


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OF THE WAR



**BRITISH
PROPAGANDA
IN ENEMY
COUNTRIES**

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CHAPTER CCCXIV.

BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.

PROPAGANDA IN WAR AS THEORY AND IN OPERATION—GERMAN ACTIVITIES—EARLY BRITISH PROPAGANDA WORK—WELLINGTON HOUSE—THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION—THE FORMATION AND SCOPE OF THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION—VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE BECOMES DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES—OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY AND BULGARIA—METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE—TRIBUTES TO LORD NORTHCLIFFE'S WORK FROM HINDENBURG, LUDENDORFF, AND THE GERMAN PRESS.

BEFORE 1914 the function of propaganda in war was little understood. In operation during the war under skilful direction it achieved marvellous results. Yet, when badly controlled, it was worse than a failure.

The Germans made first use of it as a serious weapon, putting into practice the doctrine of Clausewitz, who laid down that war must be waged with the whole force of a nation. But in the twentieth century no ruler, be he ever so autocratic, could conduct a protracted war, or a war bringing a heavy burden on his people, or that sways doubtfully, unless supported by public opinion. Therefore the capture and control of the public opinion of the nation were vital factors in the successful waging of war. Scarcely less important was the influencing of foreign opinion, especially if such influence could be made to reach enemy countries.

Propaganda may be defined as the attempt to control public opinion. It had four objectives—the control of :

- (a) Home opinion.
- (b) Neutral opinion.
- (c) Allied opinion.
- (d) Enemy opinion.

On both sides, home propaganda proclaimed the certainty of victory, explained reverses, lauded naval and military successes, described the national economic strength, financial resources, power of organization, the overcoming of difficulties in supply of food and raw materials and so forth.

Neutral opinion was influenced with the propagation of all the themes mentioned in Vol. XXI—Part 270


the preceding paragraph, special attention being directed to explaining as necessities of war all those steps which interfered with the rights of neutrals, or which had been harmful to them, and all war aims were presented in the mildest possible fashion. Again these same themes were used for maintaining the prestige of the nations in the eyes of their allies, and in encouraging the allies to maintain their efforts at the highest possible pitch. In the enemy propaganda both sides claimed that they were winning and must win the war, and the Germans made many attempts to sow discord among the countries allied in opposition. Much of the German propaganda was so crude and palpably untrue, many of the methods employed were so unscrupulous, that frequently by excess it produced the opposite effect to that desired.

A high British authority, who had closely studied German propaganda during the war, pointed out that there was a chaotic exuberance of different points of view. He quoted the distinguished German professor, Dr. Karl Lamprecht, who, in a lecture given at the end of 1914, when the Germans thought that their victory was secure, deplored the modern tendency of Germans to misunderstand other nations. "When the war came," he said, "everyone who could write obtained the largest possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required some excuse. The effect was stupendous. I can speak with the

most open heart on the subject," he added, "for amongst the whole crowd it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause without preparation. What was wanted was organization."

The Germans made great play among their own people of their enemies' "encircling

cast over the Central Empires and the neutral countries. Great efforts were made to convince their own people of the historic mission, high culture and civilisation, and real freedom of Germany. They proclaimed that German victory would be for the good of the world. Moreover, they pointed out that the great and expanding German people required an outlet for their talent, organizing capacity, capital and manufacturing products, and that, as Germany arrived too late to obtain her real place in the sun, German rights had to be secured by force, from England in particular. Especial




HOME PROPAGANDA: EXHIBITION OF WAR PICTURES AT THE GRAFTON GALLERIES.

policy," pointing out the danger to Germany, and contending that German militarism was the necessary consequence of the position of Germany surrounded by powerful enemies, the Russian danger, and the "English jealousy of German commercial success." As it was not easy to square this theory with the actual German plan of campaign, including the invasion of Belgium, the plea was advanced that an offensive was merely the best means of defence. Violent reports about the English "starvation plan," the violations of the laws of war by all the Allies, and the use of dum-dum bullets and of black troops, were spread broad-

emphasis was laid upon the assertion that the growth of the "English Empire" was an accomplishment of "successful piracy," and that England must now be made to "disgorge."

German propaganda in neutral countries laid great stress on the gain that would come to neutrals from "the freedom of the seas," and care was expended in showing that the victory of the Allies would be disastrous to neutrals. This was especially manifest in the United States before that country came into the war. In allied countries it was strongly urged that Germany and her allies had common interests, and that a great future lay before



EXHIBITION OF WAR RELICS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE ROYAL ACADEMY: BRITISH SECTION.

Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, when, by the help of Germany, the power of England, France and Russia had been broken.

In endeavouring to control the opinions of their enemies Germany proclaimed far and wide that she was winning, but in the later stages of the war she shifted her ground by harping on the theme that the Allies could not win, and that the greater time they were in realising this the greater would be their losses. Many attempts were made to stir up disaffection between the Allies, and the favourite topics were that England was not taking her fair share of the burden, that Britain intended to retain Belgium and the northern part of France,

that Britain was using France and Russia merely for her own selfish ends, and that the interests of the Balkan Powers could not be reconciled. Other attempts were made to stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries, were examples in the case of Britain; Algeria in the case of France. Pacifism in Allied countries was encouraged. But, despite the great expenditure of effort, Caporetto was the only success worth mentioning which she achieved.

For too long a time the British Government neglected propaganda, both for defensive and offensive purposes, gravely under-estimating its



EXHIBITION OF WAR RELICS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE ROYAL ACADEMY: CANADIAN SECTION.

effectiveness. Those few who realised its potentialities worked enthusiastically but lacked support, encouragement, and guidance in policy. The presentation of isolated facts, the influencing of opinion on particular matters, were alike




MR. C. F. G. MASTERMAN,
In charge of "Wellington House," one of the earliest British propaganda departments.

of little avail unless there was an underlying foundation of sympathy on the part of the people thus to be influenced. Such a foundation in its turn could only be built up by a consistent propaganda policy. The lack of realization of this basic principle was the chief reason for the failure of much early British propaganda work, with all the advantage it possessed of having on its side the righteousness of the British cause and the universal loathing of German militarism and *Kultur* in theory and in practice.

One of the earliest propaganda efforts of the British Government was the formation of a department under the Rt. Hon. C. F. G. Masterman for the production and distribution of books, pamphlets, maps, photographs and articles for use in Allied and neutral countries. This department was always known as Wellington House, from its location in the Buckingham Gate office of the National Health Insurance Commission. Many of its publications were ably produced, but the overseas transport and distribution of bulky parcels were difficult problems. When these were overcome there

was no assurance that the printed word would be read, even if received, by those whom it was intended to influence. Later came the setting up of a Department of Information under the auspices of the Foreign Office. Mr. John Buchan was appointed head of the Department, for which Sir Edward Carson assumed Ministerial responsibility.

Slowly the march of events forced the Government to appreciate the efficacy of propaganda, and some semblance of a serious effort was begun. At length, in February, 1918, the long-overdue Ministry of Information was set up under the very efficient direction of Lord Beaverbrook, who was already a member of the Government with the sinecure office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Lord Beaverbrook took prompt and vigorous charge of propaganda in Allied and neutral countries and in Turkey.



[Bereford.]

MR. JOHN BUCHAN,
Head of the Department of Information.

Associated with him, supervising various sections of the Ministry, were Lord Rothermere, Sir Roderick Jones, Mr. John Buchan, Mr. Arnold Bennett, Mr. Harold Snagge and Mr. Evelyn Wrench. Wellington House and the Department of Information were absorbed into Lord Beaverbrook's department. For general administrative purposes such countries as France, Russia, Italy, Sweden and Holland were each allotted to a "National," while "Nationals"

were also appointed for Scandinavia, India, the United States, South America and other parts of the world. These "Nationals" met together in conference twice a week to discuss the details of their campaign. The methods adopted in the United States have already been described in Chapter CCCVI., pages 100 to 108, and similar methods, adapted to local circumstances, were employed in other countries.

So as not to offend political susceptibilities the work of explaining at home the reasons for Great Britain's participation in the war was undertaken by the National War Aims Committee, which consisted of representatives of all political parties and all religious denominations.



VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE,

Who was associated with the Ministry of Information.

It was assisted by local committees, established throughout the country. As far as possible each local committee was equally representative of the different parties.

A special department of the Ministry of Information, in charge of Colonel W. J. Galloway, acted as hosts in the British Isles to parties of representative visitors from the Dominions and from Allied and neutral countries who came as the guests of the Ministry to study the British war effort. Another admirably organised department, under the late Sir Bertram Lima, arranged the wonderful supply of photographs of Britain at war on land, sea, in the air, and in the great workshops.

