"A regular exchange of information, ideas and opinions between UNITAF, the NGOs, and the Somali people is essential to the peace and rehabilitation process."

BG Lawson Magruder III
Kismayo Task Force Commander
Psychological operations (PSYOP) were a key Battlefield Operating System used extensively to support Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia operations. In order to maximize the PSYOP impact, we established a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) under the supervision of the Director of Operations, integrated PSYOP into all plans and operations, and limited the PSYOP focus to the operational and tactical levels.

The JPOTF was comprised of approximately 125 members of the US Army's Fourth Psychological Operations Group, and several of its subordinate battalions -- the Eighth, a regionally oriented battalion, which served as the command and control element and ran the PSYOP Product Development Center (PDC); the Ninth, a tactical loudspeaker battalion, which provided eight loudspeaker teams to US Army and Marine forces and forces from several coalition partners; and the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, which provided the expertise and equipment to operate the print presses and the radio station. A US Navy sailor who spoke Somali and over a dozen Somali civilian linguists from the US served on loudspeaker teams and in the PDC. The JPOTF also hired over thirty local Somalis, who by the end of Operation RESTORE HOPE, were trained and ready to form the nucleus of the PSYOP newspaper and radio broadcast functions for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.

Throughout the course of Operation RESTORE HOPE, thirty-seven different leaflets and over a dozen different handbills and posters were designed, printed and disseminated. Over seven million leaflets were dropped over central and southern Somalia.

One hundred sixteen different editions of the UNITAF newspaper RAJO, which means Hope in Somali, were published. As many as 25,000 copies were printed and distributed daily to every town and village where UNITAF forces were deployed.

This booklet contains exemplars of those printed products. Each represents the collective efforts of members of the UNITAF JPOTF who provided PSYOP support to Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The UNITAF psychological operations campaign also included radio and loudspeaker broadcasts. Loudspeaker teams provided tactical PSYOP support to maneuver commanders, while the radio program broadcast news from the RAJO newspaper across Somalia.

Psychological operations do not accomplish missions alone. They work best when they are combined with and integrated in an overall theater campaign plan. In Operation RESTORE HOPE, we were successful in doing that. We dedicate this booklet to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians from twenty-three nations who served as part of this difficult and challenging humanitarian relief operation, and helped restore hope to the Somali people for a better future.

ANTHONY C. ZINNI
Major General, US Marine Corps
Director of Operations,
Unified Task Force Somalia
INTRODUCTION

In early December 1992, elements from the 4th PSYOP Gp (ABN) deployed to Somalia as part of the US led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia to provide PSYOP support to Operation RESTORE HOPE. To ensure that the application of psychological operations would be consistent and that PSYOP assets could be responsive to a broad spectrum of operational requirements, a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) was formed and placed under operational control of the UNITAF commander. Elements of the 8th PSYOP Bn and Product Dissemination Bn (PDB) formed the nucleus of the JPOTF, while two Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSEs) and eight loudspeaker teams (LSTs) from the 9th PSYOP Bn (Tactical) were attached to support the Marine 7th Regimental Combat Support Team from Twenty-nine Palms, California and Army Forces from Fort Drum, New York. The JPOTF’s mission provided for analysis of PSYOP-relevant intelligence, and production of all printed products (leaflets, handbills, posters) including the Somali language newspaper RAJO (HOPE), and broadcasts of Radio RAJO via AM, FM and shortwave programming. PSYOP staff planners were dispatched to US Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill AFB, Florida; Camp Pendleton, California; and Fort Drum, New York to integrate PSYOP into JTF and component plans.

After receiving the deployment and execute orders, the JPOTF operations sergeant and two loudspeaker teams deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Mombasa, Kenya where they joined the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the
USS Tripoli. On 9 December the PSYOP force accompanied the initial Marine landing at Mogadishu. After the JPOTF advance party arrived two days later, it quickly began coordinating PSYOP support for UNITAF operations. The JPOTF began publishing a daily newspaper and broadcasting a daily radio program - both called RAJÔ - on 20 December, 4 days after the arrival of the main contingent. Over the next several weeks, eight loudspeaker teams accompanied UNITAF ground forces as they deployed throughout central and southern Somalia to secure relief convoys and promote stability.

