during which tactical leaflet problems were first discussed at the fortnightly meeting, later, formulated and disposed of in a weekly guidance.

(d) Overall leaflet directives. A basic psychological warfare directive was issued by S.H.A.E.F. before the invasion, mainly containing a basic appreciation of German soldier morale. One other, considerably shorter and more precise directive was produced later in the campaign, chiefly in order to assure a maximum of similarity in the various approaches, and to avoid fundamental blunders to which Army teams under pressure from field commands were likely to be subject.

(e) Perhaps the most important method of co-ordination lay in the exchange of leaflets and intelligence between the Armies, Army Groups and S.H.A.E.F. Criticisms of leaflets of the forward teams often furnished them with specific guidances, just as the S.H.A.E.F. leaflets were found to provide the clearest and most precise form of policy guidance.

(f) Informal correspondence between the leaflet writers on the various echelons were helpful to achieve some co-ordination. At irregular intervals, S.H.A.E.F. also issued letters cataloguing current strategic leaflets, outlining their objectives and discussing the policy behind them.

(g) Flow of intelligence. An important element in the co-ordination of leaflet policy between the various echelons was the continuous flow of German soldier and civilian intelligence to S.H.A.E.F. from the Armies and Army Groups, as well as from its own intelligence officers in the field. Interrogations by the forward teams not only furnished output material for the leaflet newspapers and newsheets, but also turned up important new trends in German morale and in German soldier psychology (e.g., the “Victory or Siberia” theme), which often were the subject of further, more detailed interrogations and quantitative analyses by polls.

This large body of intelligence was the underlying basis of guidance and directives and the agenda of meetings between representatives of various echelons. Moreover, aside from outright policy directives or guidances based on the intelligence available at S.H.A.E.F., the lower echelons had the benefit of receiving evaluated material consisting of consolidated evidence from several
sources, and the results of studies (such as prisoner polls on the popularity of Hitler) which helped them in their understanding and implementation of the agreed policy.

Between S.H.A.E.F. and the Army teams. Personal contact by visits between the German output personnel of S.H.A.E.F. and the Armies with permission of the Army Groups in every case - enabled many of the policy problems to be discussed on the spot, and valuable guidance to be furnished in this manner, in addition to the co-ordination through the Army Groups. As the Army teams frequently had to produce leaflets under directive from their Army Commander or on request from forward units, local tactical propaganda was far less co-ordinated than general tactical (i.e., more long-term) leaflets produced by the Army teams.
III. MEDIA AND POLICY.

1. The Leaflet Media.

News was found early in the campaign, to be the most effective means to undermine the enemy’s morale and to secure the necessary attention for the basic surrender message to the enemy. Aside from news leaflets (see b. (1) below), the following publications were disseminated to the enemy:

a. Leaflet Newspapers.

(1) Nachrichten für die Truppe was a daily leaflet newspaper, at first of two, and then of four sides, which was dropped continuously on or behind the German Western Front from before D-Day (25 April 1944) until the German capitulation. It was a political warfare venture planned especially for operation Overlord by a joint British and American staff from P.I.D. and O.S.S. Owing to the fact that it was produced in England, in close touch with the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, it had certain unique features which distinguish it from other successful newspapers dropped on German troops in other theatres.

It combined accurate, up-to-the-minute military news gained from all possible sources of information, some of them secret, available to P.I.D. and O.S.S. Depending for its appeal on this complete news coverage, otherwise unavailable to German troops, it relied for its effectiveness on indirect propaganda aimed at undermining the German’s faith in his leaders and convincing him of the inevitability of defeat. Originally designed to be a purely tactical newspaper, it was later used on civilian targets as well.

The project of such a daily newspaper would have been impossible without the virtual guarantee of daily distribution given by the Special Squadron of the 8th Air Force. Weather conditions frequently interrupted continuous delivery, but during the height of the Normandy battle, important railway and road junctions and key towns behind the German lines must have received their Nachrichten in large quantities as regularly as their breakfasts. A number of special drops were also arranged on cut-off garrisons, e.g. Cherbourg, Le Harve, the Ardennes pocket, Holland, in which the whole emphasis on the front news was on the particular tactical situation of the troops on whom the newspaper was dropped.

The newspaper was normally written and made up between 2200 hours of one day and 0600 hours of the next. It would then be dropped 18 to 24 hours later, although daylight drops have taken place at even shorter intervals. When big Allied operations were impending it was necessary to ensure that the newspaper dropped on the night of D-Day should contain at least headlines and an outline story of what had happened the same morning. For example, on the day of the Normandy landings, several hundred thousand newspapers announcing the breach of the Atlantic Wall in several places were dropped on
German reserve divisions in Normandy the same night. This would have been impossible without that close co-operation and confidence which existed between editors of the newspaper, the senior officers of P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. and the intelligence and operational staffs of the Supreme Commander.

The daily production of Nachrichten proceeded without interruption from 25 April 1944 to 4 May 1945, when the final issue announced the end of hostilities in the West. Ten to twelve thousand words were written, sub-edited and headlined daily: news photographs were secured and reproduced nightly through a special service of cars from London to the country headquarters of P.I.D.; upto half a million copies daily - sometimes more - were distributed to aerodromes, packed in bombs and delivered to general and pinpoint targets selected in daily conferences between military and P.W.D. staff. The newspaper employed the services of roughly 25 editorial, and between 70 and 80 printers and distribution staff.

(2) Frontpost was a weekly, semi-tactical newspaper produced by the Twelfth Army Group for dissemination by fighter bomber and medium bomber. This paper was especially angled for the requirements of the particular Army Group front, and being a “white” publication, stressed the surrender angle more in the nature of a combat leaflet. Produced in the field, and without the benefit of the extensive civilian organisation available in the U.K., Frontpost was a "semi-hot" medium, usually slightly less timely than Nachrichten. An abridged version, Feldpost, was furnished to lower echelons for additional artillery dissemination.

3. Frontbrief was a weekly newspaper published by the Seventh U.S. Army team under field conditions. Especially during the winter when that Army proved difficult to service by the Special Leaflet Squadron due to its distance from base (a factor especially during bad weather), Frontbrief proved to be virtually the only news source for the Germans in that sector. As a timely publication, it legged somewhat behind either Nachrichten or Frontpost.

b. General Tactical Leaflets.

This kind of leaflet, which was usually produced by P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. and disseminated by the Special Leaflet Squadron from the U.K., included appeals to the German soldier, usually dealt with the general surrender theme, as distinguished from leaflets written for particular units locally limited situations. The need for dissemination of general surrender leaflets in great bulk by bomber was demonstrated in the campaign. Whereas artillery could pinpoint small targets more accurately, the dropping of leaflets along the enemy’s line of retreat, before and during the mobile phases, could only be accomplished by bomber dissemination. General tactical leaflets can be divided into two classes:

(1) Static situations. During these periods general tactical leaflets waged a war of attrition, dealing with general topics - either with news in its largest strategic sense (for instance, the July 44 putsch) - or exclusively with the surrender theme, the treatment of prisoners, and the prospects of the individual reader in the
battles to come. By far the largest portion of the output was taken up by this kind of general surrender propaganda, with clearly documented success.