A third most important department of the Ministry harnessed to the cause of the Allies that great educational and publicity agent, the cinema, and produced and distributed throughout the world wonderful films. Sir William Jury, with his great technical knowledge of cinematography, managed this department. Such films as that entitled "The Battle of the Somme" attracted and amazed millions of



LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Minister of Information, 1918.

people all over the globe, graphically portraying alike to Anglophile and Anglophobe eyes and minds the story of British prowess. Where there were no picture houses, as, for instance, in rural parts of Italy, Sir William Jury sent "cinemotors"—big lorries carrying all the necessary paraphernalia for improvised open-air cinema shows—to the great wonderment and edification of innumerable villagers.

Simultaneously with the Ministry of Information a department was established under Viscount Northcliffe to undertake propaganda in the enemy countries of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.

It is not generally remembered that Lord Northcliffe, at the suggestion of General Swinton, prepared some pamphlets for distribution among the German troops as far back as October, 1914.

Propaganda in enemy countries was of an essentially different nature to that carried on



THE LATE SIR BERTRAM LIMA,
Organizer of War Photographs Section of the
Ministry of Information.

elsewhere. Throughout the war it was known that the truth was being withheld from enemy armies and peoples by their leaders because of the lowering of *moral* which would follow the publication of inconvenient facts.

When Lord Northcliffe took charge of the work, coordinated existing agencies, laid down policies for propaganda approved by the Foreign Office, and began an energetic campaign, the results achieved astonished friend and enemy alike. Abundant testimony to its devastating effect on enemy armies and populations came from innumerable enemy sources. The results achieved were out of all proportion to the size of the staff employed and the amount of money expended. Many have contended that had



MR. HAROLD SNAGGE,
Secretary of the Ministry of Information.

such an effort been made in 1916 instead of being delayed until 1918 the war would have been more quickly won. This cannot be more than inference, but it is undeniable that the British Government stayed its hand in this respect far too long.

Great credit is due to those who persevered amid all kinds of discouragement in the early years of the war. For a long period Mr. S. A. Guest, a Civil Servant attached to the National Health Insurance Commission, worked almost single-handed. Although lacking support, he set up agencies by which propagandist literature was smuggled into Germany through Holland, Scandinavia and



SIR WILLIAM JURY,
Head of the Cinematograph Section of the
Ministry of Information.

Switzerland. The names of the persons who carried out this highly dangerous work or the methods employed can never be revealed. It was not until Lord Northcliffe's department was formed and Mr. Guest and his small staff became incorporated with it that the value of his constant work was fully realized. With renewed energy and a free hand he was able to develop new channels of distribution in co-operation with the other sections of Lord Northcliffe's department.

Better known, although no more appreciated, was the work of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office. A special sub-section of this department had been set up at Adastral House to prepare leaflets



COLONEL GALLOWAY,
Head of the Hospitality Section of the Ministry
of Information.

in German for distribution by aeroplane over the lines among the German troops on the Western front. After aeroplanes had been used for a short period in 1917 for this purpose two British airmen were captured by the enemy and were tried by court-martial, and threats, which could have been met by reprisals, were made that any others detected dropping propaganda material would be shot. The War Office thereupon feebly decided to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the distribu-

tion of propaganda material. Laborious research for a satisfactory substitute for aeroplanes was made, with the cooperation of the Aerial Inventions Board and the Munitions Inventions Department, but it was not until the early part of 1918 that it was decided that paper balloons could be fairly satisfactorily used. This work was developed by the War Office as successfully as was possible with such poor substitutes for aeroplanes.

In the summer of 1918 the work of preparing the leaflets was transferred to Crewe House, but the distribution was always organized and carried out by the War Office in close association with the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Lord Northcliffe, who had publicly declined a seat in the Cabinet, became Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries in February 1918. It was arranged that he should report directly to the Prime Minister although, of course, keeping in close touch with the Ministry of Information. He gathered round him a number of remarkable men possessing expert knowledge of Continental politics, of the psychology of enemy peoples, and of publicity methods. All three qualifications were vitally necessary to the complete equipment of the department. The central office of the department was at Crewe House, which, by the generous public spirit of the Marquis and Marchioness of Crewe, had



A MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CINEMOTOR.

been placed at the disposal of the Government. Crewe House became as well known in the Chancelleries of Europe for its propaganda politics as it had been in Great Britain as a social centre for national politics.

Lord Northcliffe realized that inter-allied cooperation in propaganda against the enemy would mean greatly increased results. A small inter-allied committee met at Crewe House early in February. There were present, besides Lord Northcliffe and his principal assistants, Lord Beaverbrook, Mr. C. J. Phillips of the Foreign Office, Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon

Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuter's Agency).

Sir Sidney Low.

Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.


Mr. James O'Grady, M.P.

Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor, and later Editor-in-Chief, of *The Times*).

Mr. H. G. Wells.

Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.

This Committee held fortnightly meetings at which the progress of the work was reported and discussed. Mr. C. J. Phillips and Commander (now Sir) Guy Standing, R.N.V.R.,



A CINEMOTOR OPEN PREPARATORY TO A DISPLAY.

(representing France) and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (representing Italy) and their assistants, together with representatives of the United States. Lord Northcliffe thus formed an inter-allied link which was strengthened from time to time until it resulted in the coordination of policies, methods and organizations.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart, K.B.E., who was Vice-Chairman of the London Headquarters of the British War Mission to the United States, was appointed Deputy Director of the Department and achieved great success in that capacity. A strong advisory committee was formed of the following well-known men of affairs and publicists :—

Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.

Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the *Daily Chronicle*).

attended these meetings and also the daily meetings of the heads of the different sections at Crewe House in the capacity of liaison officers of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty respectively. They rendered invaluable services as did later Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who previously had been in charge of the War Office propaganda section at Adastral House.

The short daily meetings at Crewe House were highly successful, as they enabled every responsible member of the staff to keep in touch with all his colleagues' activities. The discussions were fruitful in leading up to suggestions for new channels of distribution and for the production of new literature and in the maintenance of a common policy.

Ludendorff showed in his "Memoirs" that he had discovered the secret of the success of



["At Home" photo by Ernest H. Mills,
for G. E. Houghton, Ltd., Margate.

VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE,

Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

Lord Northcliffe's department. Propaganda, he wrote, should be "the pace-maker for policy, and should form opinion without opinion realizing that it is so being formed." This was the first and principal maxim of

Crewe House. The second was to tell the enemy the plain truth, and nothing but the truth, without *suggestio falsi* or deft "interpretation."

The immediate task confronting Lord North-

cliffe was the definition of propaganda policy, according with that of the Government where the Government policy had already been formulated. In other cases, which were not infrequent, memoranda suggesting main principles of policy were submitted for Cabinet or Foreign Office concurrence.

Surveying the whole field, Lord Northcliffe and his advisers came speedily to the conclusion that, as success would naturally come quickest if the weakest link of the chain of enemy States were attacked, Austria-Hungary offered greatest opportunities. Of the 31,000,000 inhabitants of the Empire of Austria less than one-third were of German sympathies. The



[Hoppe.]

SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.,
Deputy Director of the Department of Propaganda
in Enemy Countries.

remaining two-thirds—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians and Southern Slavs—were actively or passively anti-German. In Hungary one-half of the population of 21,000,000 was anti-German. Thus, of Austria-Hungary's total population, 31,000,000 were anti-German and 21,000,000 only were pro-German.*

The greatest blow which could be struck at the Dual Monarchy was the active encouragement and support of these anti-German and

* The Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary published in Chapter XXXVI (pages 216, 217) strikingly illustrates the preponderance of the anti-German populations.



[Speight]

THE EARL OF DENBIGH,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

pro-Ally peoples and tendencies. The chief means of accomplishing the desired effect were agreed to be the insistence by the Allied Governments and the United States upon their determination to secure democratic freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary on the



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.,
One of the Directors of the Ministry of
Information.

principle of "government by the consent of the governed"; the appreciation of the fact that the war could not be won without the removal of the anti-German Hapsburg peoples from German control; the use of such already existing agencies for propaganda among the anti-German peoples as the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee, and certain Polish organizations;



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR SIDNEY LOW,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.


and the encouragement of an *entente* between Italy and these anti-German peoples.

To prevent misapprehension, the point must be emphasized that this was a constructive programme calculated to form a basis for a future federation of free non-German peoples in Central Europe, while gradually paralyzing the striking power of the Austro-Hungarian armies which were about to undertake a decisive offensive against Italy.

The greatest difficulty in the way of linking up the pro-Ally Hapsburg peoples with each other and of mobilizing their influence on the side of the Allies lay in the existence of the London Treaty of April, 1915, by which Russia, Great Britain, and France had promised to Italy certain territories inhabited by the Southern Slavs. As long as Allied policy was represented only by this Treaty, it appeared impossible to convince the Southern Slavs that the Allies really wished them well. Under the influence of the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration, concluded at Corfu on June 20, 1917, by the President of the Southern Slav Committee, Dr. Trumbitch, and Mr. Pashitch, on behalf and with the assent of the Government of Serbia and the leading public men, the move-

ment for union with Serbia which had long existed among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary took definite shape and affected the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian Army. This development of the movement disquieted the German military authorities and hastened their decision to take direct control of the Hapsburg forces. This they did in October, 1917, and organized the offensive which broke the Italian line at Caporetto.