During the five-month period leading to the 4 May 1993 change of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, a fundamental role of psychological operations was to facilitate the flow of information between Somalis and the organizations and key communicators responsible for implementing the humanitarian mission of Operation RESTORE HOPE. According to Lt.Gen. Robert Johnston, the UNITAF Commander, "Having understood the potential impact of PSYOP, I was extremely interested in having PSYOP up front for this operation because I knew I was going to be the JTF commander and I thought that perhaps the most useful part of PSYOP would be that it would prevent armed conflict... You come in with tanks and people think you're there to hurt them. PSYOP really worked well to convince (Somalis) that we were there with the military capability to take care of the factions and their little armies - that we were going to provide support and safety. I think that was the dimension of PSYOP."
US AND COALITION FORCES

On D-Day, 9 December 1992, PSYOP teams dropped the first leaflets over Mogadishu from a US Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter. Over the course of the operation, various kinds of aircraft were used. In the early weeks, US Air Force C-130 Hercules fixed-wing aircraft dropped leaflets over Mogadishu and each of the major towns in the eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs). Later in the operation, this capability was augmented by US Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion and US Army UH-60 Blackhawk and UH-1 Huey helicopters, and by a Canadian C-130. During one operation, PSYOP teams utilized US Navy S-3 Viking fixed-wing aircraft to jettison 60 tubes, each carrying 2500 leaflets, over the target area. With the gradual redeployment of US C-130s, leaflet missions were also conducted from New Zealand Andover fixed-wing aircraft, a small version of the DC-3.


"United Nations forces are here to assist in the international relief effort for the Somali people. We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our activities. We are here to help you."
ARRIVE IN SOMALIA

The first two leaflets of the operation supported the arrival of US forces and announced convoy security missions. These three-by-six inch leaflets were printed at Fort Bragg on the 4th PSYOP Group's Heidelberg print presses. Post-testing demonstrated that the "handshake" leaflet (p.4) effectively communicated the basic message that coalition troops would use force to protect the relief shipments. The inclusion of the words "United Nations" clarified the phrase "Adoonka Cidanka", while the graphic on the reverse side of the leaflet emphasized that the intent of the mission was to assist, not harm, Somalia. The "handshake" leaflets were dropped two or three days prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces in each town, while the convoy leaflets were dropped two or three days afterwards. Throughout the operation, PSYOP teams continued to drop both leaflets along the major supply routes (MSRs).

△ "We are here to Protect Relief Convoys!"
"Do Not Block Roadways!"

△ "Our forces are here to protect relief convoys. Do not block roadways! Force will be used to protect the convoys."
TACTICAL PSYOP DISSEMINATION

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

From the initial landing on the beach at Mogadishu to the transition to UNOSOM II, the eight loudspeaker teams participating in Operation RESTORE HOPE faced many different and demanding challenges. Loudspeaker teams broadcast numerous messages, including surrender appeals, instructions during weapons sweeps and at roadblocks, and announcements to organize crowds at feeding sites. Loudspeaker teams also distributed the UNITAF newspaper RAJO in many of the major towns and villages in each HRS. Marine maneuver commanders integrated loudspeaker teams into complex security operations in Mogadishu targeting local arms markets. In mid-January 1993, for example, a Marine operation directed against an area of the city known as the Argentine arms market used loudspeaker teams to inform local residents of the operation and to request their support and non-interference. Using loudspeakers mounted in helicopters and on vehicles, the teams thanked the crowds as Marines cleared the area of weapons. Heliborne PSYOP personnel also disseminated leaflets informing the people of Mogadishu that

Loudspeaker teams distribute RAJO newspapers.

the objective of the operation was to improve security in the city. Children chased the leaflets which drew them away from the potentially dangerous areas being searched. To quote the commander of US Marine Forces in Somalia, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm, "the PSYOP loudspeaker teams were a combat subtractor . . . they reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight." Three of these teams remain in Somalia as part of the US Army’s Quick Reaction Force for UNOSOM II.
With assistance from tactical PSYOP teams, UNITAF forces uncovered weapons caches and captured "technical" vehicles. The "technical" pictured above, which belonged to the Somali Liberation Army, was seized in Baidoa.

FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION

Acting as the "scout platoon" of the JPOTF, loudspeaker teams used face-to-face communication to assess the security environment and collect PSYOP-relevant information. This was also the most effective means for PSYOP soldiers to assist the maneuver commander of each HRS in understanding the perceptions, attitudes and concerns of the Somali people. Loudspeaker teams reinforced the UNITAF messages in the RAJO newspaper and radio broadcasts by meeting directly with village elders and religious leaders.

In addition to relying on traditional PSYOP methods to communicate with the local population, loudspeaker teams found unique ways to use their interpersonal skills. While waiting for the return of officers they had escorted to a community meeting, one team attracted a crowd of several hundred curious children. After several unsuccessful attempts to warn the children to leave, one soldier thought they might be distracted by inviting them to join him in a game. Once he explained the rules and started the game, the children joined enthusiastically, and the soldiers were able to return to their mission.

PSYOP soldiers use loudspeakers and face-to-face communication to assist relief workers at feeding sites.
The daily Somali language newspaper RAJO was first published on 20 December 1992. Printed on both sides of 8 1/2 by 14 inch paper, RAJO was distributed to every town and village where UNITAF forces were deployed. At the beginning of operations, the RAJO publishing and editorial staff included 4th PSYOP Gp soldiers and civilian area specialists - as well as Somali linguists from the US who translated articles from English to Somali for the final product. RAJO articles generally focused on the following areas: military operations to secure Mogadishu and each of the major towns in the eight HRSs; humanitarian relief provided to the famine areas; redevelopment efforts; hope for the future; and analyses of the reconciliation and national unity process. Regular features included interviews with relief agency staff; public health information on treating common childhood diseases; the status of HRS security; reports on rebuilding the educational system and judicial institutions; and forming local police forces and security councils. The JPOTF published up to 28,000 copies of RAJO daily; however, average daily publication quantities often did not exceed 15,000 copies because the supply of paper was limited and it was necessary to reduce wear and tear on the press presses.

*English translation of the original Somali text*
At the beginning of the operation, RAJO staff delivered the paper from the rear of a military vehicle.

One of the most popular features of the newspaper was the cartoon devoted to the comments and observations of a Somali man named Celmi (after the US Navy sailor born in Somalia who served as a linguist for the JPO TF) and his wise friend, the camel Mandeqq. The dialogue between these two characters reinforced various PSYOP themes and described specific aspects of the UNITAF mission. In an effort to encourage national unity and revitalize Somali traditional culture, RAJO sponsored a poetry contest and published the six winning entries in a special edition of the paper. Commenting on the importance of RAJO to the success of the operation, the US Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley said, "We are using RAJO to get the correct information into the hands of the Somali population and to correct distortions . . . . The newspaper and the radio are in the Somali language, an extremely difficult language. The work you all have done to put this into Somali is extremely important. It has made a big difference. The faction leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every once in a while Aideed or Ali Mahdi or one of the other faction leaders draws to my attention something that appeared in the newspaper. So, they're very, very sensitive to it and they know its power."

Ambassador Robert Oakley presents a certificate to one of the winners of the RAJO poetry contest.
As a complement to the RAJO newspaper, the JPOTF established a radio station on the US Embassy compound. Radio RAJO broadcast a 45 minute Somali language program twice daily on AM/Midwave, FM, and Shortwave. The program included a reading from the Qur'an, a reading of the RAJO newspaper articles, selections of Somali poetry and short stories, news about Africa, significant events throughout the world, and Somali music. After extensive antenna adjustments, the radio programs broadcast over shortwave eventually reached every city and town in Somalia where UNITAF forces were deployed.