(2) Mobile situations. Only the broadest aspects of the developing strategy could be exploited by general tactical leaflets, due to the fact that usually several days were taken up in their production. However, due to close liaison with Army Groups, the S.H.A.E.F. produced leaflets were able to exploit the chief tactical developments of the campaign in well co-ordinated leaflet series - such as the landing, the Avranches breakthrough, the Falaise battle, the first assault on the Westwall, the Rundstedt counter-offensive, and finally, the crossing of the Rhine. The surrender theme was kept foremost in all of these situations.

c. Local Tactical Leaflets.

This includes leaflets written for a temporary situation occasioned by the battle, which is exploited by a short-lived, and therefore, necessarily quickly produced leaflet. The ideal small-scale tactical medium is the Army team produced and artillery - or fighter bomber - dissemination leaflet. The Army Groups and S.H.A.E.F. were confined either to the treatment of big events (see b. (2) above) or to the production (by S.H.A.E.F.) of a line of 'contingency' leaflets, such as You are Surrounded, which were then available for heavy bomber drop upon forward units.

d. Strategic Leaflets.

These were entirely handled from the rear where the necessary large production facilities existed, and disseminated by heavy bombers - except for a small quantity of fighter bomber disseminated Army leaflets addressed to specific German communities in the final phase. Three chief classifications of strategic leaflets are in order:

(1) "General" (attrition) leaflets. These leaflets were designed to undermine confidence in the regime and in the outcome of the war. As soon as the Allies entered Germany, instruction-type leaflets demanded higher priorities and these leaflets faded out of the picture.

(2) Civilian instruction leaflets. These consisted of warnings to specified communities, evacuation orders, instructions on how to save a town by surrender, on evasion of the Volkssturm, etc. They were exclusively produced by S.H.A.E.F. and disseminated by heavy bombers.

(3) Foreign worker leaflets. Produced by S.H.A.E.F. and distributed by heavy bombers from the U.K., these leaflets pursued the double purpose of waging psychological warfare against the German authorities, and of issuing practical instructions to the widely dispersed foreign worker element in Germany.
e. Official Instruction Leaflets.

Owing to the fact that these leaflets, in their character as documents, committed the Supreme Commander and the Allied Governments, they were exclusively produced by S.H.A.E.F. and cleared by the Chief of Staff, usually in close co-operation with the civilian agencies, who provided the radio outlet for such statements. Many of the civilian instruction leaflets and those addressed to foreign workers come under this classification. The most important document of this sort, however, was the official S.H.A.E.F. Safe Conduct, which was signed by the Supreme Commander and guaranteed good treatment to German soldiers under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Others were the official instructions to specified occupational groups, such as to railroad workers.

f. "Black" Leaflets.

These leaflets, which purported to originate from enemy sources, were the joint responsibility of P.I.D. and O.S.S. (see II. 2). This was a special secret operation and cannot be discussed in detail in this report. Substantial quantities of this material were distributed by approximately 5% of them into leaflet bombs along with Nachrichten, and it is believed to have been a very effective form of propaganda.

2. Leaflet Policy.

a. Daily "grey" newspapers.

Nachrichten für die Truppe. An essential part of the Nachrichten operation was to provide German troops with an up-to-date and detailed account of events on the German home front, about which they heard nothing - or at best, only half truths - on the official German radio or in the official newsheets issued to them by trained propaganda teams. The sources of intelligence for such detailed treatment of the frictions, inequalities and gradual weakening of the German home front were in London, and with them, the small group of specialists able to provide that documentation and appreciation of German internal events which was required.

It was, of course, difficult in the time of war to ensure complete accuracy for, and to give authenticity to, news of what was happening in Germany behind the German soldier’s back. On the other hand, it was possible through special intelligence and advice received from military headquarters, both forward and in England, to secure reliable and fast news of happenings on the battlefield. It was, therefore, possible, as it were, to carry uncheckable irrefutable and highly subversive home news on the shoulders of checkable and topical front news. On many occasions, Nachrichten was able to give the German soldier his first news of notable military events such as the Allied landing in the south of France or the Arnhem landing. It, therefore, seems to have acquired a reputation for reliability in its war news which, it is reasonable to assume, many readers transferred unconsciously to its home news. It also carried news from
the D.N.B. service which by presenting the reader with matter he could hear from official German sources gave the sheet an air of objective reporting.

The newspaper also included daily a leading article in a direct and personal style, addressed to the "comrades" - both officers and men at the front in which the case against the Party, against the useless prolongation of the war, against the muddles and corruptions in the official hierarchy and against the destruction of German and European values by the National Socialists was directly attacked.

In detail, the newspaper was made-up as follows: on the front page, and in some columns on the back page, the German soldier found the news story from each front on which German troops were fighting, his own Western Front being covered in great detail. These stories were so written as to encourage the German soldier in the West to look back over his shoulder. For example, it was continually emphasised before and during the Normandy campaign that the Russian Front was the only one taken seriously by the Party and the High Command, and the front was represented as an example of useless sacrifice and diversion of strength. On page two, was the daily topical commentary by Lt. von O., expressing a critical, browned-off indignant attitude to the conduct of the war, both at home and at the front, and giving plausible and rational form to the soldier's suppressed desires to slacken off and give up hope. On page three, the German soldier found startling and worrying news from home, suggesting the flagrant inequality in the sacrifices made by the man at the front and the leader at home, by the ordinary civilian and by the Party member. He learned about the scandals of reserved occupations, of the overworking of women, of conditions in children's evacuation camps, of "black-marketing" in high quarters and of insincere and bombastic appeals for sacrifice by bosses and by wire-pullers hundreds of miles behind the front.

In addition, an attempt was made to keep before the German reader a picture of the world political situation and Germany's place in it in which particular attention was paid to the failure of Germany's satellites and allies. Sports news and pictures of pin-up girls assured that this page did not have a purely propaganda content, but plenty of reader interest and entertainment.