As soon as the Italian line had been established on the Piave, an attempt was made in London by Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, subsequently directors of the Austrian section of Crewe House, and other members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, to promote conferences between leading Italians and members of the Southern Slav Committee with a view to establishing a general agreement that



[Russell]

MR. JAMES O'GRADY, M.P.,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

might serve as a basis for a solution of the Italo-Southern Slav question. General Mola, the Italian Military Attaché in London, attended those conferences, and contributed greatly to their success. A memorandum containing roughly the general points under discussion was communicated to the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Orlando, in London, in January, 1918. At the suggestion of Mr. Steed, Signor Orlando thereupon received Dr. Trumbitch, and after considerable discussion with him, invited him to Rome. In the meantime an

influential Italian parliamentary committee, representing both Houses of Parliament, sent one of its members, Dr. Torre, to London, with the object of establishing, if possible, a definite basis of agreement. After much negotiation, in which Mr. Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and Sir Arthur Evans took part, the agreement was concluded, which was subsequently ratified by the Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races held at Rome, with the assent of the Italian Government, on April 8, 9 and 10. The terms of this agreement, together with the general resolutions of the Congress, in which it was embodied, are given below. The resolutions



[Elliott & Fry.]

MR. ROBERT DONALD,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

received the public adhesion of several Italian ministers, including the Prime Minister and Signor Bissolati:—

“The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in part to the rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern Slavs—join in affirming their principles of common action as follows:

“(1) Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full political and economic independence.

“(2) Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and rights.

“(3) The assembly recognizes the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit.

“The representatives of the Italian people, and of the Jugo-Slav people in particular, agree as follows:

“(1) In the relation of the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—known also under the name of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And, therefore, the representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace these ends of the two nations may be completely attained.

“(2) They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples.

“(3) They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future, to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace.

“(4) To such racial groups (nuclei) of one people as it may be found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there shall be recognized and guaranteed the right of their language, culture, and moral and economic interests.”

The conclusion of the Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement in London had made it possible to begin propaganda against Austria-Hungary on the lines suggested by Lord Northcliffe.

During the interval between the conclusion of the Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement and the meeting of the Rome Congress, Lord Northcliffe sent Mr. Wickham Steed to Italy at the head of a special mission which, with the support of the Italian Prime Minister and the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and of the British and French commanders, organized at Italian Headquarters a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission that arranged for the distribution of propaganda literature, in the chief




DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS BY AEROPLANE IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR.

Austro-Hungarian languages, among the Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. Representatives of each of the principal subject races were attached to the Commission to supervise the drafting and printing of the literature.

Lieut.-Colonel Granville Baker remained permanently at Italian Headquarters as representative of Lord Northcliffe's department. He received every assistance and encour-

— Karta koja prestavlja veliku ofensivu Saveznika sa rezultatima postignutim od 9. Avgusta do 1. Septembra. —



— Italija sa koje je počela ofensiva Saveznika 9 Avgusta.
- - - linija dostignuta 1. Septembra.
..... linija Hindenburgova.

U ovoj ofensivi od 15 Jula do 31. Avgusta Saveznici zarobiše 140.000 Nijemaca od kojih 2674 Oficira, 2500 topova, 1734 vatrometa, 13783 mitraljeza, te ostali ogroman ratni materijal.

330

Jugoslovenski Odbor.

A MANIFESTO ISSUED BY THE JUGO-SLAV COMMITTEE.

agement from General (now Sir Charles) Delmé Radcliffe, head of the British Military Mission. The actual work of distribution of leaflets and other propagandist material was naturally directed by representatives of the Italian military authorities. After the Rome Congress this organization distributed by aeroplanes, contact patrols, balloons and rockets, many million leaflets based upon the resolutions of the Rome Congress. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern

Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci.

"Glasnik Slovenzija Stefani" službeno objavljuje:
Odlukom ministarskog vijeća od 8. Septembra, talijanska Vlada izvijestila je savezničke Vlade, da Ona smatra pokret Jugoslovena za postignućem nezavisnosti i stvaranja slobodne Države kao nacelo za koje se Saveznici bore i kao uslov jednoga pravednog i dugog mira."

Vlade savezničkih država odgovorile su, da sa zadovoljstvom primaju ovu izjavu talijanske Vlade.

Jugosloveni.

Ovom istoriskom i sudbonosnom izjavom Italija postavlja kao svrhu za koju se bori: rušenje Austro-Ugarske monarhije onake kakva je danas i podizanje na razvalinama njenim, nezavisne i ujedinjene države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.

Ovu plemenitu odluku njezinu, prihvataju i svi Saveznici naši.

Vojnici.

Uloga koju je Italiji povjest dodjela, manifestirala se danas jače nego ikad. Kao zaštitnica slabih, nosioc slobode i one misli za koju Saveznici već četiri godine ratuju, njezina svila za koju se bori, nije mir Brest-litovski i Bukureški, nego sloboda slabih i potlačenih.

Zato otvorite oči. Upamtite, da boreći se protiv nje, borimo se protiv sebe, protiv potomstva našeg, protiv slobode i ujedinjenja našeg.

Zivita Italija, zivita ujedinjena i slobodna Jugoslavija, živili Saveznici naši.

DR ANTE TRUMBIĆ
predsjednik Jugoslovenskog Odbora.

A JUGO-SLAV MANIFESTO SIGNED BY DR. TRUMBITCH.

It has the National Colours printed across it.

Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner, and used in the front line trenches. The Commission also published a newspaper in the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Rumanian and Polish languages, containing news collected mainly from the Austro-Hungarian Press, by a special Italian office which Professor Borgese had set up at Berne


The propaganda thus initiated deranged the Austrian military plans for the great offensive against Italy intended for the middle of April, 1918. During May and June it induced many Austrian soldiers, belonging to the subject races, to come over to the Allied lines. Then the offensive was planned for June, and was delayed about ten days. From the deserters the Allied commanders were completely informed of the Austrian plans and dispositions.

The delay proved to be very important, because when the offensive came the Piave rose behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into almost a disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind the lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against Italy, but this was officially denied

The divisions in question were a mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenes. It appeared that the Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with "reliable" troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the Allies. The Austrians detached machine-gun sections to deal with attempts at desertion *en masse* during the offensive. Desertions of single men or parties were frequent during the action—indeed, one whole company of Jugo-Slavs went over.

and independent Southern Slav State. Some weeks later the Italian Cabinet, after much discussion, responded to this invitation, but its action was naturally less efficacious than it would have been had it been more prompt.


Propaganda by these various methods continued to exert an ever-increasing influence on the Austro-Hungarian Army. News of the victorious progress of the Allied armies on the Western front was sent over the lines continually, and kept well up to date. Desertions and disorder increased among the ranks of the enemy's army to such an extent that, finally, in the last days of October, one vigorous attack



MR. H. WICKHAM STEED,

Directors of the Austrian Section of Crewe House.

After the Piave victory the Italian Commander-in-Chief expressly recognized the great value of the propaganda in helping to prepare it. It is possible that, had the official policy of the Italian Government during May and June been less reticent in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, the victory on the Piave might have been decisive. The reticence of Italian policy proved, indeed, so severe a handicap upon the work of propaganda, that at the Inter-Allied Enemy Propaganda Conference, convened by Lord Northcliffe in London on August 14th, a resolution was passed, with the assent of the British, French, American and Italian delegates, inviting the Italian Government to take the initiative in making a public declaration in favour of the creation of a united



DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON,


Directors of the Austrian Section of Crewe House.

started by British divisions brought down in a crumbling mass an army which had for centuries shown a surprising capacity for recovering from defeat.

When the collapse of Bulgaria took place, not a moment was lost in using the new field of operations thus opened out against Austria-Hungary; and it was decided to establish a Propaganda Commission on the Balkan front on lines similar to the Commission at the Italian G.H.Q., though, of course, adapted to the new circumstances. Colonel Granville Baker was despatched to Salonica, and arrangements were already being made for the printing and distribution of leaflets (some were actually used) and the despatch of a small expert staff which would be in specially close touch with

the Jugo-Slavs and Rumanians as border races. Fortunately, however, events altogether outdistanced these preparations. The defeat and dissolution of Austria-Hungary rendered the further work of the department superfluous.

Office continued the preparation of leaflets suitable for dropping over the German lines. This work was in charge of Captain Chalmers Mitchell, F.R.S., who had made a comprehensive study of German propagandist litera-



PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS DESCENDING ON VIENNA FROM AN AEROPLANE.

While the operations against Austria-Hungary were thus being engineered, propaganda in Germany had been left in the hands of the existing agencies. A special section of the Military Intelligence Department of the War

ture. Besides these leaflets in German, this section prepared a weekly newspaper in French (entitled *Le Courier de l'Air*) for French and Belgian inhabitants in territory occupied by the Germans, and also made reproductions of

letters, written by German prisoners in British hands, for distribution over the German lines. Mr. Guest also continued his admirable work of circulating books and pamphlets in Germany through non-military channels.