Guided by a broadcast journalist from the 4th PSYOP Gp's PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB), Somali staff members, PSYOP specialists and civilian analysts worked together to develop articles. To encourage Somali clans to put aside their differences and rebuild their country, for example, JPOTF staff members travelled to Marka where they interviewed President Aadan 'Abdullah 'Usmaan, Somalia’s first head of state and an important symbol of national unity. Excerpts from his interview were published in the newspaper and broadcast over the radio.

▲ Reception quality of Radio RAJO in each of the HRSs and forces responsible for each sector during the initial phases of the transition to UNOSOM II.
UNITAF SOMALIA PSYOP THEMES INCORPORATED INTO RAJO

* Explain that UNITAF rules of engagement are applied fairly regardless of faction or position
* Highlight that UNITAF does not support or favor any faction
* Reinforce that Somalia's problems can only be resolved by Somalis, that UNITAF and relief agencies can only assist the process
* Highlight the roles and capabilities of the 22 nations participating in UNITAF, particularly those from Africa and the Islamic world
* Highlight the seamless transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, emphasizing that there will be no change in the rules of engagement or troop performance
* Encourage displaced persons to return to their homes to harvest crops and plant fields
* Highlight the redevelopment and re-establishment of Somalia's infrastructure
* Highlight the agreements made by faction leaders and the consequences for violating those agreements
* Focus on disarmament, keeping everyone appraised of the progress in each HRS
PREPARING FOR LEAFLET DROPS

Preparations for a leaflet drop are complex. To calculate the precise moment when leaflets must be released to reach a specific target, PSYOP specialists use a mathematical formula that integrates wind speed and direction, calculated at 500-foot intervals from ground level. The formula also varies according to the dimensions and weight of the leaflets. The leaflet drops in Somalia were effective when the formula was correctly applied using a sufficient quantity of leaflets.

PSYOP personnel packed leaflets for fixed-wing aircraft in boxes that were cut along the top, bottom, and sides, then specially rigged with engineer and masking tape. The boxes, which generally contained between 20,000 and 40,000 leaflets, were hooked to static lines inside the aircraft. When a mission required fewer leaflets, plastic trash bags were substituted for boxes and hooked to static lines.

LEAFLET OPERATIONS:

"THESE ARE FORBIDDEN IN MOGADISHU...
-TECHNICAL TYPE VEHICLES
-ARMORED VEHICLES
-POINTING OR AIMING WEAPONS AT CTF FORCES
-CREW SERVED WEAPONS
(MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, RECOILLESS RIFLES)"

"COMBINED TASK FORCE - RESTORE HOPE RULES FOR MOGADISHU
1) MACHINE GUNS, RECOILLESS RIFLES, MORTARS AND OTHER CREW SERVED WEAPONS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
2) ARMORED VEHICLES, INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES, OR VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS MOUNTS (TECHNICALS) WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
IF ANY OF THESE ITEMS ARE SEEN, THEY ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE CONFISCATION
KILLING OR LOOTING OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
ANYONE AIMING OR POINTING WEAPONS AT CTF FORCES WILL BE SHOT
CTF FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE IF THEY ARE THREATENED OR PERCEIVE THEY ARE THREATENED..."
ENFORCING SECURITY RULES

"THESE ARE FORBIDDEN IN AFGOOYE...
- ARMORED AND TECHNICAL TYPE VEHICLES
- BLOCKING ROADS
- OPENLY CARRYING WEAPONS OF ANY TYPE
  (RIFLES, HANDGUNS, HAND GRENADES)
- CREW SERVED WEAPONS
  (MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, RECOILLESS
  RIFLES)
"