It is to be emphasised that this newspaper was in no sense official; the news it gave and the views it expressed daily were submitted neither to military censorship nor to policy approval. Security considerations were discussed by liaison officers in military headquarters and the main lines of policy were regularly discussed with P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. and the civilian agencies. It was, therefore, possible on occasions for campaigns to be conducted against the morale of German troops, which contained information and ideas with which it was not desired directly to associate the Supreme Commander and the Allied Governments. For example, the rumour was successfully spread that German airmen wishing to desert to Allied airfields would not be fired upon by ground defences if certain signals were given. Such signals were, in fact, never officially approved on the Allied side, but German pilots followed the instructions and landed safely nonetheless. Likewise, items of intelligence about German order of battle and possible intentions during such critical battles as Falaise, the
Ardernnes and the crossing of the Rhine, could be made use of in this unofficial newspaper because German intelligence knew quite well that tactical deception might be one of the newspaper’s functions, and that it was, therefore, a dangerous guide to Allied estimates of any tactical situation.

Nachrichten für die Truppe was, therefore, able to combine the functions of a political leaflet, a strategic leaflet and sometimes, of a tactical leaflet. Its principle difference from other Allied tactical leaflets was that it was neither in style nor in approach avowedly an Allied product. The German soldier knew quite well that it came from the Allies, but its writers took every trouble to avoid reminding him of the fact.

b. Combat Leaflets.

Since the topics of the day, including news from Germany, were treated by the daily leaflet newspapers, the soldier leaflets confined themselves to surrender propaganda, which was treated through general tactical leaflets (l.b. (1) and (2) above), official instruction leaflets and local tactical leaflets. The basic policy considerations underlying the use of these leaflets were as follows:

(1) Captivity. All soldier leaflets dealt, in one form or another, incidentally or as a main theme, with the topic of captivity. As all combat leaflets had as their objective the taking of prisoners, the theme of captivity was constantly kept before the mind of the German soldier.

(2) Good treatment. Perhaps the most impressive argument for the continued use of the good treatment theme was the fact that German soldiers, not trusting us to treat them well, kept our Safe Conducts on their person in great numbers, and that of many leaflets, they often tended to remember only the feature dealing with good treatment. As a cardinal theme, therefore, but treated with conservatism (“underplayed”), the good treatment theme ran through the entire output.

(3) Desertion vs. Surrender. It was found that soldierly pride and feelings that desertion was dishonourable, were perhaps the most basic and unchanging factors of German soldier mentality, even among deserters. S.H.A.E.F., therefore, attempted to enforce a policy which pictured captivity entirely as something that "happened" to a German soldier especially since detailed inquires showed that the line between surrender and capture was indeed a thin one. It was found that such a distinction had no noticeable effect on the volume of desertions, while avoiding the danger of alienating the German readers who rejected the idea of desertion although quite willing to stretch a point when it came to getting captured. The uniform application of this policy, however, proved impossible due to considerable pressure on the forward teams whenever front-line commanders found themselves confronted with especially low morale German units. Toward the end of the campaign, the policy was superseded by the use of the Surrender Order. (see 2.d. (2) below).
III. MEDIA AND POLICY

(4) Material Superiority. It has been deliberate policy to furnish the German soldier with a sop to his honour by continuously pointing out that however great his bravery, he was confronted by a crushing superiority of war material against which his soldierly qualities were useless. This simple line, whose effect was constantly checked by detailed prisoner interrogations, was basic to the S.H.A.E.F. leaflets. The leaflets of Army teams, where more to stress specific deficiencies of German units. The effect obtained by this latter line was to disconcert the enemy by the extent of our knowledge.

(5) Geneva Convention. Our adherence to the Convention, and the strict observation of its provisions in Canada and the United States, proved to be a great asset and was exploited throughout the campaign. Insistence on our observation of Article 75 of the Convention was an especially useful weapon in countering German claims that prisoners would be shipped to Russia.

(6) Capitulation Theme. The Nazi’s exploitation of our unconditional surrender policy was counter-acted in a number of ways, the most important of which was the projection of General Eisenhower as Military Governor, and the description of his regime as firm, but just. Capitulation as such was likewise shown to be a military act with many precedents, never - if on a tactical level - robbing the surrendering German soldier of his privileges under the Geneva Convention.

(7) Excluded Topics. As the operation progressed and more and more intelligence on the German soldier accumulated, it became clear that a number of obvious propaganda arguments were either ineffective or could not be used for policy reasons. A useful view of the scope of combat propaganda its progressive limitation to the above simple and basic points can be obtained from a consideration of the following excluded subjects:

(a) Outright revolutionary propaganda. The evidence clearly showed that there was little inclination on the part of either German soldiers or civilians to revolt, and that in any case, they both were under too much restraint to make this line of propaganda even remotely effective.

(b) Personal attacks on Hitler. The mystical and fanatical attachment to Hitler was found to have no direct connection with either the belief in victory or the willingness to surrender, and in as much as the objective was not to convert the soldier, but to get him to surrender, this subject was by-passed as a strong point of German morale.

(c) Ideological warfare. Re-education of the German soldier was conceived of as a post-hostilities problem. As more and more lost faith in victory, they likewise became ripe for new ideas. In that final stage, however, the unconditional surrender propaganda made it necessary to concentrate on the futility of fighting on, rather than on the promises offered by the democratic way of life. We were not offering democracy to Germany, but Military Government.

(d) Divisions and Splits, between Army and Party, and between officers and men, or between Army and S.S., were found to be obtainable chiefly by
indirection. The leaflet newspaper, Nachrichten, giving news items permitting of
indivious comparisons, or of suspicions of disloyalty or favouritism, was found
to be the best means for accomplishing this purpose.

(e) Appeals by German generals. For reasons of high policy, we were unable to
utilise the German general staff, whom we were pledged to render impotent,
for our purposes - despite the fact that many German generals in Allied hands
would have been willing to recommend surrender. Use was made, however, of
the statements made by the German generals in Russian hands.

(f) Counter-propaganda. German claims of Nazi propaganda lies were never
recognised or directly contradicted. It was believed the most effective method
of handling them was either to ignore them entirely or to negate them with a
positive line of propaganda.

In addition to sub-paragraph (d) above, it should be remembered that a number
of topics associated with daily news, were covered by the daily newspaper
Nachrichten and, therefore, omitted from the combat leaflet output. Among such
topics were items exploiting the soldier's anxiety about bombing, or about
foreign workers in Germany, news about other fronts, secret weapons, etc.
Furthermore, "black" propaganda dealt with such subjects as malingering,
subversion and the aiding and abetting of desertion.

c. Civilian Leaflets.

(1) Action Themes. Intelligence from German soldiers, and later from civilians
in occupied Germany, showed that defeatism was so widespread and that the
acceptance of Nazism was so complete and so efficiently enforced by terror,
that many of our "attrition type" leaflets met with the answer "You are right, but
what can we do?" The problem therefore, was to find things the Germans could
do to speed the end of the war without immediately risking their lives.
Incitements to revolution were not used except in the final collapse situation,
when they took the form of recommending steps to effect the surrender of
towns or villages. The principal themes were as follows:

(a) Anti-evacuation theme (before we reached the Rhine).
(b) Evacuation of specified areas, designed as "danger areas".
(c) Anti-Volkssturm campaign (evasion of service, and surrender).
(d) Slow-down campaign, combined with the evacuation theme.
(e) Talk-to-the-soldier campaign (tied in with surrender theme).
(f) Avoid the needless destruction of your town (by surrender).