After the campaign against Austria was successfully launched, Crewe House turned its attention to Germany. Mr. H. G. Wells agreed to take charge of propaganda against Germany, with the cooperation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. Much study was devoted to the exact line of policy to be followed, and on May 27 Mr. Wells submitted a long memorandum to the Committee on this subject. A letter summarizing this memorandum, surveying the existent conditions in Germany, and outlining the lines upon which propaganda could be based was sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the object of drawing the attention of the Government to the need of a public and authoritative statement of policy from the Allied Governments.

The memorandum set out that propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously be based upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and Allied war aims had been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans. The real war aim of the Allies was not only to beat the enemy but to establish a world peace that precluded the resumption of war. Successful propaganda in Germany presupposed the clear definition of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies had determined to secure and the place of Germany in it.

The points to be brought home to the Germans were :

1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepted the Allied peace settlement
2. The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations was to be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial and economic resources of its members pooled until
 - (a) Its military purpose was achieved, and
 - (b) Peace was established on lasting foundations

One of the first requisites was to study and to lay down the lines of a practical League of Nations. The present alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League. Its control of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe to and give pledges of their acceptance of its

principles should be emphasized. It must be pointed out that nothing stood between enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes ; that the design of the Allies was not to crush any people, but to assure the freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under definite guarantees of justice and fair play ; that, unless enemy peoples accepted the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it

Poselství prof. Masaryka československému vojsku v Itálii.

Prof. T. G. Masaryk poslal z Washingtonu prostřednictvím krále italského velvyslance československému autonomnímu vojsku v Itálii tento vzkaz :

" Bratři ! Rakousko-Uhersko, chtějíc zlomiti ve vlasti ošinci československou, tvrdilo, že naše vojsko je sebranka, jež nemá ani politického ani vojenského významu. Vypuštilo dokonce lež, že naše vojsko se skládá z Rusů a jiných národností a že nestává vojska československého. Náš národ nenechal tomu klamu a zůstal nesmířitelným a hrdým na své vojsko. Tehdy Rakousko-Uhersko pokusilo se zasaditi rozhodnou ránu našemu národu tím, že by zničilo vás zničilo vojsko jeho. Chtělo zmoeniti se naši vládky odboje a samostatnosti, symbolu viry a aspiraci našeho národa.

" Bratři ! Vaše vůle, váš dalekozřimý hled překazily plány nepřitele. Náš prapor vlaje ještě hrdě na posíci svěřené vaši ochraně. Náš národ pozná vaše hrdinské činy a všechna srdce se pohnou hlubokou vděčností k vám. Chloubou nad vámi a hrdou vzpomínkou padlých bratrů.

" Jako váš vrchní velitel posílám vám svůj nejsrdčejší dík za udatnost, kterouž jste znova přispěli k vítězství našeho národa, Itálie, Spojenců a celého lidstva.

Nazdar ! "

T. G. Masaryk.

Nutkalo nás pochlubiti se vám uznáním našeho milovaného vůdce, jenž nás i národ náš dovede k vítěznému cíli.

Jsmo přesvědčeni, že i vy, ve shodě s celým národem, vidíte spásu Vlasti a uskutečnění našich svatých práv jea v rozbití Rakouska.

Až poženou vás, ubyste nastavili prsa za proradnou dynastii, k níž národ nemá závazků, najdete jistě příležitost odpovědět vhodně na stáleté útky a zachránit se pro lepší budoucnost !

Nazdar !

Vojáci-dobrovolci československé armády v Itálii.

V Itálii 2. října 1918.

420.

MANIFESTO TO CZECH SOLDIERS,

Signed by Professor Masaryk.

would be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war, to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged misery ; and that the longer the struggle lasted the deeper would become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy peoples would labour, even after their admission into a League of Nations.

The primary war aim of the Allies thus became the *changing of Germany*, not only in the interest of the Allied League but in that of the German people itself. Without the honest cooperation of Germany disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and without disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. Germany had, therefore, to choose between her own

permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of Government and policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly in the Allied scheme of world organization. It had become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full statement of the war aims of the Allies was vitally necessary.

such as could, if presented in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever 'opposition' exists in Germany.

"From such information as is available as to the internal condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest importance for immediate purposes:

"(a) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more



CREWE HOUSE,

Headquarters of the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

In his letter to the Foreign Secretary Lord Northcliffe wrote:

"I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as a basis for British—and eventually Allied—propaganda in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the settled war aims of the Allies:

"The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy to war and victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans are most concerned. . . It appears to me, however, that our war aims, as I understand them, are

than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the present offensive chiefly because they are assured by their leaders that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding German military successes, and that for this reason military success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless policy of commercial blockade

"(b) Side by side with this we have another motive of the highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual German family would find itself without work, without money, and without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be avoided. They will happen if the Government of Germany continues to carry out its openly avowed design of subjecting the other free nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent to accept the Allied scheme for a new organization of the world.

"These two points (a) and (b) must be kept in close connexion; the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the element of hope. . . .

"Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and involving 'annexations and indemnities,' such as have in the past been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish such a world peace as shall, within the limits of human foresight, preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment of civilized government in Mesopotamia and Palestine, should be put forward in their proper places as individual but essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future wars.

"Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of a 'League of Free Nations.' It is, I presume, generally understood that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its foundation. Her admission to the

League would be in itself her guarantee against the establishment of, *e.g.*, a hostile monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to put our aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the moderate elements in Germany



LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTED
CONDITION OF GERMAN PRISONERS
IN BRITISH HANDS.

than if they were put forward merely as terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy.

"It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany into accepting a peace renunciation, and that, as soon as this object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany permanently in a

position of political and commercial inferiority. . . ."

Mr. Balfour replied that this "important letter" must be brought before the War Cabinet, and that he was in general agreement with the line of thought. Eventually the War Cabinet approved the letter as a basis of propaganda, but no public declarations of the character suggested by Lord Northcliffe were made.

Meanwhile Mr. Wells had been laying bases for work upon the lines suggested. He kept

for the German section at Crewe House to make its own printing arrangements, and plans were made for daily bulletins of war news and leaflets explaining to the Germans the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, to be produced with the same speed as that of a daily newspaper and dispatched to France for distribution by balloons within forty-eight hours of their being written. This called for rapid work on the part of the printers, Messrs. Harrison & Son, and at Messrs. Gamage's, where the leaflets were attached to the balloon



A MEDALLION STRUCK IN "DISHONOUR" OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE by the Germans, whose undying hatred he earned as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

closely in touch with the associations formed to promote a League of Nations. He took up the idea of setting before the German people a vision of a new Germany which should renounce aims of world-domination and return to peaceful and beneficent activities in the fields of art, science and industry, with which the greatest names of German history were honourably associated. Mr. Wells also began a systematic collection of facts bearing upon the application in Great Britain of science to industry; the object of this was to show the Germans that we were emancipating ourselves from dependence upon them in the matter of products of scientific manufacture.

Mr. Wells, however, was not able long to continue his work. On July 17th he offered his resignation, which was accepted by the Committee on July 23rd, and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed organizer and conductor of German propaganda in his stead.

About this time the work of preparing leaflets for dropping among German troops was transferred from Adastral House, and Captain Chalmers Mitchell and Mr. Guest both became attached to Crewe House. Now it was possible

"releases"; their cooperation was willingly given, and was a most valuable aid.

The War Office undertook the necessary organization for transporting these "releases" to the front, and for the inflation and dispatch of balloons. These were made of paper, cut in longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 18 inches long. Their diameter was approximately 20 feet, and their height, when inflated, 8 feet. They were inflated nearly to their full capacity, being sent up with from 90 to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. The weight of the balloon was under one pound, and the weight of propaganda just over four pounds. The propaganda leaflets were attached to a fuse of treated cotton, similar to that used in flint pipelights, and burning at the rate of an inch every five minutes. The string of the leaflets was fastened to the neck of the balloon, and just before liberation a slit was cut in the neck to allow for the escape of gas, and the end of the fuse was lighted. The weights were adjusted so that the balloon rose sharply into the air to a height of several thousand feet before the loss of gas due to expansion would have destroyed the free lift. At this point

Heer und Heimat

November 1918.

10 Bfg.

Verhängnisvolle Fahrt.

Am Steuerrad.

„Ich wollte das deutsche Volk würde in größerem Maße als bisher mitarbeiten die Geschichte des Vaterlandes zu gestalten — Der deutsche Kaiser an den Grafen Hertling.



Dem Führer wird's unheimlich —



Und er hatte Grund dazu!

Wird der
Chaufeur
heraus-
geschmissen?

A REDUCED FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST PAGE OF A NEWSPAPER DROPPED INTO THE GERMAN LINES JUST BEFORE THE ARMISTICE.

Heer und Heimat

November 1918.

10 Pf.

Der Ruf zur Einigkeit.

Das Ideal.



Es wird zum „Sammeln“ geblasen.

Das verlorene Paradies.