UNITAF - SOOMAALIYA
SHARCiyADA AFGOOYE

1) BOOBAYAASHA FUDUD IYO BOOBAYAASHA CULUS AMA HOOBIYE LOOMA
   DULQAADAN DOONO
2) GAWAARIDA GASHAAMAN, GAWAARIDA HUBKU SAARANYIHIN (TEKNIKADA)
   LOOMA DULQAADAN DOONO
3) HUB SI CAD LO SILO (OO NOOC KASO AH) LOOMA DULQAADAN DOONO

HADDI WAX KA MID AH QALABKAAS LA ARKO SI DEG-DEG
AH AYAA LOO QADAYAA

AFGOOYE, JID XIR LOOMA DULQAADAN DOONO

DILKA AMA BIILIGEYSIGA MACAAWINADA SAMAFALKA
LOOMA DULQAADAN DOONO

UNITAF WAXAY AMAB KU HAYSTANA INAY KOOG
ISTICMAALAAH HADDI AY DAREEMAAN IN LA SOO HANADANDO

"UNITAF - SOMALIA, RULES FOR AFGOOYE
1) MACHINE GUNS, RECOILLESS RIFLES, MORTARS AND OTHER
   CREW SERVED WEAPONS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
2) ARMORED VEHICLES, INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES, OR
   VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS MOUNTS (TECHNICALS) WILL
   NOT BE TOLERATED
3) CARRYING ANY TYPE OF WEAPON OPENLY WILL NOT BE
   TOLERATED (RIFLES, HANDGUNS, HAND GRENADES)
   IF ANY OF THESE ITEMS ARE SEEN, THEY ARE SUBJECT TO
   IMMEDIATE CONFISCATION
   BLOCKING ROADS INTO AFGOOYE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
   KILLING OR LOOTING OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE
   TOLERATED
   CTF FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE IF THEY ARE
   THREATENED OR PERCEIVE THEY ARE THREATENED...
"

Following the establishment of the RAJO newspaper and radio program, UNITAF continued to use leaflets to support military operations in each HRS. Leaflets announced the rules prohibiting specific categories of weapons and behavior, and informed the local communities that coalition troops were authorized to use force if they were threatened or perceived themselves to be threatened. Loudspeaker teams attached to Army and Marine forces in each sector contacted the JPOTF and requested specific leaflets based on the situation confronting each maneuver commander. Leaflet concepts were coordinated with the UNITAF Director of Operations, then designed, printed and dropped over the target areas. Announcements published in the RAJO newspaper and broadcast over Radio RAJO reinforced leaflet messages. The rules for each major town in the HRSS were roughly the same as those established for Afgooye (printed left); they reflected local conditions and were modified as the security environment changed. During the initial stages of the operation, Somalis in Mogadishu could carry weapons if they did not point them at - or threaten - UNITAF forces. Ongoing security problems eventually lead UNITAF to prohibit all weapons from Mogadishu streets.
To calculate the leaflet release points from aircraft, PSYOP specialists normally obtain weather data, wind speed and wind direction from US Air Force weathermen. Because this information tended to be the same for all of southern Somalia, it was necessary to use real-time data provided in flight by the air crew. On the ground prior to the mission, PSYOP specialists calculated the precise number of leaflets and the specific altitudes that would maximize leaflet dispersion over the target areas. Once airborne and in the vicinity of the target area, crew members informed the PSYOP specialist of the wind speed and direction for each 500-foot increment to the desired release altitude. Based on calculations determining the release point, the pilot could then maneuver the aircraft to the correct position and turn on the green light alerting the load master or PSYOP specialist to jettison the boxes or bags of leaflets.

"Operation CLEAN STREETS beginning 28 December 92 from 9:00 pm till 4:00 am"

Wuxuu ka nadiifin doona waddooyinka weyn wixii xiraya, baabuur laga tegay, clid, dhagax lyo qashin kale. Fadlan ka leexi dabaaka yooynkaaga, baabuurada lyo wixii kale ee hanti ah dhammaan jildak dagaadi. DIB BAYNU U DHISI KARNA WADAJIR AHAAN SOOMALIYA

"OPERATION CLEAN STREETS - will clear main routes from curb to curb, from the airport and US Embassy to the seaport, of all fixed objects, abandoned vehicles, sand, rocks and other debris. Please move your market stands, vehicles and other property completely off the roadways. Together we can rebuild Somalia."
"UNITAF engineers working to help the Somali people improve their roads. Help us help you. Report mines!"