(2) Projection of Military Government, and of the authority of General
Eisenhower. This closely tied in with the imposition of Allied authority on
Germans, as used by Voice of S.H.A.E.F. broadcasts, and capitalised on General
Eisenhower's character and personality, as contrasted to that of Himmler. As in
combat leaflets, no direct attack was made on Hitler. Rather, the National
Socialist "terror system" and particularly, its foremost representative, Himmler,
were held up as the alternatives to Military Government.
d. Official Instruction Leaflets.

Due to the prestige which such leaflets were intended to carry, committing as they did, the Allied Governments and the Supreme Commander personally, especial care was taken in their production - in the selection of type, layout, reproduction of insignia and in their printing. While the policy involved in the contents of such leaflets naturally was different in each case, two examples in the line of combat propaganda were of especial importance:

(1) The Safe Conduct. Designed as a document complete with the crests of Great Britain and the United States, the S.H.A.E.F. insignia and the signature of the Supreme Commander, this leaflet embodied the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention and instructed the Allied outposts to take the bearer prisoner and treat him decently. So successful was this leaflet all through the campaign that it was mixed in the proportion of ten per cent, and later fifteen percent, with all other combat leaflets dropped. In situations especially favourable from a tactical point of view, bombs filled with nothing but Safe Conducts were dropped on German troops.

(2) The Surrender Order. As defeatism spread through the German army, it became more and more obvious that reasons for surrendering and general exhortations were insufficient to overcome the strong obedience to orders which prevented many German soldiers from ceasing resistance. Consequently, an order was designed which tried to substitute the authority of General Eisenhower for that of the German’s own immediate superior, and to pit his prestige against that of his German counterparts. Instructions were given by S.H.A.E.F. to use this order only in acute tactical situations where there were good chances that German soldiers would use it as an alibi for surrender.

e. “Black” Leaflets.

Purporting to come from enemy sources, these leaflets attempted to accomplish their aims by subtlety and indirection. They covered a multitude of themes, and in general, were designed to weaken the enemy’s morale by undermining the soldier’s confidence in the Nazi Party and the High Command. There were also special leaflets, such as forged German food and clothing coupons, travel orders, etc., which were intended to add to the enemy’s administrative difficulties and provide additional work for the S.S. and the Gestapo.
IV. PRODUCTION.


Functioning at this level was a Joint Production Unit manned by P.I.D. and O.W.I. personnel. To work with this Production Unit, the P.W.D. Leaflet Section maintained a sub-office in the same building through which were channelled all copy to be printed, as well as the final proofs to be filed and copies of the leaflets to be distributed to the interested departments throughout the psychological warfare operation.

a. Paper and printing were the responsibility of the Joint Production Unit. Paper was requisitioned as needed from a joint Anglo-American pool administered by H.M. Stationary Office. To provide for these needs, approximately 1,000 tons of paper allocated for leaflets and periodicals (roughly half of it of British manufacture, and the other half shipped over from America) was fed into the joint pool per month.

All typesetting, except for small occasional overflows, was handled by a special typography department of the Joint Production Unit. From this department the completed forms were sent out for plate-making and printing to regular commercial houses under contract to the unit.

From D-Day through to April 1945, a total of over 3,500,000,000 leaflet units, covering a range from single-unit leaflets to 48 page booklets, were set, printed and dispatched - the largest percentage of them being rushed through to meet delivery dates.

b. Packaging and trucking were the responsibility of the P.W.D. Leaflet Section which maintained a special military unit consisting of one officer and eighty enlisted men with 25 trucks, for this purpose. In the case of one or two leaflets, in connection with which the time element was of paramount importance (e.g. the daily newsheets), the finished job was packed into leaflet bombs at the printers and immediately rushed by the trucking unit to the desired airfields. In all other cases, the finished job was picked up from the printer, brought back to the packaging unit for packing into bombs and delivered to the various airfields as needed.

The Leaflet Section took delivery of 75,277 bombs, of which approximately 14,000 were still on hand on VE-Day, and another 6,000 were shipped to the Continent. The remaining 55,000 were packed with leaflets at the rate of approximately 4,000 bombs per month. The unit’s trucks averaged some 18,230 miles per week on pick-up and delivery trips to the various printers and airfields.

In September 1944, the P.W.D. Leaflet Section moved to Paris (leaving the Rear Section at Headquarters, Eighth Air Force) and arranged for a comparatively
small amount of printing for distribution by the Army Groups to be done by local printers in Paris and Brussels, where local stocks of paper, as well as requisitions from H.M. Stationary Office, were used. When the Leaflet Section writing team was stationed in Paris, all tactical leaflet typesetting was done by commercial firms in Paris and reproduction proofs were forwarded to London and Brussels. However, since the majority of leaflets were dropped by British-based aircraft and U.K. printing facilities were superior to those available on the Continent, the great majority of the leaflets, and all of the publications, continued to be printed in the U.K.

2. Army Groups.

The problems in Army Group leaflet production varied widely. In the Twenty-first Army Group, lack of facilities at Army levels necessitated production of tactical leaflets at Group. In the Twelfth Army Group, the principal output was of the newspapers *Frontpost* and *Feldpost*, with only about a dozen different general tactical leaflets produced in addition. No leaflets were produced by the Sixth Army Group, the production job being done at Army level in this case.

The Army Groups, because of their rear-area locations, were generally able to utilise local civilian printing plants for their production, giving them flexibility in layout, type faces and, when possible, use of colour. However, because of their distance from the Army teams, transportation provided a serious bottleneck, especially in the case of artillery leaflets produced at Group for distribution by Armies. The failure to provide organic transportation for psychological warfare units was a serious handicap, both at Army Group and Armies.

A comparatively small number of highly skilled personnel were required for leaflet production: absolutely essential were one bi-lingual leaflet writer with previous writing experience, a skilled layout man and an officer to supervise printing operations. These, with the necessary enlisted men for clerical and printing jobs are the basic personnel for leaflet production at both Army Groups and Armies.

3. Army.

The most difficult production job of all, that of turning out combat leaflets at short notice under field conditions, was performed by the Army Psychological Warfare teams. Those which concentrated especially on volume production of local tactical leaflets were the First, Third, Ninth and Seventh Army Psychological Warfare Units. A considerable proportion of their production was done on mobile presses, but local facilities were utilised wherever possible because of the greater variety of format and larger volume possible.