„Wie anders, Gretchen, war dir's.—Goethe's
„Faust.“

Wie anders, Deutschland war dir's vor dem
Kriege

Den deine Herrschbegier zu Stand gebracht ;
Du schrittest selbstbewußt von Sieg zu Siege,
Den Gipfelpunkt erreichst deiner Macht ;
Unangerührt, besitzend zur Genüge
Das Erdengut, den Ruhm, die weltliche Pracht ;
Du hattest ja wonach die Menschheit trachtet,
Und warst, wenn nicht geliebt, so doch geachtet.

Und jezo welcher Ekel, welcher Schauer,
Wenn bloß der Name Deutschlands wird ge-
nannt !

Um dein verlor'nes Glück wie tiefe Trauer,
Die Ehre hin, die Seelenruh verbannt !

Du liegst, getrennt durch eine eiserne Mauer
Die dein Verbrechen zwischen uns gespannt.

In deinem falschen Ideal gebunden—
Und alle frühere Herrlichkeit verschwunden

Die Wirklichkeit.

Der Krieg wurde in Potsdam beschlossen.

Zu ungarischen Parlament be-
hauptet Graf Tisza während einer
Debatte über den Ursprung des
Krieges, daß das Ultimatum an
Serbien bei einer Konferenz aufgesetzt
wurde, bei der kein deutscher Vertreter
zugegen war.

Ein Abgeordneter : „Nicht in Wien,
sondern in Potsdam.“

Graf Tisza erwiderte : „Weder in
Potsdam, noch irgendwo anders.“

Der Abgeordnete : „Das Ultima-
tum wurde nicht in Potsdam be-
schlossen, aber der Kriegsaus-
bruch wurde dort beschlossen.“

Eine Prophezeiung.

Die holländische Zeitung Handels-
blad meldet, daß ein Joeben aus
Deutschland nach Holland Zurückge-
kehrter an einer wichtigen Fabrik in
Niesebucht haben geschrieben sah :

„Dauert der Krieg noch ein Jahr
geht es Wilhelm wie dem Czar.“



„Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen.“ — Molke.

ANOTHER ISSUE OF "HEER UND HEIMAT."

the first bundle of leaflets was liberated from the fuse, and this process continued until the end of the run, when the last bundle was released.

The total time-length of the fuse and the attachment of the propaganda to it were calculated according to the area which it was desired to reach, and the average strength of the wind. The experimental improvement of



MR. H. G. WELLS.


In charge of Propaganda against Germany.

the "dope" with which the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion, and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards of 150 miles well within the capacity of the method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the propaganda was distributed over an area of from ten to fifty miles behind the enemy lines.

The distribution unit at the front consisted of two motor lorries, which carried the balloons, hydrogen cylinders, and personnel to a convenient spot, generally from three to five miles behind the front line. Thence the balloons were sent up. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn the wind was almost consistently favourable for their dispatch.

Nevertheless, distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the Army Council's decision to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose (to which reference has already been made) was a serious setback to Lord Northcliffe's work. Balloon distribution was dependent upon favourable winds, and could only be performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive

area at great speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request early in May, to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended to institute reprisals immediately on receiving information that any British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and meanwhile literature continued to be distributed there by other and, as they thought, more effective means. *Yet they*




[Elliott & Fry.]

MR. HAMILTON FYFE.

Succeeded Mr. Wells in the Direction of Propaganda against Germany.

admitted that there had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the Italian Front.

A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as, according to his information, the Germans themselves con-



TESTING LIFTING POWER OF PAPER BALLOONS.

tinued to drop leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe that distribution by balloon was anything like as accurate, or therefore anything like as effective.

Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes, and then the Air Ministry raised further objection. Finally all objections were overcome, but not until the end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just before the Armistice stopped such operations.

In the meantime the best possible use had been made of balloons. In the beginning of August it became important to increase the speed of distribution, particularly because early news of the military successes of the Allies, concealed by the Germans from their own troops, became valuable propaganda. It was therefore arranged that the leaflets should be divided into two categories, "stock" leaflets, the contents of which would not lose their value by a little delay, and "priority" leaflets, containing matter of urgent importance. It was agreed that the latter should be printed three times a week, each leaflet being of uniform

length and printed in an edition of 100,000 copies. The issue and rapid dispatch of these continued from August until the signing of the Armistice. Of the "stock" leaflets produced by Crewe House, over nine millions were attached to releases, and sent to France between August and November.

During the month of August, then, the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines and behind them reached a figure of well over 100,000 a day. Written in simple language, they aimed at letting the Germans know the truth, which was being concealed from them by their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in all theatres, and showed at a glance the territory gained by the Associated Nations by means of shaded maps. Great stress was laid upon the large numbers of troops arriving daily from the United States. By the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of the American forces was strikingly illustrated. German losses were insisted upon and the futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause.

The large number of prisoners taken with leaflets in their pockets proved that these were doing their work. The German commanders issued orders against their being read. Some

offered rewards for all leaflets handed to officers. Others threatened punishment if they were not given up. This is an example of the notices which appeared in German Army Orders :

ORDERS REGARDING PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS.

The distribution of propaganda leaflets from English aeroplanes and balloons has of late considerably increased.


It is the duty of every officer and man immediately to hand in such leaflets to his unit.

Any officer or man found to be in possession of such leaflets after their having been found, or attempting to send same home, is to be very severely dealt with.

(From Standing Orders of the 11th Reserve Division).

An equally severe warning was given by the Deputy Commander of the VIIth Army Corps in the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten* of September 22 :

Our opponents have recently been endeavouring with enhanced zeal to produce discontent among the German people by spreading mischievous leaflets in the interior. These leaflets are mostly dropped over the country in



INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING LEAFLETS.

paper or indiarubber toy balloons by means of a mechanical dropping apparatus, and they are further spread by enemy agents. Although, in view of the sound sense of the people, it is only to be expected that they will of their own accord resist these enemy machinations, it is nevertheless emphatically pointed out that it is the patriotic duty of every German in whose hands such leaflets, paper balloons or indiarubber balloons fall, to deliver them to the nearest police authorities and to denounce to the police the agents who spread such leaflets.


In the *Weissenburger Zeitung* of August 29, 1918, the following notice was published :

It is prohibited to retain pamphlets, books and leaflets, and pictures of the enemy propaganda. For the delivery of unknown specimens a bonus will be paid as follows

- 3 marks (3s. nominal) for the first copy.
- 30 pfg. (4d. nominal) for other copies.
- 5 marks (5s. nominal) for a book.

In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* Herr F. Stössinger characterized British propaganda as "The most complicated and dangerous of all." "Countless are its activities," Herr Stössinger declared. The result of this and other articles in the same complimentary vein was the stirring-up in Germany of an agitation for counter-

Wo die Hindenburg-Linie durchbrochen ist.



• Diese Karte zeigt genau wo die englischen Truppen sich einen Weg durch einen wichtigen Teil der Hindenburg-Verteidigungslinie erzwingen haben. Die gezackte Linie von Norden nach Süden deutet die Verteidigungen an. Die schwarze Linie zeigt die von den Engländern erreichten Stellungen. Ihre Vordringen dauert an. In Handern sind die deutschen Heere in vollem Rückzug, der Kemmelberg ist aufgegeben. „Schweren Herzens verließen ihn unsere Truppen,“ schreibt Karl Döner, Kriegsberichterstatter des „Völkensposters.“

Heute sind wir auf dem Rückzuge.

Nächstes Jahr werden wir vernichtet werden.


Amerika, welches jetzt 1750 000 Mann in Frankreich hat, hatte Anstalten getroffen bis nächstes Jahr 3 500 000 zu senden.

Aber jetzt, angesichts der Weigerung der deutschen Regierung einen echten Friedensvorschlag zu machen, hat sich Amerika entschlossen die Anzahl zu vergrößern.

Bis nächstes Jahr wird Amerika 5 000 000 Mann an der Westfront haben.

Was sagen unsere Führer hierzu — unsere Führer, die erklären, daß Amerika keine Gefahr für uns wäre, weil unsere U-Boote es daran verhindern würden, Truppen nach Europa zu schicken?

Was sagen wir dazu, wir, die wir durch die ungeheure Zahlenüberlegenheit vollständig erdrückt werden?



Das Zunehmen der amerikanischen Armee an der Westfront.

1917	1918	1919
100 000.	1 750 000.	5 000 000.

A LEAFLET SHOWING THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.

propaganda. "In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our superior," admitted the Minister for War, General von Stein, in the *Berlin Morgenvost* on August 25.

To the same effect wrote the *Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung* :

At any rate, the British Propaganda Department has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity in our propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now. But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we hope that by now we have learned differently.

And the *Deutsche Tagezeitung* :

We Germans have a right to be proud of our General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies' General Staff cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have none.

The creation of a Ministry of Propaganda was, therefore, urgently demanded, and a German Army order, captured towards the end of October, showed that some such organization had been established.