"UNITAF engineers are in Somalia to help improve roads. Once the roads are repaired, relief agencies will be able to deliver humanitarian relief supplies from the ports to remote locations throughout the country. We need your assistance and cooperation to help make this effort successful.
- Please do not do anything to endanger yourself or the engineers who are working on the roads and bridges. Stay a safe distance away from engineer equipment and operations.
- Please mark and report all mine locations. Do not touch mines because they are dangerous. Report anyone seen placing mines along or near roadways. Help us help you!"

Leaflets, handbills and posters supported several engineer projects. In December and again in March, engineers cleared the streets of Mogadishu of abandoned and destroyed vehicles, downed telephone poles, and other objects that blocked the flow of traffic along major roads and near shopping areas. Engineers also removed sand and tons of debris that had narrowed streets. Later in the operation, Army engineers and Navy Seabees repaired or constructed over 1,200 miles of roads, drilled fourteen wells, and erected a Bailey bridge across the Juba River near the town of Jilib.

Leaflets, handbills, and posters complemented these efforts by informing the Somali people of the programs, and asking them to cooperate by staying clear of hazardous engineer equipment. These products also requested that Somalis report mine locations.

A consistent propaganda theme broadcast by one of the local warlords over his radio station and published in his faction's newspaper, was that UNITAF - and US forces in particular - were exploiting Somalia's precious natural resources. PSYOP indirectly countered this propaganda by publishing and broadcasting stories in the RAJO describing engineer activities throughout Somalia.
LEAFLET ACCURACY

During the first month of the operation, most leaflet drops were conducted at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 feet. At these high altitudes, PSYOP specialists needed approximately ten minutes to compute the release points. As long as the specialists used sufficient quantities of leaflets, the accuracy rates were fairly good and dispersion patterns were reasonably wide. As operations continued and the anti-aircraft threat remained low, UNITAF aircraft dropped leaflets at altitudes ranging from 500 to 1,000 feet, and the time to calculate the drops was negligible. Greater accuracy could be achieved at these lower altitudes, but the resulting smaller dispersion pattern meant that multiple passes were required to saturate the target area.

During early leaflet operations using helicopters, PSYOP specialists threw handfuls of leaflets from the aircraft. At a later phase, they taped the leaflets in blocks of 500 then immediately prior to release, slit the tape to ensure positive deployment. These drops were accurate and relatively simple to conduct, but they were also time consuming because the helicopters had to fly slowly and make several passes.

LEAFLET OPERATIONS:

"UNITAF’s mission is to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts throughout Somalia. Initial emphasis was on securing key cities; now the focus is on expanding that security to smaller towns and villages. As they are secured, relief agencies are beginning to distribute dry food, seeds and farm utensils to help displaced families return to their farms, rebuild their homes and plant their fields. Now it is harvest time for many crops. Preparations need to be made for the next planting."
"Moving the bodies of these deceased Somalis while respecting Somali religious traditions is a necessity to help make the water safe."

"Over the past several years, the civil war and factional fighting combined with banditry and looting caused many Somalis to die from starvation all over Somalia. In the SHIIKH ASHAROW ravine area, many of those who died were buried near the bank of the ravine. This has the potential to pose a very hazardous health risk to those who use the ravine's water for drinking and washing. Under the strict guidelines set by your elders, the buried will be moved with proper religious respect and traditions to another location. The Somali people themselves will work on this task and hopefully be able to remove all of the bodies before the rainy season washes them into the water system. This operation will prevent disease from spreading and will be supported by relief agencies. Until the bodies have been removed from the bank near the ravine, and the water is safer to drink, do not drink water from the ravine or other surface water; only drink water from wells; clean all water containers before using wells. To prevent disease, boil water for 5 - 10 minutes before using."
LEAFLET OPERATIONS:

The first leaflets printed on the Risographs in Somalia were laid-out four leaflets per page, on paper custom cut to approximately 6 1/2 by 13 inches. After some experimentation, the leaflet size was reduced to 2 1/4 by 5 inches, and six leaflets were printed on a standard 8 1/2 by 11 inch sheet of paper. This increased by 50 percent the number of leaflets that could be produced over the same period of time. The reduction of the leaflet dimensions also eliminated the need to custom cut the paper to 6 1/2 by 13 inches. With six leaflets per page instead of four, only three cuts were required after the printing process was completed.

At the beginning of the operation, the leaflets displayed both the US and UN flags. As international participation in the operation expanded, a Somali flag replaced the US flag. Eventually, every leaflet included the UN and Somali flags on one side, and the flag of each UNITAF member nation on the reverse side.

"Looting, stealing, or throwing rocks is not Somali, it's criminal. Pointing guns -- even play guns -- at anyone is threatening. UNITAF forces are authorized to use deadly force if they are threatened or perceive they are threatened. Help stop this behavior before anyone gets hurt."

BILIQAYS! TUUGANIMO IYO DHAGAX-TUUR SOOMAALINIMO MA AHA, WAA DEMBIILENIMO. QORI KU SOO FIIQIDDU (XATAA KU CIYAARKU) KHAATAR BAY QOF KASTA GELI-NAYSAA. CIIDAMMADA UNITAF WAXAY SHARCI U HAYSTAAN IN AY XOOG DILAA AH ISTICMAALAAAN, HADDII KHAATAR LA GELIYO AMA AY DAREEMAAN IN AY KHAATAR KU JIRAAN. NAGA CAAWI SIDII AAN DABEECADAN U JOOJIN LAHAYN, INTAA NAAY CID KALE DHAAWAC SOO GAARIN.
ATTENTION MORGAN FORCES

* All forces and weapons must be moved out of the Lower Juba Valley to locations north of Dobley by midnight 25 February, or risk destruction
* These locations must be designated and provided to UNITAF officials on 25 February
* Any forces found outside of these locations thereafter will be engaged by UNITAF forces, and any weapons located will be destroyed.

"UNITAF forces are more than able to stabilize the military situation in the Kismayo region, and are ready to do this if Somalis can not or will not choose peace and reconciliation over fighting. There is nothing to be gained from further fighting among Somalis, except the continued suffering of the Somali people. The time has come for the people of Kismayo and the surrounding region to reject the path of fighting and turn seriously towards reconciliation, peace and prosperity."

At the end of February 1993, on the first day of Ramadan, there were violent demonstrations in the area of Mogadishu controlled by Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of the Somali National Alliance. Following these demonstrations, children started carrying toy handguns which they occasionally pointed at UNITAF forces. By the end of Ramadan, these toy guns were prevalent throughout the city, and there were several incidents where UNITAF forces came close to shooting children who pointed the toy guns at them. The JPOTF initiated a campaign to address the problem in the RAJO newspaper, over the radio, and in leaflets. The RAJO radio program included an interview with a prominent representative of a Somali women’s group who spoke in very strong terms about the dangers of this behavior. Fortunately there were no accidents, and the number of incidents eventually decreased.

PSYOP also responded quickly to the repeated crises in Kismayo. After Hersi Morgan "took" Kismayo in late February, and Lt Gen Johnston and Ambassador Oakley issued him an ultimatum to withdraw his forces to a town on the Kenyan border, PSYOP produced and dropped leaflets informing Morgan’s supporters, as well as the people of Kismayo and the major towns in the Lower Juba Valley, of the demarche.
DEPLOYABLE PRINT CAPABILITY

PSYOP teams produced thirty-five different leaflets and over a dozen handbills and posters in Somalia. These products were printed on two Risograph 5800 print presses leased specifically to support Operation RESTORE HOPE. These presses were mimeograph machines with electronic stencil cutting capability. They were high tech, high speed, low maintenance, and user friendly.