In the matter of mobile production equipment, tremendous improvisation was required. Many printing trucks were equipped with Davidson presses capable of turning out only 4,000 leaflets per hour. The Webbendorfer press, which later became almost standard equipment, was able to print as many as 36,000 leaflets per hour (i.e. nine times faster than a Davidson press) but possessed the
limitation of requiring special sized paper. Often, only a small variety of type faces, some of them not ideal for leaflets, were available. Colour equipment, too, was usually lacking and during this campaign the value of colour in attracting attention to leaflets, especially when snow covered the front, was well established.

Transportation was again a tremendous problem, especially since the Army teams were required to print and pack leaflets in large volume for firing by artillery at lower echelons often long distances away over front line roads. By the end of the campaign, most, of these problems, and equally serious one of training personnel for leaflet production, had been overcome to the extent that the Army teams were able to fulfil almost any leaflet production mission requested by lower echelons, or required by the tactical situation. An example of this was the production by the Seventh Army team of leaflets ready for firing against the town of Forbach within 12 hours from the time of the initial request being received.
V. DISTRIBUTION.

Ideally, a leaflet operation should use all methods of distribution; artillery for pinpoint local tactical leaflets, fighter bombers for tactical targets out of the reach of artillery, medium bombers for closein strategic and semi-tactical leaflets and heavy bombers for strategic leaflets aimed at enemy civilians far behind the line. In this campaign, however, due to the superior production facilities in the United Kingdom, and the fact that the only aircraft continuously under the operational control of P.W.D. were the Special Leaflet Squadron of the 8th Air Force, the great bulk of S.H.A.E.F. leaflets, both strategic and tactical, were distributed by U.K.-based heavy bombers. The medium bombers were used for a few weeks after D-Day for special tactical leaflet missions, but as soon as they moved to the Continent, these operations ceased owing to lack of communications and transportation facilities. From then until the closing months of the war when arrangements were made for the distribution of the Twelfth Army Group weekly newspaper Frontpost, little use was made of the medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force.

1. Air.

a. Special Leaflet Squadron.

The most effective leaflet distribution by P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. was done by a squadron of heavy bombers especially assigned for leaflet operations by the 8th Air Force. This Special Leaflet Squadron sent out an average of ten aircraft per night, weather permitting. These aircraft went out singley each covering as many as five targets per night selected by the Leaflet Section, P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F. This squadron accomplished the bulk of the leaflet distribution from the United Kingdom and was used primarily for the distribution of general tactical leaflets on targets on all sectors of the front, at the request of the Army Groups.

The Leaflet Section, P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F., Rear, which was located at Headquarters 8th Air Force, received by wire requests direct from the Army Groups and Armies for Nachrichten and standard general tactical leaflets, such as Safe Conduct, You are Surrounded, etc., on targets in their areas. Based on these requests, the Leaflet Section made up each morning a list of targets and loads for the available planes for that night and telephoned them direct to the Operations Officer of the Squadron.

This was the only air force unit which was permanently and directly under the operational control of a psychological warfare organisation, and it enabled P.W.D. to deliver leaflets to any targets they selected at the time when they were most needed.
The tremendous advantages of a special leaflet squadron are obvious. In addition to making it possible to direct leaflets to targets when they were most needed, it also made it possible for P.W.D. to write and produce special leaflets with assurance that they were delivered where intended. This enabled them to write messages addressed specifically to the inhabitants of a particular town or region, which greatly increases the effectiveness of the leaflets.

In the closing days of the campaign when the demand for leaflets on the demoralised enemy was at its height, the 8th Air Force made an additional squadron available for leaflet operations, but soon after this unit became available, VE-Day put an end to the leaflet operations.

b. Special Leaflet Missions.

(1) Heavy bombers. At the request of P.W.D., the 8th Air Force, on several occasions, made available heavy bombers for special leaflet missions. Regular bombing missions, however, obviously had priority, and it was only on a few special occasions, such as the attempt on Hitler's life on 20th July 1944, that the air forces were willing to make this special lift available.

(2) Medium bombers. Medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force, based in the U.K., were made available for the special tactical leaflet missions for several weeks after D-Day, but when the Ninth Air Force moved to the Continent, the lack of communications and transportation facilities made it impossible to continue this operation. In the closing months of war, these aircraft were also made available for special leaflet missions to distribute the Twelfth Army Group weekly newspaper *Frontpost*.

(3) Fighter bombers. The tactical air command supporting each Army made available fighter bombers for special leaflet missions to pinpoint local tactical targets. These missions were flown at the request of the Army Psychological Warfare liaison officer and made an extremely valuable contribution to the leaflet operation. Regular operational missions, however, had priority.

c. Regular Bombing Missions.

(1) Royal Air Force. The bombers of the R.A.F. carried bundles of leaflets on their regular operational missions over enemy territory. These leaflets were released through the flare chute at or near the target and in this way, very substantial quantities of leaflets were distributed over enemy territory. The disadvantages of this system was that P.I.D., which co-ordinated this operation, had no information before the mission of the target to be attacked and, therefore, had no control over the selection of leaflets or the quantities of leaflets which were dropped on each target. Also, leaflets dropped loose at bombing altitudes often drifted considerable distances before reaching the ground.
(2) Eighth Air Force. On each bombing mission of the 8th Air Force, a maximum of twelve aircraft were loaded with leaflet bombs. Each aircraft carried ten leaflet bombs so that on a mission, a maximum of 9,600,000 leaflet units could be distributed. Arrangements were made with the 8th Air Force to give the Leaflet Section, P.W.D./S.H.A.E.F., Rear, which was located at the Headquarters, 8th Air Force, the targets when the mission was planned, so that they were able to specify the leaflet and the quantities which were to be dropped on each target. This had the obvious advantage of allowing P.W.D. to specify a reasonable quantity, and the proper leaflet for each target, and also, to avoid covering the same target with the same leaflet on successive missions.

As the R.A.F. and the 8th Air Force usually went to targets deep in Germany which were beyond the range of the Special Leaflet Squadron, they were used primarily for the distribution of strategic leaflets addressed to the German civilian population.

2. Aircraft and Equipment.

a. Heavy, Medium and Fighter Bombers,

...were used for leaflet distribution during the Western European campaign. Each possessed certain unique qualifications for the particular task performed, and the use of all three types of aircraft was essential to the successful execution of the leaflet effort. In this campaign, however, due to the superior production facilities in the U.K., and the fact that the Special Leaflet Squadron was the only distributing unit continuously under the operational control of P.W.D., the great bulk of S.H.A.E.F. leaflets, both strategic and tactical, were distributed by that unit. This was not an ideal arrangement as much of this distribution could have been done more economically and with greater accuracy in daylight operations by medium and fighter bombers based on the Continent had these aircraft been made permanently available for special leaflet operations.

b. Methods of Dropping.