All this time the most violent attacks were being made upon the British Enemy Propaganda Department. It was accused, rightly, of being responsible for the nervousness of the German nation, and for its waning confidence in its leaders. But the means by which it had

caused nervousness and sapped confidence were not understood. The German leaders and newspapers declared the agency at work to be lies. For example, in the Bavarian Lower House of Parliament during August the Bavarian Minister for War, General von Hellingrath, referred to rumours in circulation, which, according to the Munich correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, were "so wild and extravagant that one hardly understands how they can be credited and passed on among certain classes of the people."

"These rumours," the Minister said, "are nothing but the result of the industrious and determined agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior through their agents."

The editor of the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger*, Herr von Kupferr, dealt in a leading article with the effect of these same rumours in the North of Germany. They had produced, he wrote, "a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal irresponsibility," and he went on :

The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralize us and, by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these things radiate from that organization in England formed to shatter the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time ?

Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda ? Does not everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning and almost impressive skill ? Does not everybody realize that the Northcliffe propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty and alarm into our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal communications of all sorts ? Paid rascals are systematically employed for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connexion with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every bit of washerwoman's gossip as gospel, even though it be without the slightest foundation in fact.

The same rumours circulated in and around Hamburg, and on September 14 the widely-read shipping journal *Hansa* printed the following :

God be thanked ! At last we are just beginning to recognize what the hour of war demands ; what our duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling ! We meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin, these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front, these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which

passed so glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but always it was something bad in regard to our military situation. Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions, which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening our temper ; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither and thither in all directions through our German air.

Whence came they ? Who brought them to us ? To-day we know. To-day we can recognize the origin of this depression of German will-power. It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente directed against us under England's lead, and under the special direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.

These diatribes were founded in misconception. The unrest in Germany, with the



ATTACHING LEAFLETS TO A BALLOON.

spreading of wild rumours to which unrest always gives birth, were caused indeed by British propaganda ; this propaganda used as its ammunition, however, not lies, but solely the truth. It was because they began to realize the truth that the German people felt nervous and depressed. It was because the failure of the U-boats and the coming of the Americans, and the solidarity of the Allies and the weakening of their own military power were now revealed to them, in spite of their leaders' efforts to keep them still in ignorance. It was because of their enlightenment on these and other matters that the Germans were seized with panic, a panic which culminated towards the end of October in complete collapse, and, during the first days of November, in revolution.

The rumours were as rife among the troops as among the civil population. There is ground, indeed, for belief that the soldiers communicated to their relations and friends the uneasiness they felt upon learning how matters really stood. An order issued by General Ludendorff said :

There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the *moral* of the people at home.

in my hands, and it is not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our masters, for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the look-out is very likely to fall a victim to them.

One effect of telling the Germans the truth was to make them distrust their official *communiqués*. "We have in our dear Fatherland to-day," wrote the *Kölnische Zeitung* on September 11, "great numbers of innocent and ingenuous minds, who doubt the plain statements of the German Army reports, but believe the false reports and omissions of the enemy. To prove constantly the contrary to them is a



NOTING THE DIRECTION OF THE WIND AND THE POINTS AT WHICH THE LEAFLETS WILL FALL.

Certainly the discipline and the confidence of the German Army declined steadily as the year wore on. In the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* for September 11 a letter from the front said :

Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade, which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily ; that our troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy, and such like things.

In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the writer said :

Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets from the air. I have had two of these leaflets

rather thankless task, but of which one should never tire."

It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the whole German nation. "Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands, not to believe the enemy's leaflets," was one of "Ten Commandments for German Women," published by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* on October 20, but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German resistance had been stimulated for so long.

That the enemy leaders and newspapers made so loud an outcry against British truth-propaganda proved that it was effective. The first sign that Lord Northcliffe's department was meeting with the success hoped for was the

THE TWO SIDES OF A LEAFLET REPORTING THE ALLIES' ADVANCES AGAINST BULGARIA AND IN SYRIA.

TRUPPEN-NACHRICHTENBLATT.

1013

Deutscher General flüchtet.

Die Türken halten Liman von Sanders für ihr Unheil verantwortlich.

Zwei Armeen vernichtet.

Bulgaren werden auch auf ausgedehnter Saffanfront verfolgt.

Düstere Stimmung des Grafen Hertling.

Der Sieg der englischen Truppen in Palästina über die vom deutschen General Liman von Sanders befehligten türkischen Truppen hat sich entwickelt und hat viel größere Dimensionen angenommen als die ersten Berichte andeuten.

Zwei türkische Armeen, die 7. und die 8., haben aufgehört zu existieren. Ihr ganzes Train, alle ihre Geschütze, ihr ganzes Kriegsmaterial ist erbeutet worden 30000 Mann ergaben sich.

Die wenigen, die dem Tode oder der Gefangenschaft entgingen, flüchteten in kleinen, zusammenhangslosen Gruppen über den Jordanfuß und treiben sich nun im Wüste herum.

Jetzt verfolgen die Engländer die 4. türkische Armee, welche auch in Gefahr steht vernichtet zu werden. Auf jeden Fall ist der türkische Widerstand in Palästina endgültig gebrochen.

General Liman von Sanders, der deutsche Befehlshaber, der so vollständig übertrübt und vom feindlichen Hauptquartier an Führung so übertrübt wurde, flüchtet vor den Engländern.

Die Türken behaupten sie seien verraten und von den deutschen Offizieren, die ihren Streitkräften vorgelegt waren, ins Unglück geführt worden.

Palästina ist ihnen nun auf ewig verloren. Die Heiligen Stätten sind von der Muselmanenherrschaft befreit. Die Entente hat sich verpflichtet Palästina dem jüdischen Volke zurückzugeben.

Der Sieg der französischen und der serbischen Truppen über die Bulgaren im Balkangebirge hat sich in schlagender Weise entwickelt.

Die Bulgaren ziehen sich jetzt auf einer Front von 160 Kilometern zurück.

Sie haben dem Vordringen der Ententetruppen keinen starken Widerstand entgegengesetzt. Die deutschen Niederlagen an der Westfront haben sie sehr niedergedrückt und ihren Kampfesifer geschwächt. Wir wissen, daß es nutzlos ist den Kampf fortzusetzen.

Dies weiß auch Graf Hertling, der Reichskanzler. Er hat dem Hauptauschuß des Reichstags gesagt, daß tiefe Unzufriedenheit unter weite Kreise der Bevölkerung ergriffen hat. Was empfiehlt er? Daß das deutsche Volk das alte, sichere Vertrauen auf Hindenburg und Ludendorff bewahren soll, in der Hoffnung, daß sie die Lage ein wenig besser machen könnten. Aber er weiß, wir wissen und alle Welt weiß, daß sie sie nicht besser können, nur das deutsche Volk selbst

kann eine Besserung herbeiführen dadurch, daß es der Autokratie und dem Militarismus, dem Allduldsamkeit und den veralteten Lächerlichkeiten, andere Wäfler schon längst abgeschafft haben, ein Ende macht

manifesto of Marshal Hindenburg which appeared early in September. The text of this ingenuous confession that the truth was gaining ground read as follows:

We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit; he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.


We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.

Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up:


In May	84,000
In June	120,000
In July	300,000

A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the strength and confidence for

Diese obere Karte stellt die Eintreffungsbewegung der Engländer, welche die türkischen Streitkräfte unter General Liman von Sanders vernichtete dar



Die untere Karte zeigt das durch die französischen und serbischen Truppen, welche den Bulgaren die schwerste Niederlage, die sie während des Krieges erlitten haben beigebracht haben, im Balkan genommene Gelände



ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.

POISONING THE HOME SPIRIT.

But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write their doubts to the Front, and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau rub their hands.

The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance, are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland, in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly details, in the remotest regions of our country—in Silesia, in East Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend their way thence over the remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his hands.

The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for everyone. He deceys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs:

"German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that the

French ill-treat German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and a peaceful refuge."

Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise that the enemy conjures up really looks like.

Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them. God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of prisoners' camps in England and France; but these are the exception, and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying:

"Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink; after the war we shall debar you from getting raw materials, then Germany's industry must starve. You will never see your colonies again."

That is the tone of the leaflets: now enticement, now threat.

GERMAN FACTS AND FANCIES.

What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the Americans; but we must be strong and united: that is what the enemy is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.

Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals.

Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us.

Again, the enemy says another thing:—

"You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you a better form of State."

The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for centuries was the dream of Germans, and which our fathers won for us, and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years' War.

The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself sacrifices his allies; he who is England's ally dies of it.

TRAITORS TO THE FATHERLAND.

And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned arrows dipped in printers' ink when he throws down the utterances of German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to share our struggle and our privations, or to be condemned by our Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have

champions of extreme party tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the German people.

It is our strength, but also our weakness, that even in war we allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches of enemy statesmen, which are weapons of attack directed against the spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength, because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness because it allows the enemy's poison to find an entrance among us.

Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your eyes and ears, remember that it originates with the enemy. Remember nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Everyone must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by nature stands in the enemy's camp, keep him at a distance, despise him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true German may despise him.

Defend yourself German Army, German Homeland!

It is an interesting comment on Marshal Hindenburg's figures that in August the number of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department was 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days of November, before the armistice put an end to our activities, 1,400,000 were sent out.

General von Hutier, of the Sixth German Army, followed Hindenburg a week later with the following appeal:

The enemy begins to realize that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special Ministry ("The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence"), at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe. He has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors, and all the other ways in favour with the Entente.

The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of German poets, writers and statesmen are forged, or which present the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same purpose. His thought and aim is that these forgeries, however obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered.


Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English or Americans, incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is

at stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of victory.

Later, the contention that British propaganda leaflets contained merely lies had to be dropped. Experience proved it to be baseless. A "high officer at the front," writing to the *Kölnische Zeitung* (October 31st), said, in

from German Socialist newspapers, and by the leaflets dealing with the numbers of Americans arriving in Europe; with the Allied war aims and with German food conditions, and with the Allied victories on the Western front, in Italy, the Balkans and Palestine.

Perhaps the most striking tribute of all was that of Ludendorff, who, in his memoirs, contended that Germany was beaten not by arms, but by the moral collapse of the German



DISPATCHING BALLOONS.

describing the demoralization of the German Army, caused by retreat :

What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the enemy, who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were extraordinarily well distributed and well edited.

A report to the British Foreign Office, dated September 5th, stated :

Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that recent events have seriously shaken the *moral* of the German people and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard with paper only in future.

Prisoners bore testimony to the wide circulation of the leaflets among German troops. They were much sought after and discussed, especial interest being aroused by extracts

soldier. This moral collapse of the German soldier, according to him, was in part produced by Lord Northcliffe's deadly propaganda and in part by the demoralization of the German home population, which he again ascribes in equal degrees to the same propaganda and to the feebleness of the German Government in counteracting it. In a very noteworthy passage he says :

Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of mass-suggestion. The enemy's propaganda attacked us by transmitting reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria, and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our case as we had to rely, not

on the numbers, but on the quality of our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused to bow to the enemy's determination to annihilate us. But with the disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many Germans were no longer willing to die for their country.

The shattering of public confidence at home affected

Türkische Armee in Palästina vernichtet.

Kein weiterer Widerstand gegen die englischen Truppen.

Glänzendes Umkreisungs-Manöver.

20 000 Gefangene.

Türkisches Volk aufgebracht gegen Deutschland weil es es einem nicht wieder gutzumachenden Unglück entgegen geführt hat.

Die türkische Armee in Palästina hat aufgehört zu existieren. Die Engländer überrannten sie, durchbrachen die Front, schickten große Kavalleriemengen durch, schnitten alle Rückzugsrouten ab, schlossen die Türken vollständig ein.

Zwanzig Tausend ergaben sich, eine große Anzahl wurde getötet, nur einigen Nachzügeln gelang es zu entkommen. Das Heilige Land ist von der Infanterie-Herrschaft, die die deutsche Regierung nach Kräften aufrecht zu erhalten strebt, befreit. Kein härterer Schlag hätte die Türken treffen können. Ihre besten Truppen sind vernichtet. Die Stimmung der Türken gegen Deutschland ist eine äußerst bittere. Sie drohen öffentlich damit sich gegen die deutsche Regierung zu wenden.

Die Bulgaren sind auch kaum weniger gegen Deutschland erbittert. Sie werden immer noch von den französischen und serbischen Truppen, die sie 64 Kilometer zurückgetrieben haben, im Balkangebirge verfolgt. Ihre Niederlage ist zu einem vollständigen Unheil geworden.

Auf der Westfront gewinnen die englischen und französischen Truppen immer noch Terrain, langsam, aber ständig, jeden Tag ein wenig.

Überall befinden sich Deutschland und seine Verbündeten auf dem Rückzuge.

Of the German propaganda methods he speaks with utter contempt:

Our foreign propaganda rendered us no service. . . . Our political intentions and decisions were so violently sprung upon the world that they often seemed to have been arrived at brutally or in an offhand manner. A far-seeing propaganda with large ideas would have prevented this. . . . Only with great effort could the German propaganda make its influence felt; in its working it showed itself, notwithstanding all the pains that were taken with it, unequal to the greatness of its task.

In his account of the fighting in 1918 (which must be taken in conjunction with the dis-


Leset keine Flugblätter, die ihr zufällig finden möget. Sagen Feldmarschall Hindenburg und General von Guder.

Warum?

Weil sie wissen, daß die Flugblätter die Wahrheit, welche sie und die Regierung uns verhehlen wollen, enthalten. Sie fürchten die Wahrheit. Wenn das deutsche Volk sie kennt werden die Regierung und der Militarismus weggeragt werden. Leset umseitig von den Erfolgen der Entente-Mächte und fragt euch —

Wie lange kann dies noch so weiter gehen?

Karte zur Veranschaulichung des türkischen Unheils.



Die schwarzen Linien und Pfeile stellen die englischen Streitkräfte dar. Die Türken befanden sich zwischen Samaria und Nablus. Sie sind vernichtet worden. Ihre Armee existiert nicht mehr.

NEWS FOR GERMAN TROOPS OF CRUSHING TURKISH DEFEATS IN PALESTINE.

our moral readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory.

He mentioned that in the spring of 1918 a leading statesman of the Entente confessed that it was the general and complete belief of the Allied Governments "that the German Army on the Western Front cannot be conquered by military means," but added that it could be broken by working on German opinion

closures in the German White Paper (*Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes*, Berlin, 1919), Ludendorff again and again referred to the decline in German moral. After the great offensive of March 21 the men on leave returned in a detestable spirit, he said, from Germany. Reinforcements and drafts brought from Germany proved untrustworthy. On the eve of his last offensive, that of July 15, he says:

The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more effective because the Army was rendered

impressionable by the attitude at home. . . . The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince Lichnowsky's pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible.


The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognized. The Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our soldiers.

The immediate results which Ludendorff

attack, "our infantry did not everywhere offer a firm front. A division which had been regarded as good gave way south-west of Soissons. Three divisions in reserve, which were not quite fresh, did not fill the gap"—as they should have done. But the blackest of all days in the war for the German Army, and the day when the effect of the propaganda was most felt, was August 8, according to Ludendorff and his Staff, when the British Fourth Army

Was die Verbündeten gewonnen haben.

Wieder auf der Linie von vorigem März



Das ganze Gelände ist von den deutschen Heeren zwei Mal gewonnen und zwei Mal verloren worden. Wieviel Blut ist vergossen und wieviel Elend verursacht? Zu welchem Zwecke? Denkt darüber nach!

TRUTH FOR GERMANS ABOUT THE ALLIES' PROGRESS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

ascribed to this "drenching" were "a notable worsening of the spirit of the Army"; a plot of 1,600 Alsace soldiers to desert to Holland; malingering among the reservists; particularism among the Bavarians, who began to hate the Kaiser and Kaiserin; sharp criticism of the Staff and of the officers. These were grim signs; they were followed by the failure of the German troops in all directions.

On July 18, when Foch made his first counter-

struck its great blow in the battle of Amiens. In the great British assault on the Hindenburg Line, which began on September 27, just as Ludendorff was hoping that he might play the winter out from this position, he admits that the German troops were badly beaten, though all the preparations on the German side had been of the best. This great defeat, coinciding with the collapse of Bulgaria, which Ludendorff also ascribed to the Allied propaganda, caused panic in the German Government, and

Weitere Erfolge der Entente; der deutsche Rückzug dauert fort.

Während der vergangenen Wochen ist westlich von Cambrai und St. Quentin gekämpft worden; der Kampf erreichte einen Grad der Heftigkeit, der dem irgend eines Kampfes im Verlauf des ganzen Krieges völlig gleichkam.

Gleichzeitig wurde von deutscher und von englischer Seite angegriffen; auf beiden Seiten wurde mit hartnäckiger Entschlossenheit gekämpft, aber

die Engländer trugen den Sieg davon

Sie schlugen den deutschen Angriff zurück, machten viele Gefangene, und töteten, dank der Art und Weise, in der die deutschen Truppen unter mörderischem Maschinengewehrfeuer vorwärts getrieben wurden, eine ungeheure Anzahl.

Der englische Angriff gelang. Die deutsche Linie wurde näher an St. Quentin zurückgedrängt.

Zehn tausend Gefangene

wurden gemacht und eine Anzahl von Geschützen erbeutet. Die Außenwerke der Siegfriedlinie sind in englischem Besitz, trotz der entschlossenen und mutigen Anstrengungen der deutschen Truppen sie zu halten. Die letzteren zogen nicht „planmäßig“ zurück, sondern weil sie im offenen, ehrlichen Kampfe den

Kürzeren gezogen hatten.