Exiting A Minefield

"If you find yourself caught in a minefield, and you are not absolutely certain you can retrace your footsteps, you may probe your way out."

"Don't touch mines or explosives! Report them!"

"Stop senseless injuries and deaths. Parents please tell your children to keep away from explosives. Report mines and explosives to security forces."

KA BIXIDDA BEER-MIINO

HADDAAD ASAGTO INAAD BEER MINNO SOO DHEX GASHAY, ANADINA DARAB U HABIB INAAD RAADKAAG DI Qe IRAAC KARTO. WAAN INAAD U YEHDEH KU RAADSAA MINNOYINKA IN AAD UGA BAXDO BERTA.

Probe Method of Exiting A Minefield
1. Roll up sleeves
2. Remove metal jewelry or metal tools
3. Lower yourself to a squatting position
4. Use any non-metal probe that is approximately 40 cm long
5. Hold probe in hand palm up
6. Push probe at an angle less than 45 degrees from the horizontal
7. If a solid object is touched, stop probing and carefully remove enough earth to find out what the object is
8. Probe every 5 cm on a 5 meter front
Remember after you encounter a minefield, report it.
Mines are a serious, ongoing problem in Somalia. During Operation RESTORE HOPE, mine explosions killed or injured several UNITAF personnel. Many Somalis were also victims of mine explosions.

To address the mine issue, PSYOP specialists produced several different posters and published articles in the RAJO newspaper that served as public service announcements advising Somalis to be aware of mine hazards. Towards the end of the operation, PSYOP also produced a coloring book detailing the first aid requirements for victims of mine-related accidents; a handbill explaining how to exit a minefield safely; and posters illustrating the most common mines found in Somalia. The underlying message was the same: "report, don't touch mines."

The products were distributed to the French, Belgians, Canadians, and Botswanans, and to UNITAF commanders in the Mogadishu area. Coalition forces used English language copies of the products to train their troops.
"Operation RESTORE HOPE focused international attention on the challenges faced by military forces as they applied their combat talents and training to support difficult humanitarian objectives. The soldiers of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN) readily adapted to the demanding requirements of this challenge. Based on their experiences in Somalia, they are better prepared to face new opportunities to use their unique skills in operations around the globe. The devastation and loss of life in Somalia humbled our soldiers, but having witnessed how PSYOP directly contributed to that country’s first tentative steps toward peace and reconstruction has also strengthened their readiness to participate in future peacekeeping operations."

LTC Charles Borchini
Joint PSYOP Task Force Commander
Somali children at the Lajole Hospital and Feeding Center compound near Mogadishu

You Rajo*: when Somali felt hardship, trouble, famine, and devastation
When without reason they massacred each other,
When they left their ethnicity and cultural tradition and holy religion in the dust,
They applauded for tribalism.
When like the branding of animals, all of them created evil factions
When you couldn't find food, rations, oil, and milk in the markets,
When the death toll of young and old were increasing and every morning they were buried for nothing,
When you could hear the roar of the tanks, mortars, and rockets every morning,
When the machine guns with their bullet chains, and the guns were carried by the very young,
When the nation and national unity were in danger and the flag was about to topple,
When the UN Security Council in one voice said Somalia is devastated.
Why not send humanitarian troops and a show of strength?
When George Bush stood up and called for thirty thousand
That's when you, Rajo, your winds of change started to reach Somalia.
When Bill Clinton applauded rather than being dissatisfied.
That's when you, Rajo developed...

You Rajo, I hope you are the one who will make us reach happiness and prosperity.
You, Rajo, who will help us create a legitimate government and find national unity.
You, Rajo, we hope you are the one who has a lasting effect.
You, Rajo, we hope you are the one that will help us reach justice and equality.

* The word "Rajo" as used by the poet refers to Operation RESTORE HOPE.

Except from "The Orphan Killed by Waiting"
English translation of the original Somali by
Gabdilacir Sheek Call, Mogadishu, February 1993