Originally, leaflet dropping by the U.S.A.A.F. was done by means of bundles fitted with an aneroid device designed to release the binding and free the leaflets at a given altitude. In practice, however, these aneroids did not function satisfactorily, and it became obvious that some more efficient method of distribution was needed. Obviously a leaflet bomb, the trajectory of which would permit a reasonably accurate drop, and which would open to release leaflets at a low altitude was required. Two types of leaflet bomb, the T-1 and the T-3, were eventually accepted as standard for use in this theatre by the U.S.A.A.F.

(1) T-1 Bomb. All leaflets distributed by the 8th Air Force both on special missions and daylight bombing operations, were, after May 1944, carried in the T-1 leaflet bomb, a cylindrical, laminated, paper container, 60" long and 18" in diameter, fitted with a British 860A barometricnose fuse. This fuse functioned at approximately 2,000 feet, activating a primer cord which destroyed the
container and released the leaflets. Use of this bomb simplified leaflet handling by units, and above all, avoided the extremely wide dispersion resulting from release at the altitudes of 20,000 feet and above at which B-17s and B-24s usually operated. Each bomb contained approximately 80,000 leaflet units, and tests indicated that under normal weather conditions, these would scatter over an area of approximately one square mile. Ten of these bombs were carried by each aircraft on daylight operations and twelve in the adapted bomb bay of B-24s of the Special Squadron.

(2) T-3 Bomb. Used exclusively by fighter bombers and on some missions by mediums, the T-3 leaflet bomb consisted of a converted M-26 metal flare case, 50" long and 8" in diameter with a streamlined nose and tail to assist trajectory. This bomb could hold up to 15,000 leaflet units. As many as nine T-3 bombs were carried by fighter bombers and twenty by B-26s. Either an American M-111 clockwork fuse, or a British 860A barometric fuse was fitted.

c. Types of Aircraft.

(1) Heavy Bombers. Heavy bombers possessed the obvious advantages for leaflet operations of superior range and load-carrying capacity. As used in the Special Leaflet Squadron of the 8th Air Force, each B-24 could drop 960,000 leaflet units on as many as five separate targets per sortie. In the operations of the Special Squadron, the large number of targets covered per mission and the efficiency of enemy air defences necessitated night operations by aircraft flying singly. Although the leaflet bombing was done from high altitude at night by instruments, the wide dispersion of leaflets after the bombs burst gave sufficient coverage, and prisoner reaction figures show conclusively that a large percentage of leaflets dropped by the Special Leaflet Squadron heavies reached their target areas.

(2) Medium Bombers. Leaflet missions by the Ninth Bomber Command B-26s were carried out in daylight at medium altitudes, with each aircraft dropping twenty T-3s or six T-1 leaflet bombs, or approximately 480,000 leaflet units. Daylight operations at lower altitudes permitted greater accuracy, but of course the range of mediums was considerably less than that of heavies, and the daylight missions necessitated formation flying and fighter escort, which reduced flexibility to some extent.

(3) Fighter bomber. Pinpoint low-altitude leafleting of tactical targets beyond Artillery range was the job of the fighter bombers of the various tactical air commands. P-47s were able to carry six T-3 bombs (three clustered under each wing) and sometimes nine (with three additional in the Belly tank position) giving them a maximum load of 135,000 leaflet units. The accuracy of their low-level bombing, and the proximity of their bases to Army teams producing tactical combat leaflets made fighter bombers the ideal instrument for dissemination of these leaflets to areas immediately behind the front lines. Distribution by fighter bombers were carried out by means of special leaflet missions arranged through the air commands.
3. Artillery.

Because of its accuracy, economy and availability, field artillery is the ideal instrument for the distribution of all tactical leaflets to targets within its range. The employment of artillery for leafleting can be traced back to the French use of the 75mm field piece for propaganda purposes on the Western Front in 1918. In this war, the idea was first put into practice with the British 25-pounder during the Tunisian campaign of 1942-43.

Despite this previous battle use of artillery leaflets, this method of dissemination, although a known and accepted fact, was, because of lack of information on previous operations, still in the experimental stage when the Allied Armies landed in Normandy on D-Day, 1944. With the First Psychological Warfare Unit (then constituted as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company) which landed soon after D-Day, came an artillery liaison officer. On D-plus 6, the first six rounds of artillery leaflets, mimeographed for a local situation, were fired, and proved their efficiency by netting six prisoners. By the end of June 1944, 900 rounds of propaganda shells had been fired on the First U.S. Army sector alone. Artillery leafleting continued on an increasing scale on all of the Allied Army sectors in the West until VE-Day, and proved itself to be one of the most effective weapons used by psychological warfare.

a. Weapons.

The basic weapon used by American units for firing propaganda shells was the 105mm Howitzer, M2 or M2A1. This piece with the shell and fuse commonly used gave an average maximum range of 8,000 yards, enabling leaflets to reach as far back as battalion, regimental, and sometimes, division command posts. The shell used for leaflets was the 105mm smoke shell M84, HC, BE, W/PD, from which the smoke canister was removed. This shell held approximately 500 artillery sized (4” x 6 3/4”) leaflets. An M54 fuse was used for ranges up to 8,000 yards, and the M67 fuse was used experimentally for utilisation of the full range of the 105 - up to 12,000 yards. This piece, shell and fuse were standard U.S. weapons in almost universal use, and were most desirable from a psychological warfare viewpoint because of their availability and range, and the familiarity of artillery personnel with them.

Although experiments were made with the propaganda use of other artillery weapons, the 105mm in the U.S. area, and the 25-pounder in the British, were the mainstays of the artillery leafleting effort. Limited use was made of the 155mm smoke shell, which could hold up to 1,500 leaflets, and was capable of greater range. When firing it at ranges of over 5,000 yards, however, it is generally impossible to observe where shells burst except by aerial observation, which is often unavailable. This is somewhat of a drawback to the use of longer-range artillery weapons than the 105.

b. Control.

Control over artillery leaflet dissemination was the responsibility of the artillery liaison officer attached to Army Psychological Warfare Units. In practice, the
job of his section involved the performance of all necessary tasks from the time leaflets came off the press until they were fired by artillery units. Artillery liaison involved four principal duties:

(1) Liaison with Army ordnance and ammunition officers to insure a continuous flow of ammunition for propaganda purposes.

(2) Liaison with artillery sections at all echelons for arrangements for leaflet firing.

(3) Modification and loading of ammunition, and its delivery to depots, ASPs, division or field artillery batteries as required.

(4) Assistance to artillery units in firing of propaganda shells. Experience proved, that because of their specialised nature, none of these tasks could be successfully relegated to other units.