Die Operationen der Entente Streitkräfte haben keineswegs ihren Abschluß gefunden, wie von militärischen Schriftstellern vor acht Tagen in den deutschen Zeitungen berichtet wurde. Die deutschen Streitkräfte haben nicht standhalten können. Die Franzosen bedrohen Laon und den Chemin des Dames und drängen täglich in diesen Bezirken die Deutschen weiter zurück.

Auf der Balkanfront sind

die Bulgaren vollständig geschlagen

und ziehen sich immer noch zurück. Die französischen und serbischen Truppen sind 20 Kilometer vorgedrungen. Viele Tausende von Bulgaren haben sich ergeben. Die Schuld für die unheilsvolle Lage, in der Bulgarien sich befindet, schreiben die Gefangenen Deutschland zu.

Der österreichische Vorschlag eine geheime Konferenz unter Vertretern der kriegsführenden Nationen abzuhalten, um

die Möglichkeit des Friedens

zu diskutieren, ist von den Vertretern der Arbeiter- und Sozialistenparteien, versammelt bei der Londoner Konferenz, als mehr von der Angst die Monarchie zu stärken inspiriert als durch einen Wunsch wirksam zur Beilegung des Weltkrieges beizutragen, bezeichnet worden.

Keine Stimme erhob sich zu Gunsten der Annahme des österreichischen Vorschlags.

even at the German Headquarters, if we accept the evidence in the German White Paper. On October 28, 1918, General Gallwitz informed a German Government Council that the moral of the German soldiery was bad. A correspondent of *The Times* wrote in its issue of October 31, 1919:

It is quite certain in view of this evidence from the most important German leaders that the British enemy propaganda hit the German Armies very hard, and that, even if we heavily discount Ludendorff's statements, it greatly accelerated the Allies' victory. That was certain in any case, but the best soldiers in the summer of 1918 thought that it could not be gained before August, 1919. Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the saving of thousands of millions of money, and probably of at least a million lives.

While this intensive leaflet warfare was being waged a no less vigorous campaign was in operation against all three countries through non-military channels. New means of introducing specially selected literature into enemy countries were constantly being devised, and, despite increasing vigilance, evidence regularly reached Crewe House of the effectiveness of the work.

Articles were inserted in neutral newspapers known as being read in German newspaper offices. These were often quoted in enemy publications, as were a cleverly written series of pseudo pro-German "London Letters," which, for instance, purported to reveal the seriousness of the food position in England, but in reality would lead the German reader to institute comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany. Articles were actually sent through neutral sources to enemy newspapers and published. Much assistance was rendered by some of our leading statesmen who gave interviews for publication in neutral countries on topics interesting to Germans. These, too, were much quoted in the enemy Press.

No opportunity was lost of endeavouring to influence neutrals prominent in all walks of life who came into contact with enemy opinion, and enemy subjects living in neutral countries received attention from agents of Crewe House.

Much valuable educative work among German prisoners of war in England was accomplished by the late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P., assisted by a sub-committee, in arranging for the distribution of books, pamphlets and newspapers to the camps. Such works as Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum on the causes of the war, and *Gerade weil ich Deutscher*

bin, were found effective, and journals such as the *Arbeiter Zeitung* of Vienna helped to set before German prisoners the real state of affairs in their country and in Austria.

Special difficulties had to be overcome before the work against Bulgaria could be vigorously prosecuted. After much patient preliminary spadework the policy to be adopted was defined, and approved by the Foreign Office. Emphasis was laid upon the need for an Allied decision in favour of Southern Slav, Rumanian and Greek unity as a preliminary to any arrangement with Bulgaria and the need for consulting the Serbian and Greek Governments before negotiating with Bulgaria. It suggested as pre-

Magyar Katonák!

Kiért harcoltok ti!
Ausztria császáriért és Magyarország királyjéért!
Vagy pedig a németek császárijéért?
Ti csakis a németek császárijéért harcoltok. Ausztria császára, Atengedte neki a hadsereget és államának a kincstárát luszonói évre egy rendes szerződéssel melynek tartalmát előttek elitkolták.
A ti újságaitok is hirdették a "Waffenbund" 04. melyre 1918 május 12-én kötöttek a ti új gazdátok és a ti régi gazdátok között.

De ti magyarok ahánnek ősei amnyit vért adoztak mert szabadok akartak lenni, ti nem tudjátok az igazságot.

Ime lássátok milyen maguk a németek szerint.

A "Frankfurter Zeitung" május 13-án így szól: Kell hogy az új szerződés véglegesen megpecsételje Ausztriának mint független államnak az eltűnését és Németország részéről a Habsburg monarchiának a birtokbavételét.

Es a Deutsche Zeitung május 19-én megjegyzi: "Közép-európa szövetségének főképpen terére van szüksége és pedig sokkal többre mint a mennyire a háború kitörésekor volt. Ausztria-Magyarország nem volt elegendő elkészítve. A Waffenbund szerint Ausztria-Magyarországnak épp oly mértékben kell fegyverkeznie lakosainak arányában mint Németországnak. Nem szabad többé hogy előforduljon hogy ha a delegációk megszavazhatják rendkívüli hiteleket katonai célokra, hogy aztán hosszú idek muljanak el mielőtt az országot folyósítják mert vagy az osztják vagy a magyar pénzügyminiszter kijelenti hogy nincs pénze; vagy pedig hogy a delegációk megszavazzák az agyúkat, de a magyar parlament megtagadja a reálituk szükséges számarányát úgy hogy aztán meg vannak az új agyúk de hiányzik a kezelésükre szükséges katonák."

Még világos? Kérdeni a németek önök háborújéért mellyel uralkodni akartak az egész világon. Harcolni meg öveleg magyar vért önteni a németek üstöslétére meg éveleg és eueleg.

Természetesen a "Neue Freie Presse" ujjong és hirdeti (május 14-én) hogy az új szövetség "különösen Ausztria németeknek a győzelméne."

MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.

liminary conditions to the establishment of friendly relations with Bulgaria:

(a) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;

(b) A complete rupture with Germany;

(c) Establishment of a democratic government;

(d) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a Balkan Confederation under the ægis of the Allied Powers and of the United States.

Contact with Bulgaria was mainly established through Switzerland, and a constantly increasing pressure was brought to bear. Elaborate

preparations for the publication and distribution of a Bulgarian newspaper had just been made when Bulgaria collapsed, and further propaganda became unnecessary.

As these multifarious activities came into full operation it became evident that added effectiveness would result if they were co-ordinated with those of Allied and Associated Powers who were already cooperating to some extent. With this object in view Lord Northcliffe, with the assent of the British Government, sent invitations to the French, Italian and United States Governments to appoint delegates to an Inter-Ally Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. These invitations were cordially accepted, and the Conference was held on August 14, 15 and 16, 1918. The whole field of work was surveyed, and fruitful discussions of policies, methods of production, and distribution of propaganda material took place. It was resolved to create an Inter-Allied body for enemy propaganda. To maintain close contact with the French propaganda department, Colonel the Earl of Onslow, who had previously organized the distribution work at General Headquarters, became the department's representative in Paris.

As time went on it became clear that the Allied military pressure and the weakening of the German troops' *moral*, through defeat and propaganda effort, was the beginning of the end. Lord Northcliffe's Committee came to the conclusion that a policy of peace propaganda should be quickly formulated for use not only in enemy countries but also to explain to Allies and neutrals the general principles underlying British peace aims. It seemed, however, desirable that this basis of policy should not be the work of Crewe House alone, as the earlier documents were, but ought to be discussed by representatives of all departments in any way concerned with propaganda work. Invitations were, therefore, addressed to :

The War Cabinet.
The Admiralty.
The War Office.
The Foreign Office.
The Treasury.
The Air Ministry.
The Colonial Office.
The India Office.
The Ministry of Information.
The War Aims Committee.
The Overseas Bureau.

Each was asked to appoint a representative to attend the meetings of a Policy Committee.

This Committee met for the first time on October 4, Sir Campbell Stuart taking the chair in the absence, through illness, of Lord Northcliffe. At this and subsequent meetings a memorandum embodying the basic principles of a just and lasting peace was discussed and agreed upon as a policy for common use. Soon afterwards the armistices were signed and the Policy Committee was dissolved.



[Russell.]

THE LATE SIR CHAS. NICHOLSON,
Member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee.

On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe resigned his post. The following is the text of the letters which passed between him and the Prime Minister :

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves necessitates the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to render the very

best possible services to the Government and to the country.

Believe me, dear Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely,

NORTHCLIFFE.

In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day :

MY DEAR NORTHCLIFFE,

I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by recent events.

In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied cause while holding this important post. I have had many direct evidences of the success of your invaluable work and of the extent to

which it has contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria and Germany.

I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the Mission, will remain in office as Acting Chairman of the Mission until December 31, 1918, in order to wind up its activities.

Ever sincerely,

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

Sir Campbell Stuart agreed to act as chairman until December 31, 1918, by which date the business of the Department was wound up.

If an epitaph of the Department is required, it was provided by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, which said: "Unfortunately, we cannot deny that Lord Northcliffe attained all his aims, and he can leave the political arena in triumph."