Requests for artillery leaflet "shoots" were generally passed by division or corps personnel (often G-2) through psychological warfare personnel operating at that level either as liaison officers or in amplifier units, to the artillery liaison section of the Army Psychological Warfare Unit, which would then co-ordinate all details of the operation. Usually, the loaded leaflet shells would be delivered to the S-4 or ordnance officer of the unit performing the firing. The S-3 or operations officer would then allot shells to the various batteries, basing his distribution on the best information on local enemy dispositions available from the unit S-2 or intelligence officer.

c. Advantages of Artillery Leafleting.

The distribution of leaflets by artillery possessed several distinct advantages over other methods:

(1) Accuracy. In local tactical situations artillery leaflets could ordinarily be placed within a few hundred yards, at least, of enemy positions within range. Although greater saturation could be obtained by means of airdrops, it was the estimate of one P.W. officer that up to five times as many airdropped as artillery leaflets were required to insure pinpoint coverage of a given position.

(2) Availability. Along any active ground front there will be artillery positions, and the fact that psychological warfare units at lower echelons are attached to ground rather than air units makes the co-ordination and arrangement of artillery leafleting simpler than air drops. Also, in the case of air leaflet missions, such operations must be scheduled and special units detailed for the performance of the task with artillery leaflets, the only requirement is the delivery of filled shells to the appropriate unit and co-ordination with the unit's commander. Finally, and extremely important in a theatre such as Western Europe, is the fact that artillery is not affected by adverse weather conditions. During this campaign many air missions scheduled for co-ordination with important tactical operations had to be cancelled or postponed because aircraft could not get off the ground.
V. DISTRIBUTION

(3) Economy. The firing of propaganda shells requires no extra risk of men and equipment and little extra employment of service personnel, in contrast to air missions.

d. Disadvantages of Artillery Leafleting.

The obvious disadvantages of artillery leafleting are lack of range and lack of flexibility. The latter factor is especially important during fluid situations when artillery units are frequently on the move and, therefore, unavailable. During periods of breakthrough and pursuit, artillery can seldom be utilised to full advantage for leaflet operations, but in relatively static situations it is, within its range, the ideal method of tactical leaflet dissemination.

4. Other Methods.

a. Balloons.

Small quantities of leaflets, mostly "black", were regularly disseminated by British agencies operating first in the United Kingdom and later on the Continent, using balloons especially adapted for this work, designed to release bundles of leaflets at a given time after the balloons had been set free.

b. Patrols.

Additional small numbers of leaflets, often of a local tactical nature, were frequently scattered behind the enemy's lines on various sectors by scouting patrols and agents at night. This means of augmenting leaflet distribution is especially valuable because leaflets are almost certain of reaching the hands of enemy troops. However, the leaflets created an added risk that the passage of a patrol or agent would be given away.
VI. RESULTS.

1. Psychological warfare deals with such intangibles as the comparative influence of various factors on the thought processes of the enemy. It is, therefore, impossible to measure the results in exact mathematical terms. However, a mass of material dealing with enemy countermeasures, prisoner of war reactions, as disclosed in polls and interviews, and official reports by Allied ground units, gives convincing evidence of the effectiveness of the leaflet operation in Western Europe.

2. The following examples selected from this mass of evidence is divided into two categories:

(1) Indirect reactions - penalties, warnings and other examples of counter action; and

(2) Direct reactions - statements by individuals, results of official surveys and evidence reported by our own ground forces.

a. Indirect Reactions.

(1) “Goebbels gives warning - ‘very clever leaflets’. Through his mouthpiece, Karl Siegbold, Goebbels last night broadcast a warning to Germans against Allied leaflets. German soldiers and civilians were told, ‘There is not a single sentence in these leaflets which does not want to do us harm. They are addressed to the weak points which exist in every nation. It ought to be below our dignity to read what the leaflets say. They are weapons and we must be careful with all weapons.

There are two kinds of leaflet. The first is a small size newsheet, very cleverly done, with impressive maps and pictures. It has a completely bona fide appearance. But among correct and truthful reports it contains innumerable half-truths, omissions, exaggerations. Indeed, every news item, every short article, every comment contains a small - only just noticeable - amount of distrust in the actions of the German High Command.

The second type of leaflet is different. It is openly treacherous, grinning with lies and broad impudence,’ etc. etc.”

- London Daily Express, 30th September 1944.

(Latest Reports of Leaflet Reactions, No. 10)

(2) "Captured German soldiers say that nobody below the rank of Major is allowed to pick up leaflets dropped on them by the Allies. An army order told them: ‘These leaflets invite you to desert; if you do, you will be sent to England and run the risk of death by V1. After that you will be shipped to the United States or Canada for life-long hard labour, or exchanged for an American or
British paratroops - of whom we have captured thousands - tried by court-martial, and shot.”

- Daily Mail, 13th August 1944.

(Latest Report of Leaflet Reactions, No. 7)

(3) Penalties ordered by German civilian courts for reading and distributing Allied Leaflets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Aachen</td>
<td>2 months imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>2 years imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Innsbruck</td>
<td>Death Sentence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) "In the early hours of 10th November, the enemy dropped leaflets Nachrichten für die Truppe dated 9th November. They bring, in part very clever, partly somewhat clumsy form, the news of yesterday. Even the most self-respecting soldier is tempted to read these newsheets, since our own Frontkurier usually does not arrive until the late afternoon or even three to four days later. There must be some way for us to bring the news to our men earlier than the enemy in order to kill the soldier's curiosity."

- Communication from German front line C.O. to Higher H.Q.

(5) "At this point the enemy leaflet comes out with a notorious objective article. Whoever yields to the temptation reads the article, in spite of all prohibitions, will be puzzled at first. Here is a cool, objective, German military style. Not a word too many or too few. The article contains an account of the course of the battle during the last few days which exactly corresponds to the facts. The reader is amazed to find that this discussion contains no lies what he does not notice, of course, is the fact that this is the exact moment when the devil is on the spot leading him into temptation. For, now comes the concluding part of the report which apparently was so objective. Again in the same cool, matter-of-fact style, it is stated that certain persons are responsible for the outcome of the battle - an S.S. general is named here, an army general there. In the end, the soldier is asked when he will finally give up this senseless struggle. We wish to make the following remarks in this connection:

1. The enemy is using this type of propaganda more frequently; it is assumed that there will be more of it and we must, therefore, be on our guard.

2. On the whole, it can be assumed that the order to destroy enemy leaflets or hand them in is carried out well.

3. In spite of this, however, this order must be stressed again and again every time the troops go into action."

- Wehrmacht High Command bulletin for the Officer Corps.

(Latest Reports of Leaflet Reactions, No. 16)

(6) "The enemy on his part is employing all means in order to shatter the steadfastness of the German people on which everything depends. He seeks
especially by means of clever propaganda to disintegrate the German Forces and to paralyse their will to resist. He will not succeed in this. However, it would be wrong to think that such attempts are so futile that they need not be taken seriously (signed) Blaskowicz.”

- Order from Commander-in-Chief, Army Group G.

b. Direct Reactions.

(1) “Seventy seven percent of the prisoners taken had read our leaflets.” Anthony Eden, House of Commons, July 1944.

(2) Estimated percentages of prisoners who had seen and who had been influenced by leaflets. (Based on polls of sample groups of Prisoners of War):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Combat Area</th>
<th>Percentage who saw leaflets.</th>
<th>Percentage influenced (of those who saw Leaflets).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06-28/06</td>
<td>Cherbourg</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/07-17/07</td>
<td>Clarenton - St. Lo</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/07-27/07</td>
<td>St. Lo</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/08-10/08</td>
<td>St. Malo - Le Mans</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Western Front</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/10-19/10</td>
<td>Aachen</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1st U.S. Army Front</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/12-31/12</td>
<td>1st, 3rd, 9th U.S. Army</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/01-31/01</td>
<td>1st, 3rd, 9th U.S. Army</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/02-28/02</td>
<td>1st, 3rd, 9th U.S. Army</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/03-15/03</td>
<td>1st, 3rd, 9th U.S. Army</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Estimated percentages of civilians in medium sized towns in central Germany reached by Allied leafleting (Based on polls of the populations of Hersfield, Marburg and Eschwege):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of those who had seen leaflets &amp; who read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% read leaflets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures are particularly impressive indication of the penetration of strategic leafleting to the German civilian population because none of the towns polled had been leafleted by the 8th Air Force, the R.A.F. or the Special Leafleting Squadron.
VI. RESULTS

(4) “It is impossible to determine the exact effectiveness of airdrops, but it is a fact that over 80% of all prisoners we have netted on the Brest Peninsula have come in with leaflets in their possession... Korvette Kapitan Fritz Otto, now a prisoner, informed us that with leaflets falling all round his troops he found himself leading a ‘Bunch of neurotics’ and gave the whole thing up, coming over to us.”

- Twelfth Army Group Report.  
  (Latest Reports of Leaflet Reactions, No. 11-T)

(5) "When the final count came in for Le Harve, it showed 11,302 prisoners out of 12,000 garrison. Analysis shows that over 75% had leaflets on them."

- Twenty-first Army Group Report.  
  (Latest Reports of Leaflet Reactions, No. 11-T)

(6) “Out of a sample group of 200 prisoners captured in and around Aachen in the middle of October, approximately 50% had leaflets on their person at the time of their capture.”

  (Latest Report of Leaflet Reactions, No. 12)

(7) “P/Ws reported that the P.W.B. leaflet containing the text of the Aachen ultimatum had influenced them to desert. One, a Prusso-phobe Bavarian, decided to desert after reading this leaflet, took a Viennese comrade along, persuaded 11 others to join, marched to the U.S. lines waving the leaflets and white flags, and finally broadcast appeals over our public address system to remaining comrades.”

- 12 Army Group Report.  
  (Latest Report of Leaflet Reactions, No. 14)

(8) “Despite strict orders not to read our leaflets, they are passed on and discussed constantly.”

(9) “Lt. Wisser, an ardent Nazi, decided not to speak during the interrogation but later stated that ‘unhappily, these leaflets have a great influence on the men and constitute a serious threat to their morale.’ The morale of the troops fighting against this army is seriously shaken. The enemy knows that it is futile to fight tanks with guns, but they are afraid to surrender because they have been briefed on bad treatment. They believe they will be shot by ‘de Gaulle troops’. These leaflets give them confidence. They have only one wish - to surrender. The obvious conclusion is to increase, if possible, the distribution of leaflets.”

- Fifth Armoured Division (1st French Army) Report.

(10) "Prisoners taken during the operation against the Ardennes salient all claimed to have been deeply impressed by the leaflets. Even towards the end of the operation many German soldiers believed, that they were defending a flank under difficult circumstances but that the spearhead of the German attack had passed into Liege, Brussels, and even Paris. When they learned the true state of affairs they were often ready to capitulate. Although no official figures are available, it would seem reasonable to estimate that more than half of the prisoners taken in the last week of December and during the month of January had seen our leaflets. A great many still had leaflets with them, and in most cases the leaflets proved to be those which had been dropped by high level bombers in the interior of the salient.”

VII. CONCLUSIONS.

In as much as the detailed organisation of any future psychological warfare leaflet operation must, of necessity, be governed by the nature and location of the campaign, the only conclusions presented in this report are certain broad, general aspects which the experience in the Western European Theatre indicate should be basic to any future psychological warfare operation.


In order to obtain the close co-ordination with plans and operations necessary to make psychological warfare an effective part of military operation, it is essential to have the organisation responsible an integral part of the military organisation. The security which is required in planning future operations makes it undesirable to disclose these plans to outside organisations, and without this advance information, it is impossible to intelligently plan a psychological warfare campaign to tie in with the military operation. Also, in liaison and co-ordination with lower echelons, it is much easier for a military representative of the commanding general to get results than a civilian representing some outside organisation. The restrictions imposed on civilians in combat zones make it very difficult for them to operate and it is believed absolutely essential to have the psychological warfare organisation basically military and directly responsible to military authority with a minimum of civilian specialists attached.

2. Operational Control of Aircraft.

To produce maximum results, it is obviously essential for leaflet messages to be delivered to the desired target at a particular time. To accomplish this, it is necessary for the psychological warfare unit to have aircraft at its disposal which it can send to selected targets when required, and experience has shown that the only way that this can be done is to have certain aircraft assigned permanently and exclusively to leaflet operations. Although the Air Forces have been extremely co-operative, arrangements made with them at some echelons whereby they agreed to schedule special leaflet missions on request from the psychological warfare unit have not worked out satisfactorily. On this basis, it was obvious that regular combat missions had priority and quite naturally very often during periods of great ground activity when leaflets were most needed, the aircraft were not available. It is, therefore, believed to be a basic and fundamental requirement that all echelons of psychological warfare in future operations that a sufficient number of aircraft be assigned permanently and exclusively to leaflet missions.
3. Intelligence.

The results of leaflet operations can not be assessed by means of photographs or examination of damaged installations. They are so intangible as to require the constant efforts of specialised personnel at all levels to determine, by means of surveillance of every conceivable source of information, the efficiency of given leaflets and of the over-all psychological warfare campaign. Above all, effective liaison must be maintained from the lowest to the highest level for the immediate transmission of all relevant intelligence of the effectiveness of propaganda and on the enemy situation and morale. The prompt receipt of this information is essential to the preparation of effective leaflets for future distribution.